- 02 Sep, 2014 7 commits
-
-
Vlad Yasevich authored
[ Upstream commit 081e83a7 ] Macvlan devices do not initialize vlan_features. As a result, any vlan devices configured on top of macvlans perform very poorly. Initialize vlan_features based on the vlan features of the lower-level device. Signed-off-by:
Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
-
Christoph Paasch authored
[ Upstream commit 1f74e613 ] In vegas we do a multiplication of the cwnd and the rtt. This may overflow and thus their result is stored in a u64. However, we first need to cast the cwnd so that actually 64-bit arithmetic is done. Then, we need to do do_div to allow this to be used on 32-bit arches. Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM> Cc: Doug Leith <doug.leith@nuim.ie> Fixes: 8d3a564d (tcp: tcp_vegas cong avoid fix) Signed-off-by:
Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be> Signed-off-by:
-
Christoph Paasch authored
[ Upstream commit 45a07695 ] In veno we do a multiplication of the cwnd and the rtt. This may overflow and thus their result is stored in a u64. However, we first need to cast the cwnd so that actually 64-bit arithmetic is done. A first attempt at fixing 76f10177 ([TCP]: TCP Veno congestion control) was made by 15913114 (tcp: Overflow bug in Vegas), but it failed to add the required cast in tcp_veno_cong_avoid(). Fixes: 76f10177 ([TCP]: TCP Veno congestion control) Signed-off-by:
-
Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 04ca6973 ] In "Counting Packets Sent Between Arbitrary Internet Hosts", Jeffrey and Jedidiah describe ways exploiting linux IP identifier generation to infer whether two machines are exchanging packets. With commit 73f156a6 ("inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count"), we changed IP id generation, but this does not really prevent this side-channel technique. This patch adds a random amount of perturbation so that IP identifiers for a given destination [1] are no longer monotonically increasing after an idle period. Note that prandom_u32_max(1) returns 0, so if generator is used at most once per jiffy, this patch inserts no hole in the ID suite and do not increase collision probability. This is jiffies based, so in the worst case (HZ=1000), the id can rollover after ~65 seconds of idle time, which should be fine. We also change the hash used in __ip_select_ident() to not only hash on daddr, but also saddr and protocol, so that ICMP probes can not be used to infer information for other protocols. For IPv6, adds saddr into the hash as well, but not nexthdr. If I ping the patched target, we can see ID are now hard to predict. 21:57:11.008086 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 1, length 64 21:57:11.010752 IP (... id 2081 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 1, length 64 21:57:12.013133 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 2, length 64 21:57:12.015737 IP (... id 3039 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 2, length 64 21:57:13.016580 IP (...) A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 3, length 64 21:57:13.019251 IP (... id 3437 ...) target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 3, length 64 [1] TCP sessions uses a per flow ID generator not changed by this patch. Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by:
Jeffrey Knockel <jeffk@cs.unm.edu> Reported-by:
Jedidiah R. Crandall <crandall@cs.unm.edu> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 73f156a6 ] Ideally, we would need to generate IP ID using a per destination IP generator. linux kernels used inet_peer cache for this purpose, but this had a huge cost on servers disabling MTU discovery. 1) each inet_peer struct consumes 192 bytes 2) inetpeer cache uses a binary tree of inet_peer structs, with a nominal size of ~66000 elements under load. 3) lookups in this tree are hitting a lot of cache lines, as tree depth is about 20. 4) If server deals with many tcp flows, we have a high probability of not finding the inet_peer, allocating a fresh one, inserting it in the tree with same initial ip_id_count, (cf secure_ip_id()) 5) We garbage collect inet_peer aggressively. IP ID generation do not have to be 'perfect' Goal is trying to avoid duplicates in a short period of time, so that reassembly units have a chance to complete reassembly of fragments belonging to one message before receiving other fragments with a recycled ID. We simply use an array of generators, and a Jenkin hash using the dst IP as a key. ipv6_select_ident() is put back into net/ipv6/ip6_output.c where it belongs (it is only used from this file) secure_ip_id() and secure_ipv6_id() no longer are needed. Rename ip_select_ident_more() to ip_select_ident_segs() to avoid unnecessary decrement/increment of the number of segments. Signed-off-by:
-
Dmitry Kravkov authored
[ Upstream commit fe26566d ] When TSO packet is transmitted additional BD w/o mapping is used to describe the packed. The BD needs special handling in tx completion. kernel: Call Trace: kernel: <IRQ> [<ffffffff815e19ba>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b kernel: [<ffffffff8105dee1>] warn_slowpath_common+0x61/0x80 kernel: [<ffffffff8105df5c>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x5c/0x80 kernel: [<ffffffff814a8c0d>] ? find_iova+0x4d/0x90 kernel: [<ffffffff814ab0e2>] intel_unmap_page.part.36+0x142/0x160 kernel: [<ffffffff814ad0e6>] intel_unmap_page+0x26/0x30 kernel: [<ffffffffa01f55d7>] bnx2x_free_tx_pkt+0x157/0x2b0 [bnx2x] kernel: [<ffffffffa01f8dac>] bnx2x_tx_int+0xac/0x220 [bnx2x] kernel: [<ffffffff8101a0d9>] ? read_tsc+0x9/0x20 kernel: [<ffffffffa01f8fdb>] bnx2x_poll+0xbb/0x3c0 [bnx2x] kernel: [<ffffffff814d041a>] net_rx_action+0x15a/0x250 kernel: [<ffffffff81067047>] __do_softirq+0xf7/0x290 kernel: [<ffffffff815f3a5c>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30 kernel: [<ffffffff81014d25>] do_softirq+0x55/0x90 kernel: [<ffffffff810673e5>] irq_exit+0x115/0x120 kernel: [<ffffffff815f4358>] do_IRQ+0x58/0xf0 kernel: [<ffffffff815e94ad>] common_interrupt+0x6d/0x6d kernel: <EOI> [<ffffffff810bbff7>] ? clockevents_notify+0x127/0x140 kernel: [<ffffffff814834df>] ? cpuidle_enter_state+0x4f/0xc0 kernel: [<ffffffff81483615>] cpuidle_idle_call+0xc5/0x200 kernel: [<ffffffff8101bc7e>] arch_cpu_idle+0xe/0x30 kernel: [<ffffffff810b4725>] cpu_startup_entry+0xf5/0x290 kernel: [<ffffffff815cfee1>] start_secondary+0x265/0x27b kernel: ---[ end trace 11aa7726f18d7e80 ]--- Fixes: a848ade4 ("bnx2x: add CSUM and TSO support for encapsulation protocols") Reported-by:
