Event synthesis may occur at the start or end (tail) of a perf command.
In system-wide mode it can scan every process in /proc, which may add
seconds of latency before event recording. Add a new benchmark that
times how long event synthesis takes with and without data synthesis.

An example execution looks like:

 $ perf bench internals synthesize
 # Running 'internals/synthesize' benchmark:
 Average synthesis took: 168.253800 usec
 Average data synthesis took: 208.104700 usec
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrey Zhizhikin <andrey.z@gmail.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200402154357.107873-2-irogers@google.comSigned-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

This simplifies the print functions for the following perf script
options:

	--show-task-events
	--show-namespace-events
	--show-cgroup-events
	--show-mmap-events
	--show-switch-events
	--show-lost-events
	--show-bpf-events

Example:
	# perf record --switch-events -a -e cycles -c 10000 sleep 1
 Before:
	# perf script --show-task-events --show-namespace-events --show-cgroup-events --show-mmap-events --show-switch-events --show-lost-events --show-bpf-events > out-before.txt
 After:
	# perf script --show-task-events --show-namespace-events --show-cgroup-events --show-mmap-events --show-switch-events --show-lost-events --show-bpf-events > out-after.txt
	# diff -s out-before.txt out-after.txt
	Files out-before.txt and out-after.tx are identical
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200402141548.21283-1-adrian.hunter@intel.comSigned-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Update the kernel.rst documentation file with the information related to
usage of CAP_PERFMON capability to secure performance monitoring and
observability operations in system.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/84c32383-14a2-fa35-16b6-f9e59bd37240@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Update perf-security.rst documentation file with the information
related to usage of CAP_PERFMON capability to secure performance
monitoring and observability operations in system.

Committer notes:

While testing 'perf top' under cap_perfmon I noticed that it needs
some more capability and Alexey pointed out cap_ipc_lock, as needed by
this kernel chunk:

  kernel/events/core.c: 6101
       if ((locked > lock_limit) && perf_is_paranoid() &&
               !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
               ret = -EPERM;
               goto unlock;
       }

So I added it to the documentation, and also mentioned that if the
libcap version doesn't yet supports 'cap_perfmon', its numeric value can
be used instead, i.e. if:

	# setcap "cap_perfmon,cap_ipc_lock,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf

Fails, try:

	# setcap "38,cap_ipc_lock,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" perf

I also added a paragraph stating that using an unpatched libcap will
fail the check for CAP_PERFMON, as it checks the cap number against a
maximum to see if it is valid, which makes it use as the default the
'cycles:u' event, even tho a cap_perfmon capable perf binary can get
kernel samples, to workaround that just use, e.g.:

  # perf top -e cycles
  # perf record -e cycles

And it will sample kernel and user modes.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/17278551-9399-9ebe-d665-8827016a217d@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.  Providing
the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of
CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials
and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
for the time that such privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/691f1096-b15f-9b12-50a0-c2b93918149e@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.  Providing
the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of
CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials
and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
for the time that such privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/4ec1d6f7-548c-8d1c-f84a-cebeb9674e4e@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.  Providing
the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of
CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials
and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
for the time that such privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/8cc98809-d35b-de0f-de02-4cf554f3cf62@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.  Providing
the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of
CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials
and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
for the time that such privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
secure monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Anju T Sudhakar <anju@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ac98cd9f-b59e-673c-c70d-180b3e7695d2@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Open access to bpf_trace monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the
rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the
credentials and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
for the time that such privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to bpf_trace monitoring
remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN
usage for secure bpf_trace monitoring is discouraged with respect to
CAP_PERFMON capability.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/c0a0ae47-8b6e-ff3e-416b-3cd1faaf71c0@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Open access to i915_perf monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the
rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the
credentials and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
for the time that such privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to i915_events subsystem remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
secure i915_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
capability.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@intel.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/e3e3292f-f765-ea98-e59c-fbe2db93fd34@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Extend error messages to mention CAP_PERFMON capability as an option to
substitute CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability for secure system performance
monitoring and observability operations. Make
perf_event_paranoid_check() and __cmd_ftrace() to be aware of
CAP_PERFMON capability.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
for the time that such privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
capability.

Committer testing:

Using a libcap with this patch:

  diff --git a/libcap/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
  index 78b2fd4c8a95..89b5b0279b60 100644
  --- a/libcap/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
  +++ b/libcap/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
  @@ -366,8 +366,9 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {

   #define CAP_AUDIT_READ       37

  +#define CAP_PERFMON	     38

  -#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_AUDIT_READ
  +#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_PERFMON

   #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)

Note that using '38' in place of 'cap_perfmon' works to some degree with
an old libcap, its only when cap_get_flag() is called that libcap
performs an error check based on the maximum value known for
capabilities that it will fail.

