- 13 Feb, 2018 5 commits
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit e7aadb27 ] Newly added igmpv3_get_srcaddr() needs to be called under rcu lock. Timer callbacks do not ensure this locking. ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 4.15.0+ #200 Not tainted ----------------------------- ./include/linux/inetdevice.h:216 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 3 locks held by syzkaller616973/4074: #0: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: [<00000000bfce669e>] __do_page_fault+0x32d/0xc90 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1355 #1: ((&im->timer)){+.-.}, at: [<00000000619d2f71>] lockdep_copy_map include/linux/lockdep.h:178 [inline] #1: ((&im->timer)){+.-.}, at: [<00000000619d2f71>] call_timer_fn+0x1c6/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1316 #2: (&(&im->lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: [<000000005f833c5c>] spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:315 [inline] #2: (&(&im->lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: [<000000005f833c5c>] igmpv3_send_report+0x98/0x5b0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:600 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 4074 Comm: syzkaller616973 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #200 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x123/0x170 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4592 __in_dev_get_rcu include/linux/inetdevice.h:216 [inline] igmpv3_get_srcaddr net/ipv4/igmp.c:329 [inline] igmpv3_newpack+0xeef/0x12e0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:389 add_grhead.isra.27+0x235/0x300 net/ipv4/igmp.c:432 add_grec+0xbd3/0x1170 net/ipv4/igmp.c:565 igmpv3_send_report+0xd5/0x5b0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:605 igmp_send_report+0xc43/0x1050 net/ipv4/igmp.c:722 igmp_timer_expire+0x322/0x5c0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:831 call_timer_fn+0x228/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1326 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1363 [inline] __run_timers+0x7ee/0xb70 kernel/time/timer.c:1666 run_timer_softirq+0x4c/0x70 kernel/time/timer.c:1692 __do_softirq+0x2d7/0xb85 kernel/softirq.c:285 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:365 [inline] irq_exit+0x1cc/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:405 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:541 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16b/0x700 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052 apic_timer_interrupt+0xa9/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:938 Fixes: a46182b0 ("net: igmp: Use correct source address on IGMPv3 reports") Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by:
syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Nikolay Aleksandrov authored
[ Upstream commit 4adfa79f ] When we dump the ip6mr mfc entries via proc, we initialize an iterator with the table to dump but we don't clear the cache pointer which might be initialized from a prior read on the same descriptor that ended. This can result in lock imbalance (an unnecessary unlock) leading to other crashes and hangs. Clear the cache pointer like ipmr does to fix the issue. Thanks for the reliable reproducer. Here's syzbot's trace: WARNING: bad unlock balance detected! 4.15.0-rc3+ #128 Not tainted syzkaller971460/3195 is trying to release lock (mrt_lock) at: [<000000006898068d>] ipmr_mfc_seq_stop+0xe1/0x130 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:553 but there are no more locks to release! other info that might help us debug this: 1 lock held by syzkaller971460/3195: #0: (&p->lock){+.+.}, at: [<00000000744a6565>] seq_read+0xd5/0x13d0 fs/seq_file.c:165 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 3195 Comm: syzkaller971460 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc3+ #128 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_unlock_imbalance_bug+0x12f/0x140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3561 __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3775 [inline] lock_release+0x5f9/0xda0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4023 __raw_read_unlock include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:225 [inline] _raw_read_unlock+0x1a/0x30 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:255 ipmr_mfc_seq_stop+0xe1/0x130 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:553 traverse+0x3bc/0xa00 fs/seq_file.c:135 seq_read+0x96a/0x13d0 fs/seq_file.c:189 proc_reg_read+0xef/0x170 fs/proc/inode.c:217 do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:673 [inline] do_iter_read+0x3db/0x5b0 fs/read_write.c:897 compat_readv+0x1bf/0x270 fs/read_write.c:1140 do_compat_preadv64+0xdc/0x100 fs/read_write.c:1189 C_SYSC_preadv fs/read_write.c:1209 [inline] compat_SyS_preadv+0x3b/0x50 fs/read_write.c:1203 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:327 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x3ee/0xf9d arch/x86/entry/common.c:389 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x51/0x60 