1. 03 Jun, 2015 14 commits
  2. 28 May, 2015 22 commits
  3. 27 May, 2015 4 commits
    • Tom Lendacky's avatar
      crypto: ccp - Remove unused structure field · d7253322
      Tom Lendacky authored
      Remove the length field from the ccp_sg_workarea since it is unused.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      d7253322
    • Tom Lendacky's avatar
      crypto: ccp - Remove manual check and set of dma_mask pointer · d921620e
      Tom Lendacky authored
      The underlying device support will set the device dma_mask pointer
      if DMA is set up properly for the device.  Remove the check for and
      assignment of dma_mask when it is null. Instead, just error out if
      the dma_set_mask_and_coherent function fails because dma_mask is null.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      d921620e
    • Stephan Mueller's avatar
      crypto: jitterentropy - add jitterentropy RNG · bb5530e4
      Stephan Mueller authored
      The CPU Jitter RNG provides a source of good entropy by
      collecting CPU executing time jitter. The entropy in the CPU
      execution time jitter is magnified by the CPU Jitter Random
      Number Generator. The CPU Jitter Random Number Generator uses
      the CPU execution timing jitter to generate a bit stream
      which complies with different statistical measurements that
      determine the bit stream is random.
      
      The CPU Jitter Random Number Generator delivers entropy which
      follows information theoretical requirements. Based on these
      studies and the implementation, the caller can assume that
      one bit of data extracted from the CPU Jitter Random Number
      Generator holds one bit of entropy.
      
      The CPU Jitter Random Number Generator provides a decentralized
      source of entropy, i.e. every caller can operate on a private
      state of the entropy pool.
      
      The RNG does not have any dependencies on any other service
      in the kernel. The RNG only needs a high-resolution time
      stamp.
      
      Further design details, the cryptographic assessment and
      large array of test results are documented at
      http://www.chronox.de/jent.html.
      
      CC: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org>
      CC: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      CC: Sandy Harris <sandyinchina@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      bb5530e4
    • Stephan Mueller's avatar
      crypto: drbg - use Jitter RNG to obtain seed · b8ec5ba4
      Stephan Mueller authored
      During initialization, the DRBG now tries to allocate a handle of the
      Jitter RNG. If such a Jitter RNG is available during seeding, the DRBG
      pulls the required entropy/nonce string from get_random_bytes and
      concatenates it with a string of equal size from the Jitter RNG. That
      combined string is now the seed for the DRBG.
      
      Written differently, the initial seed of the DRBG is now:
      
      get_random_bytes(entropy/nonce) || jitterentropy (entropy/nonce)
      
      If the Jitter RNG is not available, the DRBG only seeds from
      get_random_bytes.
      
      CC: Andreas Steffen <andreas.steffen@strongswan.org>
      CC: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      CC: Sandy Harris <sandyinchina@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      b8ec5ba4