This makes determining the default of perf_event_attr.exclude_kernel to
fail, as it can't determine if CAP_PERFMON is in place.

Using 'perf top -e cycles' avoids the default check and sets
perf_event_attr.exclude_kernel to 1.

As root, with a libcap supporting CAP_PERFMON:

  # groupadd perf_users
  # adduser perf -g perf_users
  # mkdir ~perf/bin
  # cp ~acme/bin/perf ~perf/bin/
  # chgrp perf_users ~perf/bin/perf
  # setcap "cap_perfmon,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog=ep" ~perf/bin/perf
  # getcap ~perf/bin/perf
  /home/perf/bin/perf = cap_sys_ptrace,cap_syslog,cap_perfmon+ep
  # ls -la ~perf/bin/perf
  -rwxr-xr-x. 1 root perf_users 16968552 Apr  9 13:10 /home/perf/bin/perf

As the 'perf' user in the 'perf_users' group:

  $ perf top -a --stdio
  Error:
  Failed to mmap with 1 (Operation not permitted)
  $

Either add the cap_ipc_lock capability to the perf binary or reduce the
ring buffer size to some smaller value:

  $ perf top -m10 -a --stdio
  rounding mmap pages size to 64K (16 pages)
  Error:
  Failed to mmap with 1 (Operation not permitted)
  $ perf top -m4 -a --stdio
  Error:
  Failed to mmap with 1 (Operation not permitted)
  $ perf top -m2 -a --stdio
   PerfTop: 762 irqs/sec  kernel:49.7%  exact: 100.0% lost: 0/0 drop: 0/0 [4000Hz cycles], (all, 4 CPUs)
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

     9.83%  perf                [.] __symbols__insert
     8.58%  perf                [.] rb_next
     5.91%  [kernel]            [k] module_get_kallsym
     5.66%  [kernel]            [k] kallsyms_expand_symbol.constprop.0
     3.98%  libc-2.29.so        [.] __GI_____strtoull_l_internal
     3.66%  perf                [.] rb_insert_color
     2.34%  [kernel]            [k] vsnprintf
     2.30%  [kernel]            [k] string_nocheck
     2.16%  libc-2.29.so        [.] _IO_getdelim
     2.15%  [kernel]            [k] number
     2.13%  [kernel]            [k] format_decode
     1.58%  libc-2.29.so        [.] _IO_feof
     1.52%  libc-2.29.so        [.] __strcmp_avx2
     1.50%  perf                [.] rb_set_parent_color
     1.47%  libc-2.29.so        [.] __libc_calloc
     1.24%  [kernel]            [k] do_syscall_64
     1.17%  [kernel]            [k] __x86_indirect_thunk_rax

  $ perf record -a sleep 1
  [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ]
  [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.552 MB perf.data (74 samples) ]
  $ perf evlist
  cycles
  $ perf evlist -v
  cycles: size: 120, { sample_period, sample_freq }: 4000, sample_type: IP|TID|TIME|CPU|PERIOD, read_format: ID, disabled: 1, inherit: 1, mmap: 1, comm: 1, freq: 1, task: 1, precise_ip: 3, sample_id_all: 1, exclude_guest: 1, mmap2: 1, comm_exec: 1, ksymbol: 1, bpf_event: 1
  $ perf report | head -20
  # To display the perf.data header info, please use --header/--header-only options.
  #
  #
  # Total Lost Samples: 0
  #
  # Samples: 74  of event 'cycles'
  # Event count (approx.): 15694834
  #
  # Overhead  Command          Shared Object               Symbol
  # ........  ...............  ..........................  ......................................
  #
      19.62%  perf             [kernel.vmlinux]            [k] strnlen_user
      13.88%  swapper          [kernel.vmlinux]            [k] intel_idle
      13.83%  ksoftirqd/0      [kernel.vmlinux]            [k] pfifo_fast_dequeue
      13.51%  swapper          [kernel.vmlinux]            [k] kmem_cache_free
       6.31%  gnome-shell      [kernel.vmlinux]            [k] kmem_cache_free
       5.66%  kworker/u8:3+ix  [kernel.vmlinux]            [k] delay_tsc
       4.42%  perf             [kernel.vmlinux]            [k] __set_cpus_allowed_ptr
       3.45%  kworker/2:1-eve  [kernel.vmlinux]            [k] shmem_truncate_range
       2.29%  gnome-shell      libgobject-2.0.so.0.6000.7  [.] g_closure_ref
  $
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/a66d5648-2b8e-577e-e1f2-1d56c017ab5e@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Open access to monitoring via kprobes and uprobes and eBPF tracing for
CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON
capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials,
excludes chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more
secure.

perf kprobes and uprobes are used by ftrace and eBPF. perf probe uses
ftrace to define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as
tracepoint events. eBPF defines new probes via perf_event_open interface
and then the probes are used in eBPF tracing.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
for the time that such privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem
remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN
usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to
CAP_PERFMON capability.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/3c129d9a-ba8a-3483-ecc5-ad6c8e7c203f@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Open access to monitoring of kernel code, CPUs, tracepoints and
namespaces data for a CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the
access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of
CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials
and makes operation more secure.

CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for performance
monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39
principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states
that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g.,
capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only
for the time that such privileges are actually required)

For backward compatibility reasons the access to perf_events subsystem
remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN
usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to
CAP_PERFMON capability.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/471acaef-bb8a-5ce2-923f-90606b78eef9@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Introduce the CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system
performance monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON
can assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for
performance monitoring and observability subsystems.

CAP_PERFMON hardens system security and integrity during performance
monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that
is available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [2]. Providing the access
to system performance monitoring and observability operations under CAP_PERFMON
capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes
chances to misuse the credentials and makes the operation more secure.

Thus, CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for
performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e:
2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that
  states that a process or program be granted only those privileges
(e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function,
and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)

CAP_PERFMON meets the demand to secure system performance monitoring and
observability operations for adoption in security sensitive, restricted,
multiuser production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute
environments), where root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials are not available to
mass users of a system, and securely unblocks applicability and scalability
of system performance monitoring and observability operations beyond root
and CAP_SYS_ADMIN use cases.

CAP_PERFMON takes over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system performance
monitoring and observability operations and balances amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN
credentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [1]
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel
developers, below." For backward compatibility reasons access to system
performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability
usage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations
is discouraged with respect to the designed CAP_PERFMON capability.

Although the software running under CAP_PERFMON can not ensure avoidance
of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate these issues
following the official hardware issues mitigation procedure [2]. The bugs
in the software itself can be fixed following the standard kernel development
process [3] to maintain and harden security of system performance monitoring
and observability operations.

[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
[2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html
[3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.htmlSigned-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/5590d543-82c6-490a-6544-08e6a5517db0@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Add the DSO_BINARY_TYPE__BPF_IMAGE dso binary type to recognize BPF
images that carry trampoline or dispatcher.

Upcoming patches will add support to read the image data, store it
within the BPF feature in perf.data and display it for annotation
purposes.

Currently we only display following message:

  # ./perf annotate bpf_trampoline_24456 --stdio
   Percent |      Source code & Disassembly of . for cycles (504  ...
  --------------------------------------------------------------- ...
           :       to be implemented
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Cc: Björn Töpel <bjorn.topel@intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200312195610.346362-16-jolsa@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

There's no special load action for ksymbol data on map__load/dso__load
action, where the kernel is getting loaded. It only gets confused with
kernel kallsyms/vmlinux load for bpf object, which fails and could mess
up with the map.

Disabling any further load of the map for ksymbol related dso/map.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Cc: Björn Töpel <bjorn.topel@intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200312195610.346362-15-jolsa@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Synthesize bpf images (trampolines/dispatchers) on start, as ksymbol
events from /proc/kallsyms. Having this perf can recognize samples from
those images and perf report and top shows them correctly.

The rest of the ksymbol handling is already in place from for the bpf
programs monitoring, so only the initial state was needed.

perf report output:

  # Overhead  Command     Shared Object                  Symbol

    12.37%  test_progs  [kernel.vmlinux]                 [k] entry_SYSCALL_64
    11.80%  test_progs  [kernel.vmlinux]                 [k] syscall_return_via_sysret
     9.63%  test_progs  bpf_prog_bcf7977d3b93787c_prog2  [k] bpf_prog_bcf7977d3b93787c_prog2
     6.90%  test_progs  bpf_trampoline_24456             [k] bpf_trampoline_24456
     6.36%  test_progs  [kernel.vmlinux]                 [k] memcpy_erms

Committer notes:

Use scnprintf() instead of strncpy() to overcome this on fedora:32,
rawhide and OpenMandriva Cooker:

    CC       /tmp/build/perf/util/bpf-event.o
  In file included from /usr/include/string.h:495,
                   from /git/linux/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_common.h:12,
                   from /git/linux/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h:31,
                   from util/bpf-event.c:4:
  In function 'strncpy',
      inlined from 'process_bpf_image' at util/bpf-event.c:323:2,
      inlined from 'kallsyms_process_symbol' at util/bpf-event.c:358:9:
  /usr/include/bits/string_fortified.h:106:10: error: '__builtin_strncpy' specified bound 256 equals destination size [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
    106 |   return __builtin___strncpy_chk (__dest, __src, __len, __bos (__dest));
        |          ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Cc: Björn Töpel <bjorn.topel@intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200312195610.346362-14-jolsa@kernel.org/Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

When --timeout is used and a workload is specified to be started by
'perf stat', i.e.

