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  1. 29 Apr, 2020 27 commits
  3. 23 Apr, 2020 13 commits
    • Greg Kroah-Hartman's avatar
      Linux 4.19.118 · 7edd66cf
      Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
      7edd66cf
    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      bpf: fix buggy r0 retval refinement for tracing helpers · e0b80b7d
      Daniel Borkmann authored 
      [ no upstream commit ]

See the glory details in 10060503 ("bpf: Verifier, do_refine_retval_range
may clamp umin to 0 incorrectly") for why 849fa506 ("bpf/verifier: refine
retval R0 state for bpf_get_stack helper") is buggy. The whole series however
is not suitable for stable since it adds significant amount [0] of verifier
complexity in order to add 32bit subreg tracking. Something simpler is needed.

Unfortunately, reverting 849fa506 ("bpf/verifier: refine retval R0 state
for bpf_get_stack helper") or just cherry-picking 10060503 ("bpf: Verifier,
do_refine_retval_range may clamp umin to 0 incorrectly") is not an option since
it will break existing tracing programs badly (at least those that are using
bpf_get_stack() and bpf_probe_read_str() helpers). Not fixing it in stable is
also not an option since on 4.19 kernels an error will cause a soft-lockup due
to hitting dead-code sanitized branch since we don't hard-wire such branches
in old kernels yet. But even then for 5.x 849fa506 ("bpf/verifier: refine
retval R0 state for bpf_get_stack helper") would cause wrong bounds on the
verifier simluation when an error is hit.

In one of the earlier iterations of mentioned patch series for upstream there
was the concern that just using smax_value in do_refine_retval_range() would
nuke bounds by subsequent <<32 >>32 shifts before the comparison against 0 [1]
which eventually led to the 32bit subreg tracking in the first place. While I
initially went for implementing the idea [1] to pattern match the two shift
operations, it turned out to be more complex than actually needed, meaning, we
could simply treat do_refine_retval_range() similarly to how we branch off
verification for conditionals or under speculation, that is, pushing a new
reg state to the stack for later verification. This means, instead of verifying
the current path with the ret_reg in [S32MIN, msize_max_value] interval where
later bounds would get nuked, we split this into two: i) for the success case
where ret_reg can be in [0, msize_max_value], and ii) for the error case with
ret_reg known to be in interval [S32MIN, -1]. Latter will preserve the bounds
during these shift patterns and can match reg < 0 test. test_progs also succeed
with this approach.

  [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/158507130343.15666.8018068546764556975.stgit@john-Precision-5820-Tower/
  [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/158015334199.28573.4940395881683556537.stgit@john-XPS-13-9370/T/#m2e0ad1d5949131014748b6daa48a3495e7f0456d

Fixes: 849fa506 ("bpf/verifier: refine retval R0 state for bpf_get_stack helper")
Reported-by: default avatarLorenzo Fontana <fontanalorenz@gmail.com>
Reported-by: default avatarLeonardo Di Donato <leodidonato@gmail.com>
Reported-by: default avatarJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: default avatarJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Tested-by: default avatarJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Tested-by: default avatarLorenzo Fontana <fontanalorenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: default avatarLeonardo Di Donato <leodidonato@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      e0b80b7d
    • Waiman Long's avatar
      KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphore · 18779eac
      Waiman Long authored 
      commit d3ec10aa upstream.

A lockdep circular locking dependency report was seen when running a
keyutils test:

[12537.027242] ======================================================
[12537.059309] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[12537.088148] 4.18.0-147.7.1.el8_1.x86_64+debug #1 Tainted: G OE    --------- -  -
[12537.125253] ------------------------------------------------------
[12537.153189] keyctl/25598 is trying to acquire lock:
[12537.175087] 000000007c39f96c (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
[12537.208365]
[12537.208365] but task is already holding lock:
[12537.234507] 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220
[12537.270476]
[12537.270476] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[12537.270476]
[12537.307209]
[12537.307209] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[12537.340754]
[12537.340754] -> #3 (&type->lock_class){++++}:
[12537.367434]        down_write+0x4d/0x110
[12537.385202]        __key_link_begin+0x87/0x280
[12537.405232]        request_key_and_link+0x483/0xf70
[12537.427221]        request_key+0x3c/0x80
[12537.444839]        dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver]
[12537.468445]        dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs]
[12537.496731]        cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs]
[12537.519418]        cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs]
[12537.546263]        cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs]
[12537.573551]        cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs]
[12537.601045]        kthread+0x30c/0x3d0
[12537.617906]        ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[12537.636225]
[12537.636225] -> #2 (root_key_user.cons_lock){+.+.}:
[12537.664525]        __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0
[12537.683734]        request_key_and_link+0x35a/0xf70
[12537.705640]        request_key+0x3c/0x80
[12537.723304]        dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver]
[12537.746773]        dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs]
[12537.775607]        cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs]
[12537.798322]        cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs]
[12537.823369]        cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs]
[12537.847262]        cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs]
[12537.873477]        kthread+0x30c/0x3d0
[12537.890281]        ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[12537.908649]
[12537.908649] -> #1 (&tcp_ses->srv_mutex){+.+.}:
[12537.935225]        __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0
[12537.954450]        cifs_call_async+0x102/0x7f0 [cifs]
[12537.977250]        smb2_async_readv+0x6c3/0xc90 [cifs]
[12538.000659]        cifs_readpages+0x120a/0x1e50 [cifs]
[12538.023920]        read_pages+0xf5/0x560
[12538.041583]        __do_page_cache_readahead+0x41d/0x4b0
[12538.067047]        ondemand_readahead+0x44c/0xc10
[12538.092069]        filemap_fault+0xec1/0x1830
[12538.111637]        __do_fault+0x82/0x260
[12538.129216]        do_fault+0x419/0xfb0
[12538.146390]        __handle_mm_fault+0x862/0xdf0
[12538.167408]        handle_mm_fault+0x154/0x550
[12538.187401]        __do_page_fault+0x42f/0xa60
[12538.207395]        do_page_fault+0x38/0x5e0
[12538.225777]        page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[12538.243010]
[12538.243010] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}:
[12538.267875]        lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420
[12538.286848]        __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0
[12538.306006]        keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170
[12538.327936]        assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280
[12538.352154]        keyring_read+0xe9/0x110
[12538.370558]        keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220
[12538.391470]        do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0
[12538.410511]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf
[12538.435535]
[12538.435535] other info that might help us debug this:
[12538.435535]
[12538.472829] Chain exists of:
[12538.472829]   &mm->mmap_sem --> root_key_user.cons_lock --> &type->lock_class
[12538.472829]
[12538.524820]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[12538.524820]
[12538.551431]        CPU0                    CPU1
[12538.572654]        ----                    ----
[12538.595865]   lock(&type->lock_class);
[12538.613737]                                lock(root_key_user.cons_lock);
[12538.644234]                                lock(&type->lock_class);
[12538.672410]   lock(&mm->mmap_sem);
[12538.687758]
[12538.687758]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[12538.687758]
[12538.714455] 1 lock held by keyctl/25598:
[12538.732097]  #0: 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220
[12538.770573]
[12538.770573] stack backtrace:
[12538.790136] CPU: 2 PID: 25598 Comm: keyctl Kdump: loaded Tainted: G
[12538.844855] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360 Gen9, BIOS P89 12/27/2015
[12538.881963] Call Trace:
[12538.892897]  dump_stack+0x9a/0xf0
[12538.907908]  print_circular_bug.isra.25.cold.50+0x1bc/0x279
[12538.932891]  ? save_trace+0xd6/0x250
[12538.948979]  check_prev_add.constprop.32+0xc36/0x14f0
[12538.971643]  ? keyring_compare_object+0x104/0x190
[12538.992738]  ? check_usage+0x550/0x550
[12539.009845]  ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
[12539.025484]  ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x1e0
[12539.043555]  __lock_acquire+0x1f12/0x38d0
[12539.061551]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x10/0x10
[12539.080554]  lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420
[12539.100330]  ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
[12539.119079]  __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0
[12539.135869]  ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
[12539.153234]  keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170
[12539.172787]  ? keyring_read+0x110/0x110
[12539.190059]  assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280
[12539.211526]  keyring_read+0xe9/0x110
[12539.227561]  ? keyring_gc_check_iterator+0xc0/0xc0
[12539.249076]  keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220
[12539.266660]  do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0
[12539.283091]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf

One way to prevent this deadlock scenario from happening is to not
allow writing to userspace while holding the key semaphore. Instead,
an internal buffer is allocated for getting the keys out from the
read method first before copying them out to userspace without holding
the lock.

That requires taking out the __user modifier from all the relevant
read methods as well as additional changes to not use any userspace
write helpers. That is,

  1) The put_user() call is replaced by a direct copy.
  2) The copy_to_user() call is replaced by memcpy().
  3) All the fault handling code is removed.

Compiling on a x86-64 system, the size of the rxrpc_read() function is
reduced from 3795 bytes to 2384 bytes with this patch.

Fixes: ^1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reviewed-by: default avatarJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarWaiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      18779eac
    • Wen Yang's avatar
      mtd: phram: fix a double free issue in error path · 9e303d52
      Wen Yang authored 
      commit 49c64df8 upstream.

