- 26 Oct, 2015 25 commits
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Simon Guinot authored
commit daf158d0 upstream. This patch fixes a regression introduced by the commit a84e3289 ("net: mvneta: fix refilling for Rx DMA buffers"). Due to this commit the newly allocated Rx buffers are DMA-unmapped in place of those passed to the networking stack. Obviously, this causes data corruptions. This patch fixes the issue by ensuring that the right Rx buffers are DMA-unmapped. Reported-by:
Oren Laskin <oren@igneous.io> Signed-off-by:
Simon Guinot <simon.guinot@sequanux.org> Fixes: a84e3289 ("net: mvneta: fix refilling for Rx DMA buffers") Tested-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
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Jason Wang authored
commit 8f4216c7 upstream. Currently, if we had a zero length mmio eventfd assigned on KVM_MMIO_BUS. It will never be found by kvm_io_bus_cmp() since it always compares the kvm_io_range() with the length that guest wrote. This will cause e.g for vhost, kick will be trapped by qemu userspace instead of vhost. Fixing this by using zero length if an iodevice is zero length. Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jason Wang authored
commit eefd6b06 upstream. We register wildcard mmio eventfd on two buses, once for KVM_MMIO_BUS and once on KVM_FAST_MMIO_BUS but with a single iodev instance. This will lead to an issue: kvm_io_bus_destroy() knows nothing about the devices on two buses pointing to a single dev. Which will lead to double free[1] during exit. Fix this by allocating two instances of iodevs then registering one on KVM_MMIO_BUS and another on KVM_FAST_MMIO_BUS. CPU: 1 PID: 2894 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 3.19.0-26-generic #28-Ubuntu Hardware name: LENOVO 2356BG6/2356BG6, BIOS G7ET96WW (2.56 ) 09/12/2013 task: ffff88009ae0c4b0 ti: ffff88020e7f0000 task.ti: ffff88020e7f0000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffc07e25d8>] [<ffffffffc07e25d8>] ioeventfd_release+0x28/0x60 [kvm] RSP: 0018:ffff88020e7f3bc8 EFLAGS: 00010292 RAX: dead000000200200 RBX: ffff8801ec19c900 RCX: 000000018200016d RDX: ffff8801ec19cf80 RSI: ffffea0008bf1d40 RDI: ffff8801ec19c900 RBP: ffff88020e7f3bd8 R08: 000000002fc75a01 R09: 000000018200016d R10: ffffffffc07df6ae R11: ffff88022fc75a98 R12: ffff88021e7cc000 R13: ffff88021e7cca48 R14: ffff88021e7cca50 R15: ffff8801ec19c880 FS: 00007fc1ee3e6700(0000) GS:ffff88023e240000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f8f389d8000 CR3: 000000023dc13000 CR4: 00000000001427e0 Stack: ffff88021e7cc000 0000000000000000 ffff88020e7f3be8 ffffffffc07e2622 ffff88020e7f3c38 ffffffffc07df69a ffff880232524160 ffff88020e792d80 0000000000000000 ffff880219b78c00 0000000000000008 ffff8802321686a8 Call Trace: [<ffffffffc07e2622>] ioeventfd_destructor+0x12/0x20 [kvm] [<ffffffffc07df69a>] kvm_put_kvm+0xca/0x210 [kvm] [<ffffffffc07df818>] kvm_vcpu_release+0x18/0x20 [kvm] [<ffffffff811f69f7>] __fput+0xe7/0x250 [<ffffffff811f6bae>] ____fput+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffff81093f04>] task_work_run+0xd4/0xf0 [<ffffffff81079358>] do_exit+0x368/0xa50 [<ffffffff81082c8f>] ? recalc_sigpending+0x1f/0x60 [<ffffffff81079ad5>] do_group_exit+0x45/0xb0 [<ffffffff81085c71>] get_signal+0x291/0x750 [<ffffffff810144d8>] do_signal+0x28/0xab0 [<ffffffff810f3a3b>] ? do_futex+0xdb/0x5d0 [<ffffffff810b7028>] ? __wake_up_locked_key+0x18/0x20 [<ffffffff810f3fa6>] ? SyS_futex+0x76/0x170 [<ffffffff81014fc9>] do_notify_resume+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff817cb9af>] int_signal+0x12/0x17 Code: 5d c3 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 53 48 89 fb 48 83 ec 08 48 8b 7f 20 e8 06 d6 a5 c0 48 8b 43 08 48 8b 13 48 89 df 48 89 42 08 <48> 89 10 48 b8 00 01 10 00 00 RIP [<ffffffffc07e25d8>] ioeventfd_release+0x28/0x60 [kvm] RSP <ffff88020e7f3bc8> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jason Wang authored
commit 85da11ca upstream. This patch factors out core eventfd assign/deassign logic and leaves the argument checking and bus index selection to callers. Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jason Wang authored
commit 8453fecb upstream. We only want zero length mmio eventfd to be registered on KVM_FAST_MMIO_BUS. So check this explicitly when arg->len is zero to make sure this. Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Will Deacon authored
commit d10bcd47 upstream. When entering the kernel at EL2, we fail to initialise the MDCR_EL2 register which controls debug access and PMU capabilities at EL1. This patch ensures that the register is initialised so that all traps are disabled and all the PMU counters are available to the host. When a guest is scheduled, KVM takes care to configure trapping appropriately. Acked-by:
Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Axtens authored
