1. 17 Jun, 2014 6 commits
    • Thomas Petazzoni's avatar
      memory: mvebu-devbus: fix the conversion of the bus width · 03ad5dd8
      Thomas Petazzoni authored
      commit ce965c3d upstream.
      
      According to the Armada 370 and Armada XP datasheets, the part of the
      Device Bus register that configure the bus width should contain 0 for
      a 8 bits bus width, and 1 for a 16 bits bus width (other values are
      unsupported/reserved).
      
      However, the current conversion done in the driver to convert from a
      bus width in bits to the value expected by the register leads to
      setting the register to 1 for a 8 bits bus, and 2 for a 16 bits bus.
      
      This mistake was compensated by a mistake in the existing Device Tree
      files for Armada 370/XP platforms: they were declaring a 8 bits bus
      width, while the hardware in fact uses a 16 bits bus width.
      
      This commit fixes that by adjusting the conversion logic.
      
      This patch fixes a bug that was introduced in
      3edad321 ('drivers: memory: Introduce
      Marvell EBU Device Bus driver'), which was merged in v3.11.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1397489361-5833-2-git-send-email-thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com
      Fixes: 3edad321 ('drivers: memory: Introduce Marvell EBU Device Bus driver')
      Acked-by: default avatarEzequiel Garcia <ezequiel.garcia@free-electrons.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarGregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@free-electrons.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      03ad5dd8
    • Antti Palosaari's avatar
      [media] fc2580: fix tuning failure on 32-bit arch · b40eb04d
      Antti Palosaari authored
      commit 8845cc64 upstream.
      
      There was some frequency calculation overflows which caused tuning
      failure on 32-bit architecture. Use 64-bit numbers where needed in
      order to avoid calculation overflows.
      
      Thanks for the Finnish person, who asked remain anonymous, reporting,
      testing and suggesting the fix.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAntti Palosaari <crope@iki.fi>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMauro Carvalho Chehab <m.chehab@samsung.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      b40eb04d
    • Daeseok Youn's avatar
      workqueue: fix bugs in wq_update_unbound_numa() failure path · 47f445e1
      Daeseok Youn authored
      commit 77f300b1 upstream.
      
      wq_update_unbound_numa() failure path has the following two bugs.
      
      - alloc_unbound_pwq() is called without holding wq->mutex; however, if
        the allocation fails, it jumps to out_unlock which tries to unlock
        wq->mutex.
      
      - The function should switch to dfl_pwq on failure but didn't do so
        after alloc_unbound_pwq() failure.
      
      Fix it by regrabbing wq->mutex and jumping to use_dfl_pwq on
      alloc_unbound_pwq() failure.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDaeseok Youn <daeseok.youn@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarLai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
      Fixes: 4c16bd32 ("workqueue: implement NUMA affinity for unbound workqueues")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      47f445e1
    • Jianyu Zhan's avatar
      percpu: make pcpu_alloc_chunk() use pcpu_mem_free() instead of kfree() · ed0781a6
      Jianyu Zhan authored
      commit 5a838c3b upstream.
      
      pcpu_chunk_struct_size = sizeof(struct pcpu_chunk) +
      	BITS_TO_LONGS(pcpu_unit_pages) * sizeof(unsigned long)
      
      It hardly could be ever bigger than PAGE_SIZE even for large-scale machine,
      but for consistency with its couterpart pcpu_mem_zalloc(),
      use pcpu_mem_free() instead.
      
      Commit b4916cb1 ("percpu: make pcpu_free_chunk() use
      pcpu_mem_free() instead of kfree()") addressed this problem, but
      missed this one.
      
      tj: commit message updated
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJianyu Zhan <nasa4836@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
      Fixes: 099a19d9 ("percpu: allow limited allocation before slab is online)
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      ed0781a6
    • Mimi Zohar's avatar
      ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag · 46a91e71
      Mimi Zohar authored
      commit f9b2a735 upstream.
      
      Files are measured or appraised based on the IMA policy.  When a
      file, in policy, is opened with the O_DIRECT flag, a deadlock
      occurs.
      
