1. 25 Jul, 2014 2 commits
  2. 24 Jul, 2014 1 commit
  3. 23 Jul, 2014 4 commits
    • Wei Yongjun's avatar
      hyperv: Fix error return code in netvsc_init_buf() · dd1d3f8f
      Wei Yongjun authored
      Fix to return -ENOMEM from the kalloc error handling
      case instead of 0.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarWei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarHaiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      dd1d3f8f
    • Wei Yongjun's avatar
      amd-xgbe: Fix error return code in xgbe_probe() · 332cfc82
      Wei Yongjun authored
      Fix to return a negative error code from the setting real tx queue
      count error handling case instead of 0.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarWei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn>
      Acked-by: default avatarTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      332cfc82
    • Florian Fainelli's avatar
      net: bcmgenet: correctly pad short packets · 474ea9ca
      Florian Fainelli authored
      Packets shorter than ETH_ZLEN were not padded with zeroes, hence leaking
      potentially sensitive information. This bug has been present since the
      driver got accepted in commit 1c1008c7
      ("net: bcmgenet: add main driver file").
      Signed-off-by: default avatarFlorian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      474ea9ca
    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions · 1be9a950
      Daniel Borkmann authored
      Jason reported an oops caused by SCTP on his ARM machine with
      SCTP authentication enabled:
      
      Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] ARM
      CPU: 0 PID: 104 Comm: sctp-test Not tainted 3.13.0-68744-g3632f30c9b20-dirty #1
      task: c6eefa40 ti: c6f52000 task.ti: c6f52000
      PC is at sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0xc4/0x10c
      LR is at sg_init_table+0x20/0x38
      pc : [<c024bb80>]    lr : [<c00f32dc>]    psr: 40000013
      sp : c6f538e8  ip : 00000000  fp : c6f53924
      r10: c6f50d80  r9 : 00000000  r8 : 00010000
      r7 : 00000000  r6 : c7be4000  r5 : 00000000  r4 : c6f56254
      r3 : c00c8170  r2 : 00000001  r1 : 00000008  r0 : c6f1e660
      Flags: nZcv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment user
      Control: 0005397f  Table: 06f28000  DAC: 00000015
      Process sctp-test (pid: 104, stack limit = 0xc6f521c0)
      Stack: (0xc6f538e8 to 0xc6f54000)
      [...]
      Backtrace:
      [<c024babc>] (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0249af8>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x33c/0x5c8)
      [<c02497bc>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x0/0x5c8) from [<c023e96c>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x7fc/0x844)
      [<c023e170>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x0/0x844) from [<c023ef78>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x24/0x28)
      [<c023ef54>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x0/0x28) from [<c0234364>] (sctp_side_effects+0x1134/0x1220)
      [<c0233230>] (sctp_side_effects+0x0/0x1220) from [<c02330b0>] (sctp_do_sm+0xac/0xd4)
      [<c0233004>] (sctp_do_sm+0x0/0xd4) from [<c023675c>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x118/0x160)
      [<c0236644>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x0/0x160) from [<c023d5bc>] (sctp_inq_push+0x6c/0x74)
      [<c023d550>] (sctp_inq_push+0x0/0x74) from [<c024a6b0>] (sctp_rcv+0x7d8/0x888)
      
      While we already had various kind of bugs in that area
      ec0223ec ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if
      we/peer is AUTH capable") and b14878cc ("net: sctp: cache
      auth_enable per endpoint"), this one is a bit of a different
      kind.
      
      Giving a bit more background on why SCTP authentication is
      needed can be found in RFC4895:
      
        SCTP uses 32-bit verification tags to protect itself against
        blind attackers. These values are not changed during the
        lifetime of an SCTP association.
      
        Looking at new SCTP extensions, there is the need to have a
        method of proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by
        the original peer that started the association and not by a
        malicious attacker.
      
      To cause this bug, we're triggering an INIT collision between
      peers; normal SCTP handshake where both sides intent to
      authenticate packets contains RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO
      parameters that are being negotiated among peers:
      
        ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
        <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
        -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
        <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
      
      RFC4895 says that each endpoint therefore knows its own random
      number and the peer's random number *after* the association
      has been established. The local and peer's random number along
      with the shared key are then part of the secret used for
      calculating the HMAC in the AUTH chunk.
      