Yulong Pei <ypei@redhat.com> Cc: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Dmitry Kravkov <Dmitry.Kravkov@qlogic.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Michael S. Tsirkin authored
commit 350b8bdd upstream. The third parameter of kvm_iommu_put_pages is wrong, It should be 'gfn - slot->base_gfn'. By making gfn very large, malicious guest or userspace can cause kvm to go to this error path, and subsequently to pass a huge value as size. Alternatively if gfn is small, then pages would be pinned but never unpinned, causing host memory leak and local DOS. Passing a reasonable but large value could be the most dangerous case, because it would unpin a page that should have stayed pinned, and thus allow the device to DMA into arbitrary memory. However, this cannot happen because of the condition that can trigger the error: - out of memory (where you can't allocate even a single page) should not be possible for the attacker to trigger - when exceeding the iommu's address space, guest pages after gfn will also exceed the iommu's address space, and inside kvm_iommu_put_pages() the iommu_iova_to_phys() will fail. The page thus would not be unpinned at all. Reported-by:
Jack Morgenstein <jackm@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by:
Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
-
- 15 Aug, 2014 1 commit
-
-
Daniel Borkmann authored
commit 1be9a950 upstream. Jason reported an oops caused by SCTP on his ARM machine with SCTP authentication enabled: Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] ARM CPU: 0 PID: 104 Comm: sctp-test Not tainted 3.13.0-68744-g3632f30c9b20-dirty #1 task: c6eefa40 ti: c6f52000 task.ti: c6f52000 PC is at sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0xc4/0x10c LR is at sg_init_table+0x20/0x38 pc : [<c024bb80>] lr : [<c00f32dc>] psr: 40000013 sp : c6f538e8 ip : 00000000 fp : c6f53924 r10: c6f50d80 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00010000 r7 : 00000000 r6 : c7be4000 r5 : 00000000 r4 : c6f56254 r3 : c00c8170 r2 : 00000001 r1 : 00000008 r0 : c6f1e660 Flags: nZcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user Control: 0005397f Table: 06f28000 DAC: 00000015 Process sctp-test (pid: 104, stack limit = 0xc6f521c0) Stack: (0xc6f538e8 to 0xc6f54000) [...] Backtrace: [<c024babc>] (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0249af8>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x33c/0x5c8) [<c02497bc>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x0/0x5c8) from [<c023e96c>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x7fc/0x844) [<c023e170>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x0/0x844) from [<c023ef78>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x24/0x28) [<c023ef54>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x0/0x28) from [<c0234364>] (sctp_side_effects+0x1134/0x1220) [<c0233230>] (sctp_side_effects+0x0/0x1220) from [<c02330b0>] (sctp_do_sm+0xac/0xd4) [<c0233004>] (sctp_do_sm+0x0/0xd4) from [<c023675c>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x118/0x160) [<c0236644>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x0/0x160) from [<c023d5bc>] (sctp_inq_push+0x6c/0x74) [<c023d550>] (sctp_inq_push+0x0/0x74) from [<c024a6b0>] (sctp_rcv+0x7d8/0x888) While we already had various kind of bugs in that area ec0223ec ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if we/peer is AUTH capable") and b14878cc ("net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint"), this one is a bit of a different kind. Giving a bit more background on why SCTP authentication is needed can be found in RFC4895: SCTP uses 32-bit verification tags to protect itself against blind attackers. These values are not changed during the lifetime of an SCTP association. Looking at new SCTP extensions, there is the need to have a method of proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by the original peer that started the association and not by a malicious attacker. To cause this bug, we're triggering an INIT collision between peers; normal SCTP handshake where both sides intent to authenticate packets contains RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO parameters that are being negotiated among peers: ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ----------> <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] --------- -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- RFC4895 says that each endpoint therefore knows its own random number and the peer's random number *after* the association has been established. The local and peer's random number along with the shared key are then part of the secret used for calculating the HMAC in the AUTH chunk. Now, in our scenario, we have 2 threads with 1 non-blocking SEQ_PACKET socket each, setting up common shared SCTP_AUTH_KEY and SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY properly, and each of them calling sctp_bindx(3), listen(2) and connect(2) against each other, thus the handshake looks similar to this, e.g.: ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ----------> <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] --------- <--------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ----------- -------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] --------> ... Since such collisions can also happen with verification tags, the RFC4895 for AUTH rather vaguely says under section 6.1: In case of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling of this Random Number follow the same pattern as those for the Verification Tag, as explained in Section 5.2.4 of RFC 2960 [5]. Therefore, each endpoint knows its own Random Number and the peer's Random Number after the association has been established. In RFC2960, section 5.2.4, we're eventually hitting Action B: B) In this case, both sides may be attempting to start an association at about the same time but the peer endpoint started its INIT after responding to the local endpoint's INIT. Thus it may have picked a new Verification Tag not being aware of the previous Tag it had sent this endpoint. The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED state but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from the State Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may running and send a COOKIE ACK. In other words, the handling of the Random parameter is the same as behavior for the Verification Tag as described in Action B of section 5.2.4. Looking at the code, we exactly hit the sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b() case which triggers an SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC command to the side effect interpreter, and in fact it properly copies over peer_{random, hmacs, chunks} parameters from the newly created association to update the existing one. Also, the old asoc_shared_key is being released and based on the new params, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() updated. However, the issue observed in this case is that the previous asoc->peer.auth_capable was 0, and has *not* been updated, so that instead of creating a new secret, we're doing an early return from the function sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() leaving asoc->asoc_shared_key as NULL. However, we now have to authenticate chunks from the updated chunk list (e.g. COOKIE-ACK). That in fact causes the server side when responding with ... <------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ACK ----------------- ... to trigger a NULL pointer dereference, since in sctp_packet_transmit(), it discovers that an AUTH chunk is being queued for xmit, and thus it calls sctp_auth_calculate_hmac(). Since the asoc->active_key_id is still inherited from the endpoint, and the same as encoded into the chunk, it uses asoc->asoc_shared_key, which is still NULL, as an asoc_key and dereferences it in ... crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, &asoc_key->data[0], asoc_key->len) ... causing an oops. All this happens because sctp_make_cookie_ack() called with the *new* association has the peer.auth_capable=1 and therefore marks the chunk with auth=1 after checking sctp_auth_send_cid(), but it is *actually* sent later on over the then *updated* association's transport that didn't initialize its shared key due to peer.auth_capable=0. Since control chunks in that case are not sent by the temporary association which are scheduled for deletion, they are issued for xmit via SCTP_CMD_REPLY in the interpreter with the context of the *updated* association. peer.auth_capable was 0 in the updated association (which went from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED state), since all previous processing that performed sctp_process_init() was being done on temporary associations, that we eventually throw away each time. The correct fix is to update to the new peer.auth_capable value as well in the collision case via sctp_assoc_update(), so that in case the collision migrated from 0 -> 1, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() can properly recalculate the secret. This therefore fixes the observed server panic. Fixes: 730fc3d0 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing") Reported-by:
Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Signed-off-by:
Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Tested-by:
Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
-
- 13 Aug, 2014 5 commits
-
-
Kamal Mostafa authored
Signed-off-by: -
Eric W. Biederman authored
commit ffbc6f0e upstream. Since March 2009 the kernel has treated the state that if no MS_..ATIME flags are passed then the kernel defaults to relatime. Defaulting to relatime instead of the existing atime state during a remount is silly, and causes problems in practice for people who don't specify any MS_...ATIME flags and to get the default filesystem atime setting. Those users may encounter a permission error because the default atime setting does not work. A default that does not work and causes permission problems is ridiculous, so preserve the existing value to have a default atime setting that is always guaranteed to work. Using the default atime setting in this way is particularly interesting for applications built to run in restricted userspace environments without /proc mounted, as the existing atime mount options of a filesystem can not be read from /proc/mounts. In practice this fixes user space that uses the default atime setting on remount that are broken by the permission checks keeping less privileged users from changing more privileged users atime settings. Acked-by:
Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Signed-off-by:
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Eric W. Biederman authored
commit 9566d674 upstream. While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..." would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if the mount started off locked I realized that there are several additional mount flags that should be locked and are not. In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND, and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user. The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch. - nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user. - nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user. - noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user. - atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user. The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated), and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set by a more privileged user. The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME mnt flags. Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously. Acked-by:
-
Eric W. Biederman authored
commit 07b64558 upstream. There are no races as locked mount flags are guaranteed to never change. Moving the test into do_remount makes it more visible, and ensures all filesystem remounts pass the MNT_LOCK_READONLY permission check. This second case is not an issue today as filesystem remounts are guarded by capable(CAP_DAC_ADMIN) and thus will always fail in less privileged mount namespaces, but it could become an issue in the future. Acked-by:
-
Eric W. Biederman authored
commit a6138db8 upstream. Kenton Varda <kenton@sandstorm.io> discovered that by remounting a read-only bind mount read-only in a user namespace the MNT_LOCK_READONLY bit would be cleared, allowing an unprivileged user to the remount a read-only mount read-write. Correct this by replacing the mask of mount flags to preserve with a mask of mount flags that may be changed, and preserve all others. This ensures that any future bugs with this mask and remount will fail in an easy to detect way where new mount flags simply won't change. Acked-by:
-
- 12 Aug, 2014 1 commit
-
-
David Vrabel authored
commit ea9f9274 upstream. Remove xen_enable_nmi() to fix a 64-bit guest crash when registering the NMI callback on Xen 3.1 and earlier. It's not needed since the NMI callback is set by a set_trap_table hypercall (in xen_load_idt() or xen_write_idt_entry()). It's also broken since it only set the current VCPU's callback. Signed-off-by:
David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Reported-by:
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Tested-by:
-
- 08 Aug, 2014 26 commits
-
-
Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 10ec9472 ] There is a benign buffer overflow in ip_options_compile spotted by AddressSanitizer[1] : Its benign because we always can access one extra byte in skb->head (because header is followed by struct skb_shared_info), and in this case this byte is not even used. [28504.910798] ================================================================== [28504.912046] AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow in ip_options_compile [28504.913170] Read of size 1 by thread T15843: [28504.914026] [<ffffffff81802f91>] ip_options_compile+0x121/0x9c0 [28504.915394] [<ffffffff81804a0d>] ip_options_get_from_user+0xad/0x120 [28504.916843] [<ffffffff8180dedf>] do_ip_setsockopt.isra.15+0x8df/0x1630 [28504.918175] [<ffffffff8180ec60>] ip_setsockopt+0x30/0xa0 [28504.919490] [<ffffffff8181e59b>] tcp_setsockopt+0x5b/0x90 [28504.920835] [<ffffffff8177462f>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x5f/0x70 [28504.922208] [<ffffffff817729c2>] SyS_setsockopt+0xa2/0x140 [28504.923459] [<ffffffff818cfb69>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [28504.924722] [28504.925106] Allocated by thread T15843: [28504.925815] [<ffffffff81804995>] ip_options_get_from_user+0x35/0x120 [28504.926884] [<ffffffff8180dedf>] do_ip_setsockopt.isra.15+0x8df/0x1630 [28504.927975] [<ffffffff8180ec60>] ip_setsockopt+0x30/0xa0 [28504.929175] [<ffffffff8181e59b>] tcp_setsockopt+0x5b/0x90 [28504.930400] [<ffffffff8177462f>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x5f/0x70 [28504.931677] [<ffffffff817729c2>] SyS_setsockopt+0xa2/0x140 [28504.932851] [<ffffffff818cfb69>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [28504.934018] [28504.934377] The buggy address ffff880026382828 is located 0 bytes to the right [28504.934377] of 40-byte region [ffff880026382800, ffff880026382828) [28504.937144] [28504.937474] Memory state around the buggy address: [28504.938430] ffff880026382300: ........ rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28504.939884] ffff880026382400: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28504.941294] ffff880026382500: .....rrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28504.942504] ffff880026382600: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28504.943483] ffff880026382700: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28504.944511] >ffff880026382800: .....rrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28504.945573] ^ [28504.946277] ffff880026382900: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28505.094949] ffff880026382a00: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28505.096114] ffff880026382b00: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28505.097116] ffff880026382c00: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28505.098472] ffff880026382d00: ffffffff rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr rrrrrrrr [28505.099804] Legend: [28505.100269] f - 8 freed bytes [28505.100884] r - 8 redzone bytes [28505.101649] . - 8 allocated bytes [28505.102406] x=1..7 - x allocated bytes + (8-x) redzone bytes [28505.103637] ================================================================== [1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernelSigned-off-by:
-
Ben Hutchings authored
[ Upstream commit 640d7efe ] *_result[len] is parsed as *(_result[len]) which is not at all what we want to touch here. Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Fixes: 84a7c0b1 ("dns_resolver: assure that dns_query() result is null-terminated") Signed-off-by:
-
Manuel Schölling authored
[ Upstream commit 84a7c0b1 ] dns_query() credulously assumes that keys are null-terminated and returns a copy of a memory block that is off by one. Signed-off-by:
Manuel Schölling <manuel.schoelling@gmx.de> Signed-off-by:
-
Bjørn Mork authored
[ Upstream commit c2a6c781 ] Huawei's usage of the subclass and protocol fields is not 100% clear to us, but there appears to be a very strict system. A device with the "shared" device ID 12d1:1506 and this NCM function was recently reported (showing only default altsetting): Interface Descriptor: bLength 9 bDescriptorType 4 bInterfaceNumber 1 bAlternateSetting 0 bNumEndpoints 1 bInterfaceClass 255 Vendor Specific Class bInterfaceSubClass 3 bInterfaceProtocol 22 iInterface 8 CDC Network Control Model (NCM) ** UNRECOGNIZED: 05 24 00 10 01 ** UNRECOGNIZED: 06 24 1a 00 01 1f ** UNRECOGNIZED: 0c 24 1b 00 01 00 04 10 14 dc 05 20 ** UNRECOGNIZED: 0d 24 0f 0a 0f 00 00 00 ea 05 03 00 01 ** UNRECOGNIZED: 05 24 06 01 01 Endpoint Descriptor: bLength 7 bDescriptorType 5 bEndpointAddress 0x85 EP 5 IN bmAttributes 3 Transfer Type Interrupt Synch Type None Usage Type Data wMaxPacketSize 0x0010 1x 16 bytes bInterval 9 Cc: Enrico Mioso <mrkiko.rs@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Signed-off-by:
-
Sowmini Varadhan authored
[ Upstream commit a4b70a07 ] Nothing cleans up the objects created by vnet_new(), they are completely leaked. vnet_exit(), after doing the vio_unregister_driver() to clean up ports, should call a helper function that iterates over vnet_list and cleans up those objects. This includes unregister_netdevice() as well as free_netdev(). Signed-off-by:
Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com> Acked-by:
Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
Karl Volz <karl.volz@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Christoph Schulz authored