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:125 RIP: 0023:0xf7f73c79 RSP: 002b:00000000e574a15c EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000014d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000f RCX: 0000000020a3afb0 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000067 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at lib/usercopy.c:25 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 3195, name: syzkaller971460 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 1 PID: 3195 Comm: syzkaller971460 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc3+ #128 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 ___might_sleep+0x2b2/0x470 kernel/sched/core.c:6060 __might_sleep+0x95/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6013 __might_fault+0xab/0x1d0 mm/memory.c:4525 _copy_to_user+0x2c/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:25 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:155 [inline] seq_read+0xcb4/0x13d0 fs/seq_file.c:279 proc_reg_read+0xef/0x170 fs/proc/inode.c:217 do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:673 [inline] do_iter_read+0x3db/0x5b0 fs/read_write.c:897 compat_readv+0x1bf/0x270 fs/read_write.c:1140 do_compat_preadv64+0xdc/0x100 fs/read_write.c:1189 C_SYSC_preadv fs/read_write.c:1209 [inline] compat_SyS_preadv+0x3b/0x50 fs/read_write.c:1203 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:327 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x3ee/0xf9d arch/x86/entry/common.c:389 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x51/0x60 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:125 RIP: 0023:0xf7f73c79 RSP: 002b:00000000e574a15c EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000014d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000f RCX: 0000000020a3afb0 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000067 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3195 at lib/usercopy.c:26 _copy_to_user+0xb5/0xc0 lib/usercopy.c:26 Reported-by:
syzbot <bot+eceb3204562c41a438fa1f2335e0fe4f6886d669@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by:
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Masahiro Yamada authored
commit af60e207 upstream. If build fails during (bin)rpm-pkg, the spec file is not cleaned by anyone until the next successful build of the package. We do not have to immediately delete the spec file in case somebody may want to take a look at it. Instead, make them ignored by git, and cleaned up by make mrproper. Signed-off-by:
Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by:
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Masahiro Yamada authored
commit 10b62a2f upstream. Most of DT files are compiled under arch/*/boot/dts/, but we have some other directories, like drivers/of/unittest-data/. We often miss to add gitignore patterns per directory. Since there are no source files that end with .dtb or .dtb.S, we can ignore the patterns globally. Signed-off-by:
Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Masahiro Yamada authored
commit 1377dd3e upstream. We are having more and more ignore patterns. Sort the list alphabetically. We will easily catch duplicated patterns if any. Signed-off-by:
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- 07 Feb, 2018 35 commits
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
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Ian Abbott authored
commit 0f5eb154 upstream. Both fpga_region_get_manager() and fpga_region_get_bridges() call of_parse_phandle(), but nothing calls of_node_put() on the returned struct device_node pointers. Make sure to do that to stop their reference counters getting out of whack. Fixes: 0fa20cdf ("fpga: fpga-region: device tree control for FPGA") Signed-off-by:
Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
Alan Tull <atull@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Sebastian Andrzej Siewior authored
commit 44117a1d upstream. setserial changes the IRQ via uart_set_info(). It invokes uart_shutdown() which free the current used IRQ and clear TTY_PORT_INITIALIZED. It will then update the IRQ number and invoke uart_startup() before returning to the caller leaving TTY_PORT_INITIALIZED cleared. The next open will crash with | list_add double add: new=ffffffff839fcc98, prev=ffffffff839fcc98, next=ffffffff839fcc98. since the close from the IOCTL won't free the IRQ (and clean the list) due to the TTY_PORT_INITIALIZED check in uart_shutdown(). There is same pattern in uart_do_autoconfig() and I *think* it also needs to set TTY_PORT_INITIALIZED there. Is there a reason why uart_startup() does not set the flag by itself after the IRQ has been acquired (since it is cleared in uart_shutdown)? Signed-off-by:
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
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KarimAllah Ahmed authored
commit b2ac58f9 [ Based on a patch from Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> ] ... basically doing exactly what we do for VMX: - Passthrough SPEC_CTRL to guests (if enabled in guest CPUID) - Save and restore SPEC_CTRL around VMExit and VMEntry only if the guest actually used it. Signed-off-by:
KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de> Signed-off-by:
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517669783-20732-1-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon.deSigned-off-by:
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KarimAllah Ahmed authored
commit d28b387f [ Based on a patch from Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> ] Add direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for guests. This is needed for guests that will only mitigate Spectre V2 through IBRS+IBPB and will not be using a retpoline+IBPB based approach. To avoid the overhead of saving and restoring the MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for guests that do not actually use the MSR, only start saving and restoring when a non-zero is written to it. No attempt is made to handle STIBP here, intentionally. Filtering STIBP may be added in a future patch, which may require trapping all writes if we don't want to pass it through directly to the guest. [dwmw2: Clean up CPUID bits, save/restore manually, handle reset] Signed-off-by:
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517522386-18410-5-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon.deSigned-off-by:
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KarimAllah Ahmed authored
commit 28c1c9fa Intel processors use MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR to indicate RDCL_NO (bit 0) and IBRS_ALL (bit 1). This is a read-only MSR. By default the contents will come directly from the hardware, but user-space can still override it. [dwmw2: The bit in kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features can be unconditional] Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
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Ashok Raj authored
commit 15d45071 The Indirect Branch Predictor Barrier (IBPB) is an indirect branch control mechanism. It keeps earlier branches from influencing later ones. Unlike IBRS and STIBP, IBPB does not define a new mode of operation. It's a command that ensures predicted branch targets aren't used after the barrier. Although IBRS and IBPB are enumerated by the same CPUID enumeration, IBPB is very different. IBPB helps mitigate against three potential attacks: * Mitigate guests from being attacked by other guests. - This is addressed by issing IBPB when we do a guest switch. * Mitigate attacks from guest/ring3->host/ring3. These would require a IBPB during context switch in host, or after VMEXIT. The host process has two ways to mitigate - Either it can be compiled with retpoline - If its going through context switch, and has set !dumpable then there is a IBPB in that path. (Tim's patch: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10192871) - The case where after a VMEXIT you return back to Qemu might make Qemu attackable from guest when Qemu isn't compiled with retpoline. There are issues reported when doing IBPB on every VMEXIT that resulted in some tsc calibration woes in guest. * Mitigate guest/ring0->host/ring0 attacks. When host kernel is using retpoline it is safe against these attacks. If host kernel isn't using retpoline we might need to do a IBPB flush on every VMEXIT. Even when using retpoline for indirect calls, in certain conditions 'ret' can use the BTB on Skylake-era CPUs. There are other mitigations available like RSB stuffing/clearing. * IBPB is issued only for SVM during svm_free_vcpu(). VMX has a vmclear and SVM doesn't. Follow discussion here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/1/15/146 Please refer to the following spec for more details on the enumeration and control. Refer here to get documentation about mitigations. https://software.intel.com/en-us/side-channel-security-support [peterz: rebase and changelog rewrite] [karahmed: - rebase - vmx: expose PRED_CMD if guest has it in CPUID - svm: only pass through IBPB if guest has it in CPUID - vmx: support !cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()] - vmx: support nested] [dwmw2: Expose CPUID bit too (AMD IBPB only for now as we lack IBRS) PRED_CMD is a write-only MSR] Signed-off-by:
Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by:
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KarimAllah Ahmed authored
commit b7b27aa0 [dwmw2: Stop using KF() for bits in it, too] Signed-off-by:
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Darren Kenny authored
commit af189c95 Fixes: 117cc7a9 ("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit") Signed-off-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
commit 4bf5d56d I'm seeing build failures from the two newly introduced arrays that are marked 'const' and '__initdata', which are mutually exclusive: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c:882:43: error: 'cpu_no_speculation' causes a section type conflict with 'e820_table_firmware_init' arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c:895:43: error: 'cpu_no_meltdown' causes a section type conflict with 'e820_table_firmware_init' The correct annotation is __initconst. Fixes: fec9434a ("x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown") Signed-off-by:
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by:
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KarimAllah Ahmed authored
commit 9005c683 [dwmw2: Use ARRAY_SIZE] Signed-off-by:
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David Woodhouse authored
commit 66f79309 There's no point in building init code with retpolines, since it runs before any potentially hostile userspace does. And before the retpoline is actually ALTERNATIVEd into place, for much of it. Signed-off-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit 085331df Commit 75f139aa "KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup" added a raw 'asm("lfence");' to prevent a bounds check bypass of 'vmcs_field_to_offset_table'. The lfence can be avoided in this path by using the array_index_nospec() helper designed for these types of fixes. Signed-off-by:
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
commit 904e14fb Place the MSR bitmap in struct loaded_vmcs, and update it in place every time the x2apic or APICv state can change. This is rare and the loop can handle 64 MSRs per iteration, in a similar fashion as nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap. This prepares for choosing, on a per-VM basis, whether to intercept the SPEC_CTRL and PRED_CMD MSRs. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # prereq for Spectre mitigation Suggested-by:
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Josh Poimboeuf authored
commit 12c69f1e The 'noreplace-paravirt' option disables paravirt patching, leaving the original pv indirect calls in place. That's highly incompatible with retpolines, unless we want to uglify paravirt even further and convert the paravirt calls to retpolines. As far as I can tell, the option doesn't seem to be useful for much other than introducing surprising corner cases and making the kernel vulnerable to Spectre v2. It was probably a debug option from the early paravirt days. So just remove it. Signed-off-by:
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Alok Kataria <akataria@vmware.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180131041333.2x6blhxirc2kclrq@trebleSigned-off-by:
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Tim Chen authored
commit 18bf3c3e Flush indirect branches when switching into a process that marked itself non dumpable. This protects high value processes like gpg better, without having too high performance overhead. If done naïvely, we could switch to a kernel idle thread and then back to the original process, such as: process A -> idle -> process A In such scenario, we do not have to do IBPB here even though the process is non-dumpable, as we are switching back to the same process after a hiatus. To avoid the redundant IBPB, which is expensive, we track the last mm user context ID. The cost is to have an extra u64 mm context id to track the last mm we were using before switching to the init_mm used by idle. Avoiding the extra IBPB is probably worth the extra memory for this common scenario. For those cases where tlb_defer_switch_to_init_mm() returns true (non PCID), lazy tlb will defer switch to init_mm, so we will not be changing the mm for the process A -> idle -> process A switch. So IBPB will be skipped for this case. Thanks to the reviewers and Andy Lutomirski for the suggestion of using ctx_id which got rid of the problem of mm pointer recycling. Signed-off-by:
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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David Woodhouse authored
commit 7fcae111 Despite the fact that all the other code there seems to be doing it, just using set_cpu_cap() in early_intel_init() doesn't actually work. For CPUs with PKU support, setup_pku() calls get_cpu_cap() after c->c_init() has set those feature bits. That resets those bits back to what was queried from the hardware. Turning the bits off for bad microcode is easy to fix. That can just use setup_clear_cpu_cap() to force them off for all CPUs. I was less keen on forcing the feature bits *on* that way, just in case of inconsistencies. I appreciate that the kernel is going to get this utterly wrong if CPU features are not consistent, because it has already applied alternatives by the time secondary CPUs are brought up. But at least if setup_force_cpu_cap() isn't being used, we might have a chance of *detecting* the lack of the corresponding bit and either panicking or refusing to bring the offending CPU online. So ensure that the appropriate feature bits are set within get_cpu_cap() regardless of how many extra times it's called. Fixes: 2961298e ("x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags") Signed-off-by:
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Colin Ian King authored
commit e698dcdf Trivial fix to spelling mistake in pr_err error message text. Signed-off-by:
Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit edfbae53 Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim mitigation for __user pointer de-references. Reported-by:
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit 259d8c1e Wireless drivers rely on parse_txq_params to validate that txq_params->ac is less than NL80211_NUM_ACS by the time the low-level driver's ->conf_tx() handler is called. Use a new helper, array_index_nospec(), to sanitize txq_params->ac with respect to speculation. I.e. ensure that any speculation into ->conf_tx() handlers is done with a value of txq_params->ac that is within the bounds of [0, NL80211_NUM_ACS). Reported-by:
Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com> Reported-by:
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727419584.33451.7700736761686184303.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.comSigned-off-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit 56c30ba7 'fd' is a user controlled value that is used as a data dependency to read from the 'fdt->fd' array. In order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue reads based on an invalid 'file *' returned from __fcheck_files. Co-developed-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit 2fbd7af5 The syscall table base is a user controlled function pointer in kernel space. Use array_index_nospec() to prevent any out of bounds speculation. While retpoline prevents speculating into a userspace directed target it does not stop the pointer de-reference, the concern is leaking memory relative to the syscall table base, by observing instruction cache behavior. Reported-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit c7f631cb Quoting Linus: I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends, but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_ accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache. Unlike the __get_user() case get_user() includes the address limit check near the pointer de-reference. With that locality the speculation can be mitigated with pointer narrowing rather than a barrier, i.e. array_index_nospec(). Where the narrowing is performed by: cmp %limit, %ptr sbb %mask, %mask and %mask, %ptr With respect to speculation the value of %ptr is either less than %limit or NULL. Co-developed-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit 304ec1b0 Quoting Linus: I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends, but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_ accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache. __uaccess_begin_nospec() covers __get_user() and copy_from_iter() where the limit check is far away from the user pointer de-reference. In those cases a barrier_nospec() prevents speculation with a potential pointer to privileged memory. uaccess_try_nospec covers get_user_try. Suggested-by:
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit b5c4ae4f In preparation for converting some __uaccess_begin() instances to __uacess_begin_nospec(), make sure all 'from user' uaccess paths are using the _begin(), _end() helpers rather than open-coded stac() and clac(). No functional changes. Suggested-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit b3bbfb3f For __get_user() paths, do not allow the kernel to speculate on the value of a user controlled pointer. In addition to the 'stac' instruction for Supervisor Mode Access Protection (SMAP), a barrier_nospec() causes the access_ok() result to resolve in the pipeline before the CPU might take any speculative action on the pointer value. Given the cost of 'stac' the speculation barrier is placed after 'stac' to hopefully overlap the cost of disabling SMAP with the cost of flushing the instruction pipeline. Since __get_user is a major kernel interface that deals with user controlled pointers, the __uaccess_begin_nospec() mechanism will prevent speculative execution past an access_ok() permission check. While speculative execution past access_ok() is not enough to lead to a kernel memory leak, it is a necessary precondition. To be clear, __uaccess_begin_nospec() is addressing a class of potential problems near __get_user() usages. Note, that while the barrier_nospec() in __uaccess_begin_nospec() is used to protect __get_user(), pointer masking similar to array_index_nospec() will be used for get_user() since it incorporates a bounds check near the usage. uaccess_try_nospec provides the same mechanism for get_user_try. No functional changes. Suggested-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit b3d7ad85 Rename the open coded form of this instruction sequence from rdtsc_ordered() into a generic barrier primitive, barrier_nospec(). One of the mitigations for Spectre variant1 vulnerabilities is to fence speculative execution after successfully validating a bounds check. I.e. force the result of a bounds check to resolve in the instruction pipeline to ensure speculative execution honors that result before potentially operating on out-of-bounds data. No