commit 2925c2fd upstream. Currently the first thing we do in cxl_probe is to grab a reference on the pci device. Later on, we call device_register on our adapter. In our remove path, we call device_unregister, but we never call pci_dev_put. We therefore leak the device every time we do a reflash. device_register/unregister is sufficient to hold the reference. Therefore, drop the call to pci_dev_get. Here's why this is safe. The proposed cxl_probe(pdev) calls cxl_adapter_init: a) init calls cxl_adapter_alloc, which creates a struct cxl, conventionally called adapter. This struct contains a device entry, adapter->dev. b) init calls cxl_configure_adapter, where we set adapter->dev.parent = &dev->dev (here dev is the pci dev) So at this point, the cxl adapter's device's parent is the PCI device that I want to be refcounted properly. c) init calls cxl_register_adapter *) cxl_register_adapter calls device_register(&adapter->dev) So now we're in device_register, where dev is the adapter device, and we want to know if the PCI device is safe after we return. device_register(&adapter->dev) calls device_initialize() and then device_add(). device_add() does a get_device(). device_add() also explicitly grabs the device's parent, and calls get_device() on it: parent = get_device(dev->parent); So therefore, device_register() takes a lock on the parent PCI dev, which is what pci_dev_get() was guarding. pci_dev_get() can therefore be safely removed. Fixes: f204e0b8 ("cxl: Driver code for powernv PCIe based cards for userspace access") Signed-off-by:
Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Acked-by:
Ian Munsie <imunsie@au1.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by:
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Peter Chen authored
commit 56ffa1d1 upstream. According to spec, there are functional and protocol stalls. For functional stall, it is for bulk and interrupt endpoints, below are cases for it: - Host sends SET_FEATURE request for Set-Halt, the udc driver needs to set stall, and return true unconditionally. - The gadget driver may call usb_ep_set_halt to stall certain endpoints, if there is a transfer in pending, the udc driver should not set stall, and return -EAGAIN accordingly. These two kinds of stall need to be cleared by host using CLEAR_FEATURE request (Clear-Halt). For protocol stall, it is for control endpoint, this stall will be set if the control request has failed. This stall will be cleared by next setup request (hardware will do it). It fixed usbtest (drivers/usb/misc/usbtest.c) Test 13 "set/clear halt" test failure, meanwhile, this change has been verified by USB2 CV Compliance Test and MSC Tests. Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com> Signed-off-by:
Peter Chen <peter.chen@freescale.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jeff Mahoney authored
commit a30e577c upstream. In btrfs_evict_inode, we properly truncate the page cache for evicted inodes but then we call btrfs_wait_ordered_range for every inode as well. It's the right thing to do for regular files but results in incorrect behavior for device inodes for block devices. filemap_fdatawrite_range gets called with inode->i_mapping which gets resolved to the block device inode before getting passed to wbc_attach_fdatawrite_inode and ultimately to inode_to_bdi. What happens next depends on whether there's an open file handle associated with the inode. If there is, we write to the block device, which is unexpected behavior. If there isn't, we through normally and inode->i_data is used. We can also end up racing against open/close which can result in crashes when i_mapping points to a block device inode that has been closed. Since there can't be any page cache associated with special file inodes, it's safe to skip the btrfs_wait_ordered_range call entirely and avoid the problem. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=100911Tested-by:
Christoph Biedl <linux-kernel.bfrz@manchmal.in-ulm.de> Signed-off-by:
Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com> Reviewed-by:
Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
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Filipe Manana authored
commit 005efedf upstream. If a file has a range pointing to a compressed extent, followed by another range that points to the same compressed extent and a read operation attempts to read both ranges (either completely or part of them), the pages that correspond to the second range are incorrectly filled with zeroes. Consider the following example: File layout [0 - 8K] [8K - 24K] | | | | points to extent X, points to extent X, offset 4K, length of 8K offset 0, length 16K [extent X, compressed length = 4K uncompressed length = 16K] If a readpages() call spans the 2 ranges, a single bio to read the extent is submitted - extent_io.c:submit_extent_page() would only create a new bio to cover the second range pointing to the extent if the extent it points to had a different logical address than the extent associated with the first range. This has a consequence of the compressed read end io handler (compression.c:end_compressed_bio_read()) finish once the extent is decompressed into the pages covering the first range, leaving the remaining pages (belonging to the second range) filled with zeroes (done by compression.c:btrfs_clear_biovec_end()). So fix this by submitting the current bio whenever we find a range pointing to a compressed extent that was preceded by a range with a different extent map. This is the simplest solution for this corner case. Making the end io callback populate both ranges (or more, if we have multiple pointing to the same extent) is a much more complex solution since each bio is tightly coupled with a single extent map and the extent maps associated to the ranges pointing to the shared extent can have different offsets and lengths. The following test case for fstests triggers the issue: seq=`basename $0` seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq echo "QA output created by $seq" tmp=/tmp/$$ status=1 # failure is the default! trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15 _cleanup() { rm -f $tmp.