  $ perf stat --timeout 1000 sleep 1h

The --timeout wasn't being honoured, i.e. the workload, 'sleep 1h' in
the above example, should be terminated after 1000ms, but it wasn't,
'perf stat' was waiting for it to finish.

Fix it by sending a SIGTERM when the timeout expires.

Now it works:

  # perf stat -e cycles --timeout 1234 sleep 1h
  sleep: Terminated

   Performance counter stats for 'sleep 1h':

           1,066,692      cycles

         1.234314838 seconds time elapsed

         0.000750000 seconds user
         0.000000000 seconds sys

  #

Fixes: f1f8ad52 ("perf stat: Add support to print counts after a period of time")
Reported-by: Konstantin Kharlamov <hi-angel@yandex.ru>
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=207243Tested-by: Konstantin Kharlamov <hi-angel@yandex.ru>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: yuzhoujian <yuzhoujian@didichuxing.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200415153803.GB20324@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Merge tag 'perf-urgent-for-mingo-5.7-20200414' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux into perf/urgent

Pull perf/urgent fixes from Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo:

perf stat:

  Jin Yao:

  - Fix no metric header if --per-socket and --metric-only set

build system:

  - Fix python building when built with clang, that was failing if the clang
    version doesn't support -fno-semantic-interposition.

tools UAPI headers:

  Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo:

  - Update various copies of kernel headers, some ended up automatically
    updating build-time generated tables to enable tools such as 'perf trace'
    to decode syscalls and tracepoints arguments.

    Now the tools/perf build is free of UAPI drift warnings.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Pull EFI fixes from Ingo Molnar:
 "Misc EFI fixes, including the boot failure regression caused by the
  BSS section not being cleared by the loaders"

* tag 'efi-urgent-2020-04-15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  efi/x86: Revert struct layout change to fix kexec boot regression
  efi/x86: Don't remap text<->rodata gap read-only for mixed mode
  efi/x86: Fix the deletion of variables in mixed mode
  efi/libstub/file: Merge file name buffers to reduce stack usage
  Documentation/x86, efi/x86: Clarify EFI handover protocol and its requirements
  efi/arm: Deal with ADR going out of range in efi_enter_kernel()
  efi/x86: Always relocate the kernel for EFI handover entry
  efi/x86: Move efi stub globals from .bss to .data
  efi/libstub/x86: Remove redundant assignment to pointer hdr
  efi/cper: Use scnprintf() for avoiding potential buffer overflow

Pull hyperv fixes from Wei Liu:

 - a series from Tianyu Lan to fix crash reporting on Hyper-V

 - three miscellaneous cleanup patches

* tag 'hyperv-fixes-signed' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hyperv/linux:
  x86/Hyper-V: Report crash data in die() when panic_on_oops is set
  x86/Hyper-V: Report crash register data when sysctl_record_panic_msg is not set
  x86/Hyper-V: Report crash register data or kmsg before running crash kernel
  x86/Hyper-V: Trigger crash enlightenment only once during system crash.
  x86/Hyper-V: Free hv_panic_page when fail to register kmsg dump
  x86/Hyper-V: Unload vmbus channel in hv panic callback
  x86: hyperv: report value of misc_features
  hv_debugfs: Make hv_debug_root static
  hv: hyperv_vmbus.h: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array member

Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
 "We have a few regressions and one fix for stable:

   - revert fsync optimization

   - fix lost i_size update

   - fix a space accounting leak

   - build fix, add back definition of a deprecated ioctl flag

   - fix search condition for old roots in relocation"

* tag 'for-5.7-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
  btrfs: re-instantiate the removed BTRFS_SUBVOL_CREATE_ASYNC definition
  btrfs: fix reclaim counter leak of space_info objects
  btrfs: make full fsyncs always operate on the entire file again
  btrfs: fix lost i_size update after cloning inline extent
  btrfs: check commit root generation in should_ignore_root

Pull AFS fixes from David Howells:

 - Fix the decoding of fetched file status records so that the xdr
   pointer is advanced under all circumstances.

 - Fix the decoding of a fetched file status record that indicates an
   inline abort (ie. an error) so that it sets the flag saying the
   decoder stored the abort code.

 - Fix the decoding of the result of the rename operation so that it
   doesn't skip the decoding of the second fetched file status (ie. that
   of the dest dir) in the case that the source and dest dirs were the
   same as this causes the xdr pointer not to be advanced, leading to
   incorrect decoding of subsequent parts of the reply.