functional changes. Suggested-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit babdde26 array_index_nospec() uses a mask to sanitize user controllable array indexes, i.e. generate a 0 mask if 'index' >= 'size', and a ~0 mask otherwise. While the default array_index_mask_nospec() handles the carry-bit from the (index - size) result in software. The x86 array_index_mask_nospec() does the same, but the carry-bit is handled in the processor CF flag without conditional instructions in the control flow. Suggested-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit f3804203 array_index_nospec() is proposed as a generic mechanism to mitigate against Spectre-variant-1 attacks, i.e. an attack that bypasses boundary checks via speculative execution. The array_index_nospec() implementation is expected to be safe for current generation CPUs across multiple architectures (ARM, x86). Based on an original implementation by Linus Torvalds, tweaked to remove speculative flows by Alexei Starovoitov, and tweaked again by Linus to introduce an x86 assembly implementation for the mask generation. Co-developed-by:
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Suggested-by:
Cyril Novikov <cnovikov@lynx.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mark Rutland authored
commit f84a56f7 Document the rationale and usage of the new array_index_nospec() helper. Signed-off-by:
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727413645.33451.15878817161436755393.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.comSigned-off-by:
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Andy Lutomirski authored
commit 37a8f7c3 The TS_COMPAT bit is very hot and is accessed from code paths that mostly also touch thread_info::flags. Move it into struct thread_info to improve cache locality. The only reason it was in thread_struct is that there was a brief period during which arch-specific fields were not allowed in struct thread_info. Linus suggested further changing: ti->status &= ~(TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED); to: if (unlikely(ti->status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED))) ti->status &= ~(TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED); on the theory that frequently dirtying the cacheline even in pure 64-bit code that never needs to modify status hurts performance. That could be a reasonable followup patch, but I suspect it matters less on top of this patch. Suggested-by:
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by:
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Andy Lutomirski authored
commit d1f77320 With the fast path removed there is no point in splitting the push of the normal and the extra register set. Just push the extra regs right away. [ tglx: Split out from 'x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path' ] Signed-off-by:
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Andy Lutomirski authored
commit 21d375b6 The SYCALLL64 fast path was a nice, if small, optimization back in the good old days when syscalls were actually reasonably fast. Now there is PTI to slow everything down, and indirect branches are verboten, making everything messier. The retpoline code in the fast path is particularly nasty. Just get rid of the fast path. The slow path is barely slower. [ tglx: Split out the 'push all extra regs' part ] Signed-off-by:
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Dou Liyang authored
commit 9471eee9 The spectre_v2 option 'auto' does not check whether CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. As a consequence it fails to emit the appropriate warning and sets feature flags which have no effect at all. Add the missing IS_ENABLED() check. Fixes: da285121 ("x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation") Signed-off-by:
Dou Liyang <douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by:
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William Grant authored
commit 55f49fcb Since commit 92a0f81d ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmap"), i386's CPU_ENTRY_AREA has been mapped to the memory area just below FIXADDR_START. But already immediately before FIXADDR_START is the FIX_BTMAP area, which means that early_ioremap can collide with the entry area. It's especially bad on PAE where FIX_BTMAP_BEGIN gets aligned to exactly match CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE, so the first early_ioremap slot clobbers the IDT and causes interrupts during early boot to reset the system. The overlap wasn't a problem before the CPU entry area was introduced, as the fixmap has classically been preceded by the pkmap or vmalloc areas, neither of which is used until early_ioremap is out of the picture. Relocate CPU_ENTRY_AREA to below FIX_BTMAP, not just below the permanent fixmap area. Fixes: commit 92a0f81d ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmap") Signed-off-by:
William Grant <william.grant@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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