- 15 Feb, 2018 1 commit
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Dominik Brodowski authored
On 64-bit builds, we should not rely on "int $0x80" working (it only does if CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION=y is enabled). To keep the "Set TF and check int80" test running on 64-bit installs with CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION=y enabled, build this test only if we can also build 32-bit binaries (which should be a good approximation for that). Signed-off-by:
Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: shuah@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180211111013.16888-5-linux@dominikbrodowski.netSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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- 13 Feb, 2018 20 commits
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Dominik Brodowski authored
On 64-bit builds, we should not rely on "int $0x80" working (it only does if CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION=y is enabled). Without this patch, the move test may succeed, but the "int $0x80" causes a segfault, resulting in a false negative output of this self-test. Signed-off-by:
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Dominik Brodowski authored
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Ingo Molnar authored
This also gets rid of two build warnings: protection_keys.c: In function ‘dumpit’: protection_keys.c:419:3: warning: ignoring return value of ‘write’, declared with attribute warn_unused_result [-Wunused-result] write(1, buf, nr_read); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: -
Dominik Brodowski authored
Replace a couple of magically connected buffer length literal constants with a common definition that makes their relationship obvious. Also document why our sscanf() usage is safe. No intended functional changes. Suggested-by:
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Dominik Brodowski authored
The vDSO selftest tries to execute a vsyscall unconditionally, even if it is not present on the test system (e.g. if booted with vsyscall=none or with CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE=y set. Fix this by copying (and tweaking) the vsyscall check from test_vsyscall.c Signed-off-by:
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Borislav Petkov authored
That macro was touched around 2.5.8 times, judging by the full history linux repo, but it was unused even then. Get rid of it already. Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux@dominikbrodowski.net Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180212201318.GD14640@pd.tnicSigned-off-by:
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Josh Poimboeuf authored
With the following commit: f09d160992d1 ("x86/entry/64: Get rid of the ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK and SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS macros") ... one of my suggested improvements triggered a frame pointer warning: arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o: warning: objtool: paranoid_entry()+0x11: call without frame pointer save/setup The warning is correct for the build-time code, but it's actually not relevant at runtime because of paravirt patching. The paravirt swapgs call gets replaced with either a SWAPGS instruction or NOPs at runtime. Go back to the previous behavior by removing the ELF function annotation for paranoid_entry() and adding an unwind hint, which effectively silences the warning. Reported-by:kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: kbuild-all@01.org Cc: tipbuild@zytor.com Fixes: f09d160992d1 ("x86/entry/64: Get rid of the ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK and SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS macros") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180212174503.5acbymg5z6p32snu@trebleSigned-off-by:
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Dominik Brodowski authored
... same as the other macros in arch/x86/entry/calling.h Signed-off-by:
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Dominik Brodowski authored
Previously, error_entry() and paranoid_entry() saved the GP registers onto stack space previously allocated by its callers. Combine these two steps in the callers, and use the generic PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS macro for that. This adds a significant amount ot text size. However, Ingo Molnar points out that: "these numbers also _very_ significantly over-represent the extra footprint. The assumptions that resulted in us compressing the IRQ entry code have changed very significantly with the new x86 IRQ allocation code we introduced in the last year: - IRQ vectors are usually populated in tightly clustered groups. With our new vector allocator code the typical per CPU allocation percentage on x86 systems is ~3 device vectors and ~10 fixed vectors out of ~220 vectors - i.e. a very low ~6% utilization (!). [...] The days where we allocated a lot of vectors on every CPU and the compression of the IRQ entry code text mattered are over. - Another issue is that only a small minority of vectors is frequent enough to actually matter to cache utilization in practice: 3-4 key IPIs and 1-2 device IRQs at most - and those vectors tend to be tightly clustered as well into about two groups, and are probably already on 2-3 cache lines in practice. For the common case of 'cache cold' IRQs it's the depth of the call chain and the fragmentation of the resulting I$ that should be the main performance limit - not the overall size of it. - The CPU side cost of IRQ delivery is still very expensive even in the best, most cached case, as in 'over a thousand cycles'. So much stuff is done that maybe contemporary x86 IRQ entry microcode already prefetches the IDT entry and its expected call target address."[*] [*] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180208094710.qnjixhm6hybebdv7@gmail.com The "testb $3, CS(%rsp)" instruction in the idtentry macro does not need modification. Previously, %rsp was manually decreased by 15*8; with this patch, %rsp is decreased by 15 pushq instructions. [jpoimboe@redhat.com: unwind hint improvements] Suggested-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Dominik Brodowski authored
