- 30 Sep, 2016 15 commits
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Michal Marek authored
commit a85a41ed upstream. Based on a x86-only patch by Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> With modular kernels, 'make install' is going to need the installed modules at some point to generate the initramfs. Signed-off-by:
Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Ashish Samant authored
commit d21c353d upstream. If we punch a hole on a reflink such that following conditions are met: 1. start offset is on a cluster boundary 2. end offset is not on a cluster boundary 3. (end offset is somewhere in another extent) or (hole range > MAX_CONTIG_BYTES(1MB)), we dont COW the first cluster starting at the start offset. But in this case, we were wrongly passing this cluster to ocfs2_zero_range_for_truncate() to zero out. This will modify the cluster in place and zero it in the source too. Fix this by skipping this cluster in such a scenario. To reproduce: 1. Create a random file of say 10 MB xfs_io -c 'pwrite -b 4k 0 10M' -f 10MBfile 2. Reflink it reflink -f 10MBfile reflnktest 3. Punch a hole at starting at cluster boundary with range greater that 1MB. You can also use a range that will put the end offset in another extent. fallocate -p -o 0 -l 1048615 reflnktest 4. sync 5. Check the first cluster in the source file. (It will be zeroed out). dd if=10MBfile iflag=direct bs=<cluster size> count=1 | hexdump -C Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470957147-14185-1-git-send-email-ashish.samant@oracle.comSigned-off-by:
Ashish Samant <ashish.samant@oracle.com> Reported-by:
Saar Maoz <saar.maoz@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
Srinivas Eeda <srinivas.eeda@oracle.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com> Cc: Eric Ren <zren@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Joseph Qi authored
commit e6f0c6e6 upstream. Commit ac7cf246 ("ocfs2/dlm: fix race between convert and recovery") checks if lockres master has changed to identify whether new master has finished recovery or not. This will introduce a race that right after old master does umount ( means master will change), a new convert request comes. In this case, it will reset lockres state to DLM_RECOVERING and then retry convert, and then fail with lockres->l_action being set to OCFS2_AST_INVALID, which will cause inconsistent lock level between ocfs2 and dlm, and then finally BUG. Since dlm recovery will clear lock->convert_pending in dlm_move_lockres_to_recovery_list, we can use it to correctly identify the race case between convert and recovery. So fix it. Fixes: ac7cf246 ("ocfs2/dlm: fix race between convert and recovery") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/57CE1569.8010704@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Herbert Xu authored
commit 53a5d5dd upstream. The current implementation uses a global per-cpu array to store data which are used to derive the next IV. This is insecure as the attacker may change the stored data. This patch removes all traces of chaining and replaces it with multiplication of the salt and the sequence number. Fixes: a10f554f ("crypto: echainiv - Add encrypted chain IV...") Reported-by:
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by:
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Herbert Xu authored
commit acdb04d0 upstream. When we need to allocate a temporary blkcipher_walk_next and it fails, the code is supposed to take the slow path of processing the data block by block. However, due to an unrelated change we instead end up dereferencing the NULL pointer. This patch fixes it by moving the unrelated bsize setting out of the way so that we enter the slow path as inteded. Fixes: 7607bd8f ("[CRYPTO] blkcipher: Added blkcipher_walk_virt_block") Reported-by:
xiakaixu <xiakaixu@huawei.com> Reported-by:
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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Ard Biesheuvel authored
commit f82e90b2 upstream. The AES-CTR glue code avoids calling into the blkcipher API for the tail portion of the walk, by comparing the remainder of walk.nbytes modulo AES_BLOCK_SIZE with the residual nbytes, and jumping straight into the tail processing block if they are equal. This tail processing block checks whether nbytes != 0, and does nothing otherwise. However, in case of an allocation failure in the blkcipher layer, we may enter this code with walk.nbytes == 0, while nbytes > 0. In this case, we should not dereference the source and destination pointers, since they may be NULL. So instead of checking for nbytes != 0, check for (walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE) != 0, which implies the former in non-error conditions. Fixes: 86464859 ("crypto: arm - AES in ECB/CBC/CTR/XTS modes using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions") Reported-by:
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Ard Biesheuvel authored
