- 02 Jul, 2017 7 commits
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Paolo Bonzini authored
commit c8401dda upstream. TF is handled a bit differently for syscall and sysret, compared to the other instructions: TF is checked after the instruction completes, so that the OS can disable #DB at a syscall by adding TF to FMASK. When the sysret is executed the #DB is taken "as if" the syscall insn just completed. KVM emulates syscall so that it can trap 32-bit syscall on Intel processors. Fix the behavior, otherwise you could get #DB on a user stack which is not nice. This does not affect Linux guests, as they use an IST or task gate for #DB. This fixes CVE-2017-7518. Reported-by:
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - kvm_vcpu_check_singlestep() did not take an rflags parameter but called get_rflags() itself; delete that code - kvm_vcpu_check_singlestep() sets some flags differently - Drop changes to kvm_skip_emulated_instruction()] Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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David Howells authored
commit 5f2f9765 upstream. This fixes CVE-2017-7482. When a kerberos 5 ticket is being decoded so that it can be loaded into an rxrpc-type key, there are several places in which the length of a variable-length field is checked to make sure that it's not going to overrun the available data - but the data is padded to the nearest four-byte boundary and the code doesn't check for this extra. This could lead to the size-remaining variable wrapping and the data pointer going over the end of the buffer. Fix this by making the various variable-length data checks use the padded length. Reported-by:
石磊 <shilei-c@360.cn> Signed-off-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@auristor.com> Reviewed-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename, context] Signed-off-by:
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Vladis Dronov authored
commit ee9c4e68 upstream. The 'req->mip_levels' parameter in vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl() is a user-controlled 'uint32_t' value which is used as a loop count limit. This can lead to a kernel lockup and DoS. Add check for 'req->mip_levels'. References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1437431Signed-off-by:
Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Sinclair Yeh <syeh@vmware.com> Signed-off-by:
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Seung-Woo Kim authored
commit 60a2362f upstream. After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing. Signed-off-by:
Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com> Signed-off-by:
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Helge Deller authored
commit bd726c90 upstream. Fix expand_upwards() on architectures with an upward-growing stack (parisc, metag and partly IA-64) to allow the stack to reliably grow exactly up to the address space limit given by TASK_SIZE. Signed-off-by:
Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Acked-by:
Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Hugh Dickins authored
commit f4cb767d upstream. Trinity gets kernel BUG at mm/mmap.c:1963! in about 3 minutes of mmap testing. That's the VM_BUG_ON(gap_end < gap_start) at the end of unmapped_area_topdown(). Linus points out how MAP_FIXED (which does not have to respect our stack guard gap intentions) could result in gap_end below gap_start there. Fix that, and the similar case in its alternative, unmapped_area(). Fixes: 1be7107f ("mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas") Reported-by:
Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Debugged-by:
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
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Hugh Dickins authored
commit 1be7107f upstream. Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping. But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX] which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN. This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical, unfortunatelly. Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot. One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace, but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong for some special case applications. For now, add a kernel command line option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units). Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page: because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point, a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK and strict non-overcommit mode. Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start (or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(), and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that. Original-patch-by:
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Original-patch-by:
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- 05 Jun, 2017 33 commits
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Ben Hutchings authored
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Eric Dumazet authored
commit 232cd35d upstream. Andrey Konovalov and idaifish@gmail.com reported crashes caused by one skb shared_info being overwritten from __ip6_append_data() Andrey program lead to following state : copy -4200 datalen 2000 fraglen 2040 maxfraglen 2040 alloclen 2048 transhdrlen 0 offset 0 fraggap 6200 The skb_copy_and_csum_bits(skb_prev, maxfraglen, data + transhdrlen, fraggap, 0); is overwriting skb->head and skb_shared_info Since we apparently detect this rare condition too late, move the code earlier to even avoid allocating skb and risking crashes. Once again, many thanks to Andrey and syzkaller team. Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by:
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Tested-by:
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WANG Cong authored