The variable 'name' is released multiple times in the error path,
which may cause double free issues.
This problem is avoided by adding a goto label to release the memory
uniformly. And this change also makes the code a bit more cleaner.

Fixes: 4f678a58 ("mtd: fix memory leaks in phram_setup")
Signed-off-by: default avatarWen Yang <wenyang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Joern Engel <joern@lazybastard.org>
Cc: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Vignesh Raghavendra <vigneshr@ti.com>
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: default avatarMiquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/20200318153156.25612-1-wenyang@linux.alibaba.comSigned-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      9e303d52
    • Dan Carpenter's avatar
      mtd: lpddr: Fix a double free in probe() · 42baf547
      Dan Carpenter authored 
      commit 4da0ea71 upstream.

This function is only called from lpddr_probe().  We free "lpddr" both
here and in the caller, so it's a double free.  The best place to free
"lpddr" is in lpddr_probe() so let's delete this one.

Fixes: 8dc00439 ("[MTD] LPDDR qinfo probing.")
Signed-off-by: default avatarDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMiquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/20200228092554.o57igp3nqhyvf66t@kili.mountainSigned-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      42baf547
    • Frieder Schrempf's avatar
      mtd: spinand: Explicitly use MTD_OPS_RAW to write the bad block marker to OOB · f966b038
      Frieder Schrempf authored 
      commit 621a7b78 upstream.

When writing the bad block marker to the OOB area the access mode
should be set to MTD_OPS_RAW as it is done for reading the marker.
Currently this only works because req.mode is initialized to
MTD_OPS_PLACE_OOB (0) and spinand_write_to_cache_op() checks for
req.mode != MTD_OPS_AUTO_OOB.

Fix this by explicitly setting req.mode to MTD_OPS_RAW.

Fixes: 7529df46 ("mtd: nand: Add core infrastructure to support SPI NANDs")
Signed-off-by: default avatarFrieder Schrempf <frieder.schrempf@kontron.de>
Reviewed-by: default avatarBoris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMiquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/20200218100432.32433-3-frieder.schrempf@kontron.deSigned-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      f966b038
    • Paul E. McKenney's avatar
      locktorture: Print ratio of acquisitions, not failures · 9c85fc00
      Paul E. McKenney authored 
      commit 80c503e0 upstream.

The __torture_print_stats() function in locktorture.c carefully
initializes local variable "min" to statp[0].n_lock_acquired, but
then compares it to statp[i].n_lock_fail.  Given that the .n_lock_fail
field should normally be zero, and given the initialization, it seems
reasonable to display the maximum and minimum number acquisitions
instead of miscomputing the maximum and minimum number of failures.
This commit therefore switches from failures to acquisitions.

And this turns out to be not only a day-zero bug, but entirely my
own fault.  I hate it when that happens!

Fixes: 0af3fe1e ("locktorture: Add a lock-torture kernel module")
Reported-by: default avatarWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Acked-by: default avatarWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      9c85fc00
    • Stephen Rothwell's avatar
      tty: evh_bytechan: Fix out of bounds accesses · 34f5859b
      Stephen Rothwell authored 
      commit 3670664b upstream.

ev_byte_channel_send() assumes that its third argument is a 16 byte
array. Some places where it is called it may not be (or we can't
easily tell if it is). Newer compilers have started producing warnings
about this, so make sure we actually pass a 16 byte array.

There may be more elegant solutions to this, but the driver is quite
old and hasn't been updated in many years.

The warnings (from a powerpc allyesconfig build) are:

  In file included from include/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:5,
                   from arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/byteorder.h:14,
                   from include/asm-generic/bitops/le.h:6,
                   from arch/powerpc/include/asm/bitops.h:250,
                   from include/linux/bitops.h:29,
                   from include/linux/kernel.h:12,
                   from include/asm-generic/bug.h:19,
                   from arch/powerpc/include/asm/bug.h:109,
                   from include/linux/bug.h:5,
                   from include/linux/mmdebug.h:5,
                   from include/linux/gfp.h:5,
                   from include/linux/slab.h:15,
                   from drivers/tty/ehv_bytechan.c:24:
  drivers/tty/ehv_bytechan.c: In function ‘ehv_bc_udbg_putc’:
  arch/powerpc/include/asm/epapr_hcalls.h:298:20: warning: array subscript 1 is outside array bounds of ‘const char[1]’ [-Warray-bounds]
    298 |  r6 = be32_to_cpu(p[1]);
  include/uapi/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:40:51: note: in definition of macro ‘__be32_to_cpu’
     40 | #define __be32_to_cpu(x) ((__force __u32)(__be32)(x))
        |                                                   ^
  arch/powerpc/include/asm/epapr_hcalls.h:298:7: note: in expansion of macro ‘be32_to_cpu’
    298 |  r6 = be32_to_cpu(p[1]);
        |       ^~~~~~~~~~~
  drivers/tty/ehv_bytechan.c:166:13: note: while referencing ‘data’
    166 | static void ehv_bc_udbg_putc(char c)
        |             ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Fixes: dcd83aaf ("tty/powerpc: introduce the ePAPR embedded hypervisor byte channel driver")
Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Tested-by: default avatarLaurentiu Tudor <laurentiu.tudor@nxp.com>
[mpe: Trim warnings from change log]
Signed-off-by: default avatarMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200109183912.5fcb52aa@canb.auug.org.auSigned-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      34f5859b
    • Maxime Roussin-Bélanger's avatar
      iio: si1133: read 24-bit signed integer for measurement · 84f77a94
      Maxime Roussin-Bélanger authored 
      commit 328b50e9 upstream.