commit 2db34e78 upstream. The AES-CTR glue code avoids calling into the blkcipher API for the tail portion of the walk, by comparing the remainder of walk.nbytes modulo AES_BLOCK_SIZE with the residual nbytes, and jumping straight into the tail processing block if they are equal. This tail processing block checks whether nbytes != 0, and does nothing otherwise. However, in case of an allocation failure in the blkcipher layer, we may enter this code with walk.nbytes == 0, while nbytes > 0. In this case, we should not dereference the source and destination pointers, since they may be NULL. So instead of checking for nbytes != 0, check for (walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE) != 0, which implies the former in non-error conditions. Fixes: 49788fe2 ("arm64/crypto: AES-ECB/CBC/CTR/XTS using ARMv8 NEON and Crypto Extensions") Reported-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 20a2b49f ] When sending an ack in SYN_RECV state, we must scale the offered window if wscale option was negotiated and accepted. Tested: Following packetdrill test demonstrates the issue : 0.000 socket(..., SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP) = 3 +0 setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, [1], 4) = 0 +0 bind(3, ..., ...) = 0 +0 listen(3, 1) = 0 // Establish a connection. +0 < S 0:0(0) win 20000 <mss 1000,sackOK,wscale 7, nop, TS val 100 ecr 0> +0 > S. 0:0(0) ack 1 win 28960 <mss 1460,sackOK, TS val 100 ecr 100, nop, wscale 7> +0 < . 1:11(10) ack 1 win 156 <nop,nop,TS val 99 ecr 100> // check that window is properly scaled ! +0 > . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 226 <nop,nop,TS val 200 ecr 100> Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Acked-by:
Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by:
Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
Holger Hoffstätte <holger@applied-asynchrony.com>
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit bb1fceca ] When tcp_sendmsg() allocates a fresh and empty skb, it puts it at the tail of the write queue using tcp_add_write_queue_tail() Then it attempts to copy user data into this fresh skb. If the copy fails, we undo the work and remove the fresh skb. Unfortunately, this undo lacks the change done to tp->highest_sack and we can leave a dangling pointer (to a freed skb) Later, tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue() can dereference this pointer and access freed memory. For regular kernels where memory is not unmapped, this might cause SACK bugs because tcp_highest_sack_seq() is buggy, returning garbage instead of tp->snd_nxt, but with various debug features like CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, this can crash the kernel. This bug was found by Marco Grassi thanks to syzkaller. Fixes: 6859d494 ("[TCP]: Abstract tp->highest_sack accessing & point to next skb") Reported-by:
Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Artem Germanov authored
[ Upstream commit db7196a0 ] Commit 76174004 (tcp: do not slow start when cwnd equals ssthresh ) introduced regression in TCP YeAH. Using 100ms delay 1% loss virtual ethernet link kernel 4.2 shows bandwidth ~500KB/s for single TCP connection and kernel 4.3 and above (including 4.8-rc4) shows bandwidth ~100KB/s. That is caused by stalled cwnd when cwnd equals ssthresh. This patch fixes it by proper increasing cwnd in this case. Signed-off-by:
Artem Germanov <agermanov@anchorfree.com> Acked-by:
Dmitry Adamushko <d.adamushko@anchorfree.com> Signed-off-by:
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Dave Jones authored
[ Upstream commit 03c2778a ] Neither the failure or success paths of ping_v6_sendmsg release the dst it acquires. This leads to a flood of warnings from "net/core/dst.c:288 dst_release" on older kernels that don't have 8bf4ada2 backported. That patch optimistically hoped this had been fixed post 3.10, but it seems at least one case wasn't, where I've seen this triggered a lot from machines doing unprivileged icmp sockets. Cc: Martin Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Acked-by:
Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
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David Forster authored
[ Upstream commit 94d9f1c5 ] Panic occurs when issuing "cat /proc/net/route" whilst populating FIB with > 1M routes. Use of cached node pointer in fib_route_get_idx is unsafe. BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffc90001630024 IP: [<ffffffff814cf6a0>] leaf_walk_rcu+0x10/0xe0 PGD 11b08d067 PUD 11b08e067 PMD dac4b067 PTE 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: nfsd auth_rpcgss oid_registry nfs_acl nfs lockd grace fscac snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep virti acpi_cpufreq button parport_pc ppdev lp parport autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd tio_ring virtio floppy uhci_hcd ehci_hcd usbcore usb_common libata scsi_mod CPU: 1 PID: 785 Comm: cat Not tainted 4.2.0-rc8+ #4 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007 task: ffff8800da1c0bc0 ti: ffff88011a05c000 task.ti: ffff88011a05c000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814cf6a0>] [<ffffffff814cf6a0>] leaf_walk_rcu+0x10/0xe0 