[ Upstream commit a8a3e41c ] The PPP channel MTU is used with Multilink PPP when ppp_mp_explode() (see ppp_generic module) tries to determine how big a fragment might be. According to RFC 1661, the MTU excludes the 2-byte PPP protocol field, see the corresponding comment and code in ppp_mp_explode(): /* * hdrlen includes the 2-byte PPP protocol field, but the * MTU counts only the payload excluding the protocol field. * (RFC1661 Section 2) */ mtu = pch->chan->mtu - (hdrlen - 2); However, the pppoe module *does* include the PPP protocol field in the channel MTU, which is wrong as it causes the PPP payload to be 1-2 bytes too big under certain circumstances (one byte if PPP protocol compression is used, two otherwise), causing the generated Ethernet packets to be dropped. So the pppoe module has to subtract two bytes from the channel MTU. This error only manifests itself when using Multilink PPP, as otherwise the channel MTU is not used anywhere. In the following, I will describe how to reproduce this bug. We configure two pppd instances for multilink PPP over two PPPoE links, say eth2 and eth3, with a MTU of 1492 bytes for each link and a MRRU of 2976 bytes. (This MRRU is computed by adding the two link MTUs and subtracting the MP header twice, which is 4 bytes long.) The necessary pppd statements on both sides are "multilink mtu 1492 mru 1492 mrru 2976". On the client side, we additionally need "plugin rp-pppoe.so eth2" and "plugin rp-pppoe.so eth3", respectively; on the server side, we additionally need to start two pppoe-server instances to be able to establish two PPPoE sessions, one over eth2 and one over eth3. We set the MTU of the PPP network interface to the MRRU (2976) on both sides of the connection in order to make use of the higher bandwidth. (If we didn't do that, IP fragmentation would kick in, which we want to avoid.) Now we send a ICMPv4 echo request with a payload of 2948 bytes from client to server over the PPP link. This results in the following network packet: 2948 (echo payload) + 8 (ICMPv4 header) + 20 (IPv4 header) --------------------- 2976 (PPP payload) These 2976 bytes do not exceed the MTU of the PPP network interface, so the IP packet is not fragmented. Now the multilink PPP code in ppp_mp_explode() prepends one protocol byte (0x21 for IPv4), making the packet one byte bigger than the negotiated MRRU. So this packet would have to be divided in three fragments. But this does not happen as each link MTU is assumed to be two bytes larger. So this packet is diveded into two fragments only, one of size 1489 and one of size 1488. Now we have for that bigger fragment: 1489 (PPP payload) + 4 (MP header) + 2 (PPP protocol field for the MP payload (0x3d)) + 6 (PPPoE header) -------------------------- 1501 (Ethernet payload) This packet exceeds the link MTU and is discarded. If one configures the link MTU on the client side to 1501, one can see the discarded Ethernet frames with tcpdump running on the client. A ping -s 2948 -c 1 192.168.15.254 leads to the smaller fragment that is correctly received on the server side: (tcpdump -vvvne -i eth3 pppoes and ppp proto 0x3d) 52:54:00:ad:87:fd > 52:54:00:79:5c:d0, ethertype PPPoE S (0x8864), length 1514: PPPoE [ses 0x3] MLPPP (0x003d), length 1494: seq 0x000, Flags [end], length 1492 and to the bigger fragment that is not received on the server side: (tcpdump -vvvne -i eth2 pppoes and ppp proto 0x3d) 52:54:00:70:9e:89 > 52:54:00:5d:6f:b0, ethertype PPPoE S (0x8864), length 1515: PPPoE [ses 0x5] MLPPP (0x003d), length 1495: seq 0x000, Flags [begin], length 1493 With the patch below, we correctly obtain three fragments: 52:54:00:ad:87:fd > 52:54:00:79:5c:d0, ethertype PPPoE S (0x8864), length 1514: PPPoE [ses 0x1] MLPPP (0x003d), length 1494: seq 0x000, Flags [begin], length 1492 52:54:00:70:9e:89 > 52:54:00:5d:6f:b0, ethertype PPPoE S (0x8864), length 1514: PPPoE [ses 0x1] MLPPP (0x003d), length 1494: seq 0x000, Flags [none], length 1492 52:54:00:ad:87:fd > 52:54:00:79:5c:d0, ethertype PPPoE S (0x8864), length 27: PPPoE [ses 0x1] MLPPP (0x003d), length 7: seq 0x000, Flags [end], length 5 And the ICMPv4 echo request is successfully received at the server side: IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 21925, offset 0, flags [DF], proto ICMP (1), length 2976) 192.168.222.2 > 192.168.15.254: ICMP echo request, id 30530, seq 0, length 2956 The bug was introduced in commit c9aa6895 ("[PPPOE]: Advertise PPPoE MTU") from the very beginning. This patch applies to 3.10 upwards but the fix can be applied (with minor modifications) to kernels as old as 2.6.32. Signed-off-by:
Christoph Schulz <develop@kristov.de> Signed-off-by:
-
Daniel Borkmann authored
[ Upstream commit 8f2e5ae4 ] While working on some other SCTP code, I noticed that some structures shared with user space are leaking uninitialized stack or heap buffer. In particular, struct sctp_sndrcvinfo has a 2 bytes hole between .sinfo_flags and .sinfo_ppid that remains unfilled by us in sctp_ulpevent_read_sndrcvinfo() when putting this into cmsg. But also struct sctp_remote_error contains a 2 bytes hole that we don't fill but place into a skb through skb_copy_expand() via sctp_ulpevent_make_remote_error(). Both structures are defined by the IETF in RFC6458: * Section 5.3.2. SCTP Header Information Structure: The sctp_sndrcvinfo structure is defined below: struct sctp_sndrcvinfo { uint16_t sinfo_stream; uint16_t sinfo_ssn; uint16_t sinfo_flags; <-- 2 bytes hole --> uint32_t sinfo_ppid; uint32_t sinfo_context; uint32_t sinfo_timetolive; uint32_t sinfo_tsn; uint32_t sinfo_cumtsn; sctp_assoc_t sinfo_assoc_id; }; * 6.1.3. SCTP_REMOTE_ERROR: A remote peer may send an Operation Error message to its peer. This message indicates a variety of error conditions on an association. The entire ERROR chunk as it appears on the wire is included in an SCTP_REMOTE_ERROR event. Please refer to the SCTP specification [RFC4960] and any extensions for a list of possible error formats. An SCTP error notification has the following format: struct sctp_remote_error { uint16_t sre_type; uint16_t sre_flags; uint32_t sre_length; uint16_t sre_error; <-- 2 bytes hole --> sctp_assoc_t sre_assoc_id; uint8_t sre_data[]; }; Fix this by setting both to 0 before filling them out. We also have other structures shared between user and kernel space in SCTP that contains holes (e.g. struct sctp_paddrthlds), but we copy that buffer over from user space first and thus don't need to care about it in that cases. While at it, we can also remove lengthy comments copied from the draft, instead, we update the comment with the correct RFC number where one can look it up. Signed-off-by:
-
Jon Paul Maloy authored
[ Upstream commit 99941754 ] If the 'next' pointer of the last fragment buffer in a message is not zeroed before reassembly, we risk ending up with a corrupt message, since the reassembly function itself isn't doing this. Currently, when a buffer is retrieved from the deferred queue of the broadcast link, the next pointer is not cleared, with the result as described above. This commit corrects this, and thereby fixes a bug that may occur when long broadcast messages are transmitted across dual interfaces. The bug has been present since 40ba3cdf ("tipc: message reassembly using fragment chain") This commit should be applied to both net and net-next. Signed-off-by:
Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Suresh Reddy authored
[ Upstream commit 4cad9f3b ] On BE3, if the clear-interrupt bit of the EQ doorbell is not set the first time it is armed, ocassionally we have observed that the EQ doesn't raise anymore interrupts even if it is in armed state. This patch fixes this by setting the clear-interrupt bit when EQs are armed for the first time in be_open(). Signed-off-by:
Suresh Reddy <Suresh.Reddy@emulex.com> Signed-off-by:
Sathya Perla <sathya.perla@emulex.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Ben Pfaff authored
[ Upstream commit ac30ef83 ] netlink_dump() returns a negative errno value on error. Until now, netlink_recvmsg() directly recorded that negative value in sk->sk_err, but that's wrong since sk_err takes positive errno values. (This manifests as userspace receiving a positive return value from the recv() system call, falsely indicating success.) This bug was introduced in the commit that started checking the netlink_dump() return value, commit b44d211e (netlink: handle errors from netlink_dump()). Multithreaded Netlink dumps are one way to trigger this behavior in practice, as described in the commit message for the userspace workaround posted here: http://openvswitch.org/pipermail/dev/2014-June/042339.html This commit also fixes the same bug in netlink_poll(), introduced in commit cd1df525 (netlink: add flow control for memory mapped I/O). Signed-off-by:
Ben Pfaff <blp@nicira.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Andrey Utkin authored
[ Upstream commit 36beddc2 ] Setting just skb->sk without taking its reference and setting a destructor is invalid. However, in the places where this was done, skb is used in a way not requiring skb->sk setting. So dropping the setting of skb->sk. Thanks to Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> for correct solution. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=79441Reported-by:
Ed Martin <edman007@edman007.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrey Utkin <andrey.krieger.utkin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Yuchung Cheng authored
[ Upstream commit 6e08d5e3 ] The undo code assumes that, upon entering loss recovery, TCP 1) always retransmit something 2) the retransmission never fails locally (e.g., qdisc drop) so undo_marker is set in tcp_enter_recovery() and undo_retrans is incremented only when tcp_retransmit_skb() is successful. When the assumption is broken because TCP's cwnd is too small to retransmit or the retransmit fails locally. The next (DUP)ACK would incorrectly revert the cwnd and the congestion state in tcp_try_undo_dsack() or tcp_may_undo(). Subsequent (DUP)ACKs may enter the recovery state. The sender repeatedly enter and (incorrectly) exit recovery states if the retransmits continue to fail locally while receiving (DUP)ACKs. The fix is to initialize undo_retrans to -1 and start counting on the first retransmission. Always increment undo_retrans even if the retransmissions fail locally because they couldn't cause DSACKs to undo the cwnd reduction. Signed-off-by:
Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by:
-
dingtianhong authored
[ Upstream commit 52ad353a ] The problem was triggered by these steps: 1) create socket, bind and then setsockopt for add mc group. mreq.imr_multiaddr.s_addr = inet_addr("255.0.0.37"); mreq.imr_interface.s_addr = inet_addr("192.168.1.2"); setsockopt(sockfd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP, &mreq, sizeof(mreq)); 2) drop the mc group for this socket. mreq.imr_multiaddr.s_addr = inet_addr("255.0.0.37"); mreq.imr_interface.s_addr = inet_addr("0.0.0.0"); setsockopt(sockfd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_DROP_MEMBERSHIP, &mreq, sizeof(mreq)); 3) and then drop the socket, I found the mc group was still used by the dev: netstat -g Interface RefCnt Group --------------- ------ --------------------- eth2 1 255.0.0.37 Normally even though the IP_DROP_MEMBERSHIP return error, the mc group still need to be released for the netdev when drop the socket, but this process was broken when route default is NULL, the reason is that: The ip_mc_leave_group() will choose the in_dev by the imr_interface.s_addr, if input addr is NULL, the default route dev will be chosen, then the ifindex is got from the dev, then polling the inet->mc_list and return -ENODEV, but if the default route dev is NULL, the in_dev and ifIndex is both NULL, when polling the inet->mc_list, the mc group will be released from the mc_list, but the dev didn't dec the refcnt for this mc group, so when dropping the socket, the mc_list is NULL and the dev still keep this group. v1->v2: According Hideaki's suggestion, we should align with IPv6 (RFC3493) and BSDs, so I add the checking for the in_dev before polling the mc_list, make sure when we remove the mc group, dec the refcnt to the real dev which was using the mc address. The problem would never happened again. Signed-off-by:
Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Loic Prylli authored
[ Upstream commit 54951194 ] A bug was introduced in NETDEV_CHANGE notifier sequence causing the arp table to be sometimes spuriously cleared (including manual arp entries marked permanent), upon network link carrier changes. The changed argument for the notifier was applied only to a single caller of NETDEV_CHANGE, missing among others netdev_state_change(). So upon net_carrier events induced by the network, which are triggering a call to netdev_state_change(), arp_netdev_event() would decide whether to clear or not arp cache based on random/junk stack values (a kind of read buffer overflow). Fixes: be9efd36 ("net: pass changed flags along with NETDEV_CHANGE event") Fixes: 6c8b4e3f ("arp: flush arp cache on IFF_NOARP change") Signed-off-by:
Loic Prylli <loicp@google.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Bjørn Mork authored
[ Upstream commit 53433300 ] Add two device IDs found in an out-of-tree driver downloadable from Netgear. Signed-off-by:
-
Bernd Wachter authored
[ Upstream commit 8dcb4b15 ] There's a new version of the Telewell 4G modem working with, but not recognized by this driver. Signed-off-by:
Bernd Wachter <bernd.wachter@jolla.com> Acked-by:
-
Edward Allcutt authored
