- 04 Dec, 2017 35 commits
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Brijesh Singh authored
The SEV memory encryption engine uses a tweak such that two identical plaintext pages at different location will have different ciphertext. So swapping or moving ciphertext of two pages will not result in plaintext being swapped. Relocating (or migrating) physical backing pages for a SEV guest will require some additional steps. The current SEV key management spec does not provide commands to swap or migrate (move) ciphertext pages. For now, we pin the guest memory registered through KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION ioctl. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
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Brijesh Singh authored
The command is used for injecting a secret into the guest memory region. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Brijesh Singh authored
The command copies a plaintext into guest memory and encrypts it using the VM encryption key. The command will be used for debug purposes (e.g setting breakpoints through gdbserver) Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
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Brijesh Singh authored
The command is used for decrypting a guest memory region for debug purposes. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Brijesh Singh authored
The command is used for querying the SEV guest information. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Brijesh Singh authored
The command is used for finializing the SEV guest launch process. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Brijesh Singh authored
The command is used to retrieve the measurement of contents encrypted through the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Brijesh Singh authored
The command is used for encrypting the guest memory region using the VM encryption key (VEK) created during KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Brijesh Singh authored
The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START command is used to create a memory encryption context within the SEV firmware. In order to do so, the guest owner should provide the guest's policy, its public Diffie-Hellman (PDH) key and session information. The command implements the LAUNCH_START flow defined in SEV spec Section 6.2. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Brijesh Singh authored
SEV hardware uses ASIDs to associate a memory encryption key with a guest VM. During guest creation, a SEV VM uses the SEV_CMD_ACTIVATE command to bind a particular ASID to the guest. Lets make sure that the VMCB is programmed with the bound ASID before a VMRUN. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Brijesh Singh authored
The command initializes the SEV platform context and allocates a new ASID for this guest from the SEV ASID pool. The firmware must be initialized before we issue any guest launch commands to create a new memory encryption context. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Brijesh Singh authored
Define Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) key management command id and structure. The command definition is available in SEV KM spec 0.14 (http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM API_Specification.pdf) and Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.txt. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Brijesh Singh authored
The module parameter can be used to control the SEV feature support. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Brijesh Singh authored
A SEV-enabled guest must use ASIDs from the defined subset, while non-SEV guests can use the remaining ASID range. The range of allowed SEV guest ASIDs is [1 - CPUID_8000_001F[ECX][31:0]]. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Brijesh Singh authored
The config option can be used to enable SEV support on AMD Processors. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Brijesh Singh authored
The SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT command can be used to export the PDH and its certificate chain. The command is defined in SEV spec section 5.10. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
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Brijesh Singh authored
The SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT command can be used to import the signed PEK certificate. The command is defined in SEV spec section 5.8. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Brijesh Singh authored
The SEV_PEK_CSR command can be used to generate a PEK certificate signing request. The command is defined in SEV spec section 5.7. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
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Brijesh Singh authored
The SEV_PDH_GEN command is used to re-generate the Platform Diffie-Hellman (PDH) key. The command is defined in SEV spec section 5.6. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
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Brijesh Singh authored
The SEV_PEK_GEN command is used to generate a new Platform Endorsement Key (PEK). The command is defined in SEV spec section 5.6. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
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Brijesh Singh authored
The SEV_PLATFORM_STATUS command can be used by the platform owner to get the current status of the platform. The command is defined in SEV spec section 5.5. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
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Brijesh Singh authored
The SEV_FACTORY_RESET command can be used by the platform owner to reset the non-volatile SEV related data. The command is defined in SEV spec section 5.4 Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
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Brijesh Singh authored
AMD's new Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature allows the memory contents of virtual machines to be transparently encrypted with a key unique to the VM. The programming and management of the encryption keys are handled by the AMD Secure Processor (AMD-SP) which exposes the commands for these tasks. The complete spec is available at: http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM%20API_Specification.pdf Extend the AMD-SP driver to provide the following support: - an in-kernel API to communicate with the SEV firmware. The API can be used by the hypervisor to create encryption context for a SEV guest. - a userspace IOCTL to manage the platform certificates. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
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Brijesh Singh authored
The Platform Security Processor (PSP) is part of the AMD Secure Processor (AMD-SP) functionality. The PSP is a dedicated processor that provides support for key management commands in Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) mode, along with software-based Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to enable third-party trusted applications. Note that the key management functionality provided by the SEV firmware can be used outside of the kvm-amd driver hence it doesn't need to depend on CONFIG_KVM_AMD. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Brijesh Singh authored