RSP: 0018:ffff88011a05fda0 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: ffff8800d8a40c00 RBX: ffff8800da4af940 RCX: ffff88011a05ff20 RDX: ffffc90001630020 RSI: 0000000001013531 RDI: ffff8800da4af950 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8800da1f9a00 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8800db45b7e4 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffff8800da4af950 R13: ffff8800d97a74c0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8800d97a7480 FS: 00007fd3970e0700(0000) GS:ffff88011fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: ffffc90001630024 CR3: 000000011a7e4000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffffffff814d00d3 0000000000000000 ffff88011a05ff20 ffff8800da1f9a00 ffffffff811dd8b9 0000000000000800 0000000000020000 00007fd396f35000 ffffffff811f8714 0000000000003431 ffffffff8138dce0 0000000000000f80 Call Trace: [<ffffffff814d00d3>] ? fib_route_seq_start+0x93/0xc0 [<ffffffff811dd8b9>] ? seq_read+0x149/0x380 [<ffffffff811f8714>] ? fsnotify+0x3b4/0x500 [<ffffffff8138dce0>] ? process_echoes+0x70/0x70 [<ffffffff8121cfa7>] ? proc_reg_read+0x47/0x70 [<ffffffff811bb823>] ? __vfs_read+0x23/0xd0 [<ffffffff811bbd42>] ? rw_verify_area+0x52/0xf0 [<ffffffff811bbe61>] ? vfs_read+0x81/0x120 [<ffffffff811bcbc2>] ? SyS_read+0x42/0xa0 [<ffffffff81549ab2>] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75 Code: 48 85 c0 75 d8 f3 c3 31 c0 c3 f3 c3 66 66 66 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 a 04 89 f0 33 02 44 89 c9 48 d3 e8 0f b6 4a 05 49 89 RIP [<ffffffff814cf6a0>] leaf_walk_rcu+0x10/0xe0 RSP <ffff88011a05fda0> CR2: ffffc90001630024 Signed-off-by:
Dave Forster <dforster@brocade.com> Acked-by:
Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jeff Mahoney authored
commit 0a11b9aa upstream. new_insert_key only makes any sense when it's associated with a new_insert_ptr, which is initialized to NULL and changed to a buffer_head when we also initialize new_insert_key. We can key off of that to avoid the uninitialized warning. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5eca5ffb-2155-8df2-b4a2-f162f105efed@suse.comSigned-off-by:
Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
> 2 ../kernel/cpuset.c:2101:11: warning: initialization from incompatible pointer type [-Wincompatible-pointer-types] > 1 ../kernel/cpuset.c:2101:2: warning: initialization from incompatible pointer type > 1 ../kernel/cpuset.c:2101:2: warning: (near initialization for 'cpuset_cgrp_subsys.fork') This got introduced by 06ec7a1d ("cpuset: make sure new tasks conform to the current config of the cpuset"). In the upstream kernel, the function prototype was changed as of b53202e6 ("cgroup: kill cgrp_ss_priv[CGROUP_CANFORK_COUNT] and friends"). That patch is not suitable for stable kernels, and fortunately the warning seems harmless as the prototypes only differ in the second argument that is unused. Adding that argument gets rid of the warning: Signed-off-by:
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Michal Nazarewicz authored
commit 8f57e4d9 upstream. Rewrite abs() so that its return type does not depend on the architecture and no unexpected type conversion happen inside of it. The only conversion is from unsigned to signed type. char is left as a return type but treated as a signed type regradless of it's actual signedness. With the old version, int arguments were promoted to long and depending on architecture a long argument might result in s64 or long return type (which may or may not be the same). This came after some back and forth with Nicolas. The current macro has different return type (for the same input type) depending on architecture which might be midly iritating. An alternative version would promote to int like so: #define abs(x) __abs_choose_expr(x, long long, \ __abs_choose_expr(x, long, \ __builtin_choose_expr( \ sizeof(x) <= sizeof(int), \ ({ int __x = (x); __x<0?-__x:__x; }), \ ((void)0)))) I have no preference but imagine Linus might. :] Nicolas argument against is that promoting to int causes iconsistent behaviour: int main(void) { unsigned short a = 0, b = 1, c = a - b; unsigned short d = abs(a - b); unsigned short e = abs(c); printf("%u %u\n", d, e); // prints: 1 65535 } Then again, no sane person expects consistent behaviour from C integer arithmetic. ;) Note: __builtin_types_compatible_p(unsigned char, char) is always false, and __builtin_types_compatible_p(signed char, char) is also always false. Signed-off-by:
Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com> Reviewed-by:
Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Cc: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Cc: Wey-Yi Guy <wey-yi.w.guy@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 24 Sep, 2016 25 commits
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
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Guenter Roeck authored
commit 8e4b7205 upstream. Since commit acb2505d ("openrisc: fix copy_from_user()"), copy_from_user() returns the number of bytes requested, not the number of bytes not copied. Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Fixes: acb2505d ("openrisc: fix copy_from_user()") Signed-off-by:
Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by:
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Guenter Roeck authored
commit 65c0044c upstream. avr32 builds fail with: arch/avr32/kernel/built-in.o: In function `arch_ptrace': (.text+0x650): undefined reference to `___copy_from_user' arch/avr32/kernel/built-in.o:(___ksymtab+___copy_from_user+0x0): undefined reference to `___copy_from_user' kernel/built-in.o: In function `proc_doulongvec_ms_jiffies_minmax': (.text+0x5dd8): undefined reference to `___copy_from_user' kernel/built-in.o: In function `proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin': sysctl.c:(.text+0x6174): undefined reference to `___copy_from_user' kernel/built-in.o: In function `ptrace_has_cap': ptrace.c:(.text+0x69c0): undefined reference to `___copy_from_user' kernel/built-in.o:ptrace.c:(.text+0x6b90): more undefined references to `___copy_from_user' follow Fixes: 8630c322 ("avr32: fix copy_from_user()") Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Acked-by:
Havard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Hans-Christian Noren Egtvedt <egtvedt@samfundet.no> Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
commit a5e541f7 upstream. Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 4364e1a2 upstream. virq is not required to be the same for all msi descs. Use the base irq number from the desc in the debug printk. Reported-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
commit 22426465 upstream. should clear on access_ok() failures. Also remove the useless range truncation logics. Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
commit 917400ce upstream. Acked-by:
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Al Viro authored
commit ae7cc577 upstream. Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
commit e33d1f6f upstream. Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
commit acb2505d upstream. ... that should zero on faults. Also remove the <censored> helpful logics wrt range truncation copied from ppc32. Where it had ever been needed only in case of copy_from_user() *and* had not been merged into the mainline until a month after the need had disappeared. A decade before openrisc went into mainline, I might add... Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
commit aace880f upstream. Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
commit 8ae95ed4 upstream. Acked-by:
James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
commit 2561d309 upstream. it should clear the destination even when access_ok() fails. Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
commit 2545e5da upstream. ... in all cases, including the failing access_ok() Note that some architectures using asm-generic/uaccess.h have __copy_from_user() not zeroing the tail on failure halfway through. This variant works either way. Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
commit e69d7005 upstream. Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
commit f35c1e06 upstream. It's -EFAULT, not -1 (and contrary to the comment in there, __strnlen_user() can return 0 - on faults). Acked-by:
Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
commit 6e050503 upstream. Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
commit b615e3c7 upstream. Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
commit 8f035983 upstream. Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
commit eb47e029 upstream. * copy_from_user() on access_ok() failure ought to zero the destination * none of those primitives should skip the access_ok() check in case of small constant size. Acked-by:
Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
commit 3b8767a8 upstream. It should check access_ok(). Otherwise a bunch of places turn into trivially exploitable rootholes. Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
commit 9ad18b75 upstream. both for access_ok() failures and for faults halfway through Signed-off-by:
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Vineet Gupta authored
commit 05d9d0b9 upstream. Al reported potential issue with ARC get_user() as it wasn't clearing out destination pointer in case of fault due to bad address etc. Verified using following | { | u32 bogus1 = 0xdeadbeef; | u64 bogus2 = 0xdead; | int rc1, rc2; | | pr_info("Orig values %x %llx\n", bogus1, bogus2); | rc1 = get_user(bogus1, (u32 __user *)0x40000000); | rc2 = get_user(bogus2, (u64 __user *)0x50000000); | pr_info("access %d %d, new values %x %llx\n", | rc1, rc2, bogus1, bogus2); | } | [ARCLinux]# insmod /mnt/kernel-module/qtn.ko | Orig values deadbeef dead | access -14 -14, new values 0 0 Reported-by:
Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
commit fd2d2b19 upstream. Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
commit c2f18fa4 upstream. * should zero on any failure * __get_user() should use __copy_from_user(), not copy_from_user() Signed-off-by:
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