* } # get standard environment, filters and checks . ./common/rc . ./common/filter # real QA test starts here _need_to_be_root _supported_fs btrfs _supported_os Linux _require_scratch _require_cloner rm -f $seqres.full test_clone_and_read_compressed_extent() { local mount_opts=$1 _scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1 _scratch_mount $mount_opts # Create a test file with a single extent that is compressed (the # data we write into it is highly compressible no matter which # compression algorithm is used, zlib or lzo). $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xaa 0K 4K" \ -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 4K 8K" \ -c "pwrite -S 0xcc 12K 4K" \ $SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io # Now clone our extent into an adjacent offset. $CLONER_PROG -s $((4 * 1024)) -d $((16 * 1024)) -l $((8 * 1024)) \ $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/foo # Same as before but for this file we clone the extent into a lower # file offset. $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xaa 8K 4K" \ -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 12K 8K" \ -c "pwrite -S 0xcc 20K 4K" \ $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io $CLONER_PROG -s $((12 * 1024)) -d 0 -l $((8 * 1024)) \ $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/bar echo "File digests before unmounting filesystem:" md5sum $SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_scratch md5sum $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_scratch # Evicting the inode or clearing the page cache before reading # again the file would also trigger the bug - reads were returning # all bytes in the range corresponding to the second reference to # the extent with a value of 0, but the correct data was persisted # (it was a bug exclusively in the read path). The issue happened # only if the same readpages() call targeted pages belonging to the # first and second ranges that point to the same compressed extent. _scratch_remount echo "File digests after mounting filesystem again:" # Must match the same digests we got before. md5sum $SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_scratch md5sum $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_scratch } echo -e "\nTesting with zlib compression..." test_clone_and_read_compressed_extent "-o compress=zlib" _scratch_unmount echo -e "\nTesting with lzo compression..." test_clone_and_read_compressed_extent "-o compress=lzo" status=0 exit Signed-off-by:
Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Carl Frederik Werner authored
commit 3a2fa775 upstream. Let's fix pinmux address of gpio 170 used by tfp410 powerdown-gpio. According to the OMAP35x Technical Reference Manual CONTROL_PADCONF_I2C3_SDA[15:0] 0x480021C4 mode0: i2c3_sda CONTROL_PADCONF_I2C3_SDA[31:16] 0x480021C4 mode4: gpio_170 the pinmux address of gpio 170 must be 0x480021C6. The former wrong address broke i2c3 (used by hdmi ddc), resulting in kernel message: omap_i2c 48060000.i2c: controller timed out Fixes: 8cecf52b ("ARM: omap3-beagle.dts: add display information") Signed-off-by:
Carl Frederik Werner <frederik@cfbw.eu> Signed-off-by:
Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Signed-off-by:
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Shaohua Li authored
commit 5d7c631d upstream. The APIC LVTT register is MMIO mapped but the TSC_DEADLINE register is an MSR. The write to the TSC_DEADLINE MSR is not serializing, so it's not guaranteed that the write to LVTT has reached the APIC before the TSC_DEADLINE MSR is written. In such a case the write to the MSR is ignored and as a consequence the local timer interrupt never fires. The SDM decribes this issue for xAPIC and x2APIC modes. The serialization methods recommended by the SDM differ. xAPIC: "1. Memory-mapped write to LVT Timer Register, setting bits 18:17 to 10b. 2. WRMSR to the IA32_TSC_DEADLINE MSR a value much larger than current time-stamp counter. 3. If RDMSR of the IA32_TSC_DEADLINE MSR returns zero, go to step 2. 4. WRMSR to the IA32_TSC_DEADLINE MSR the desired deadline." x2APIC: "To allow for efficient access to the APIC registers in x2APIC mode, the serializing semantics of WRMSR are relaxed when writing to the APIC registers. Thus, system software should not use 'WRMSR to APIC registers in x2APIC mode' as a serializing instruction. Read and write accesses to the APIC registers will occur in program order. A WRMSR to an APIC register may complete before all preceding stores are globally visible; software can prevent this by inserting a serializing instruction, an SFENCE, or an MFENCE before the WRMSR." The xAPIC method is to just wait for the memory mapped write to hit the LVTT by checking whether the MSR write has reached the hardware. There is no reason why a proper MFENCE after the memory mapped write would not do the same. Andi Kleen confirmed that MFENCE is sufficient for the xAPIC case as well. Issue MFENCE before writing to the TSC_DEADLINE MSR. This can be done unconditionally as all CPUs which have TSC_DEADLINE also have MFENCE support. [ tglx: Massaged the changelog ] Signed-off-by:
Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com> Reviewed-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: <Kernel-team@fb.com> Cc: <lenb@kernel.org> Cc: <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150909041352.GA2059853@devbig257.prn2.facebook.comSigned-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
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Will Deacon authored