      Now, in our scenario, we have 2 threads with 1 non-blocking
      SEQ_PACKET socket each, setting up common shared SCTP_AUTH_KEY
      and SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY properly, and each of them calling
      sctp_bindx(3), listen(2) and connect(2) against each other,
      thus the handshake looks similar to this, e.g.:
      
        ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
        <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
        <--------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -----------
        -------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -------->
        ...
      
      Since such collisions can also happen with verification tags,
      the RFC4895 for AUTH rather vaguely says under section 6.1:
      
        In case of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling
        of this Random Number follow the same pattern as those for
        the Verification Tag, as explained in Section 5.2.4 of
        RFC 2960 [5]. Therefore, each endpoint knows its own Random
        Number and the peer's Random Number after the association
        has been established.
      
      In RFC2960, section 5.2.4, we're eventually hitting Action B:
      
        B) In this case, both sides may be attempting to start an
           association at about the same time but the peer endpoint
           started its INIT after responding to the local endpoint's
           INIT. Thus it may have picked a new Verification Tag not
           being aware of the previous Tag it had sent this endpoint.
           The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED
           state but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from
           the State Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may
           running and send a COOKIE ACK.
      
      In other words, the handling of the Random parameter is the
      same as behavior for the Verification Tag as described in
      Action B of section 5.2.4.
      
      Looking at the code, we exactly hit the sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b()
      case which triggers an SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC command to the
      side effect interpreter, and in fact it properly copies over
      peer_{random, hmacs, chunks} parameters from the newly created
      association to update the existing one.
      
      Also, the old asoc_shared_key is being released and based on
      the new params, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() updated.
      However, the issue observed in this case is that the previous
      asoc->peer.auth_capable was 0, and has *not* been updated, so
      that instead of creating a new secret, we're doing an early
      return from the function sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key()
      leaving asoc->asoc_shared_key as NULL. However, we now have to
      authenticate chunks from the updated chunk list (e.g. COOKIE-ACK).
      
      That in fact causes the server side when responding with ...
      
        <------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ACK -----------------
      
      ... to trigger a NULL pointer dereference, since in
      sctp_packet_transmit(), it discovers that an AUTH chunk is
      being queued for xmit, and thus it calls sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
      
      Since the asoc->active_key_id is still inherited from the
      endpoint, and the same as encoded into the chunk, it uses
      asoc->asoc_shared_key, which is still NULL, as an asoc_key
      and dereferences it in ...
      
        crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, &asoc_key->data[0], asoc_key->len)
      
      ... causing an oops. All this happens because sctp_make_cookie_ack()
      called with the *new* association has the peer.auth_capable=1
      and therefore marks the chunk with auth=1 after checking
      sctp_auth_send_cid(), but it is *actually* sent later on over
      the then *updated* association's transport that didn't initialize
      its shared key due to peer.auth_capable=0. Since control chunks
      in that case are not sent by the temporary association which
      are scheduled for deletion, they are issued for xmit via
      SCTP_CMD_REPLY in the interpreter with the context of the
      *updated* association. peer.auth_capable was 0 in the updated
      association (which went from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED state),
      since all previous processing that performed sctp_process_init()
      was being done on temporary associations, that we eventually
      throw away each time.
      
      The correct fix is to update to the new peer.auth_capable
      value as well in the collision case via sctp_assoc_update(),
      so that in case the collision migrated from 0 -> 1,
      sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() can properly recalculate
      the secret. This therefore fixes the observed server panic.
      
      Fixes: 730fc3d0 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
      Reported-by: default avatarJason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
      Tested-by: default avatarJason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
      Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      1be9a950
  4. 22 Jul, 2014 7 commits
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net · 15ba2236
      Linus Torvalds authored
      Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
      
       1) Null termination fix in dns_resolver got the pointer dereferncing
          wrong, fix from Ben Hutchings.
      