      The first attempt at resolving this lockdep temporarily removed the
      O_DIRECT flag and restored it, after calculating the hash.  The
      second attempt introduced the O_DIRECT_HAVELOCK flag. Based on this
      flag, do_blockdev_direct_IO() would skip taking the i_mutex a second
      time.  The third attempt, by Dmitry Kasatkin, resolves the i_mutex
      locking issue, by re-introducing the IMA mutex, but uncovered
      another problem.  Reading a file with O_DIRECT flag set, writes
      directly to userspace pages.  A second patch allocates a user-space
      like memory.  This works for all IMA hooks, except ima_file_free(),
      which is called on __fput() to recalculate the file hash.
      
      Until this last issue is addressed, do not 'collect' the
      measurement for measuring, appraising, or auditing files opened
      with the O_DIRECT flag set.  Based on policy, permit or deny file
      access.  This patch defines a new IMA policy rule option named
      'permit_directio'.  Policy rules could be defined, based on LSM
      or other criteria, to permit specific applications to open files
      with the O_DIRECT flag set.
      
      Changelog v1:
      - permit or deny file access based IMA policy rules
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarDmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
      Cc: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      46a91e71
    • Dmitry Kasatkin's avatar
      ima: introduce ima_kernel_read() · 9c71c8f7
      Dmitry Kasatkin authored
      commit 0430e49b upstream.
      
      Commit 8aac6270 "move exit_task_namespaces() outside of exit_notify"
      introduced the kernel opps since the kernel v3.10, which happens when
      Apparmor and IMA-appraisal are enabled at the same time.
      
