- 25 Aug, 2019 32 commits
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Tomas Bortoli authored
commit 30a8beeb upstream. Uninitialized Kernel memory can leak to USB devices. Fix by using kzalloc() instead of kmalloc() on the affected buffers. Signed-off-by:
Tomas Bortoli <tomasbortoli@gmail.com> Reported-by: syzbot+513e4d0985298538bf9b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 0a25e1f4 ("can: peak_usb: add support for PEAK new CANFD USB adapters") Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Tomas Bortoli authored
commit ead16e53 upstream. Uninitialized Kernel memory can leak to USB devices. Fix by using kzalloc() instead of kmalloc() on the affected buffers. Signed-off-by:
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Leonard Crestez authored
[ Upstream commit 4ce54af8 ] Some hardware PMU drivers will override perf_event.cpu inside their event_init callback. This causes a lockdep splat when initialized through the kernel API: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 250 at kernel/events/core.c:2917 ctx_sched_out+0x78/0x208 pc : ctx_sched_out+0x78/0x208 Call trace: ctx_sched_out+0x78/0x208 __perf_install_in_context+0x160/0x248 remote_function+0x58/0x68 generic_exec_single+0x100/0x180 smp_call_function_single+0x174/0x1b8 perf_install_in_context+0x178/0x188 perf_event_create_kernel_counter+0x118/0x160 Fix this by calling perf_install_in_context with event->cpu, just like perf_event_open Signed-off-by:
Leonard Crestez <leonard.crestez@nxp.com> Signed-off-by:
Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by:
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Frank Li <Frank.li@nxp.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/c4ebe0503623066896d7046def4d6b1e06e0eb2e.1563972056.git.leonard.crestez@nxp.comSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Peter Zijlstra authored
[ Upstream commit 952041a8 ] While reviewing rwsem down_slowpath, Will noticed ldsem had a copy of a bug we just found for rwsem. X = 0; CPU0 CPU1 rwsem_down_read() for (;;) { set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE); X = 1; rwsem_up_write(); rwsem_mark_wake() atomic_long_add(adjustment, &sem->count); smp_store_release(&waiter->task, NULL); if (!waiter.task) break; ... } r = X; Allows 'r == 0'. Reported-by:
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Hannes Reinecke authored
[ Upstream commit 20122994 ] Retrying immediately after we've received a 'transitioning' sense code is pretty much pointless, we should always use a delay before retrying. So ensure the default delay is applied before retrying. Signed-off-by:
Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Tested-by:
Zhangguanghui <zhang.guanghui@h3c.com> Signed-off-by:
Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Tyrel Datwyler authored
[ Upstream commit 5578257c ] While removing an ibmvfc client adapter a WARN_ON like the following WARN_ON is seen in the kernel log: WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 5421 at ./include/linux/dma-mapping.h:541 ibmvfc_free_event_pool+0x12c/0x1f0 [ibmvfc] CPU: 6 PID: 5421 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G E 4.17.0-rc1-next-20180419-autotest #1 NIP: d00000000290328c LR: d00000000290325c CTR: c00000000036ee20 REGS: c000000288d1b7e0 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G E (4.17.0-rc1-next-20180419-autotest) MSR: 800000010282b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE,TM[E]> CR: 44008828 XER: 20000000 CFAR: c00000000036e408 SOFTE: 1 GPR00: d00000000290325c c000000288d1ba60 d000000002917900 c000000289d75448 GPR04: 0000000000000071 c0000000ff870000 0000000018040000 0000000000000001 GPR08: 0000000000000000 c00000000156e838 0000000000000001 d00000000290c640 GPR12: c00000000036ee20 c00000001ec4dc00 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000100276901e0 0000000010020598 GPR20: 0000000010020550 0000000010020538 0000000010020578 00000000100205b0 GPR24: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000010020590 5deadbeef0000100 GPR28: 5deadbeef0000200 d000000002910b00 0000000000000071 c0000002822f87d8 NIP [d00000000290328c] ibmvfc_free_event_pool+0x12c/0x1f0 [ibmvfc] LR [d00000000290325c] ibmvfc_free_event_pool+0xfc/0x1f0 [ibmvfc] Call Trace: [c000000288d1ba60] [d00000000290325c] ibmvfc_free_event_pool+0xfc/0x1f0 [ibmvfc] (unreliable) [c000000288d1baf0] [d000000002909390] ibmvfc_abort_task_set+0x7b0/0x8b0 [ibmvfc] [c000000288d1bb70] [c0000000000d8c68] vio_bus_remove+0x68/0x100 [c000000288d1bbb0] [c0000000007da7c4] device_release_driver_internal+0x1f4/0x2d0 [c000000288d1bc00] [c0000000007da95c] driver_detach+0x7c/0x100 [c000000288d1bc40] [c0000000007d8af4] bus_remove_driver+0x84/0x140 [c000000288d1bcb0] [c0000000007db6ac] driver_unregister+0x4c/0xa0 [c000000288d1bd20] [c0000000000d6e7c] vio_unregister_driver+0x2c/0x50 [c000000288d1bd50] [d00000000290ba0c] cleanup_module+0x24/0x15e0 [ibmvfc] [c000000288d1bd70] [c0000000001dadb0] sys_delete_module+0x220/0x2d0 [c000000288d1be30] [c00000000000b284] system_call+0x58/0x6c Instruction dump: e8410018 e87f0068 809f0078 e8bf0080 e8df0088 2fa30000 419e008c e9230200 2fa90000 419e0080 894d098a 794a07e0 <0b0a0000> e9290008 2fa90000 419e0028 This is tripped as a result of irqs being disabled during the call to dma_free_coherent() by ibmvfc_free_event_pool(). At this point in the code path we have quiesced the adapter and its overly paranoid anyways to be holding the host lock. Reported-by:
Abdul Haleem <abdhalee@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Junxiao Bi authored
[ Upstream commit 3b5f307e ] While loading fw crashdump in function fw_crash_buffer_show(), left bytes in one dma chunk was not checked, if copying size over it, overflow access will cause kernel panic. Signed-off-by:
Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Acked-by:
Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
[ Upstream commit d64b212e ] When building a multiplatform kernel that includes armv4 support, the default target CPU does not support the blx instruction, which leads to a build failure: arch/arm/mach-davinci/sleep.S: Assembler messages: arch/arm/mach-davinci/sleep.S:56: Error: selected processor does not support `blx ip' in ARM mode Add a .arch statement in the sources to make this file build. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190722145211.1154785-1-arnd@arndb.deAcked-by:
Sekhar Nori <nsekhar@ti.com> Signed-off-by:
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by:
Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Signed-off-by:
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Lorenzo Pieralisi authored
[ Upstream commit 5a46d3f7 ] Static analysis identified that index comparison against ITS entries in iort_dev_find_its_id() is off by one. Update the comparison condition and clarify the resulting error message. Fixes: 4bf2efd2 ("ACPI: Add new IORT functions to support MSI domain handling") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20190613065410.GB16334@mwanda/Reviewed-by:
Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com> Reported-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com> Cc: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
[ Upstream commit 77ce56e2 ] Building with clang and KASAN, we get a warning about an overly large stack frame on 32-bit architectures: drivers/block/drbd/drbd_receiver.c:921:31: error: stack frame size of 1280 bytes in function 'conn_connect' [-Werror,-Wframe-larger-than=] We already allocate other data dynamically in this function, so just do the same for the shash descriptor, which makes up most of this memory. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190617132440.2721536-1-arnd@arndb.de/Reviewed-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by:
Roland Kammerer <roland.kammerer@linbit.com> Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by:
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Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo authored
[ Upstream commit d95daf5a ] When perf_add_probe_events() we call cleanup_perf_probe_events() for the pev pointer it receives, then, as part of handling this failure the main 'perf probe' goes on and calls cleanup_params() and that will again call cleanup_perf_probe_events()for the same pointer, so just set nevents to zero when handling the failure of perf_add_probe_events() to avoid the double free. Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-x8qgma4g813z96dvtw9w219q@git.kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Charles Keepax authored
[ Upstream commit 3b817994 ] Draining makes little sense in the situation of hardware overrun, as the hardware will have consumed all its available samples. Additionally, draining whilst the stream is paused would presumably get stuck as no data is being consumed on the DSP side. Signed-off-by:
Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com> Acked-by:
Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Charles Keepax authored
[ Upstream commit a70ab8a8 ] Partial drain and next track are intended for gapless playback and don't really have an obvious interpretation for a capture stream, so makes sense to not allow those operations on capture streams. Signed-off-by:
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Charles Keepax authored
[ Upstream commit 26c3f154 ] Currently, whilst in SNDRV_PCM_STATE_OPEN it is possible to call snd_compr_stop, snd_compr_drain and snd_compr_partial_drain, which allow a transition to SNDRV_PCM_STATE_SETUP. The stream should only be able to move to the setup state once it has received a SNDRV_COMPRESS_SET_PARAMS ioctl. Fix this issue by not allowing those ioctls whilst in the open state. Signed-off-by:
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Charles Keepax authored
[ Upstream commit 4475f8c4 ] A previous fix to the stop handling on compressed capture streams causes some knock on issues. The previous fix updated snd_compr_drain_notify to set the state back to PREPARED for capture streams. This causes some issues however as the handling for snd_compr_poll differs between the two states and some user-space applications were relying on the poll failing after the stream had been stopped. To correct this regression whilst still fixing the original problem the patch was addressing, update the capture handling to skip the PREPARED state rather than skipping the SETUP state as it has done until now. Fixes: 4f2ab5e1 ("ALSA: compress: Fix stop handling on compressed capture streams") Signed-off-by:
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Julian Wiedmann authored
