drm/exynos: g2d: prevent integer overflow in
The size computations done in the ioctl function use an integer. If userspace submits a request with req->cmd_nr or req->cmd_buf_nr set to INT_MAX, the integer computations overflow later, leading to potential (kernel) memory corruption. Prevent this issue by enforcing a limit on the number of submitted commands, so that we have enough headroom later for the size computations. Note that this change has no impact on the currently available users in userspace, like e.g. libdrm/exynos. While at it, also make a comment about the size computation more detailed. Signed-off-by: Joonyoung Shim <jy0922.shim@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Tobias Jakobi <tjakobi@math.uni-bielefeld.de> Signed-off-by: Inki Dae <inki.dae@samsung.com>
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