      ----------------------------------------------------------------------
      [  106.750167] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
      0000000000000018
      [  106.750221] IP: [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
      [  106.750241] PGD 0
      [  106.750254] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
      [  106.750272] Modules linked in: cuse parport_pc ppdev bnep rfcomm
      bluetooth rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl nfs lockd sunrpc
      fscache dm_crypt intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp
      kvm_intel snd_hda_codec_hdmi kvm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul
      ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 glue_helper lrw gf128mul
      ablk_helper cryptd snd_hda_codec_realtek dcdbas snd_hda_intel
      snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_page_alloc snd_seq_midi
      snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi psmouse snd_seq microcode serio_raw
      snd_timer snd_seq_device snd soundcore video lpc_ich coretemp mac_hid lp
      parport mei_me mei nbd hid_generic e1000e usbhid ahci ptp hid libahci
      pps_core
      [  106.750658] CPU: 6 PID: 1394 Comm: mysqld Not tainted 3.13.0-rc7-kds+ #15
      [  106.750673] Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 9010/0M9KCM, BIOS A08
      09/19/2012
      [  106.750689] task: ffff8800de804920 ti: ffff880400fca000 task.ti:
      ffff880400fca000
      [  106.750704] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811ec7da>]  [<ffffffff811ec7da>]
      our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
      [  106.750725] RSP: 0018:ffff880400fcba60  EFLAGS: 00010286
      [  106.750738] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000100 RCX:
      ffff8800d51523e7
      [  106.750764] RDX: ffffffffffffffea RSI: ffff880400fcba34 RDI:
      ffff880402d20020
      [  106.750791] RBP: ffff880400fcbae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09:
      0000000000000001
      [  106.750817] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12:
      ffff8800d5152300
      [  106.750844] R13: ffff8803eb8df510 R14: ffff880400fcbb28 R15:
      ffff8800d51523e7
      [  106.750871] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88040d200000(0000)
      knlGS:0000000000000000
      [  106.750910] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
      [  106.750935] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000001c0e000 CR4:
      00000000001407e0
      [  106.750962] Stack:
      [  106.750981]  ffffffff813434eb ffff880400fcbb20 ffff880400fcbb18
      0000000000000000
      [  106.751037]  ffff8800de804920 ffffffff8101b9b9 0001800000000000
      0000000000000100
      [  106.751093]  0000010000000000 0000000000000002 000000000000000e
      ffff8803eb8df500
      [  106.751149] Call Trace:
      [  106.751172]  [<ffffffff813434eb>] ? aa_path_name+0x2ab/0x430
      [  106.751199]  [<ffffffff8101b9b9>] ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
      [  106.751225]  [<ffffffff8134a68d>] aa_path_perm+0x7d/0x170
      [  106.751250]  [<ffffffff8101b945>] ? native_sched_clock+0x15/0x80
      [  106.751276]  [<ffffffff8134aa73>] aa_file_perm+0x33/0x40
      [  106.751301]  [<ffffffff81348c5e>] common_file_perm+0x8e/0xb0
      [  106.751327]  [<ffffffff81348d78>] apparmor_file_permission+0x18/0x20
      [  106.751355]  [<ffffffff8130c853>] security_file_permission+0x23/0xa0
      [  106.751382]  [<ffffffff811c77a2>] rw_verify_area+0x52/0xe0
      [  106.751407]  [<ffffffff811c789d>] vfs_read+0x6d/0x170
      [  106.751432]  [<ffffffff811cda31>] kernel_read+0x41/0x60
      [  106.751457]  [<ffffffff8134fd45>] ima_calc_file_hash+0x225/0x280
      [  106.751483]  [<ffffffff8134fb52>] ? ima_calc_file_hash+0x32/0x280
      [  106.751509]  [<ffffffff8135022d>] ima_collect_measurement+0x9d/0x160
      [  106.751536]  [<ffffffff810b552d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
      [  106.751562]  [<ffffffff8134f07c>] ? ima_file_free+0x6c/0xd0
      [  106.751587]  [<ffffffff81352824>] ima_update_xattr+0x34/0x60
      [  106.751612]  [<ffffffff8134f0d0>] ima_file_free+0xc0/0xd0
      [  106.751637]  [<ffffffff811c9635>] __fput+0xd5/0x300
      [  106.751662]  [<ffffffff811c98ae>] ____fput+0xe/0x10
      [  106.751687]  [<ffffffff81086774>] task_work_run+0xc4/0xe0
      [  106.751712]  [<ffffffff81066fad>] do_exit+0x2bd/0xa90
      [  106.751738]  [<ffffffff8173c958>] ? retint_swapgs+0x13/0x1b
      [  106.751763]  [<ffffffff8106780c>] do_group_exit+0x4c/0xc0
      [  106.751788]  [<ffffffff81067894>] SyS_exit_group+0x14/0x20
      [  106.751814]  [<ffffffff8174522d>] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f
      [  106.751839] Code: c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 e8 22 fe ff ff 5d c3
      0f 1f 44 00 00 55 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 c9 00 00 48 8b 80 28 06 00 00 48 89
      e5 5d <48> 8b 40 18 48 39 87 c0 00 00 00 0f 94 c0 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00
      [  106.752185] RIP  [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
      [  106.752214]  RSP <ffff880400fcba60>
      [  106.752236] CR2: 0000000000000018
      [  106.752258] ---[ end trace 3c520748b4732721 ]---
      ----------------------------------------------------------------------
      
      The reason for the oops is that IMA-appraisal uses "kernel_read()" when
      file is closed. kernel_read() honors LSM security hook which calls
      Apparmor handler, which uses current->nsproxy->mnt_ns. The 'guilty'
      commit changed the order of cleanup code so that nsproxy->mnt_ns was
      not already available for Apparmor.
      
      Discussion about the issue with Al Viro and Eric W. Biederman suggested
      that kernel_read() is too high-level for IMA. Another issue, except
      security checking, that was identified is mandatory locking. kernel_read
      honors it as well and it might prevent IMA from calculating necessary hash.
      It was suggested to use simplified version of the function without security
      and locking checks.
      
      This patch introduces special version ima_kernel_read(), which skips security
      and mandatory locking checking. It prevents the kernel oops to happen.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
      Suggested-by: default avatarEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Cc: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      9c71c8f7
  2. 13 Jun, 2014 34 commits