commit 43297dda upstream. When restoring the system register state for an AArch32 guest at EL2, writes to DACR32_EL2 may not be correctly synchronised by Cortex-A57, which can lead to the guest effectively running with junk in the DACR and running into unexpected domain faults. This patch works around the issue by re-ordering our restoration of the AArch32 register aliases so that they happen before the AArch64 system registers. Ensuring that the registers are restored in this order guarantees that they will be correctly synchronised by the core. Reviewed-by:
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Thomas Hellstrom authored
commit 54c12bc3 upstream. If user space calls unreference on a user_dmabuf it will typically kill the struct ttm_base_object member which is responsible for the user-space visibility. However the dmabuf part may still be alive and refcounted. In some situations, like for shared guest-backed surface referencing/opening, the driver may try to reference the struct ttm_base_object member again, causing an immediate kernel warning and a later kernel NULL pointer dereference. Fix this by always maintaining a reference on the struct ttm_base_object member, in situations where it might subsequently be referenced. Signed-off-by:
Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com> Reviewed-by:
Brian Paul <brianp@vmware.com> Reviewed-by:
Sinclair Yeh <syeh@vmware.com> Signed-off-by:
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Liu.Zhao authored
commit 19ab6bc5 upstream. This is intended to add ZTE device PIDs on kernel. Signed-off-by:
Liu.Zhao <lzsos369@163.com> [johan: sort the new entries ] Signed-off-by:
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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John Stultz authored
commit 2619d7e9 upstream. The internal clocksteering done for fine-grained error correction uses a logarithmic approximation, so any time adjtimex() adjusts the clock steering, timekeeping_freqadjust() quickly approximates the correct clock frequency over a series of ticks. Unfortunately, the logic in timekeeping_freqadjust(), introduced in commit: dc491596 ("timekeeping: Rework frequency adjustments to work better w/ nohz") used the abs() function with a s64 error value to calculate the size of the approximated adjustment to be made. Per include/linux/kernel.h: "abs() should not be used for 64-bit types (s64, u64, long long) - use abs64()". Thus on 32-bit platforms, this resulted in the clocksteering to take a quite dampended random walk trying to converge on the proper frequency, which caused the adjustments to be made much slower then intended (most easily observed when large adjustments are made). This patch fixes the issue by using abs64() instead. Reported-by:
Nuno Gonçalves <nunojpg@gmail.com> Tested-by:
John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Miroslav Lichvar <mlichvar@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1441840051-20244-1-git-send-email-john.stultz@linaro.orgSigned-off-by:
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Guenter Roeck authored
commit 728d2940 upstream. The STEP_UP_TIME and STEP_DOWN_TIME registers are swapped for all chips but NCT6775. Reported-by:
Grazvydas Ignotas <notasas@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by:
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Jann Horn authored
commit 4c17a6d5 upstream. This might lead to local privilege escalation (code execution as kernel) for systems where the following conditions are met: - CONFIG_CIFS_SMB2 and CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX are enabled - a cifs filesystem is mounted where: - the mount option "vers" was used and set to a value >=2.0 - the attacker has write access to at least one file on the filesystem To attack this, an attacker would have to guess the target_tcon pointer (but guessing wrong doesn't cause a crash, it just returns an error code) and win a narrow race. Signed-off-by:
Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Signed-off-by:
Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Paul Mackerras authored
commit e297c939 upstream. This fixes a race which can result in the same virtual IRQ number being assigned to two different MSI interrupts. The most visible consequence of that is usually a warning and stack trace from the sysfs code about an attempt to create a duplicate entry in sysfs. The race happens when one CPU (say CPU 0) is disposing of an MSI while another CPU (say CPU 1) is setting up an MSI. CPU 0 calls (for example) pnv_teardown_msi_irqs(), which calls msi_bitmap_free_hwirqs() to indicate that the MSI (i.e. its hardware IRQ number) is no longer in use. Then, before CPU 0 gets to calling irq_dispose_mapping() to free up the virtal IRQ number, CPU 1 comes in and calls msi_bitmap_alloc_hwirqs() to allocate an MSI, and gets the same hardware IRQ number that CPU 0 just freed. CPU 1 then calls irq_create_mapping() to get a virtual IRQ number, which sees that there is currently a mapping for that hardware IRQ number and returns the corresponding virtual IRQ number (which is the same virtual IRQ number that CPU 0 was using). CPU 0 then calls irq_dispose_mapping() and frees that virtual IRQ number. Now, if another CPU comes along and calls irq_create_mapping(), it is likely to get the virtual IRQ number that was just freed, resulting in the same virtual IRQ number apparently being used for two different hardware interrupts. To fix this race, we just move the call to msi_bitmap_free_hwirqs() to after the call to irq_dispose_mapping(). Since virq_to_hw() doesn't work for the virtual IRQ number after irq_dispose_mapping() has been called, we need to call it before irq_dispose_mapping() and remember the result for the msi_bitmap_free_hwirqs() call. The pattern of calling msi_bitmap_free_hwirqs() before irq_dispose_mapping() appears in 5 places under arch/powerpc, and appears to have originated in commit 05af7bd2 ("[POWERPC] MPIC U3/U4 MSI backend") from 2007. Fixes: 05af7bd2 ("[POWERPC] MPIC U3/U4 MSI backend") Reported-by:
Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Signed-off-by:
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by:
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Ard Biesheuvel authored
commit a077224f upstream. While working on the 32-bit ARM port of UEFI, I noticed a strange corruption in the kernel log. The following snprintf() statement (in drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c:efi_md_typeattr_format()) snprintf(pos, size, "|%3s|%2s|%2s|%2s|%3s|%2s|%2s|%2s|%2s]", was producing the following output in the log: | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] |RUN| | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC]* |RUN| | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC]* | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] |RUN| | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC]* | | | | | |WB|WT|WC|UC] |RUN| | | | | | | |UC] |RUN| | | | | | | |UC] As it turns out, this is caused by incorrect code being emitted for the string() function in lib/vsprintf.c. The following code if (!(spec.flags & LEFT)) { while (len < spec.field_width--) { if (buf < end) *buf = ' '; ++buf; } } for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) { if (buf < end) *buf = *s; ++buf; ++s; } while (len < spec.field_width--) { if (buf < end) *buf = ' '; ++buf; } when called with len == 0, triggers an issue in the GCC SRA optimization pass (Scalar Replacement of Aggregates), which handles promotion of signed struct members incorrectly. This is a known but as yet unresolved issue. (https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=65932). In this particular case, it is causing the second while loop to be executed erroneously a single time, causing the additional space characters to be printed. So disable the optimization by passing -fno-ipa-sra. Acked-by:
Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Guenter Roeck authored
commit a394d635 upstream. Actually, spi_master_put() after spi_alloc_master() must _not_ be followed by kfree(). The memory is already freed with the call to spi_master_put() through spi_master_class, which registers a release function. Calling both spi_master_put() and kfree() results in often nasty (and delayed) crashes elsewhere in the kernel, often in the networking stack. This reverts commit eb4af0f5. Link to patch and concerns: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/3/269 or http://lkml.iu.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1209.0/00790.html Alexey Klimov: This revert becomes valid after 94c69f76 when spi-imx.c has been fixed and there is no need to call kfree() so comment for spi_alloc_master() should be fixed. Signed-off-by:
Alexey Klimov <alexey.klimov@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Tan, Jui Nee authored
commit 02bc933e upstream. On Intel Baytrail, there is case when interrupt handler get called, no SPI message is captured. The RX FIFO is indeed empty when RX timeout pending interrupt (SSSR_TINT) happens. Use the BIOS version where both HSUART and SPI are on the same IRQ. Both drivers are using IRQF_SHARED when calling the request_irq function. When running two separate and independent SPI and HSUART application that generate data traffic on both components, user will see messages like below on the console: pxa2xx-spi pxa2xx-spi.0: bad message state in interrupt handler This commit will fix this by first checking Receiver Time-out Interrupt, if it is disabled, ignore the request and return without servicing. Signed-off-by:
Tan, Jui Nee <jui.nee.tan@intel.com> Acked-by:
Jarkko Nikula <jarkko.nikula@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
commit 911b79cd upstream. If request_key() is used to find a keyring, only do the search part - don't do the construction part if the keyring was not found by the search. We don't really want keyrings in the negative instantiated state since the rejected/negative instantiation error value in the payload is unioned with keyring metadata. Now the kernel gives an error: request_key("keyring", "#selinux,bdekeyring", "keyring", KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted) Signed-off-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
commit f05819df upstream. The following sequence of commands: i=`keyctl add user a a @s` keyctl request2 keyring foo bar @t keyctl unlink $i @s tries to invoke an upcall to instantiate a keyring if one doesn't already exist by that name within the user's keyring set. However, if the upcall fails, the code sets keyring->type_data.reject_error to -ENOKEY or some other error code. When the key is garbage collected, the key destroy function is called unconditionally and keyring_destroy() uses list_empty() on keyring->type_data.link - which is in a union with reject_error. Subsequently, the kernel tries to unlink the keyring from the keyring names list - which oopses like this: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a IP: [<ffffffff8126e051>] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88 ... Workqueue: events key_garbage_collector ... RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8126e051>] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88 RSP: 0018:ffff88003e2f3d30 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: ffff88003bf1a900 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000003bfc6901 RDI: ffffffff81a73a40 RBP: ffff88003e2f3d38 