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe() and nmi() can be converted to use PUSH_AND_CLEAN_REGS instead of opencoded variants thereof. Due to the interleaving, the additional XOR-based clearing of R8 and R9 in entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe() should not have any noticeable negative implications. Suggested-by:
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Dominik Brodowski authored
Those instances where ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK is called just before SAVE_AND_CLEAR_REGS can trivially be replaced by PUSH_AND_CLEAN_REGS. This macro uses PUSH instead of MOV and should therefore be faster, at least on newer CPUs. Suggested-by:
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Dominik Brodowski authored
Same as is done for syscalls, interleave XOR with PUSH instructions for exceptions/interrupts, in order to minimize the cost of the additional instructions required for register clearing. Signed-off-by:
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Dominik Brodowski authored
The two special, opencoded cases for POP_C_REGS can be handled by ASM macros. Signed-off-by:
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Dominik Brodowski authored
All current code paths call SAVE_C_REGS and then immediately SAVE_EXTRA_REGS. Therefore, merge these two macros and order the MOV sequeneces properly. While at it, remove the macros to save all except specific registers, as these macros have been unused for a long time. Suggested-by:
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Ingo Molnar authored
Harmonize all the Spectre messages so that a: dmesg | grep -i spectre ... gives us most Spectre related kernel boot messages. Also fix a few other details: - clarify a comment about firmware speculation control - s/KPTI/PTI - remove various line-breaks that made the code uglier Acked-by:David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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KarimAllah Ahmed authored
We either clear the CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS and end up intercepting all MSR accesses or create a valid L02 MSR bitmap and use that. This decision has to be made every time we evaluate whether we are going to generate the L02 MSR bitmap. Before commit: d28b387f ("KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL") ... this was probably OK since the decision was always identical. This is no longer the case now since the MSR bitmap might actually change once we decide to not intercept SPEC_CTRL and PRED_CMD. Signed-off-by:
KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de> Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com Cc: jmattson@google.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: sironi@amazon.de Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518305967-31356-6-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.ukSigned-off-by:
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KarimAllah Ahmed authored
These two variables should check whether SPEC_CTRL and PRED_CMD are supposed to be passed through to L2 guests or not. While msr_write_intercepted_l01 would return 'true' if it is not passed through. So just invert the result of msr_write_intercepted_l01 to implement the correct semantics. Signed-off-by:
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Acked-by:
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David Woodhouse authored
KVM/x86: Reduce retpoline performance impact in slot_handle_level_range(), by always inlining iterator helper methods With retpoline, tight loops of "call this function for every XXX" are very much pessimised by taking a prediction miss *every* time. This one is by far the biggest contributor to the guest launch time with retpoline. By marking the iterator slot_handle_…() functions always_inline, we can ensure that the indirect function call can be optimised away into a direct call and it actually generates slightly smaller code because some of the other conditionals can get optimised away too. Performance is now pretty close to what we see with nospectre_v2 on the command line. Suggested-by:
Filippo Sironi <sironi@amazon.de> Signed-off-by:
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David Woodhouse authored
This reverts commit 64e16720. We cannot call C functions like that, without marking all the call-clobbered registers as, well, clobbered. We might have got away with it for now because the __ibp_barrier() function was *fairly* unlikely to actually use any other registers. But no. Just no. Signed-off-by:
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David Woodhouse authored
Arjan points out that the Intel document only clears the 0xc2 microcode on *some* parts with CPUID 506E3 (INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP stepping 3). For the Skylake H/S platform it's OK but for Skylake E3 which has the same CPUID it isn't (yet) cleared. So removing it from the blacklist was premature. Put it back for now. Also, Arjan assures me that the 0x84 microcode for Kaby Lake which was featured in one of the early revisions of the Intel document was never released to the public, and won't be until/unless it is also validated as safe. So those can change to 0x80 which is what all *other* versions of the doc have identified. Once the retrospective testing of existing public microcodes is done, we should be back into a mode where new microcodes are only released in batches and we shouldn't even need to update the blacklist for those anyway, so this tweaking of the list isn't expected to be a thing which keeps happening. Requested-by:
Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 11 Feb, 2018 1 commit
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David Woodhouse authored
Intel have retroactively blessed the 0xc2 microcode on Skylake mobile and desktop parts, and the Gemini Lake 0x22 microcode is apparently fine too. We blacklisted the latter purely because it was present with all the other problematic ones in the 2018-01-08 release, but now it's explicitly listed as OK. We still list 0x84 for the various Kaby Lake / Coffee Lake parts, as that appeared in one version of the blacklist and then reverted to 0x80 again. We can change it if 0x84 is actually announced to be safe. Signed-off-by:
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- 10 Feb, 2018 1 commit
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Nadav Amit authored
The comment is confusing since the path is taken when CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y is disabled (while the comment says it is not taken). Signed-off-by:
Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: nadav.amit@gmail.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180209170638.15161-1-namit@vmware.comSigned-off-by:
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- 09 Feb, 2018 2 commits
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Peter Zijlstra authored
Since Josh keeps asking, add myself to MAINTAINERS. Signed-off-by:
Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by:
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Peter Zijlstra authored
Linus reported that GCC-7.3 generated a switch-table construct that confused objtool. It turns out that, in particular due to KASAN, it is possible to have unrelated .rodata usage in between the .rodata setup for the switch-table and the following indirect jump. The simple linear reverse search from the indirect jump would hit upon the KASAN .rodata usage first and fail to find a switch_table, resulting in a spurious 'sibling call with modified stack frame' warning. Fix this by creating a 'jump-stack' which we can 'unwind' during reversal, thereby skipping over much of the in-between code. This is not fool proof by any means, but is sufficient to make the known cases work. Future work would be to construct more comprehensive flow analysis code. Reported-and-tested-by:
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- 06 Feb, 2018 3 commits
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Dan Williams authored
At entry userspace may have populated registers with values that could otherwise be useful in a speculative execution attack. Clear them to minimize the kernel's attack surface. Originally-From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151787989697.7847.4083702787288600552.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com [ Made small improvements to the changelog. ] Signed-off-by:
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Dan Williams authored
Clear the 'extra' registers on entering the 64-bit kernel for exceptions and interrupts. The common registers are not cleared since they are likely clobbered well before they can be exploited in a speculative execution attack. Originally-From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Williams authored
At entry userspace may have (maliciously) populated the extra registers outside the syscall calling convention with arbitrary values that could be useful in a speculative execution (Spectre style) attack. Clear these registers to minimize the kernel's attack surface. Note, this only clears the extra registers and not the unused registers for syscalls less than 6 arguments, since those registers are likely to be clobbered well before their values could be put to use under speculation. Note, Linus found that the XOR instructions can be executed with minimized cost if interleaved with the PUSH instructions, and Ingo's analysis found that R10 and R11 should be included in the register clearing beyond the typical 'extra' syscall calling convention registers. Suggested-by:
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 03 Feb, 2018 6 commits
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KarimAllah Ahmed authored
[ Based on a patch from Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> ] ... basically doing exactly what we do for VMX: - Passthrough SPEC_CTRL to guests (if enabled in guest CPUID) - Save and restore SPEC_CTRL around VMExit and VMEntry only if the guest actually used it. Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517669783-20732-1-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon.de
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KarimAllah Ahmed authored
[ Based on a patch from Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> ] Add direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for guests. This is needed for guests that will only mitigate Spectre V2 through IBRS+IBPB and will not be using a retpoline+IBPB based approach. To avoid the overhead of saving and restoring the MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for guests that do not actually use the MSR, only start saving and restoring when a non-zero is written to it. No attempt is made to handle STIBP here, intentionally. Filtering STIBP may be added in a future patch, which may require trapping all writes if we don't want to pass it through directly to the guest. [dwmw2: Clean up CPUID bits, save/restore manually, handle reset] Signed-off-by:
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KarimAllah Ahmed authored
Intel processors use MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR to indicate RDCL_NO (bit 0) and IBRS_ALL (bit 1). This is a read-only MSR. By default the contents will come directly from the hardware, but user-space can still override it. [dwmw2: The bit in kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features can be unconditional] Signed-off-by:
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Ashok Raj authored
The Indirect Branch Predictor Barrier (IBPB) is an indirect branch control mechanism. It keeps earlier branches from influencing later ones. Unlike IBRS and STIBP, IBPB does not define a new mode of operation. It's a command that ensures predicted branch targets aren't used after the barrier. Although IBRS and IBPB are enumerated by the same CPUID enumeration, IBPB is very different. IBPB helps mitigate against three potential attacks: * Mitigate guests from being attacked by other guests. - This is addressed by issing IBPB when we do a guest switch. * Mitigate attacks from guest/ring3->host/ring3. These would require a IBPB during context switch in host, or after VMEXIT. The host process has two ways to mitigate - Either it can be compiled with retpoline - If its going through context switch, and has set !dumpable then there is a IBPB in that path. (Tim's patch: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10192871) - The case where after a VMEXIT you return back to Qemu might make Qemu attackable from guest when Qemu isn't compiled with retpoline. There are issues reported when doing IBPB on every VMEXIT that resulted in some tsc calibration woes in guest. * Mitigate guest/ring0->host/ring0 attacks. When host kernel is using retpoline it is safe against these attacks. If host kernel isn't using retpoline we might need to do a IBPB flush on every VMEXIT. Even when using retpoline for indirect calls, in certain conditions 'ret' can use the BTB on Skylake-era CPUs. There are other mitigations available like RSB stuffing/clearing. * IBPB is issued only for SVM during svm_free_vcpu(). VMX has a vmclear and SVM doesn't. Follow discussion here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/1/15/146 Please refer to the following spec for more details on the enumeration and control. Refer here to get documentation about mitigations. https://software.intel.com/en-us/side-channel-security-support [peterz: rebase and changelog rewrite] [karahmed: - rebase - vmx: expose PRED_CMD if guest has it in CPUID - svm: only pass through IBPB if guest has it in CPUID - vmx: support !cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()] - vmx: support nested] [dwmw2: Expose CPUID bit too (AMD IBPB only for now as we lack IBRS) PRED_CMD is a write-only MSR] Signed-off-by:Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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KarimAllah Ahmed authored
[dwmw2: Stop using KF() for bits in it, too] Signed-off-by:
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvmThomas Gleixner authored
Pull the KVM prerequisites so the IBPB patches apply.
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- 02 Feb, 2018 4 commits
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Darren Kenny authored
Fixes: 117cc7a9 ("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit") Signed-off-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
I'm seeing build failures from the two newly introduced arrays that are marked 'const' and '__initdata', which are mutually exclusive: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c:882:43: error: 'cpu_no_speculation' causes a section type conflict with 'e820_table_firmware_init' arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c:895:43: error: 'cpu_no_meltdown' causes a section type conflict with 'e820_table_firmware_init' The correct annotation is __initconst. Fixes: fec9434a ("x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown") Signed-off-by:
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by:
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KarimAllah Ahmed authored
[dwmw2: Use ARRAY_SIZE] Signed-off-by:
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David Woodhouse authored
There's no point in building init code with retpolines, since it runs before any potentially hostile userspace does. And before the retpoline is actually ALTERNATIVEd into place, for much of it. Signed-off-by:
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- 01 Feb, 2018 1 commit
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Dan Williams authored
Commit 75f139aa "KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup" added a raw 'asm("lfence");' to prevent a bounds check bypass of 'vmcs_field_to_offset_table'. The lfence can be avoided in this path by using the array_index_nospec() helper designed for these types of fixes. Signed-off-by:
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- 31 Jan, 2018 1 commit
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Paolo Bonzini authored
Place the MSR bitmap in struct loaded_vmcs, and update it in place every time the x2apic or APICv state can change. This is rare and the loop can handle 64 MSRs per iteration, in a similar fashion as nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap. This prepares for choosing, on a per-VM basis, whether to intercept the SPEC_CTRL and PRED_CMD MSRs. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # prereq for Spectre mitigation Suggested-by:
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