[ Upstream commit a6ec414a ] If the device driver were to send out a full queue's worth of SBALs, current code would end up discovering the last of those SBALs as PRIMED and erroneously skip the SIGA-w. This immediately stalls the queue. Add a check to not attempt fast-requeue in this case. While at it also make sure that the state of the previous SBAL was successfully extracted before inspecting it. Signed-off-by:
Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:
Jens Remus <jremus@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Wen Yang authored
[ Upstream commit e0a12445 ] The cpu variable is still being used in the of_get_property() call after the of_node_put() call, which may result in use-after-free. Fixes: a9acc26b ("cpufreq/pasemi: fix possible object reference leak") Signed-off-by:
Wen Yang <wen.yang99@zte.com.cn> Acked-by:
Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Björn Gerhart authored
[ Upstream commit f3d43e2e ] Fixed address of third NCT6106_REG_WEIGHT_DUTY_STEP, and added missed NCT6106_REG_TOLERANCE_H. Fixes: 6c009501 ("hwmon: (nct6775) Add support for NCT6102D/6106D") Signed-off-by:
Bjoern Gerhart <gerhart@posteo.de> Signed-off-by:
Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by:
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Brian Norris authored
[ Upstream commit d2b3fe42 ] ieee80211_set_wmm_default() normally sets up the initial CW min/max for each queue, except that it skips doing this if the driver doesn't support ->conf_tx. We still end up calling drv_conf_tx() in some cases (e.g., ieee80211_reconfig()), which also still won't do anything useful...except it complains here about the invalid CW parameters. Let's just skip the WARN if we weren't going to do anything useful with the parameters. Signed-off-by:
Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190718015712.197499-1-briannorris@chromium.orgSigned-off-by:
Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Tai authored
[ Upstream commit 94bccc34 ] iscsi_ibft can use ACPI to find the iBFT entry during bootup, currently, ISCSI_IBFT depends on ISCSI_IBFT_FIND which is a X86 legacy way to find the iBFT by searching through the low memory. This patch changes the dependency so that other arch like ARM64 can use ISCSI_IBFT as long as the arch supports ACPI. ibft_init() needs to use the global variable ibft_addr declared in iscsi_ibft_find.c. A #ifndef CONFIG_ISCSI_IBFT_FIND is needed to declare the variable if CONFIG_ISCSI_IBFT_FIND is not selected. Moving ibft_addr into the iscsi_ibft.c does not work because if ISCSI_IBFT is selected as a module, the arch/x86/kernel/setup.c won't be able to find the variable at compile time. Signed-off-by:
Thomas Tai <thomas.tai@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
[ Upstream commit 1b0890cd ] Thomas and Juliana report a deadlock when running: (rmmod nf_conntrack_netlink/xfrm_user) conntrack -e NEW -E & modprobe -v xfrm_user They provided following analysis: conntrack -e NEW -E netlink_bind() netlink_lock_table() -> increases "nl_table_users" nfnetlink_bind() # does not unlock the table as it's locked by netlink_bind() __request_module() call_usermodehelper_exec() This triggers "modprobe nf_conntrack_netlink" from kernel, netlink_bind() won't return until modprobe process is done. "modprobe xfrm_user": xfrm_user_init() register_pernet_subsys() -> grab pernet_ops_rwsem .. netlink_table_grab() calls schedule() as "nl_table_users" is non-zero so modprobe is blocked because netlink_bind() increased nl_table_users while also holding pernet_ops_rwsem. "modprobe nf_conntrack_netlink" runs and inits nf_conntrack_netlink: ctnetlink_init() register_pernet_subsys() -> blocks on "pernet_ops_rwsem" thanks to xfrm_user module both modprobe processes wait on one another -- neither can make progress. Switch netlink_bind() to "nowait" modprobe -- this releases the netlink table lock, which then allows both modprobe instances to complete. Reported-by:
Thomas Jarosch <thomas.jarosch@intra2net.com> Reported-by:
Juliana Rodrigueiro <juliana.rodrigueiro@intra2net.com> Signed-off-by:
Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by:
Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by:
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Stephane Grosjean authored
commit fee6a892 upstream. When closing the CAN device while tx skbs are inflight, echo skb could be released twice. By calling close_candev() before unlinking all pending tx urbs, then the internal echo_skb[] array is fully and correctly cleared before the USB write callback and, therefore, can_get_echo_skb() are called, for each aborted URB. Fixes: bb478555 ("can: usb: PEAK-System Technik USB adapters driver core") Signed-off-by:
Stephane Grosjean <s.grosjean@peak-system.com> Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Suzuki K Poulose authored