R08: 0000000000000152 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff88003e2f3c18 R11: 000000000000865b R12: ffff88003bf1a900 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88003bf1a908 R15: ffff88003e2f4000 ... CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000003e3ec000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 ... Call Trace: [<ffffffff8126c756>] key_gc_unused_keys.constprop.1+0x5d/0x10f [<ffffffff8126ca71>] key_garbage_collector+0x1fa/0x351 [<ffffffff8105ec9b>] process_one_work+0x28e/0x547 [<ffffffff8105fd17>] worker_thread+0x26e/0x361 [<ffffffff8105faa9>] ? rescuer_thread+0x2a8/0x2a8 [<ffffffff810648ad>] kthread+0xf3/0xfb [<ffffffff810647ba>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2 [<ffffffff815f2ccf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 [<ffffffff810647ba>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2 Note the value in RAX. This is a 32-bit representation of -ENOKEY. The solution is to only call ->destroy() if the key was successfully instantiated. Reported-by:
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
commit 94c4554b upstream. There appears to be a race between: (1) key_gc_unused_keys() which frees key->security and then calls keyring_destroy() to unlink the name from the name list (2) find_keyring_by_name() which calls key_permission(), thus accessing key->security, on a key before checking to see whether the key usage is 0 (ie. the key is dead and might be cleaned up). Fix this by calling ->destroy() before cleaning up the core key data - including key->security. Reported-by:
Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 23 Oct, 2015 2 commits
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lucien authored
commit f648f807 upstream. Commit f8d96052 ("sctp: Enforce retransmission limit during shutdown") fixed a problem with excessive retransmissions in the SHUTDOWN_PENDING by not resetting the association overall_error_count. This allowed the association to better enforce assoc.max_retrans limit. However, the same issue still exists when the association is in SHUTDOWN_RECEIVED state. In this state, HB-ACKs will continue to reset the overall_error_count for the association would extend the lifetime of association unnecessarily. This patch solves this by resetting the overall_error_count whenever the current state is small then SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PENDING. As a small side-effect, we end up also handling SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_ACK_SENT and SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_SENT states, but they are not really impacted because we disable Heartbeats in those states. Fixes: Commit f8d96052 ("sctp: Enforce retransmission limit during shutdown") Signed-off-by:
Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Kamal Mostafa authored
Signed-off-by:
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- 21 Oct, 2015 1 commit
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Jann Horn authored
commit fbb18169 upstream. It was possible for an attacking user to trick root (or another user) into writing his coredumps into an attacker-readable, pre-existing file using rename() or link(), causing the disclosure of secret data from the victim process' virtual memory. Depending on the configuration, it was also possible to trick root into overwriting system files with coredumps. Fix that issue by never writing coredumps into existing files. Requirements for the attack: - The attack only applies if the victim's process has a nonzero RLIMIT_CORE and is dumpable. - The attacker can trick the victim into coredumping into an attacker-writable directory D, either because the core_pattern is relative and the victim's cwd is attacker-writable or because an absolute core_pattern pointing to a world-writable directory is used. - The attacker has one of these: A: on a system with protected_hardlinks=0: execute access to a folder containing a victim-owned, attacker-readable file on the same partition as D, and the victim-owned file will be deleted before the main part of the attack takes place. (In practice, there are lots of files that fulfill this condition, e.g. entries in Debian's /var/lib/dpkg/info/.) This does not apply to most Linux systems because most distros set protected_hardlinks=1. B: on a system with protected_hardlinks=1: execute access to a folder containing a victim-owned, attacker-readable and attacker-writable file on the same partition as D, and the victim-owned file will be deleted before the main part of the attack takes place. (This seems to be uncommon.) C: on any system, independent of protected_hardlinks: write access to a non-sticky folder containing a victim-owned, attacker-readable file on the same partition as D (This seems to be uncommon.) The basic idea is that the attacker moves the victim-owned file to where he expects the victim process to dump its core. The victim process dumps its core into the existing file, and the attacker reads the coredump from it. If the attacker can't move the file because he does not have write access to the containing directory, he can instead link the file to a directory he controls, then wait for the original link to the file to be deleted (because the kernel checks that the link count of the corefile is 1). A less reliable variant that requires D to be non-sticky works with link() and does not require deletion of the original link: link() the file into D, but then unlink() it directly before the kernel performs the link count check. On systems with protected_hardlinks=0, this variant allows an attacker to not only gain information from coredumps, but also clobber existing, victim-writable files with coredumps. (This could theoretically lead to a privilege escalation.) Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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- 20 Oct, 2015 12 commits