commit 83eaddab upstream. Like commit 657831ff ("dccp/tcp: do not inherit mc_list from parent") we should clear ipv6_mc_list etc. for IPv6 sockets too. Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Acked-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
commit fdcee2cb upstream. SCTP needs fixes similar to 83eaddab ("ipv6/dccp: do not inherit ipv6_mc_list from parent"), otherwise bad things can happen. Signed-off-by:
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David S. Miller authored
commit 7dd7eb95 upstream. Do not use unsigned variables to see if it returns a negative error or not. Fixes: 2423496a ("ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header options") Reported-by:
Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by:
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Craig Gallek authored
commit 2423496a upstream. The KASAN warning repoted below was discovered with a syzkaller program. The reproducer is basically: int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, NEXTHDR_HOP); send(s, &one_byte_of_data, 1, MSG_MORE); send(s, &more_than_mtu_bytes_data, 2000, 0); The socket() call sets the nexthdr field of the v6 header to NEXTHDR_HOP, the first send call primes the payload with a non zero byte of data, and the second send call triggers the fragmentation path. The fragmentation code tries to parse the header options in order to figure out where to insert the fragment option. Since nexthdr points to an invalid option, the calculation of the size of the network header can made to be much larger than the linear section of the skb and data is read outside of it. This fix makes ip6_find_1stfrag return an error if it detects running out-of-bounds. [ 42.361487] ================================================================== [ 42.364412] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.365471] Read of size 840 at addr ffff88000969e798 by task ip6_fragment-oo/3789 [ 42.366469] [ 42.366696] CPU: 1 PID: 3789 Comm: ip6_fragment-oo Not tainted 4.11.0+ #41 [ 42.367628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 42.368824] Call Trace: [ 42.369183] dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b [ 42.369664] print_address_description+0x73/0x290 [ 42.370325] kasan_report+0x252/0x370 [ 42.370839] ? ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.371396] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0 [ 42.371978] memcpy+0x23/0x50 [ 42.372395] ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.372920] ? nf_ct_expect_unregister_notifier+0x110/0x110 [ 42.373681] ? ip6_copy_metadata+0x7f0/0x7f0 [ 42.374263] ? ip6_forward+0x2e30/0x2e30 [ 42.374803] ip6_finish_output+0x584/0x990 [ 42.375350] ip6_output+0x1b7/0x690 [ 42.375836] ? ip6_finish_output+0x990/0x990 [ 42.376411] ? ip6_fragment+0x3730/0x3730 [ 42.376968] ip6_local_out+0x95/0x160 [ 42.377471] ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x330 [ 42.377969] ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0 [ 42.378589] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2051/0x2db0 [ 42.379129] ? rawv6_bind+0x8b0/0x8b0 [ 42.379633] ? _copy_from_user+0x84/0xe0 [ 42.380193] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 [ 42.380878] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x162/0x930 [ 42.381427] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120 [ 42.382074] ? sock_has_perm+0x1f6/0x290 [ 42.382614] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x167/0x930 [ 42.383173] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660 [ 42.383727] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.384226] ? inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.384748] ? inet_recvmsg+0x540/0x540 [ 42.385263] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 [ 42.385758] SYSC_sendto+0x217/0x380 [ 42.386249] ? SYSC_connect+0x310/0x310 [ 42.386783] ? __might_fault+0x110/0x1d0 [ 42.387324] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660 [ 42.387880] ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x1f0 [ 42.388403] ? __fdget+0x18/0x20 [ 42.388851] ? sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 [ 42.389472] ? SyS_setsockopt+0x17f/0x260 [ 42.390021] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe [ 42.390650] SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 [ 42.391103] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.391731] RIP: 0033:0x7fbbb711e383 [ 42.392217] RSP: 002b:00007ffff4d34f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 42.393235] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fbbb711e383 [ 42.394195] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffff4d34f60 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 42.395145] RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 00007ffff4d34f40 R09: 0000000000000018 [ 42.396056] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400aad [ 42.396598] R13: 0000000000000066 R14: 00007ffff4d34ee0 R15: 00007fbbb717af00 [ 42.397257] [ 42.397411] Allocated by task 3789: [ 42.397702] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 [ 42.398005] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 42.398267] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 [ 42.398548] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 [ 42.398848] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xcb/0x380 [ 42.399224] __kmalloc_reserve.isra.32+0x41/0xe0 [ 42.399654] __alloc_skb+0xf8/0x580 [ 42.400003] sock_wmalloc+0xab/0xf0 [ 42.400346] __ip6_append_data.isra.41+0x2472/0x33d0 [ 42.400813] ip6_append_data+0x1a8/0x2f0 [ 42.401122] rawv6_sendmsg+0x11ee/0x2db0 [ 42.401505] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.401860] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 [ 42.402209] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7cb/0x930 [ 42.402582] __sys_sendmsg+0xd9/0x190 [ 42.402941] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 [ 42.403273] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.403718] [ 42.403871] Freed by task 1794: [ 42.404146] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 [ 42.404515] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 