commit 68b7107b upstream. Some older router implementations still send Fragmentation Needed errors with the Next-Hop MTU field set to zero. This is explicitly described as an eventuality that hosts must deal with by the standard (RFC 1191) since older standards specified that those bits must be zero. Linux had a generic (for all of IPv4) implementation of the algorithm described in the RFC for searching a list of MTU plateaus for a good value. Commit 46517008 ("ipv4: Kill ip_rt_frag_needed().") removed this as part of the changes to remove the routing cache. Subsequently any Fragmentation Needed packet with a zero Next-Hop MTU has been discarded without being passed to the per-protocol handlers or notifying userspace for raw sockets. When there is a router which does not implement RFC 1191 on an MTU limited path then this results in stalled connections since large packets are discarded and the local protocols are not notified so they never attempt to lower the pMTU. One example I have seen is an OpenBSD router terminating IPSec tunnels. It's worth pointing out that this case is distinct from the BSD 4.2 bug which incorrectly calculated the Next-Hop MTU since the commit in question dismissed that as a valid concern. All of the per-protocols handlers implement the simple approach from RFC 1191 of immediately falling back to the minimum value. Although this is sub-optimal it is vastly preferable to connections hanging indefinitely. Remove the Next-Hop MTU != 0 check and allow such packets to follow the normal path. Fixes: 46517008 ("ipv4: Kill ip_rt_frag_needed().") Signed-off-by:
Edward Allcutt <edward.allcutt@openmarket.com> Signed-off-by:
Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Christoph Paasch authored
commit 5924f17a upstream. When in repair-mode and TCP_RECV_QUEUE is set, we end up calling tcp_push with mss_now being 0. If data is in the send-queue and tcp_set_skb_tso_segs gets called, we crash because it will divide by mss_now: [ 347.151939] divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 347.152907] Modules linked in: [ 347.152907] CPU: 1 PID: 1123 Comm: packetdrill Not tainted 3.16.0-rc2 #4 [ 347.152907] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007 [ 347.152907] task: f5b88540 ti: f3c82000 task.ti: f3c82000 [ 347.152907] EIP: 0060:[<c1601359>] EFLAGS: 00210246 CPU: 1 [ 347.152907] EIP is at tcp_set_skb_tso_segs+0x49/0xa0 [ 347.152907] EAX: 00000b67 EBX: f5acd080 ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000000 [ 347.152907] ESI: f5a28f40 EDI: f3c88f00 EBP: f3c83d10 ESP: f3c83d00 [ 347.152907] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 [ 347.152907] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 083158b0 CR3: 35146000 CR4: 000006b0 [ 347.152907] Stack: [ 347.152907] c167f9d9 f5acd080 000005b4 00000002 f3c83d20 c16013e6 f3c88f00 f5acd080 [ 347.152907] f3c83da0 c1603b5a f3c83d38 c10a0188 00000000 00000000 f3c83d84 c10acc85 [ 347.152907] c1ad5ec0 00000000 00000000 c1ad679c 010003e0 00000000 00000000 f3c88fc8 [ 347.152907] Call Trace: [ 347.152907] [<c167f9d9>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x2d/0x34 [ 347.152907] [<c16013e6>] tcp_init_tso_segs+0x36/0x50 [ 347.152907] [<c1603b5a>] tcp_write_xmit+0x7a/0xbf0 [ 347.152907] [<c10a0188>] ? up+0x28/0x40 [ 347.152907] [<c10acc85>] ? console_unlock+0x295/0x480 [ 347.152907] [<c10ad24f>] ? vprintk_emit+0x1ef/0x4b0 [ 347.152907] [<c1605716>] __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x36/0xd0 [ 347.152907] [<c15f4860>] tcp_push+0xf0/0x120 [ 347.152907] [<c15f7641>] tcp_sendmsg+0xf1/0xbf0 [ 347.152907] [<c116d920>] ? kmem_cache_free+0xf0/0x120 [ 347.152907] [<c106a682>] ? __sigqueue_free+0x32/0x40 [ 347.152907] [<c106a682>] ? __sigqueue_free+0x32/0x40 [ 347.152907] [<c114f0f0>] ? do_wp_page+0x3e0/0x850 [ 347.152907] [<c161c36a>] inet_sendmsg+0x4a/0xb0 [ 347.152907] [<c1150269>] ? handle_mm_fault+0x709/0xfb0 [ 347.152907] [<c15a006b>] sock_aio_write+0xbb/0xd0 [ 347.152907] [<c1180b79>] do_sync_write+0x69/0xa0 [ 347.152907] [<c1181023>] vfs_write+0x123/0x160 [ 347.152907] [<c1181d55>] SyS_write+0x55/0xb0 [ 347.152907] [<c167f0d8>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x28 This can easily be reproduced with the following packetdrill-script (the "magic" with netem, sk_pacing and limit_output_bytes is done to prevent the kernel from pushing all segments, because hitting the limit without doing this is not so easy with packetdrill): 0 socket(..., SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP) = 3 +0 setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, [1], 4) = 0 +0 bind(3, ..., ...) = 0 +0 listen(3, 1) = 0 +0 < S 0:0(0) win 32792 <mss 1460> +0 > S. 0:0(0) ack 1 <mss 1460> +0.1 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 65000 +0 accept(3, ..., ...) = 4 // This forces that not all segments of the snd-queue will be pushed +0 `tc qdisc add dev tun0 root netem delay 10ms` +0 `sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_limit_output_bytes=2` +0 setsockopt(4, SOL_SOCKET, 47, [2], 4) = 0 +0 write(4,...,10000) = 10000 +0 write(4,...,10000) = 10000 // Set tcp-repair stuff, particularly TCP_RECV_QUEUE +0 setsockopt(4, SOL_TCP, 19, [1], 4) = 0 +0 setsockopt(4, SOL_TCP, 20, [1], 4) = 0 // This now will make the write push the remaining segments +0 setsockopt(4, SOL_SOCKET, 47, [20000], 4) = 0 +0 `sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_limit_output_bytes=130000` // Now we will crash +0 write(4,...,1000) = 1000 This happens since ec342325 (tcp: fix retransmission in repair mode). Prior to that, the call to tcp_push was prevented by a check for tp->repair. The patch fixes it, by adding the new goto-label out_nopush. When exiting tcp_sendmsg and a push is not required, which is the case for tp->repair, we go to this label. When repairing and calling send() with TCP_RECV_QUEUE, the data is actually put in the receive-queue. So, no push is required because no data has been added to the send-queue. Cc: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Fixes: ec342325 (tcp: fix retransmission in repair mode) Signed-off-by:
Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Acked-by:
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 07b0f009 ] While it is legal to kfree(NULL), it is not wise to use : put_page(virt_to_head_page(NULL)) BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffeba400000000 IP: [<ffffffffc01f5928>] virt_to_head_page+0x36/0x44 [bnx2x] Reported-by:
Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit a48e5faf ] Madalin-Cristian reported crashs happening after a recent commit (5a4ae5f6 "vlan: unnecessary to check if vlan_pcpu_stats is NULL") ----------------------------------------------------------------------- root@p5040ds:~# vconfig add eth8 1 root@p5040ds:~# vconfig rem eth8.1 Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x2bc88028 Faulting instruction address: 0xc058e950 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] SMP NR_CPUS=8 CoreNet Generic Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 2167 Comm: vconfig Tainted: G W 3.16.0-rc3-00346-g65e85bf #2 task: e7264d90 ti: e2c2c000 task.ti: e2c2c000 NIP: c058e950 LR: c058ea30 CTR: c058e900 REGS: e2c2db20 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: G W (3.16.0-rc3-00346-g65e85bf) MSR: 00029002 <CE,EE,ME> CR: 48000428 XER: 20000000 DEAR: 2bc88028 ESR: 00000000 GPR00: c047299c e2c2dbd0 e7264d90 00000000 2bc88000 00000000 ffffffff 00000000 GPR08: 0000000f 00000000 000000ff 00000000 28000422 10121928 10100000 10100000 GPR16: 10100000 00000000 c07c5968 00000000 00000000 00000000 e2c2dc48 e7838000 GPR24: c07c5bac c07c58a8 e77290cc c07b0000 00000000 c05de6c0 e7838000 e2c2dc48 NIP [c058e950] vlan_dev_get_stats64+0x50/0x170 LR [c058ea30] vlan_dev_get_stats64+0x130/0x170 Call Trace: [e2c2dbd0] [ffffffea] 0xffffffea (unreliable) [e2c2dc20] [c047299c] dev_get_stats+0x4c/0x140 [e2c2dc40] [c0488ca8] rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0x3d8/0x960 [e2c2dd70] [c0489f4c] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x6c/0x110 [e2c2dd90] [c04731d4] rollback_registered_many+0x344/0x3b0 [e2c2ddd0] [c047332c] rollback_registered+0x2c/0x50 [e2c2ddf0] [c0476058] unregister_netdevice_queue+0x78/0xf0 [e2c2de00] [c058d800] unregister_vlan_dev+0xc0/0x160 [e2c2de20] [c058e360] vlan_ioctl_handler+0x1c0/0x550 [e2c2de90] [c045d11c] sock_ioctl+0x28c/0x2f0 [e2c2deb0] [c010d070] do_vfs_ioctl+0x90/0x7b0 [e2c2df20] [c010d7d0] SyS_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [e2c2df40] [c000f924] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x3c Fix this problem by freeing percpu stats from dev->destructor() instead of ndo_uninit() Reported-by:
Madalin-Cristian Bucur <madalin.bucur@freescale.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 5925a055 ] sk_dst_cache has __rcu annotation, so we need a cast to avoid following sparse error : include/net/sock.h:1774:19: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) include/net/sock.h:1774:19: expected struct dst_entry [noderef] <asn:4>*__ret include/net/sock.h:1774:19: got struct dst_entry *dst Signed-off-by:
kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Fixes: 7f502361 ("ipv4: irq safe sk_dst_[re]set() and ipv4_sk_update_pmtu() fix") Signed-off-by:
-
Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 7f502361 ] We have two different ways to handle changes to sk->sk_dst First way (used by TCP) assumes socket lock is owned by caller, and use no extra lock : __sk_dst_set() & __sk_dst_reset() Another way (used by UDP) uses sk_dst_lock because socket lock is not always taken. Note that sk_dst_lock is not softirq safe. These ways are not inter changeable for a given socket type. ipv4_sk_update_pmtu(), added in linux-3.8, added a race, as it used the socket lock as synchronization, but users might be UDP sockets. Instead of converting sk_dst_lock to a softirq safe version, use xchg() as we did for sk_rx_dst in commit e47eb5df ("udp: ipv4: do not use sk_dst_lock from softirq context") In a follow up patch, we probably can remove sk_dst_lock, as it is only used in IPv6. Signed-off-by:
-
Eric Dumazet authored
commit f8864972 upstream. When IP route cache had been removed in linux-3.6, we broke assumption that dst entries were all freed after rcu grace period. DST_NOCACHE dst were supposed to be freed from dst_release(). But it appears we want to keep such dst around, either in UDP sockets or tunnels. In sk_dst_get() we need to make sure dst refcount is not 0 before incrementing it, or else we might end up freeing a dst twice. DST_NOCACHE set on a dst does not mean this dst can not be attached to a socket or a tunnel. Then, before actual freeing, we need to observe a rcu grace period to make sure all other cpus can catch the fact the dst is no longer usable. Signed-off-by:
Dormando <dormando@rydia.net> Signed-off-by:
-
Bjørn Mork authored
[ Upstream commit 3acc7461 ] Messages from the modem exceeding 256 bytes cause communication failure. The WDM protocol is strictly "read on demand", meaning that we only poll for unread data after receiving a notification from the modem. Since we have no way to know how much data the modem has to send, we must make sure that the buffer we provide is "big enough". Message truncation does not work. Truncated messages are left unread until the modem has another message to send. Which often won't happen until the userspace application has given up waiting for the final part of the last message, and therefore sends another command. With a proper CDC WDM function there is a descriptor telling us which buffer size the modem uses. But with this vendor specific implementation there is no known way to calculate the exact "big enough" number. It is an unknown property of the modem firmware. Experience has shown that 256 is too small. The discussion of this failure ended up concluding that 512 might be too small as well. So 1024 seems like a reasonable value for now. Fixes: 41c47d8c ("net: huawei_cdc_ncm: Introduce the huawei_cdc_ncm driver") Cc: Enrico Mioso <mrkiko.rs@gmail.com> Reported-by:
Dan Williams <dcbw@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Enrico Mioso <mrkiko.rs@gmail.com> Tested-by:
-
Li RongQing authored
[ Upstream commit 916c1689 ] skb_cow called in vlan_reorder_header does not free the skb when it failed, and vlan_reorder_header returns NULL to reset original skb when it is called in vlan_untag, lead to a memory leak. Signed-off-by:
Li RongQing <roy.qing.li@gmail.com> Acked-by:
-
Daniel Borkmann authored
[ Upstream commit 24599e61 ] When writing to the sysctl field net.sctp.auth_enable, it can well be that the user buffer we handed over to proc_dointvec() via proc_sctp_do_auth() handler contains something other than integers. In that case, we would set an uninitialized 4-byte value from the stack to net->sctp.auth_enable that can be leaked back when reading the sysctl variable, and it can unintentionally turn auth_enable on/off based on the stack content since auth_enable is interpreted as a boolean. Fix it up by making sure proc_dointvec() returned sucessfully. Fixes: b14878cc ("net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint") Reported-by:
Florian Westphal <fwestpha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by:
-