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Christoph Hellwig authored
commit 294ab783 upstream. It looks like the Kconfig check that was meant to fix this (commit fe9233fb [SCSI] scsi_dh: fix kconfig related build errors) was actually reversed, but no-one noticed until the new set of patches which separated DM and SCSI_DH). Fixes: fe9233fbSigned-off-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Tested-by:
Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
James Bottomley <JBottomley@Odin.com> Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Borkmann authored
commit 6bb0fef4 upstream. When netlink mmap on receive side is the consumer of nf queue data, it can happen that in some edge cases, we write skb shared info into the user space mmap buffer: Assume a possible rx ring frame size of only 4096, and the network skb, which is being zero-copied into the netlink skb, contains page frags with an overall skb->len larger than the linear part of the netlink skb. skb_zerocopy(), which is generic and thus not aware of the fact that shared info cannot be accessed for such skbs then tries to write and fill frags, thus leaking kernel data/pointers and in some corner cases possibly writing out of bounds of the mmap area (when filling the last slot in the ring buffer this way). I.e. the ring buffer slot is then of status NL_MMAP_STATUS_VALID, has an advertised length larger than 4096, where the linear part is visible at the slot beginning, and the leaked sizeof(struct skb_shared_info) has been written to the beginning of the next slot (also corrupting the struct nl_mmap_hdr slot header incl. status etc), since skb->end points to skb->data + ring->frame_size - NL_MMAP_HDRLEN. The fix adds and lets __netlink_alloc_skb() take the actual needed linear room for the network skb + meta data into account. It's completely irrelevant for non-mmaped netlink sockets, but in case mmap sockets are used, it can be decided whether the available skb_tailroom() is really large enough for the buffer, or whether it needs to internally fallback to a normal alloc_skb(). >From nf queue side, the information whether the destination port is an mmap RX ring is not really available without extra port-to-socket lookup, thus it can only be determined in lower layers i.e. when __netlink_alloc_skb() is called that checks internally for this. I chose to add the extra ldiff parameter as mmap will then still work: We have data_len and hlen in nfqnl_build_packet_message(), data_len is the full length (capped at queue->copy_range) for skb_zerocopy() and hlen some possible part of data_len that needs to be copied; the rem_len variable indicates the needed remaining linear mmap space. The only other workaround in nf queue internally would be after allocation time by f.e. cap'ing the data_len to the skb_tailroom() iff we deal with an mmap skb, but that would 1) expose the fact that we use a mmap skb to upper layers, and 2) trim the skb where we otherwise could just have moved the full skb into the normal receive queue. After the patch, in my test case the ring slot doesn't fit and therefore shows NL_MMAP_STATUS_COPY, where a full skb carries all the data and thus needs to be picked up via recv(). Fixes: 3ab1f683 ("nfnetlink: add support for memory mapped netlink") Signed-off-by:
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by:
Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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Linus Lüssing authored
commit 4635469f upstream. Bitwise OR/AND assignments in C aren't guaranteed to be atomic. One OGM handler might undo the set/clear of a specific bit from another handler run in between. Fix this by using the atomic set_bit()/clear_bit()/test_bit() functions. Fixes: 3f4841ff ("batman-adv: tvlv - add network coding container") Signed-off-by:
Linus Lüssing <linus.luessing@c0d3.blue> Signed-off-by:
Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch> Signed-off-by:
Antonio Quartulli <antonio@meshcoding.com> [ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ] Signed-off-by:
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Linus Lüssing authored
commit 65d7d460 upstream. Bitwise OR/AND assignments in C aren't guaranteed to be atomic. One OGM handler might undo the set/clear of a specific bit from another handler run in between. Fix this by using the atomic set_bit()/clear_bit()/test_bit() functions. Fixes: 17cf0ea4 ("batman-adv: tvlv - add distributed arp table container") Signed-off-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
