Commit c7871920 authored by Jarkko Sakkinen's avatar Jarkko Sakkinen Committed by James Morris

KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM

Allow trusted.ko to initialize w/o a TPM. This commit also adds checks
to the exported functions to fail when a TPM is not available.

Fixes: 24073043 ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure...")
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Reported-by: default avatarDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Tested-by: default avatarDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
parent 71106292
...@@ -135,6 +135,9 @@ int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, ...@@ -135,6 +135,9 @@ int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
int ret; int ret;
va_list argp; va_list argp;
if (!chip)
return -ENODEV;
sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
...@@ -196,6 +199,9 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, ...@@ -196,6 +199,9 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
va_list argp; va_list argp;
int ret; int ret;
if (!chip)
return -ENODEV;
bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET); bufsize = LOAD32(buffer, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0); tag = LOAD16(buffer, 0);
ordinal = command; ordinal = command;
...@@ -363,6 +369,9 @@ int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen) ...@@ -363,6 +369,9 @@ int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
{ {
int rc; int rc;
if (!chip)
return -ENODEV;
dump_tpm_buf(cmd); dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
rc = tpm_send(chip, cmd, buflen); rc = tpm_send(chip, cmd, buflen);
dump_tpm_buf(cmd); dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
...@@ -429,6 +438,9 @@ int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce) ...@@ -429,6 +438,9 @@ int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
{ {
int ret; int ret;
if (!chip)
return -ENODEV;
INIT_BUF(tb); INIT_BUF(tb);
store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE); store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE);
...@@ -1245,9 +1257,13 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void) ...@@ -1245,9 +1257,13 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void)
{ {
int ret; int ret;
/* encrypted_keys.ko depends on successful load of this module even if
* TPM is not used.
*/
chip = tpm_default_chip(); chip = tpm_default_chip();
if (!chip) if (!chip)
return -ENOENT; return 0;
ret = init_digests(); ret = init_digests();
if (ret < 0) if (ret < 0)
goto err_put; goto err_put;
...@@ -1269,10 +1285,12 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void) ...@@ -1269,10 +1285,12 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void)
static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void) static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
{ {
put_device(&chip->dev); if (chip) {
kfree(digests); put_device(&chip->dev);
trusted_shash_release(); kfree(digests);
unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); trusted_shash_release();
unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
}
} }
late_initcall(init_trusted); late_initcall(init_trusted);
......
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