42.404827] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 [ 42.405167] kfree+0xe8/0x2b0 [ 42.405462] skb_free_head+0x74/0xb0 [ 42.405806] skb_release_data+0x30e/0x3a0 [ 42.406198] skb_release_all+0x4a/0x60 [ 42.406563] consume_skb+0x113/0x2e0 [ 42.406910] skb_free_datagram+0x1a/0xe0 [ 42.407288] netlink_recvmsg+0x60d/0xe40 [ 42.407667] sock_recvmsg+0xd7/0x110 [ 42.408022] ___sys_recvmsg+0x25c/0x580 [ 42.408395] __sys_recvmsg+0xd6/0x190 [ 42.408753] SyS_recvmsg+0x2d/0x50 [ 42.409086] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.409513] [ 42.409665] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88000969e780 [ 42.409665] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 [ 42.410846] The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of [ 42.410846] 512-byte region [ffff88000969e780, ffff88000969e980) [ 42.411941] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 42.412405] page:ffffea000025a780 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 42.413298] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head) [ 42.413729] raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800c000c [ 42.414387] raw: ffffea00002a9500 0000000900000007 ffff88000c401280 0000000000000000 [ 42.415074] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 42.415604] [ 42.415757] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 42.416222] ffff88000969e880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 42.416904] ffff88000969e900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 42.417591] >ffff88000969e980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 42.418273] ^ [ 42.418588] ffff88000969ea00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 42.419273] ffff88000969ea80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 42.419882] ================================================================== Reported-by:
Craig Gallek <kraig@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Johan Hovold authored
commit 30572418 upstream. This driver needlessly took another reference to the tty on open, a reference which was then never released on close. This lead to not just a leak of the tty, but also a driver reference leak that prevented the driver from being unloaded after a port had once been opened. Fixes: 4a90f09b ("tty: usb-serial krefs") Signed-off-by:
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Johan Hovold authored
commit 654b404f upstream. Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device. This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer buffer to user space. Fixes: 8c209e67 ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32") Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
commit 657831ff upstream. syzkaller found a way to trigger double frees from ip_mc_drop_socket() It turns out that leave a copy of parent mc_list at accept() time, which is very bad. Very similar to commit 8b485ce6 ("tcp: do not inherit fastopen_req from parent") Initial report from Pray3r, completed by Andrey one. Thanks a lot to them ! Signed-off-by:
Pray3r <pray3r.z@gmail.com> Reported-by:
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J. Bruce Fields authored
commit 13bf9fbf upstream. The NFSv2/v3 code does not systematically check whether we decode past the end of the buffer. This generally appears to be harmless, but there are a few places where we do arithmetic on the pointers involved and don't account for the possibility that a length could be negative. Add checks to catch these. Reported-by:
Tuomas Haanpää <thaan@synopsys.com> Reported-by:
Ari Kauppi <ari@synopsys.com> Reviewed-by:
NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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J. Bruce Fields authored
commit db44bac4 upstream. Use a couple shortcuts that will simplify a following bugfix. Signed-off-by:
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J. Bruce Fields authored
commit e6838a29 upstream. A client can append random data to the end of an NFSv2 or NFSv3 RPC call without our complaining; we'll just stop parsing at the end of the expected data and ignore the rest. Encoded arguments and replies are stored together in an array of pages, and if a call is too large it could leave inadequate space for the reply. This is normally OK because NFS RPC's typically have either short arguments and long replies (like READ) or long arguments and short replies (like WRITE). But a client that sends an incorrectly long reply can violate those assumptions. This was observed to cause crashes. Also, several operations increment rq_next_page in the decode routine before checking the argument size, which can leave rq_next_page pointing well past the end of the page array, causing trouble later in svc_free_pages. So, following a suggestion from Neil Brown, add a central check to enforce our expectation that no NFSv2/v3 call has both a large call and a large reply. As followup we may also want to rewrite the encoding routines to check more carefully that they aren't running off the end of the page array. We may also consider rejecting calls that have any extra garbage appended. That would be safer, and within our rights by spec, but given the age of our server and the NFS protocol, and the fact that we've never enforced this before, we may need to balance that against the possibility of breaking some oddball client. Reported-by:
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Dan Carpenter authored
commit ee0d8d84 upstream. We should call ipxitf_put() if the copy_to_user() fails. Reported-by:
李强 <liqiang6-s@360.cn> Signed-off-by:
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Amey Telawane authored
commit e09e2867 upstream. Strcpy is inherently not safe, and strlcpy() should be used instead. __trace_find_cmdline() uses strcpy() because the comms saved must have a terminating nul character, but it doesn't hurt to add the extra protection of using strlcpy() instead of strcpy(). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1493806274-13936-1-git-send-email-amit.pundir@linaro.orgSigned-off-by:
Amey Telawane <ameyt@codeaurora.org> [AmitP: Cherry-picked this commit from CodeAurora kernel/msm-3.10 https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-3.10/commit/?id=2161ae9a70b12cf18ac8e5952a20161ffbccb477] Signed-off-by:
Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org> [ Updated change log and removed the "- 1" from len parameter ] Signed-off-by:
Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by:
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Lee, Chun-Yi authored
commit 98d610c3 upstream. The accelerometer event relies on the ACERWMID_EVENT_GUID notify. So, this patch changes the codes to setup accelerometer input device when detected ACERWMID_EVENT_GUID. It avoids that the accel input device created on every Acer machines. In addition, patch adds a clearly parsing logic of accelerometer hid to acer_wmi_get_handle_cb callback function. It is positive matching the "SENR" name with "BST0001" device to avoid non-supported hardware. Reported-by:
Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org> Signed-off-by:
Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> [andy: slightly massage commit message] Signed-off-by:
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mantas M authored
commit c2ed1880 upstream. The protocol field is checked when deleting IPv4 routes, but ignored for IPv6, which causes problems with routing daemons accidentally deleting externally set routes (observed by multiple bird6 users). This can be verified using `ip -6 route del <prefix> proto something`. Signed-off-by:
Mantas Mikulėnas <grawity@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Omar Sandoval authored
commit c4baad50 upstream. put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes). Signed-off-by:
Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
commit 00514537 upstream. I ran into a stack frame size warning because of the on-stack copy of the USB device structure: drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c: In function 'dvb_usbv2_disconnect': drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c:1029:1: error: the frame size of 1104 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=] Copying a device structure like this is wrong for a number of other reasons too aside from the possible stack overflow. One of them is that the dev_info() call will print the name of the device later, but AFAICT we have only copied a pointer to the name earlier and the actual name has been freed by the time it gets printed. This removes the on-stack copy of the device and instead copies the device name using kstrdup(). I'm ignoring the possible failure here as both printk() and kfree() are able to deal with NULL pointers. Signed-off-by:
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by:
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by:
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Herbert Xu authored
commit ef0579b6 upstream. The ahash API modifies the request's callback function in order to clean up after itself in some corner cases (unaligned final and missing finup). When the request is complete ahash will restore the original callback and everything is fine. However, when the request gets an EBUSY on a full queue, an EINPROGRESS callback is made while the request is still ongoing. In this case the ahash API will incorrectly call its own callback. This patch fixes the problem by creating a temporary request object on the stack which is used to relay EINPROGRESS back to the original completion function. This patch also adds code to preserve the original flags value. Fixes: ab6bf4e5 ("crypto: hash - Fix the pointer voodoo in...") Reported-by:
Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Tested-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by:
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Chris Salls authored
commit cf01fb99 upstream. In the case that compat_get_bitmap fails we do not want to copy the bitmap to the user as it will contain uninitialized stack data and leak sensitive data. Signed-off-by:
Chris Salls <salls@cs.ucsb.edu> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
commit c9f838d1 upstream. This fixes CVE-2017-7472. Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel memory by leaking thread keyrings: #include <keyutils.h> int main() { for (;;) keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING); } Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before. To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred() and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding keyring is already present. Fixes: d84f4f99 ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials") Signed-off-by:
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Andrey Konovalov authored
commit bcc5364b upstream. When calculating po->tp_hdrlen + po->tp_reserve the result can overflow. Fix by checking that tp_reserve <= INT_MAX on assign. Signed-off-by:
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Andrey Konovalov authored
commit 8f8d28e4 upstream. When calculating rb->frames_per_block * req->tp_block_nr the result can overflow. Add a check that tp_block_size * tp_block_nr <= UINT_MAX. Since frames_per_block <= tp_block_size, the expression would never overflow. Signed-off-by:
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Andrey Konovalov authored
commit 2b6867c2 upstream. Subtracting tp_sizeof_priv from tp_block_size and casting to int to check whether one is less then the other doesn't always work (both of them are unsigned ints). Compare them as is instead. Also cast tp_sizeof_priv to u64 before using BLK_PLUS_PRIV, as it can overflow inside BLK_PLUS_PRIV otherwise. Signed-off-by:
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Li Qiang authored