 - Fix the dump of a bad YFSFetchStatus record to dump the full length.

 - Fix a race between local editing of directory contents and accessing
   the dir for reading or d_revalidate by using the same lock in both.

 - Fix afs_d_revalidate() to not accidentally reverse the version on a
   dentry when it's meant to be bringing it forward.

* tag 'afs-fixes-20200413' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
  afs: Fix afs_d_validate() to set the right directory version
  afs: Fix race between post-modification dir edit and readdir/d_revalidate
  afs: Fix length of dump of bad YFSFetchStatus record
  afs: Fix rename operation status delivery
  afs: Fix decoding of inline abort codes from version 1 status records
  afs: Fix missing XDR advance in xdr_decode_{AFS,YFS}FSFetchStatus()

To pick up the changes in these csets:

  295bcca8 ("linux/bits.h: add compile time sanity check of GENMASK inputs")
  3945ff37 ("linux/bits.h: Extract common header for vDSO")

To address this tools/perf build warning:

  Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/include/linux/bits.h' differs from latest version at 'include/linux/bits.h'
  diff -u tools/include/linux/bits.h include/linux/bits.h

This clashes with usage of userspace's static_assert(), that, at least
on glibc, is guarded by a ifnded/endif pair, do the same to our copy of
build_bug.h and avoid that diff in check_headers.sh so that we continue
checking for drifts with the kernel sources master copy.

This will all be tested with the set of build containers that includes
uCLibc, musl libc, lots of glibc versions in lots of distros and cross
build environments.

The tools/objtool, tools/bpf, etc were tested as well.

Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Rikard Falkeborn <rikard.falkeborn@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Will be needed when syncing the linux/bits.h header, in the next cset.

Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

To pick the changes from:

  d3b1b776 ("x86/entry/64: Remove ptregs qualifier from syscall table")
  cab56d34 ("x86/entry: Remove ABI prefixes from functions in syscall tables")
  27dd84fa ("x86/entry/64: Use syscall wrappers for x32_rt_sigreturn")

Addressing this tools/perf build warning:

  Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/perf/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl'
  diff -u tools/perf/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl

That didn't result in any tooling changes, as what is extracted are just
the first two columns, and these patches touched only the third.

  $ cp /tmp/build/perf/arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.c /tmp
  $ cp arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl tools/perf/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
  $ make -C tools/perf O=/tmp/build/perf install-bin
  make: Entering directory '/home/acme/git/perf/tools/perf'
    BUILD:   Doing 'make -j12' parallel build
    DESCEND  plugins
    CC       /tmp/build/perf/util/syscalltbl.o
    INSTALL  trace_plugins
    LD       /tmp/build/perf/util/perf-in.o
    LD       /tmp/build/perf/perf-in.o
    LINK     /tmp/build/perf/perf
  $ diff -u /tmp/build/perf/arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.c /tmp/syscalls_64.c
  $

Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

To pick the change in:

  88be76cd ("drm/i915: Allow userspace to specify ringsize on construction")

That don't result in any changes in tooling, just silences this perf
build warning:

  Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/include/uapi/drm/i915_drm.h' differs from latest version at 'include/uapi/drm/i915_drm.h'
  diff -u tools/include/uapi/drm/i915_drm.h include/uapi/drm/i915_drm.h

Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Picking the changes from:

  455e00f1 ("drm: Add getfb2 ioctl")

Silencing these perf build warnings:

  Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/include/uapi/drm/drm.h' differs from latest version at 'include/uapi/drm/drm.h'
  diff -u tools/include/uapi/drm/drm.h include/uapi/drm/drm.h

Now 'perf trace' and other code that might use the
tools/perf/trace/beauty autogenerated tables will be able to translate
this new ioctl code into a string:

  $ tools/perf/trace/beauty/drm_ioctl.sh > before
  $ cp include/uapi/drm/drm.h tools/include/uapi/drm/drm.h
  $ tools/perf/trace/beauty/drm_ioctl.sh > after
  $ diff -u before after
  --- before	2020-04-14 09:28:45.461821077 -0300
  +++ after	2020-04-14 09:28:53.594782685 -0300
  @@ -107,6 +107,7 @@
   	[0xCB] = "SYNCOBJ_QUERY",
   	[0xCC] = "SYNCOBJ_TRANSFER",
   	[0xCD] = "SYNCOBJ_TIMELINE_SIGNAL",
  +	[0xCE] = "MODE_GETFB2",
   	[DRM_COMMAND_BASE + 0x00] = "I915_INIT",
   	[DRM_COMMAND_BASE + 0x01] = "I915_FLUSH",
   	[DRM_COMMAND_BASE + 0x02] = "I915_FLIP",
  $

Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Stone <daniels@collabora.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

To pick up the changes from:

  9a5788c6 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add a capability for enabling secure guests")
  3c9bd400 ("KVM: x86: enable dirty log gradually in small chunks")
  13da9ae1 ("KVM: s390: protvirt: introduce and enable KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED")
  e0d2773d ("KVM: s390: protvirt: UV calls in support of diag308 0, 1")
  19e12277 ("KVM: S390: protvirt: Introduce instruction data area bounce buffer")
  29b40f10 ("KVM: s390: protvirt: Add initial vm and cpu lifecycle handling")

So far we're ignoring those arch specific ioctls, we need to revisit
this at some time to have arch specific tables, etc:

  $ grep S390 tools/perf/trace/beauty/kvm_ioctl.sh
      egrep -v " ((ARM|PPC|S390)_|[GS]ET_(DEBUGREGS|PIT2|XSAVE|TSC_KHZ)|CREATE_SPAPR_TCE_64)" | \
  $

This addresses these tools/perf build warnings:

  Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h'
  diff -u tools/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h

Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jay Zhou <jianjay.zhou@huawei.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

To pick the changes from:

  e98ad464 ("fscrypt: add FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_NONCE ioctl")

That don't trigger any changes in tooling.

This silences this perf build warning:

  Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h' differs from latest version at 'include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h'
  diff -u tools/include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h include/uapi/linux/fscrypt.h

In time we should come up with something like:

  $ tools/perf/trace/beauty/fsconfig.sh
  static const char *fsconfig_cmds[] = {
  	[0] = "SET_FLAG",
  	[1] = "SET_STRING",
  	[2] = "SET_BINARY",
  	[3] = "SET_PATH",
  	[4] = "SET_PATH_EMPTY",
  	[5] = "SET_FD",
  	[6] = "CMD_CREATE",
  	[7] = "CMD_RECONFIGURE",
  };
  $

And:

  $ tools/perf/trace/beauty/drm_ioctl.sh | head
  #ifndef DRM_COMMAND_BASE
  #define DRM_COMMAND_BASE                0x40
  #endif
  static const char *drm_ioctl_cmds[] = {
  	[0x00] = "VERSION",
  	[0x01] = "GET_UNIQUE",
  	[0x02] = "GET_MAGIC",
  	[0x03] = "IRQ_BUSID",
  	[0x04] = "GET_MAP",
  	[0x05] = "GET_CLIENT",
  $

For fscrypt's ioctls.

Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

To get the changes in:

  4c8cf318 ("vhost: introduce vDPA-based backend")

Silencing this perf build warning:

  Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/include/uapi/linux/vhost.h' differs from latest version at 'include/uapi/linux/vhost.h'
  diff -u tools/include/uapi/linux/vhost.h include/uapi/linux/vhost.h

This automatically picks these new ioctls, making tools such as 'perf
trace' aware of them and possibly allowing to use the strings in
filters, etc:

  $ tools/perf/trace/beauty/vhost_virtio_ioctl.sh > before
  $ cp include/uapi/linux/vhost.h tools/include/uapi/linux/vhost.h
  $ tools/perf/trace/beauty/vhost_virtio_ioctl.sh > after
  $ diff -u before after
  --- before	2020-04-14 09:12:28.559748968 -0300
  +++ after	2020-04-14 09:12:38.781696242 -0300
  @@ -24,9 +24,16 @@
   	[0x44] = "SCSI_GET_EVENTS_MISSED",
   	[0x60] = "VSOCK_SET_GUEST_CID",
   	[0x61] = "VSOCK_SET_RUNNING",
  +	[0x72] = "VDPA_SET_STATUS",
  +	[0x74] = "VDPA_SET_CONFIG",
  +	[0x75] = "VDPA_SET_VRING_ENABLE",
   };
   static const char *vhost_virtio_ioctl_read_cmds[] = {
   	[0x00] = "GET_FEATURES",
   	[0x12] = "GET_VRING_BASE",
   	[0x26] = "GET_BACKEND_FEATURES",
  +	[0x70] = "VDPA_GET_DEVICE_ID",
  +	[0x71] = "VDPA_GET_STATUS",
  +	[0x73] = "VDPA_GET_CONFIG",
  +	[0x76] = "VDPA_GET_VRING_NUM",
   };
  $

Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Tiwei Bie <tiwei.bie@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

To pick up the changes from:

  077168e2 ("x86/mce/amd: Add PPIN support for AMD MCE")
  753039ef ("x86/cpu/amd: Call init_amd_zn() om Family 19h processors too")
  6650cdd9 ("x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel")

These don't cause any changes in tooling, just silences this perf build
warning:

  Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'
  diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h

Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Wei Huang <wei.huang2@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

To get the changes in:

  e346b381 ("mm/mremap: add MREMAP_DONTUNMAP to mremap()")

Add that to 'perf trace's mremap 'flags' decoder.