The chip is configured in 24 bit mode. The values read from
it must always be treated as is. This fixes the issue by
replacing the previous 16 bits value by a 24 bits buffer.

This changes affects the value output by previous version of
the driver, since the least significant byte was missing.
The upper half of 16 bit values previously output are now
the upper half of a 24 bit value.

Fixes: e01e7eaf ("iio: light: introduce si1133")
Reported-by: default avatarSimon Goyette <simon.goyette@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: default avatarGuillaume Champagne <champagne.guillaume.c@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMaxime Roussin-Bélanger <maxime.roussinbelanger@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGuillaume Champagne <champagne.guillaume.c@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      84f77a94
    • Dan Carpenter's avatar
      fbdev: potential information leak in do_fb_ioctl() · 7b24ff9e
      Dan Carpenter authored 
      commit d3d19d6f upstream.

The "fix" struct has a 2 byte hole after ->ywrapstep and the
"fix = info->fix;" assignment doesn't necessarily clear it.  It depends
on the compiler.  The solution is just to replace the assignment with an
memcpy().

Fixes: 1f5e31d7 ("fbmem: don't call copy_from/to_user() with mutex held")
Signed-off-by: default avatarDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se>
Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarBartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200113100132.ixpaymordi24n3av@kili.mountainSigned-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      7b24ff9e
    • Florian Fainelli's avatar
      net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Fix overflow checks · 65dd68c7
      Florian Fainelli authored 
      commit d0802dc4 upstream.

Commit f949a12f ("net: dsa: bcm_sf2: fix buffer overflow doing
set_rxnfc") tried to fix the some user controlled buffer overflows in
bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_set() and bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_del() but the fix was using
CFP_NUM_RULES, which while it is correct not to overflow the bitmaps, is
not representative of what the device actually supports. Correct that by
using bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_size() instead.

The latter subtracts the number of rules by 1, so change the checks from
greater than or equal to greater than accordingly.

Fixes: f949a12f ("net: dsa: bcm_sf2: fix buffer overflow doing set_rxnfc")
Signed-off-by: default avatarFlorian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      65dd68c7
    • Chao Yu's avatar
      f2fs: fix to wait all node page writeback · 8b10cf2d
      Chao Yu authored 
      [ Upstream commit dc5a9412 ]

There is a race condition that we may miss to wait for all node pages
writeback, fix it.

- fsync()				- shrink
 - f2fs_do_sync_file
					 - __write_node_page
					  - set_page_writeback(page#0)
					  : remove DIRTY/TOWRITE flag
  - f2fs_fsync_node_pages
  : won't find page #0 as TOWRITE flag was removeD
  - f2fs_wait_on_node_pages_writeback
  : wont' wait page #0 writeback as it was not in fsync_node_list list.
					   - f2fs_add_fsync_node_entry

Fixes: 50fa53ec ("f2fs: fix to avoid broken of dnode block list")
Signed-off-by: default avatarChao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
      8b10cf2d
    • Adrian Huang's avatar
      iommu/amd: Fix the configuration of GCR3 table root pointer · 2fdac8fd
      Adrian Huang authored 
      [ Upstream commit c20f3653 ]

The SPA of the GCR3 table root pointer[51:31] masks 20 bits. However,
this requires 21 bits (Please see the AMD IOMMU specification).
This leads to the potential failure when the bit 51 of SPA of
the GCR3 table root pointer is 1'.
Signed-off-by: default avatarAdrian Huang <ahuang12@lenovo.com>
Fixes: 52815b75 ("iommu/amd: Add support for IOMMUv2 domain mode")
Signed-off-by: default avatarJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: default avatarSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
      2fdac8fd
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