commit e7e11f99 upstream. In vmw_surface_define_ioctl(), the 'num_sizes' is the sum of the 'req->mip_levels' array. This array can be assigned any value from the user space. As both the 'num_sizes' and the array is uint32_t, it is easy to make 'num_sizes' overflow. The later 'mip_levels' is used as the loop count. This can lead an oob write. Add the check of 'req->mip_levels' to avoid this. Signed-off-by:
Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com> Signed-off-by:
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Murray McAllister authored
commit 36274ab8 upstream. Before memory allocations vmw_surface_define_ioctl() checks the upper-bounds of a user-supplied size, but does not check if the supplied size is 0. Add check to avoid NULL pointer dereferences. Signed-off-by:
Murray McAllister <murray.mcallister@insomniasec.com> Reviewed-by:
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Andy Whitcroft authored
commit f843ee6d upstream. Kees Cook has pointed out that xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() is subject to wrapping issues. To ensure we are correctly ensuring that the two ESN structures are the same size compare both the overall size as reported by xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() and the internal length are the same. CVE-2017-7184 Signed-off-by:
Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by:
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Andy Whitcroft authored
commit 677e806d upstream. When a new xfrm state is created during an XFRM_MSG_NEWSA call we validate the user supplied replay_esn to ensure that the size is valid and to ensure that the replay_window size is within the allocated buffer. However later it is possible to update this replay_esn via a XFRM_MSG_NEWAE call. There we again validate the size of the supplied buffer matches the existing state and if so inject the contents. We do not at this point check that the replay_window is within the allocated memory. This leads to out-of-bounds reads and writes triggered by netlink packets. This leads to memory corruption and the potential for priviledge escalation. We already attempt to validate the incoming replay information in xfrm_new_ae() via xfrm_replay_verify_len(). This confirms that the user is not trying to change the size of the replay state buffer which includes the replay_esn. It however does not check the replay_window remains within that buffer. Add validation of the contained replay_window. CVE-2017-7184 Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
commit 43a66845 upstream. We got a report of yet another bug in ping http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/03/24/6 ->disconnect() is not called with socket lock held. Fix this by acquiring ping rwlock earlier. Thanks to Daniel, Alexander and Andrey for letting us know this problem. Fixes: c319b4d7 ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind") Signed-off-by:
Daniel Jiang <danieljiang0415@gmail.com> Reported-by:
Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> Reported-by:
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David Howells authored
commit ee8f844e upstream. This fixes CVE-2016-9604. Keyrings whose name begin with a '.' are special internal keyrings and so userspace isn't allowed to create keyrings by this name to prevent shadowing. However, the patch that added the guard didn't fix KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING. Not only can that create dot-named keyrings, it can also subscribe to them as a session keyring if they grant SEARCH permission to the user. This, for example, allows a root process to set .builtin_trusted_keys as its session keyring, at which point it has full access because now the possessor permissions are added. This permits root to add extra public keys, thereby bypassing module verification. This also affects kexec and IMA. This can be tested by (as root): keyctl session .builtin_trusted_keys keyctl add user a a @s keyctl list @s which on my test box gives me: 2 keys in keyring: 180010936: ---lswrv 0 0 asymmetric: Build time autogenerated kernel key: ae3d4a31b82daa8e1a75b49dc2bba949fd992a05 801382539: --alswrv 0 0 user: a Fix this by rejecting names beginning with a '.' in the keyctl. Signed-off-by:
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
commit 54e2c2c1 upstream. Reinstate the generation of EPERM for a key type name beginning with a '.' in a userspace call. Types whose name begins with a '.' are internal only. The test was removed by: commit a4e3b8d7 Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Date: Thu May 22 14:02:23 2014 -0400 Subject: KEYS: special dot prefixed keyring name bug fix I think we want to keep the restriction on type name so that userspace can't add keys of a special internal type. Note that removal of the test causes several of the tests in the keyutils testsuite to fail. Signed-off-by:
Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mimi Zohar authored
commit a4e3b8d7 upstream. Dot prefixed keyring names are supposed to be reserved for the kernel, but add_key() calls key_get_type_from_user(), which incorrectly verifies the 'type' field, not the 'description' field. This patch verifies the 'description' field isn't dot prefixed, when creating a new keyring, and removes the dot prefix test in key_get_type_from_user(). Changelog v6: - whitespace and other cleanup Changelog v5: - Only prevent userspace from creating a dot prefixed keyring, not regular keys - Dmitry Reported-by:
Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by:
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Johan Hovold authored
commit b7321e81 upstream. Make sure to check for the required interrupt-in endpoint to avoid dereferencing a NULL-pointer should a malicious device lack such an endpoint. Note that a fairly recent change purported to fix this issue, but added an insufficient test on the number of endpoints only, a test which can now be removed. Fixes: 4ec0ef3a ("USB: iowarrior: fix oops with malicious USB descriptors") Fixes: 946b960d ("USB: add driver for iowarrior devices.") Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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