This silences this perf build warning:

  Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/include/uapi/linux/mman.h' differs from latest version at 'include/uapi/linux/mman.h'
  diff -u tools/include/uapi/linux/mman.h include/uapi/linux/mman.h

Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

To get the changes in:

  ef2c41cf ("clone3: allow spawning processes into cgroups")

Add that to 'perf trace's clone 'flags' decoder.

This silences this perf build warning:

  Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/include/uapi/linux/sched.h' differs from latest version at 'include/uapi/linux/sched.h'
  diff -u tools/include/uapi/linux/sched.h include/uapi/linux/sched.h

Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

To get in line with:

  8165b57b ("linux/const.h: Extract common header for vDSO")

And silence this tools/perf/ build warning:

  Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/include/linux/const.h' differs from latest version at 'include/linux/const.h'
  diff -u tools/include/linux/const.h include/linux/const.h

Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

We received a report that was no metric header displayed if --per-socket
and --metric-only were both set.

It's hard for script to parse the perf-stat output. This patch fixes this
issue.

Before:

  root@kbl-ppc:~# perf stat -a -M CPI --metric-only --per-socket
  ^C
   Performance counter stats for 'system wide':

  S0        8                  2.6

         2.215270071 seconds time elapsed

  root@kbl-ppc:~# perf stat -a -M CPI --metric-only --per-socket -I1000
  #           time socket cpus
       1.000411692 S0        8                  2.2
       2.001547952 S0        8                  3.4
       3.002446511 S0        8                  3.4
       4.003346157 S0        8                  4.0
       5.004245736 S0        8                  0.3

After:

  root@kbl-ppc:~# perf stat -a -M CPI --metric-only --per-socket
  ^C
   Performance counter stats for 'system wide':

                               CPI
  S0        8                  2.1

         1.813579830 seconds time elapsed

  root@kbl-ppc:~# perf stat -a -M CPI --metric-only --per-socket -I1000
  #           time socket cpus                  CPI
       1.000415122 S0        8                  3.2
       2.001630051 S0        8                  2.9
       3.002612278 S0        8                  4.3
       4.003523594 S0        8                  3.0
       5.004504256 S0        8                  3.7
Signed-off-by: Jin Yao <yao.jin@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200331180226.25915-1-yao.jin@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

The set of C compiler options used by distros to build python bindings
may include options that are unknown to clang, we check for a variety of
such options, add -fno-semantic-interposition to that mix:

This fixes the build on, among others, Manjaro Linux:

    GEN      /tmp/build/perf/python/perf.so
  clang-9: error: unknown argument: '-fno-semantic-interposition'
  error: command 'clang' failed with exit status 1
  make: Leaving directory '/git/perf/tools/perf'

  [perfbuilder@602aed1c266d ~]$ gcc -v
  Using built-in specs.
  COLLECT_GCC=gcc
  COLLECT_LTO_WRAPPER=/usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-pc-linux-gnu/9.3.0/lto-wrapper
  Target: x86_64-pc-linux-gnu
  Configured with: /build/gcc/src/gcc/configure --prefix=/usr --libdir=/usr/lib --libexecdir=/usr/lib --mandir=/usr/share/man --infodir=/usr/share/info --with-pkgversion='Arch Linux 9.3.0-1' --with-bugurl=https://bugs.archlinux.org/ --enable-languages=c,c++,ada,fortran,go,lto,objc,obj-c++,d --enable-shared --enable-threads=posix --with-system-zlib --with-isl --enable-__cxa_atexit --disable-libunwind-exceptions --enable-clocale=gnu --disable-libstdcxx-pch --disable-libssp --enable-gnu-unique-object --enable-linker-build-id --enable-lto --enable-plugin --enable-install-libiberty --with-linker-hash-style=gnu --enable-gnu-indirect-function --enable-multilib --disable-werror --enable-checking=release --enable-default-pie --enable-default-ssp --enable-cet=auto gdc_include_dir=/usr/include/dlang/gdc
  Thread model: posix
  gcc version 9.3.0 (Arch Linux 9.3.0-1)
  [perfbuilder@602aed1c266d ~]$

Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

To pick up the changes in:

  6650cdd9 ("x86/split_lock: Enable split lock detection by kernel")

  Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h'
  diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h

Which causes these changes in tooling:

  $ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > before
  $ cp arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
  $ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > after
  $ diff -u before after
  --- before	2020-04-01 12:11:14.789344795 -0300
  +++ after	2020-04-01 12:11:56.907798879 -0300
  @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
   	[0x00000029] = "KNC_EVNTSEL1",
   	[0x0000002a] = "IA32_EBL_CR_POWERON",
   	[0x0000002c] = "EBC_FREQUENCY_ID",
  +	[0x00000033] = "TEST_CTRL",
   	[0x00000034] = "SMI_COUNT",
   	[0x0000003a] = "IA32_FEAT_CTL",
   	[0x0000003b] = "IA32_TSC_ADJUST",
  @@ -27,6 +28,7 @@
   	[0x000000c2] = "IA32_PERFCTR1",
   	[0x000000cd] = "FSB_FREQ",
   	[0x000000ce] = "PLATFORM_INFO",
  +	[0x000000cf] = "IA32_CORE_CAPS",
   	[0x000000e2] = "PKG_CST_CONFIG_CONTROL",
   	[0x000000e7] = "IA32_MPERF",
   	[0x000000e8] = "IA32_APERF",
  $

  $ make -C tools/perf O=/tmp/build/perf install-bin
  <SNIP>
    CC       /tmp/build/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.o
    LD       /tmp/build/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/perf-in.o
    LD       /tmp/build/perf/trace/beauty/perf-in.o
    LD       /tmp/build/perf/perf-in.o
    LINK     /tmp/build/perf/perf
  <SNIP>

Now one can do:

	perf trace -e msr:* --filter=msr==IA32_CORE_CAPS

or:

	perf trace -e msr:* --filter='msr==IA32_CORE_CAPS || msr==TEST_CTRL'

And see only those MSRs being accessed via:

  # perf trace -v -e msr:* --filter='msr==IA32_CORE_CAPS || msr==TEST_CTRL'
  New filter for msr:read_msr: (msr==0xcf || msr==0x33) && (common_pid != 8263 && common_pid != 23250)
  New filter for msr:write_msr: (msr==0xcf || msr==0x33) && (common_pid != 8263 && common_pid != 23250)
  New filter for msr:rdpmc: (msr==0xcf || msr==0x33) && (common_pid != 8263 && common_pid != 23250)

Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200401153325.GC12534@kernel.org/Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Commit

  0a67361d ("efi/x86: Remove runtime table address from kexec EFI setup data")

removed the code that retrieves the non-remapped UEFI runtime services
pointer from the data structure provided by kexec, as it was never really
needed on the kexec boot path: mapping the runtime services table at its
non-remapped address is only needed when calling SetVirtualAddressMap(),
which never happens during a kexec boot in the first place.

However, dropping the 'runtime' member from struct efi_setup_data was a
mistake. That struct is shared ABI between the kernel and the kexec tooling
for x86, and so we cannot simply change its layout. So let's put back the
removed field, but call it 'unused' to reflect the fact that we never look
at its contents. While at it, add a comment to remind our future selves
that the layout is external ABI.

Fixes: 0a67361d ("efi/x86: Remove runtime table address from kexec EFI setup data")
Reported-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Tested-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Commit

  d9e3d2c4 ("efi/x86: Don't map the entire kernel text RW for mixed mode")

updated the code that creates the 1:1 memory mapping to use read-only
attributes for the 1:1 alias of the kernel's text and rodata sections, to
protect it from inadvertent modification. However, it failed to take into
account that the unused gap between text and rodata is given to the page
allocator for general use.

If the vmap'ed stack happens to be allocated from this region, any by-ref
output arguments passed to EFI runtime services that are allocated on the
stack (such as the 'datasize' argument taken by GetVariable() when invoked
from efivar_entry_size()) will be referenced via a read-only mapping,
resulting in a page fault if the EFI code tries to write to it:

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000386aae88
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation
  PGD fd61063 P4D fd61063 PUD fd62063 PMD 386000e1
  Oops: 0003 [#1] SMP PTI
  CPU: 2 PID: 255 Comm: systemd-sysv-ge Not tainted 5.6.0-rc4-default+ #22
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  RIP: 0008:0x3eaeed95
  Code: ...  <89> 03 be 05 00 00 80 a1 74 63 b1 3e 83 c0 48 e8 44 d2 ff ff eb 05
  RSP: 0018:000000000fd73fa0 EFLAGS: 00010002
  RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 00000000386aae88 RCX: 000000003e9f1120
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000001
  RBP: 000000000fd73fd8 R08: 00000000386aae88 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: ffffc0f040220000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
  FS:  00007f21160ac940(0000) GS:ffff9cf23d500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0008 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00000000386aae88 CR3: 000000000fd6c004 CR4: 00000000003606e0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  Call Trace:
  Modules linked in:
  CR2: 00000000386aae88
  ---[ end trace a8bfbd202e712834 ]---

Let's fix this by remapping text and rodata individually, and leave the
gaps mapped read-write.

Fixes: d9e3d2c4 ("efi/x86: Don't map the entire kernel text RW for mixed mode")
Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200409130434.6736-10-ardb@kernel.org