       2) ip_options_compile() has a benign but real buffer overflow when
          parsing options.  From Eric Dumazet.
      
       3) Table updates can crash in netfilter's nftables if none of the state
          flags indicate an actual change, from Pablo Neira Ayuso.
      
       4) Fix race in nf_tables dumping, also from Pablo.
      
       5) GRE-GRO support broke the forwarding path because the segmentation
          state was not fully initialized in these paths, from Jerry Chu.
      
       6) sunvnet driver leaks objects and potentially crashes on module
          unload, from Sowmini Varadhan.
      
       7) We can accidently generate the same handle for several u32
          classifier filters, fix from Cong Wang.
      
       8) Several edge case bug fixes in fragment handling in xen-netback,
          from Zoltan Kiss.
      
      * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (21 commits)
        ipv4: fix buffer overflow in ip_options_compile()
        batman-adv: fix TT VLAN inconsistency on VLAN re-add
        batman-adv: drop QinQ claim frames in bridge loop avoidance
        dns_resolver: Null-terminate the right string
        xen-netback: Fix pointer incrementation to avoid incorrect logging
        xen-netback: Fix releasing header slot on error path
        xen-netback: Fix releasing frag_list skbs in error path
        xen-netback: Fix handling frag_list on grant op error path
        net_sched: avoid generating same handle for u32 filters
        net: huawei_cdc_ncm: add "subclass 3" devices
        net: qmi_wwan: add two Sierra Wireless/Netgear devices
        wan/x25_asy: integer overflow in x25_asy_change_mtu()
        net: ppp: fix creating PPP pass and active filters
        net/mlx4_en: cq->irq_desc wasn't set in legacy EQ's
        sunvnet: clean up objects created in vnet_new() on vnet_exit()
        r8169: Enable RX_MULTI_EN for RTL_GIGA_MAC_VER_40
        net-gre-gro: Fix a bug that breaks the forwarding path
        netfilter: nf_tables: 64bit stats need some extra synchronization
        netfilter: nf_tables: set NLM_F_DUMP_INTR if netlink dumping is stale
        netfilter: nf_tables: safe RCU iteration on list when dumping
        ...
      15ba2236
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/sparc · 89faa06e
      Linus Torvalds authored
      Pull sparc fix from David Miller:
       "Need to hook up the new renameat2 system call"
      
      * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/sparc:
        sparc: Hook up renameat2 syscall.
      89faa06e
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/ide · 14867719
      Linus Torvalds authored
      Pull IDE fixes from David Miller:
       - fix interrupt registry for some Atari IDE chipsets.
       - adjust Kconfig dependencies for x86_32 specific chips.
      
      * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/ide:
        ide: Fix SC1200 dependencies
        ide: Fix CS5520 and CS5530 dependencies
        m68k/atari - ide: do not register interrupt if host->get_lock is set
      14867719
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge tag 'trace-fixes-v3.16-rc6' of... · 8dcc3be2
      Linus Torvalds authored
      Merge tag 'trace-fixes-v3.16-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
      
      Pull trace fix from Steven Rostedt:
       "Tony Luck found that using the "uptime" trace clock that uses jiffies
        as a counter was converted to nanoseconds (silly), and after 1 hour 11
        minutes and 34 seconds, this monotonic clock would wrap, causing havoc
        with the tracing system and making the clock useless.
      
        He converted that clock to use jiffies_64 and made it into a counter
        instead of nanosecond conversions, and displayed the clock with the
        straight jiffy count, which works much better than it did in the past"
      
      * tag 'trace-fixes-v3.16-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
        tracing: Fix wraparound problems in "uptime" trace clock
      8dcc3be2
    • David S. Miller's avatar
      sparc: Hook up renameat2 syscall. · 26053926
      David S. Miller authored
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      26053926
    • David S. Miller's avatar
      Merge tag 'batman-adv-fix-for-davem' of git://git.open-mesh.org/linux-merge · 850717ef
      David S. Miller authored
      Antonio Quartulli says:
      
      ====================
      pull request [net]: batman-adv 20140721
      
      here you have two fixes that we have been testing for quite some time
      (this is why they arrived a bit late in the rc cycle).
      