commit 9d11b51c upstream. The Linux NFS server returns garbage in the data payload of inline NFS/RDMA READ replies. These are READs of under 1000 bytes or so where the client has not provided either a reply chunk or a write list. The NFS server delivers the data payload for an NFS READ reply to the transport in an xdr_buf page list. If the NFS client did not provide a reply chunk or a write list, send_reply() is supposed to set up a separate sge for the page containing the READ data, and another sge for XDR padding if needed, then post all of the sges via a single SEND Work Request. The problem is send_reply() does not advance through the xdr_buf when setting up scatter/gather entries for SEND WR. It always calls dma_map_xdr with xdr_off set to zero. When there's more than one sge, dma_map_xdr() sets up the SEND sge's so they all point to the xdr_buf's head. The current Linux NFS/RDMA client always provides a reply chunk or a write list when performing an NFS READ over RDMA. Therefore, it does not exercise this particular case. The Linux server has never had to use more than one extra sge for building RPC/RDMA replies with a Linux client. However, an NFS/RDMA client _is_ allowed to send small NFS READs without setting up a write list or reply chunk. The NFS READ reply fits entirely within the inline reply buffer in this case. This is perhaps a more efficient way of performing NFS READs that the Linux NFS/RDMA client may some day adopt. Fixes: b432e6b3 ('svcrdma: Change DMA mapping logic to . . .') BugLink: https://bugzilla.linux-nfs.org/show_bug.cgi?id=285Signed-off-by:
Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Krzysztof Kozlowski authored
commit 5f09a5cb upstream. During probe the regulator (if present) was enabled but not disabled in case of failure. So an unsuccessful probe lead to enabling the regulator which was actually not needed because the device was not enabled. Additionally each deferred probe lead to increase of regulator enable count so it would not be effectively disabled during removal of the device. Test HW: Exynos4412 - Trats2 board Signed-off-by:
Krzysztof Kozlowski <k.kozlowski@samsung.com> Fixes: 498d22f6 ("thermal: exynos: Support for TMU regulator defined at device tree") Reviewed-by:
Javier Martinez Canillas <javier.martinez@collabora.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
Lukasz Majewski <l.majewski@samsung.com> Tested-by:
Eduardo Valentin <edubezval@gmail.com> [ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ] Signed-off-by:
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Florian Fainelli authored
commit 03679a14 upstream. The macro to write 64-bits quantities to the 32-bits register swapped the value and offsets arguments, we want to preserve the ordering of the arguments with respect to how writel() is implemented for instance: value first, offset/base second. Fixes: 246d7f77 ("net: dsa: add Broadcom SF2 switch driver") Signed-off-by:
Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Vivien Didelot <vivien.didelot@savoirfairelinux.com> Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Borkmann authored
commit 592867bf upstream. We may already have gotten a proper fd struct through fdget(), so whenever we return at the end of an map operation, we need to call fdput(). However, each map operation from syscall side first probes CHECK_ATTR() to verify that unused fields in the bpf_attr union are zero. In case of malformed input, we return with error, but the lookup to the map_fd was already performed at that time, so that we return without an corresponding fdput(). Fix it by performing an fdget() only right before bpf_map_get(). The fdget() invocation on maps in the verifier is not affected. Fixes: db20fd2b ("bpf: add lookup/update/delete/iterate methods to BPF maps") Signed-off-by:
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
commit c8219906 upstream. In commit f341861f ("task_work: add a scheduling point in task_work_run()") I fixed a latency problem adding a cond_resched() call. Later, commit ac3d0da8 added yet another loop to reverse a list, bringing back the latency spike : I've seen in some cases this loop taking 275 ms, if for example a process with 2,000,000 files is killed. We could add yet another cond_resched() in the reverse loop, or we can simply remove the reversal, as I do not think anything would depend on order of task_work_add() submitted works. Fixes: ac3d0da8 ("task_work: Make task_work_add() lockless") Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by:
Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com> Acked-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Haggai Eran authored
commit 11d74804 upstream. The mlx5_ib_reg_user_mr() function will attempt to call clean_mr() in its error flow even though there is never a case where the error flow occurs with a valid MR pointer to destroy. Remove the clean_mr() call and the incorrect comment above it. Fixes: b4cfe447 ("IB/mlx5: Implement on demand paging by adding support for MMU notifiers") Cc: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by:
Haggai Eran <haggaie@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by:
Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by:
Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Viresh Kumar authored
commit a2022001 upstream. Tolerance applies on both sides of the target voltage, i.e. both min and max sides. But while checking if a voltage is supported by the regulator or not, we haven't taken care of tolerance on the lower side. Fix that. Cc: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de> Fixes: 045ee45c ("cpufreq: cpufreq-dt: disable unsupported OPPs") Signed-off-by:
Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> Reviewed-by:
Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Borkmann authored
commit e41b0bed upstream. We previously register IPPROTO_ROUTING offload under inet6_add_offload(), but in error path, we try to unregister it with inet_del_offload(). This doesn't seem correct, it should actually be inet6_del_offload(), also ipv6_exthdrs_offload_exit() from that commit seems rather incorrect (it also uses rthdr_offload twice), but it got removed entirely later on. Fixes: 3336288a ("ipv6: Switch to using new offload infrastructure.") Signed-off-by:
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