Commit de5372da authored by Gustavo A. R. Silva's avatar Gustavo A. R. Silva Committed by Zhenyu Wang

drm/i915/kvmgt: Fix potential Spectre v1

info.index can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading
to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/kvmgt.c:1232 intel_vgpu_ioctl() warn:
potential spectre issue 'vgpu->vdev.region' [r]

Fix this by sanitizing info.index before indirectly using it to index
vgpu->vdev.region

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: default avatarGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarZhenyu Wang <zhenyuw@linux.intel.com>
parent 8d458ea0
......@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@
#include <linux/mdev.h>
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include "i915_drv.h"
#include "gvt.h"
......@@ -1139,7 +1141,8 @@ static long intel_vgpu_ioctl(struct mdev_device *mdev, unsigned int cmd,
} else if (cmd == VFIO_DEVICE_GET_REGION_INFO) {
struct vfio_region_info info;
struct vfio_info_cap caps = { .buf = NULL, .size = 0 };
int i, ret;
unsigned int i;
int ret;
struct vfio_region_info_cap_sparse_mmap *sparse = NULL;
size_t size;
int nr_areas = 1;
......@@ -1224,6 +1227,10 @@ static long intel_vgpu_ioctl(struct mdev_device *mdev, unsigned int cmd,
if (info.index >= VFIO_PCI_NUM_REGIONS +
vgpu->vdev.num_regions)
return -EINVAL;
info.index =
array_index_nospec(info.index,
VFIO_PCI_NUM_REGIONS +
vgpu->vdev.num_regions);
i = info.index - VFIO_PCI_NUM_REGIONS;
......
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