      Patch 1) ensures that BLA packets get dropped and not forwarded to the
      mesh even if they reach batman-adv within QinQ frames. Forwarding them
      into the mesh means messing up with the TT database of other nodes which
      can generate all kind of unexpected behaviours during route computation.
      
      Patch 2) avoids a couple of race conditions triggered upon fast VLAN
      deletion-addition. Such race conditions are pretty dangerous because
      they not only create inconsistencies in the TT database of the nodes
      in the network, but such scenario is also unrecoverable (unless
      nodes are rebooted).
      ====================
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      850717ef
    • Eric Dumazet's avatar
      ipv4: fix buffer overflow in ip_options_compile() · 10ec9472
      Eric Dumazet authored
      There is a benign buffer overflow in ip_options_compile spotted by
      AddressSanitizer[1] :
      
      Its benign because we always can access one extra byte in skb->head
      (because header is followed by struct skb_shared_info), and in this case
      this byte is not even used.
      
      [28504.910798] ==================================================================
      [28504.912046] AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow in ip_options_compile
      [28504.913170] Read of size 1 by thread T15843:
      [28504.914026]  [<ffffffff81802f91>] ip_options_compile+0x121/0x9c0
      [28504.915394]  [<ffffffff81804a0d>] ip_options_get_from_user+0xad/0x120
      [28504.916843]  [<ffffffff8180dedf>] do_ip_setsockopt.isra.15+0x8df/0x1630
      [28504.918175]  [<ffffffff8180ec60>] ip_setsockopt+0x30/0xa0
      [28504.919490]  [<ffffffff8181e59b>] tcp_setsockopt+0x5b/0x90
      [28504.920835]  [<ffffffff8177462f>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x5f/0x70
      [28504.922208]  [<ffffffff817729c2>] SyS_setsockopt+0xa2/0x140
      [28504.923459]  [<ffffffff818cfb69>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
      [28504.924722]
      [28504.925106] Allocated by thread T15843:
      [28504.925815]  [<ffffffff81804995>] ip_options_get_from_user+0x35/0x120
      [28504.926884]  [<ffffffff8180dedf>] do_ip_setsockopt.isra.15+0x8df/0x1630
      [28504.927975]  [<ffffffff8180ec60>] ip_setsockopt+0x30/0xa0
      [28504.929175]  [<ffffffff8181e59b>] tcp_setsockopt+0x5b/0x90
      [28504.930400]  [<ffffffff8177462f>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x5f/0x70
      [28504.931677]  [<ffffffff817729c2>] SyS_setsockopt+0xa2/0x140
      [28504.932851]  [<ffffffff818cfb69>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
      [28504.934018]
      [28504.934377] The buggy address ffff880026382828 is located 0 bytes to the right
      [28504.934377]  of 40-byte region [ffff880026382800, ffff880026382828)
      [28504.937144]
      [28504.937474] Memory state around the buggy address:
      [28504.938430]  ffff880026382300: ........ rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr
      [28504.939884]  ffff880026382400: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr
      [28504.941294]  ffff880026382500: .....rrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr
      [28504.942504]  ffff880026382600: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr
      [28504.943483]  ffff880026382700: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr
      [28504.944511] >ffff880026382800: .....rrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr
      [28504.945573]                         ^
      [28504.946277]  ffff880026382900: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr
      [28505.094949]  ffff880026382a00: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr
      [28505.096114]  ffff880026382b00: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr
      [28505.097116]  ffff880026382c00: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr
      [28505.098472]  ffff880026382d00: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr
      [28505.099804] Legend:
      [28505.100269]  f - 8 freed bytes
      [28505.100884]  r - 8 redzone bytes
      [28505.101649]  . - 8 allocated bytes
      [28505.102406]  x=1..7 - x allocated bytes + (8-x) redzone bytes
      [28505.103637] ==================================================================
      
      [1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernelSigned-off-by: default avatarEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      10ec9472
  5. 21 Jul, 2014 24 commits
  6. 20 Jul, 2014 2 commits