Define Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) key management command id and structure. The command definition is available in SEV KM spec 0.14 (http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM API_Specification.pdf) Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
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Brijesh Singh authored
Add a include file which defines the ioctl and command id used for issuing SEV platform management specific commands. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
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Borislav Petkov authored
This is AMD-specific hardware so present it in Kconfig only when AMD CPU support is enabled or on ARM64 where it is also used. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
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Brijesh Singh authored
If hardware supports memory encryption then KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION and KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_UNREG_REGION ioctl's can be used by userspace to register/unregister the guest memory regions which may contain the encrypted data (e.g guest RAM, PCI BAR, SMRAM etc). Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Brijesh Singh authored
If the hardware supports memory encryption then the KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl can be used by qemu to issue a platform specific memory encryption commands. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Brijesh Singh authored
This CPUID leaf provides the memory encryption support information on AMD Platform. Its complete description is available in APM volume 2, Section 15.34 Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
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Brijesh Singh authored
Currently, ASID allocation start at 1. Add a svm_vcpu_data.min_asid which allows supplying a dynamic start ASID. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Tom Lendacky authored
Define the SEV enable bit for the VMCB control structure. The hypervisor will use this bit to enable SEV in the guest. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Tom Lendacky authored
Currently the nested_ctl variable in the vmcb_control_area structure is used to indicate nested paging support. The nested paging support field is actually defined as bit 0 of the field. In order to support a new feature flag the usage of the nested_ctl and nested paging support must be converted to operate on a single bit. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Tom Lendacky authored
Update the CPU features to include identifying and reporting on the Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature. SEV is identified by CPUID 0x8000001f, but requires BIOS support to enable it (set bit 23 of MSR_K8_SYSCFG and set bit 0 of MSR_K7_HWCR). Only show the SEV feature as available if reported by CPUID and enabled by BIOS. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Brijesh Singh authored
Create a Documentation entry to describe the AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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- 27 Nov, 2017 1 commit
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Linus Torvalds authored
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- 26 Nov, 2017 4 commits
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git://git.armlinux.org.uk/~rmk/linux-armLinus Torvalds authored
Pull ARM fixes from Russell King: - LPAE fixes for kernel-readonly regions - Fix for get_user_pages_fast on LPAE systems - avoid tying decompressor to a particular platform if DEBUG_LL is enabled - BUG if we attempt to return to userspace but the to-be-restored PSR value keeps us in privileged mode (defeating an issue that ftracetest found) * 'fixes' of git://git.armlinux.org.uk/~rmk/linux-arm: ARM: BUG if jumping to usermode address in kernel mode ARM: 8722/1: mm: make STRICT_KERNEL_RWX effective for LPAE ARM: 8721/1: mm: dump: check hardware RO bit for LPAE ARM: make decompressor debug output user selectable ARM: fix get_user_pages_fast
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tipLinus Torvalds authored
Pull irq fixes from Thomas Glexiner: - unbreak the irq trigger type check for legacy platforms - a handful fixes for ARM GIC v3/4 interrupt controllers - a few trivial fixes all over the place * 'irq-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: genirq/matrix: Make - vs ?: Precedence explicit irqchip/imgpdc: Use resource_size function on resource object irqchip/qcom: Fix u32 comparison with value less than zero irqchip/exiu: Fix return value check in exiu_init() irqchip/gic-v3-its: Remove artificial dependency on PCI irqchip/gic-v4: Add forward definition of struct irq_domain_ops irqchip/gic-v3: pr_err() strings should end with newlines irqchip/s3c24xx: pr_err() strings should end with newlines irqchip/gic-v3: Fix ppi-partitions lookup irqchip/gic-v4: Clear IRQ_DISABLE_UNLAZY again if mapping fails genirq: Track whether the trigger type has been set
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tipLinus Torvalds authored
Pull misc x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar: - topology enumeration fixes - KASAN fix - two entry fixes (not yet the big series related to KASLR) - remove obsolete code - instruction decoder fix - better /dev/mem sanity checks, hopefully working better this time - pkeys fixes - two ACPI fixes - 5-level paging related fixes - UMIP fixes that should make application visible faults more debuggable - boot fix for weird virtualization environment * 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (24 commits) x86/decoder: Add new TEST instruction pattern x86/PCI: Remove unused HyperTransport interrupt support x86/umip: Fix insn_get_code_seg_params()'s return value x86/boot/KASLR: Remove unused variable x86/entry/64: Add missing irqflags tracing to native_load_gs_index() x86/mm/kasan: Don't use vmemmap_populate() to initialize shadow x86/entry/64: Fix entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe() IRQ tracing x86/pkeys/selftests: Fix protection keys write() warning x86/pkeys/selftests: Rename 'si_pkey' to 'siginfo_pkey' x86/mpx/selftests: Fix up weird arrays x86/pkeys: Update documentation about availability x86/umip: Print a warning into the syslog if UMIP-protected instructions are used x86/smpboot: Fix __max_logical_packages estimate x86/topology: Avoid wasting 128k for package id array perf/x86/intel/uncore: Cache logical pkg id in uncore driver x86/acpi: Reduce code duplication in mp_override_legacy_irq() x86/acpi: Handle SCI interrupts above legacy space gracefully x86/boot: Fix boot failure when SMP MP-table is based at 0 x86/mm: Limit mmap() of /dev/mem to valid physical addresses x86/selftests: Add test for mapping placement for 5-level paging ...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tipLinus Torvalds authored
Pull scheduler fixes from Ingo Molnar: "Misc fixes: a documentation fix, a Sparse warning fix and a debugging fix" * 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: sched/debug: Fix task state recording/printout sched/deadline: Don't use dubious signed bitfields sched/deadline: Fix the description of runtime accounting in the documentation
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