commit fc05481b upstream. syzbot reported the following crash [0]: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in usb_free_coherent+0x79/0x80 drivers/usb/core/usb.c:928 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881b18599c8 by task syz-executor.4/16007 CPU: 0 PID: 16007 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc2+ #23 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0xca/0x13e lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description+0x6a/0x32c mm/kasan/report.c:351 __kasan_report.cold+0x1a/0x33 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xe/0x12 mm/kasan/common.c:612 usb_free_coherent+0x79/0x80 drivers/usb/core/usb.c:928 yurex_delete+0x138/0x330 drivers/usb/misc/yurex.c:100 kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] yurex_release+0x66/0x90 drivers/usb/misc/yurex.c:392 __fput+0x2d7/0x840 fs/file_table.c:280 task_work_run+0x13f/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:113 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:188 [inline] exit_to_usermode_loop+0x1d2/0x200 arch/x86/entry/common.c:163 prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:194 [inline] syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:274 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x45f/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:299 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x413511 Code: 75 14 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 04 1b 00 00 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 0a fc ff ff 48 89 04 24 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 8b 3c 24 48 89 c2 e8 53 fc ff ff 48 89 d0 48 83 c4 08 48 3d 01 RSP: 002b:00007ffc424ea2e0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000007 RCX: 0000000000413511 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000029a2fc22 R09: 0000000029a2fc26 R10: 00007ffc424ea3c0 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 000000000075c9a0 R13: 000000000075c9a0 R14: 0000000000761938 R15: ffffffffffffffff Allocated by task 2776: save_stack+0x1b/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:69 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:77 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:487 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xbf/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:460 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:552 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:748 [inline] usb_alloc_dev+0x51/0xf95 drivers/usb/core/usb.c:583 hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5004 [inline] hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5213 [inline] port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5359 [inline] hub_event+0x15c0/0x3640 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5441 process_one_work+0x92b/0x1530 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0x96/0xe20 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x318/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:255 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 Freed by task 16007: save_stack+0x1b/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:69 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:77 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:449 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1423 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1470 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:3012 [inline] kfree+0xe4/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3953 device_release+0x71/0x200 drivers/base/core.c:1064 kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:693 [inline] kobject_release lib/kobject.c:722 [inline] kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] kobject_put+0x171/0x280 lib/kobject.c:739 put_device+0x1b/0x30 drivers/base/core.c:2213 usb_put_dev+0x1f/0x30 drivers/usb/core/usb.c:725 yurex_delete+0x40/0x330 drivers/usb/misc/yurex.c:95 kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] yurex_release+0x66/0x90 drivers/usb/misc/yurex.c:392 __fput+0x2d7/0x840 fs/file_table.c:280 task_work_run+0x13f/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:113 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:188 [inline] exit_to_usermode_loop+0x1d2/0x200 arch/x86/entry/common.c:163 prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:194 [inline] syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:274 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x45f/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:299 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881b1859980 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 The buggy address is located 72 bytes inside of 2048-byte region [ffff8881b1859980, ffff8881b185a180) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0006c61600 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881da00c000 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 flags: 0x200000000010200(slab|head) raw: 0200000000010200 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 ffff8881da00c000 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000000f000f 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8881b1859880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff8881b1859900: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc > ffff8881b1859980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8881b1859a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8881b1859a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== A quick look at the yurex_delete() shows that we drop the reference to the usb_device before releasing any buffers associated with the device. Delay the reference drop until we have finished the cleanup. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0000000000003f86d8058f0bd671@google.com/ Fixes: 6bc235a2 ("USB: add driver for Meywa-Denki & Kayac YUREX") Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tomoki Sekiyama <tomoki.sekiyama@gmail.com> Cc: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com> Cc: andreyknvl@google.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com Cc: dtor@chromium.org Reported-by: syzbot+d1fedb1c1fdb07fca507@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by:
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190805111528.6758-1-suzuki.poulose@arm.comSigned-off-by:
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Thomas Richter authored
commit 12a6d294 upstream. On s390 the modules loaded in memory have the text segment located after the GOT and Relocation table. This can be seen with this output: [root@m35lp76 perf]# fgrep qeth /proc/modules qeth 151552 1 qeth_l2, Live 0x000003ff800b2000 ... [root@m35lp76 perf]# cat /sys/module/qeth/sections/.text 0x000003ff800b3990 [root@m35lp76 perf]# There is an offset of 0x1990 bytes. The size of the qeth module is 151552 bytes (0x25000 in hex). The location of the GOT/relocation table at the beginning of a module is unique to s390. commit 203d8a4a ("perf s390: Fix 'start' address of module's map") adjusts the start address of a module in the map structures, but does not adjust the size of the modules. This leads to overlapping of module maps as this example shows: [root@m35lp76 perf] # ./perf report -D 0 0 0xfb0 [0xa0]: PERF_RECORD_MMAP -1/0: [0x3ff800b3990(0x25000) @ 0]: x /lib/modules/.../qeth.ko.xz 0 0 0x1050 [0xb0]: PERF_RECORD_MMAP -1/0: [0x3ff800d85a0(0x8000) @ 0]: x /lib/modules/.../ip6_tables.ko.xz The module qeth.ko has an adjusted start address modified to b3990, but its size is unchanged and the module ends at 0x3ff800d8990. This end address overlaps with the next modules start address of 0x3ff800d85a0. When the size of the leading GOT/Relocation table stored in the beginning of the text segment (0x1990 bytes) is subtracted from module qeth end address, there are no overlaps anymore: 0x3ff800d8990 - 0x1990 = 0x0x3ff800d7000 which is the same as 0x3ff800b2000 + 0x25000 = 0x0x3ff800d7000. To fix this issue, also adjust the modules size in function arch__fix_module_text_start(). Add another function parameter named size and reduce the size of the module when the text segment start address is changed. Output after: 0 0 0xfb0 [0xa0]: PERF_RECORD_MMAP -1/0: [0x3ff800b3990(0x23670) @ 0]: x /lib/modules/.../qeth.ko.xz 0 0 0x1050 [0xb0]: PERF_RECORD_MMAP -1/0: [0x3ff800d85a0(0x7a60) @ 0]: x /lib/modules/.../ip6_tables.ko.xz Reported-by:
Stefan Liebler <stli@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by:
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Adrian Hunter authored
commit 3de7ae0b upstream. Threads synthesized from /proc have comms with a start time of zero, and not marked as "exec". Currently, there can be 2 such comms. The first is created by processing a synthesized fork event and is set to the parent's comm string, and the second by processing a synthesized comm event set to the thread's current comm string. In the absence of an "exec" comm, thread__exec_comm() picks the last (oldest) comm, which, in the case above, is the parent's comm string. For a main thread, that is very probably wrong. Use the second-to-last in that case. This affects only db-export because it is the only user of thread__exec_comm(). Example: $ sudo perf record -a -o pt-a-sleep-1 -e intel_pt//u -- sleep 1 $ sudo chown ahunter pt-a-sleep-1 Before: $ perf script -i pt-a-sleep-1 --itrace=bep -s tools/perf/scripts/python/export-to-sqlite.py pt-a-sleep-1.db branches calls $ sqlite3 -header -column pt-a-sleep-1.db 'select * from comm_threads_view' comm_id command thread_id pid tid ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- 1 swapper 1 0 0 2 rcu_sched 2 10 10 3 kthreadd 3 78 78 5 sudo 4 15180 15180 5 sudo 5 15180 15182 7 kworker/4: 6 10335 10335 8 kthreadd 7 55 55 10 systemd 8 865 865 10 systemd 9 865 875 13 perf 10 15181 15181 15 sleep 10 15181 15181 16 kworker/3: 11 14179 14179 17 kthreadd 12 29376 29376 19 systemd 13 746 746 21 systemd 14 401 401 23 systemd 15 879 879 23 systemd 16 879 945 25 kthreadd 17 556 556 27 kworker/u1 18 14136 14136 28 kworker/u1 19 15021 15021 29 kthreadd 20 509 509 31 systemd 21 836 836 31 systemd 22 836 967 33 systemd 23 1148 1148 33 systemd 24 1148 1163 35 kworker/2: 25 17988 17988 36 kworker/0: 26 13478 13478 After: $ perf script -i pt-a-sleep-1 --itrace=bep -s tools/perf/scripts/python/export-to-sqlite.py pt-a-sleep-1b.db branches calls $ sqlite3 -header -column pt-a-sleep-1b.db 'select * from comm_threads_view' comm_id command thread_id pid tid ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- 1 swapper 1 0 0 2 rcu_sched 2 10 10 3 kswapd0 3 78 78 4 perf 4 15180 15180 4 perf 5 15180 15182 6 kworker/4: 6 10335 10335 7 kcompactd0 7 55 55 8 accounts-d 8 865 865 8 accounts-d 9 865 875 10 perf 10 15181 15181 12 sleep 10 15181 15181 13 kworker/3: 11 14179 14179 14 kworker/1: 12 29376 29376 15 haveged 13 746 746 16 systemd-jo 14 401 401 17 NetworkMan 15 879 879 17 NetworkMan 16 879 945 19 irq/131-iw 17 556 556 20 kworker/u1 18 14136 14136 21 kworker/u1 19 15021 15021 22 kworker/u1 20 509 509 23 thermald 21 836 836 23 thermald 22 836 967 25 unity-sett 23 1148 1148 25 unity-sett 24 1148 1163 27 kworker/2: 25 17988 17988 28 kworker/0: 26 13478 13478 Signed-off-by:
Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 65de51f9 ("perf tools: Identify which comms are from exec") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190808064823.14846-1-adrian.hunter@intel.comSigned-off-by:
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Thomas Richter authored
commit 9ad4652b upstream. During work on perf report for s390 I ran into the following issue: 0 0x318 [0x78]: PERF_RECORD_MMAP -1/0: [0x3ff804d6990(0xfffffc007fb2966f) @ 0]: x /lib/modules/4.12.0perf1+/kernel/drivers/s390/net/qeth_l2.ko This is a PERF_RECORD_MMAP entry of the perf.data file with an invalid module size for qeth_l2.ko (the s390 ethernet device driver). Even a mainframe does not have 0xfffffc007fb2966f bytes of main memory. It turned out that this wrong size is created by the perf record command. What happens is this function call sequence from __cmd_record(): perf_session__new(): perf_session__create_kernel_maps(): machine__create_kernel_maps(): machine__create_modules(): Creates map for all loaded kernel modules. modules__parse(): Reads /proc/modules and extracts module name and load address (1st and last column) machine__create_module(): Called for every module found in /proc/modules. Creates a new map for every module found and enters module name and start address into the map. Since the module end address is unknown it is set to zero. This ends up with a kernel module map list sorted by module start addresses. All module end addresses are zero. Last machine__create_kernel_maps() calls function map_groups__fixup_end(). This function iterates through the maps and assigns each map entry's end address the successor map entry start address. The last entry of the map group has no successor, so ~0 is used as end to consume the remaining memory. Later __cmd_record calls function record__synthesize() which in turn calls perf_event__synthesize_kernel_mmap() and perf_event__synthesize_modules() to create PERF_REPORT_MMAP entries into the perf.data file. On s390 this results in the last module qeth_l2.ko (which has highest start address, see module table: [root@s8360047 perf]# cat /proc/modules qeth_l2 86016 1 - Live 0x000003ff804d6000 qeth 266240 1 qeth_l2, Live 0x000003ff80296000 ccwgroup 24576 1 qeth, Live 0x000003ff80218000 vmur 36864 0 - Live 0x000003ff80182000 qdio 143360 2 qeth_l2,qeth, Live 0x000003ff80002000 [root@s8360047 perf]# ) to be the last entry and its map has an end address of ~0. When the PERF_RECORD_MMAP entry is created for kernel module qeth_l2.ko its start address and length is written. The length is calculated in line: event->mmap.len = pos->end - pos->start; and results in 0xffffffffffffffff - 0x3ff804d6990(*) = 0xfffffc007fb2966f (*) On s390 the module start address is actually determined by a __weak function named arch__fix_module_text_start() in machine__create_module(). I think this improvable. We can use the module size (2nd column of /proc/modules) to get each loaded kernel module size and calculate its end address. Only for map entries which do not have a valid end address (end is still zero) we can use the heuristic we have now, that is use successor start address or ~0. Signed-off-by:
Thomas-Mich Richter <tmricht@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:
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Joerg Roedel authored
commit 3f8fd02b upstream. On x86-32 with PTI enabled, parts of the kernel page-tables are not shared between processes. This can cause mappings in the vmalloc/ioremap area to persist in some page-tables after the region is unmapped and released. When the region is re-used the processes with the old mappings do not fault in the new mappings but still access the old ones. This causes undefined behavior, in reality often data corruption, kernel oopses and panics and even spontaneous reboots. Fix this problem by activly syncing unmaps in the vmalloc/ioremap area to all page-tables in the system before the regions can be re-used. References: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1118689 Fixes: 5d72b4fb ('x86, mm: support huge I/O mapping capability I/F') Signed-off-by:
Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190719184652.11391-4-joro@8bytes.orgSigned-off-by:
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Joerg Roedel authored
commit 8e998fc2 upstream. With huge-page ioremap areas the unmappings also need to be synced between all page-tables. Otherwise it can cause data corruption when a region is unmapped and later re-used. Make the vmalloc_sync_one() function ready to sync unmappings and make sure vmalloc_sync_all() iterates over all page-tables even when an unmapped PMD is found. Fixes: 5d72b4fb ('x86, mm: support huge I/O mapping capability I/F') Signed-off-by:
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Joerg Roedel authored
commit 51b75b5b upstream. Do not require a struct page for the mapped memory location because it might not exist. This can happen when an ioremapped region is mapped with 2MB pages. Fixes: 5d72b4fb ('x86, mm: support huge I/O mapping capability I/F') Signed-off-by:
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Wenwen Wang authored
commit c7cd7c74 upstream. In sound_insert_unit(), the controlling structure 's' is allocated through kmalloc(). Then it is added to the sound driver list by invoking __sound_insert_unit(). Later on, if __register_chrdev() fails, 's' is removed from the list through __sound_remove_unit(). If 'index' is not less than 0, -EBUSY is returned to indicate the error. However, 's' is not deallocated on this execution path, leading to a memory leak bug. To fix the above issue, free 's' before -EBUSY is returned. Signed-off-by:
Wenwen Wang <wenwen@cs.uga.edu> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Oliver Neukum authored
commit c468a8aa upstream. We have to drop the mutex before we close() upon disconnect() as close() needs the lock. This is safe to do by dropping the mutex as intfdata is already set to NULL, so open() will fail. Fixes: 03f36e88 ("USB: open disconnect race in iowarrior") Reported-by: syzbot+a64a382964bf6c71a9c0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190808092728.23417-1-oneukum@suse.comSigned-off-by:
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Gavin Li authored
commit c43f28df upstream. Upon an error within proc_do_submiturb(), dec_usb_memory_use_count() gets called once by the error handling tail and again by free_async(). Remove the first call. Signed-off-by:
Gavin Li <git@thegavinli.com> Acked-by:
Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190804235044.22327-1-gavinli@thegavinli.comSigned-off-by:
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- 11 Aug, 2019 8 commits
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit f36cf386 upstream. Intel provided the following information: On all current Atom processors, instructions that use a segment register value (e.g. a load or store) will not speculatively execute before the last writer of that segment retires. Thus they will not use a speculatively written segment value. That means on ATOMs there is no speculation through SWAPGS, so the SWAPGS entry paths can be excluded from the extra LFENCE if PTI is disabled. Create a separate bug flag for the through SWAPGS speculation and mark all out-of-order ATOMs and AMD/HYGON CPUs as not affected. The in-order ATOMs are excluded from the whole mitigation mess anyway. Reported-by:
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by:
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reviewed-by:
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> [bwh: Backported to 4.4: - There's no whitelist entry (or any support) for Hygon CPUs - Adjust context, indentation] Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Josh Poimboeuf authored
commit 64dbc122 upstream. Somehow the swapgs mitigation entry code patch ended up with a JMPQ instruction instead of JMP, where only the short jump is needed. Some assembler versions apparently fail to optimize JMPQ into a two-byte JMP when possible, instead always using a 7-byte JMP with relocation. For some reason that makes the entry code explode with a #GP during boot. Change it back to "JMP" as originally intended. Fixes: 18ec54fd ("x86/speculation: Prepare entry code for Spectre v1 swapgs mitigations") Signed-off-by:
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Josh Poimboeuf authored
commit a2059825 upstream. The previous commit added macro calls in the entry code which mitigate the Spectre v1 swapgs issue if the X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_* features are enabled. Enable those features where applicable. The mitigations may be disabled with "nospectre_v1" or "mitigations=off". There are different features which can affect the risk of attack: - When FSGSBASE is enabled, unprivileged users are able to place any value in GS, using the wrgsbase instruction. This means they can write a GS value which points to any value in kernel space, which can be useful with the following gadget in an interrupt/exception/NMI handler: if (coming from user space) swapgs mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg1 // dependent load or store based on the value of %reg // for example: mov %(reg1), %reg2 If an interrupt is coming from user space, and the entry code speculatively skips the swapgs (due to user branch mistraining), it may speculatively execute the GS-based load and a subsequent dependent load or store, exposing the kernel data to an L1 side channel leak. Note that, on Intel, a similar attack exists in the above gadget when coming from kernel space, if the swapgs gets speculatively executed to switch back to the user GS. On AMD, this variant isn't possible because swapgs is serializing with respect to future GS-based accesses. NOTE: The FSGSBASE patch set hasn't been merged yet, so the above case doesn't exist quite yet. - When FSGSBASE is disabled, the issue is mitigated somewhat because unprivileged users must use prctl(ARCH_SET_GS) to set GS, which restricts GS values to user space addresses only. That means the gadget would need an additional step, since the target kernel address needs to be read from user space first. Something like: if (coming from user space) swapgs mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg1 mov (%reg1), %reg2 // dependent load or store based on the value of %reg2 // for example: mov %(reg2), %reg3 It's difficult to audit for this gadget in all the handlers, so while there are no known instances of it, it's entirely possible that it exists somewhere (or could be introduced in the future). Without tooling to analyze all such code paths, consider it vulnerable. Effects of SMAP on the !FSGSBASE case: - If SMAP is enabled, and the CPU reports RDCL_NO (i.e., not susceptible to Meltdown), the kernel is prevented from speculatively reading user space memory, even L1 cached values. This effectively disables the !FSGSBASE attack vector. - If SMAP is enabled, but the CPU *is* susceptible to Meltdown, SMAP still prevents the kernel from speculatively reading user space memory. But it does *not* prevent the kernel from reading the user value from L1, if it has already been cached. This is probably only a small hurdle for an attacker to overcome. Thanks to Dave Hansen for contributing the speculative_smap() function. Thanks to Andrew Cooper for providing the inside scoop on whether swapgs is serializing on AMD. [ tglx: Fixed the USER fence decision and polished the comment as suggested by Dave Hansen ] Signed-off-by:
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> [bwh: Backported to 4.9: - Check for X86_FEATURE_KAISER instead of X86_FEATURE_PTI - mitigations= parameter is x86-only here - Adjust filename, context] Signed-off-by:
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Josh Poimboeuf authored
commit 18ec54fd upstream. Spectre v1 isn't only about array bounds checks. It can affect any conditional checks. The kernel entry code interrupt, exception, and NMI handlers all have conditional swapgs checks. Those may be problematic in the context of Spectre v1, as kernel code can speculatively run with a user GS. For example: if (coming from user space) swapgs mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg mov (%reg), %reg1 When coming from user space, the CPU can speculatively skip the swapgs, and then do a speculative percpu load using the user GS value. So the user can speculatively force a read of any kernel value. If a gadget exists which uses the percpu value as an address in another load/store, then the contents of the kernel value may become visible via an L1 side channel attack. A similar attack exists when coming from kernel space. The CPU can speculatively do the swapgs, causing the user GS to get used for the rest of the speculative window. The mitigation is similar to a traditional Spectre v1 mitigation, except: a) index masking isn't possible; because the index (percpu offset) isn't user-controlled; and b) an lfence is needed in both the "from user" swapgs path and the "from kernel" non-swapgs path (because of the two attacks described above). The user entry swapgs paths already have SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3, which has a CR3 write when PTI is enabled. Since CR3 writes are serializing, the lfences can be skipped in those cases. On the other hand, the kernel entry swapgs paths don't depend on PTI. To avoid unnecessary lfences for the user entry case, create two separate features for alternative patching: X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL Use these features in entry code to patch in lfences where needed. The features aren't enabled yet, so there's no functional change. Signed-off-by:
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Ben Hutchings authored
This will make it clearer which bits are allocated, in case we need to assign more feature bits for later backports. Signed-off-by:
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Lukas Wunner authored
commit 8d8bef50 upstream. Commit 6935224d ("spi: bcm2835: enable support of 3-wire mode") added 3-wire support to the BCM2835 SPI driver by setting the REN bit (Read Enable) in the CS register when receiving data. The REN bit puts the transmitter in high-impedance state. The driver recognizes that data is to be received by checking whether the rx_buf of a transfer is non-NULL. Commit 3ecd37ed ("spi: bcm2835: enable dma modes for transfers meeting certain conditions") subsequently broke 3-wire support because it set the SPI_MASTER_MUST_RX flag which causes spi_map_msg() to replace rx_buf with a dummy buffer if it is NULL. As a result, rx_buf is *always* non-NULL if DMA is enabled. Reinstate 3-wire support by not only checking whether rx_buf is non-NULL, but also checking that it is not the dummy buffer. Fixes: 3ecd37ed ("spi: bcm2835: enable dma modes for transfers meeting certain conditions") Reported-by:
Nuno Sá <nuno.sa@analog.com> Signed-off-by:
Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+ Cc: Martin Sperl <kernel@martin.sperl.org> Acked-by:
Stefan Wahren <wahrenst@gmx.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/328318841455e505370ef8ecad97b646c033dc8a.1562148527.git.lukas@wunner.deSigned-off-by:
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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xiao jin authored
commit 54648cf1 upstream. We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue() on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we think it has the same problem. Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue(). If the elevator init function called with error return, it will run into the fail case to free the q->fq. Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event. The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of blk_init_allocated_queue(). Fixes: commit 7c94e1c1 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by:
Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com> Signed-off-by:
xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Alessio Balsini <balsini@android.com> Signed-off-by:
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