- 30 Apr, 2017 17 commits
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Peter Zijlstra authored
commit 321027c1 upstream. Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open() calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group into a hardware context. The problem is exactly that described in commit: f63a8daa ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking") ... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx relation can have changed under us. That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the established locking rules correctly. So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead). Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested() to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means we need to validate state after we acquire the locks. Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab) Tested-by:
John Dias <joaodias@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Fixes: f63a8daa ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.netSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> [bwh: Backported to 4.4: - Test perf_event::group_flags instead of group_caps - Adjust context] Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Eric Dumazet authored
commit 43a66845 upstream. We got a report of yet another bug in ping http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/03/24/6 ->disconnect() is not called with socket lock held. Fix this by acquiring ping rwlock earlier. Thanks to Daniel, Alexander and Andrey for letting us know this problem. Fixes: c319b4d7 ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind") Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by:
Daniel Jiang <danieljiang0415@gmail.com> Reported-by:
Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> Reported-by:
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
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EunTaik Lee authored
commit 9590232b upstream. There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver. This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl() function. A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously. cpu 0 cpu 1 ------------------------------------------------------- ion_handle_get_by_id() (ref == 2) ion_handle_get_by_id() (ref == 3) ion_free() (ref == 2) ion_handle_put() (ref == 1) ion_free() (ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is called and the handle is freed.) ion_handle_put() is called and it decreases the slub's next free pointer The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other hard-to-debug problems. This symptom is caused since the first member in the ion_handle structure is the reference count and the ion driver decrements the reference after it has been freed. To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended to protect all the codes that uses the handle. Signed-off-by:
Eun Taik Lee <eun.taik.lee@samsung.com> Reviewed-by:
Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Vlad Tsyrklevich authored
commit 05692d70 upstream. The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set. VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl(). Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow and should prevent a similar occurrence. Signed-off-by:
Vlad Tsyrklevich <vlad@tsyrklevich.net> Signed-off-by:
Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Michal Kubeček authored
commit 3de81b75 upstream. Qian Zhang (张谦) reported a potential socket buffer overflow in tipc_msg_build() which is also known as CVE-2016-8632: due to insufficient checks, a buffer overflow can occur if MTU is too short for even tipc headers. As anyone can set device MTU in a user/net namespace, this issue can be abused by a regular user. As agreed in the discussion on Ben Hutchings' original patch, we should check the MTU at the moment a bearer is attached rather than for each processed packet. We also need to repeat the check when bearer MTU is adjusted to new device MTU. UDP case also needs a check to avoid overflow when calculating bearer MTU. Fixes: b97bf3fd ("[TIPC] Initial merge") Signed-off-by:
Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Reported-by:
Qian Zhang (张谦) <zhangqian-c@360.cn> Acked-by:
Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by:
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Phil Turnbull authored
commit c58d6c93 upstream. If nlh->nlmsg_len is zero then an infinite loop is triggered because 'skb_pull(skb, msglen);' pulls zero bytes. The calculation in nlmsg_len() underflows if 'nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN' which bypasses the length validation and will later trigger an out-of-bound read. If the length validation does fail then the malformed batch message is copied back to userspace. However, we cannot do this because the nlh->nlmsg_len can be invalid. This leads to an out-of-bounds read in netlink_ack: [ 41.455421] ================================================================== [ 41.456431] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy+0x1d/0x40 at addr ffff880119e79340 [ 41.456431] Read of size 4294967280 by task a.out/987 [ 41.456431] ============================================================================= [ 41.456431] BUG kmalloc-512 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected [ 41.456431] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ... [ 41.456431] Bytes b4 ffff880119e79310: 00 00 00 00 d5 03 00 00 b0 fb fe ff 00 00 00 00 ................ [ 41.456431] Object ffff880119e79320: 20 00 00 00 10 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............... [ 41.456431] Object ffff880119e79330: 14 00 0a 00 01 03 fc 40 45 56 11 22 33 10 00 05 .......@EV."3... [ 41.456431] Object ffff880119e79340: f0 ff ff ff 88 99 aa bb 00 14 00 0a 00 06 fe fb ................ ^^ start of batch nlmsg with nlmsg_len=4294967280 ... [ 41.456431] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 41.456431] ffff880119e79400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 41.456431] ffff880119e79480: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 41.456431] >ffff880119e79500: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 41.456431] ^ [ 41.456431] ffff880119e79580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 41.456431] ffff880119e79600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 41.456431] ================================================================== Fix this with better validation of nlh->nlmsg_len and by setting NFNL_BATCH_FAILURE if any batch message fails length validation. CAP_NET_ADMIN is required to trigger the bugs. Fixes: 9ea2aa8b ("netfilter: nfnetlink: validate nfnetlink header from batch") Signed-off-by:
Phil Turnbull <phil.turnbull@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Mauro Carvalho Chehab authored
commit 8dfbcc43 upstream. If struct xc2028_config is passed without a firmware name, the following trouble may happen: [11009.907205] xc2028 5-0061: type set to XCeive xc2028/xc3028 tuner [11009.907491] ================================================================== [11009.907750] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in strcmp+0x96/0xb0 at addr ffff8803bd78ab40 [11009.907992] Read of size 1 by task modprobe/28992 [11009.907994] ============================================================================= [11009.907997] BUG kmalloc-16 (Tainted: G W ): kasan: bad access detected [11009.907999] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- [11009.908008] INFO: Allocated in xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd] age=0 cpu=3 pid=28992 [11009.908012] ___slab_alloc+0x581/0x5b0 [11009.908014] __slab_alloc+0x51/0x90 [11009.908017] __kmalloc+0x27b/0x350 [11009.908022] xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd] [11009.908026] usb_hcd_submit_urb+0x1e8/0x1c60 [11009.908029] usb_submit_urb+0xb0e/0x1200 [11009.908032] usb_serial_generic_write_start+0xb6/0x4c0 [11009.908035] usb_serial_generic_write+0x92/0xc0 [11009.908039] usb_console_write+0x38a/0x560 [11009.908045] call_console_drivers.constprop.14+0x1ee/0x2c0 [11009.908051] console_unlock+0x40d/0x900 [11009.908056] vprintk_emit+0x4b4/0x830 [11009.908061] vprintk_default+0x1f/0x30 [11009.908064] printk+0x99/0xb5 [11009.908067] kasan_report_error+0x10a/0x550 [11009.908070] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50 [11009.908074] INFO: Freed in xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028] age=1 cpu=3 pid=28992 [11009.908077] __slab_free+0x2ec/0x460 [11009.908080] kfree+0x266/0x280 [11009.908083] xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028] [11009.908086] xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028] [11009.908090] em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908094] em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908098] em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908101] em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx] [11009.908105] em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908108] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300 [11009.908111] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad [11009.908114] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0 [11009.908117] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130 [11009.908120] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76 [11009.908123] INFO: Slab 0xffffea000ef5e280 objects=25 used=25 fp=0x (null) flags=0x2ffff8000004080 [11009.908126] INFO: Object 0xffff8803bd78ab40 @offset=2880 fp=0x0000000000000001 [11009.908130] Bytes b4 ffff8803bd78ab30: 01 00 00 00 2a 07 00 00 9d 28 00 00 01 00 00 00 ....*....(...... [11009.908133] Object ffff8803bd78ab40: 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 b0 1d c3 6a 00 88 ff ff ...........j.... [11009.908137] CPU: 3 PID: 28992 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G B W 4.5.0-rc1+ #43 [11009.908140] Hardware name: /NUC5i7RYB, BIOS RYBDWi35.86A.0350.2015.0812.1722 08/12/2015 [11009.908142] ffff8803bd78a000 ffff8802c273f1b8 ffffffff81932007 ffff8803c6407a80 [11009.908148] ffff8802c273f1e8 ffffffff81556759 ffff8803c6407a80 ffffea000ef5e280 [11009.908153] ffff8803bd78ab40 dffffc0000000000 ffff8802c273f210 ffffffff8155ccb4 [11009.908158] Call Trace: [11009.908162] [<ffffffff81932007>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x64 [11009.908165] [<ffffffff81556759>] print_trailer+0xf9/0x150 [11009.908168] [<ffffffff8155ccb4>] object_err+0x34/0x40 [11009.908171] [<ffffffff8155f260>] kasan_report_error+0x230/0x550 [11009.908175] [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290 [11009.908179] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50 [11009.908182] [<ffffffff8155f5c3>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50 [11009.908185] [<ffffffff8155ea00>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x50/0xa0 [11009.908189] [<ffffffff8194cea6>] ? strcmp+0x96/0xb0 [11009.908192] [<ffffffff8194cea6>] strcmp+0x96/0xb0 [11009.908196] [<ffffffffa13ba4ac>] xc2028_set_config+0x15c/0x630 [tuner_xc2028] [11009.908200] [<ffffffffa13bac90>] xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028] [11009.908203] [<ffffffff8155ea78>] ? memset+0x28/0x30 [11009.908206] [<ffffffffa13ba980>] ? xc2028_set_config+0x630/0x630 [tuner_xc2028] [11009.908211] [<ffffffffa157a59a>] em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908215] [<ffffffffa157aa2a>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x37c/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908219] [<ffffffffa157a3a1>] ? hauppauge_hvr930c_init+0x487/0x487 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908222] [<ffffffffa01795ac>] ? lgdt330x_attach+0x1cc/0x370 [lgdt330x] [11009.908226] [<ffffffffa01793e0>] ? i2c_read_demod_bytes.isra.2+0x210/0x210 [lgdt330x] [11009.908230] [<ffffffff812e87d0>] ? ref_module.part.15+0x10/0x10 [11009.908233] [<ffffffff812e56e0>] ? module_assert_mutex_or_preempt+0x80/0x80 [11009.908238] [<ffffffffa157af92>] em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908242] [<ffffffffa157a6ae>] ? em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x30d/0x30d [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908245] [<ffffffff8195222d>] ? string+0x14d/0x1f0 [11009.908249] [<ffffffff8195381f>] ? symbol_string+0xff/0x1a0 [11009.908253] [<ffffffff81953720>] ? uuid_string+0x6f0/0x6f0 [11009.908257] [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0 [11009.908260] [<ffffffff8104b02f>] ? print_context_stack+0x7f/0xf0 [11009.908264] [<ffffffff812e9846>] ? __module_address+0xb6/0x360 [11009.908268] [<ffffffff8137fdc9>] ? is_ftrace_trampoline+0x99/0xe0 [11009.908271] [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0 [11009.908275] [<ffffffff81240a70>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 [11009.908278] [<ffffffff8104a24b>] ? dump_trace+0x11b/0x300 [11009.908282] [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx] [11009.908285] [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290 [11009.908289] [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590 [11009.908292] [<ffffffff812404dd>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [11009.908296] [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx] [11009.908299] [<ffffffff822dcbb0>] ? mutex_trylock+0x400/0x400 [11009.908302] [<ffffffff810021a1>] ? do_one_initcall+0x131/0x300 [11009.908306] [<ffffffff81296dc7>] ? call_rcu_sched+0x17/0x20 [11009.908309] [<ffffffff8159e708>] ? put_object+0x48/0x70 [11009.908314] [<ffffffffa1579f11>] em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908317] [<ffffffffa13e81f9>] em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx] [11009.908320] [<ffffffffa0150000>] ? 0xffffffffa0150000 [11009.908324] [<ffffffffa0150010>] em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908327] [<ffffffff810021b1>] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300 [11009.908330] [<ffffffff81002070>] ? try_to_run_init_process+0x40/0x40 [11009.908333] [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590 [11009.908337] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50 [11009.908340] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50 [11009.908343] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50 [11009.908346] [<ffffffff8155ea37>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x87/0xa0 [11009.908350] [<ffffffff8144da7b>] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad [11009.908353] [<ffffffff812f2626>] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0 [11009.908356] [<ffffffff812e9c90>] ? symbol_put_addr+0x50/0x50 [11009.908361] [<ffffffffa1580037>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x5989/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908366] [<ffffffff812ebfc0>] ? module_frob_arch_sections+0x20/0x20 [11009.908369] [<ffffffff815bc940>] ? open_exec+0x50/0x50 [11009.908374] [<ffffffff811671bb>] ? ns_capable+0x5b/0xd0 [11009.908377] [<ffffffff812f5e58>] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130 [11009.908379] [<ffffffff812f5d50>] ? SyS_init_module+0x1f0/0x1f0 [11009.908383] [<ffffffff81004044>] ? lockdep_sys_exit_thunk+0x12/0x14 [11009.908394] [<ffffffff822e6936>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76 [11009.908396] Memory state around the buggy address: [11009.908398] ffff8803bd78aa00: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [11009.908401] ffff8803bd78aa80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [11009.908403] >ffff8803bd78ab00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc [11009.908405] ^ [11009.908407] ffff8803bd78ab80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [11009.908409] ffff8803bd78ac00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [11009.908411] ================================================================== In order to avoid it, let's set the cached value of the firmware name to NULL after freeing it. While here, return an error if the memory allocation fails. Signed-off-by:
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Eric W. Biederman authored
commit d2921684 upstream. CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace. mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2 mount --make-rshared / for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem as some people have managed to hit this by accident. As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned. Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users as follows: > The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of > the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance > problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less > than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired. > > Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that > have been triggered and not yet expired. > > The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common > case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've > not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries. > > The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large > number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat > more active mounts. So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and malfunctioning programs. For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl. Tested-by:
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> [bwh: Backported to 4.4: adjust context] Signed-off-by:
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Jon Paul Maloy authored
commit f1d048f2 upstream. We sometimes observe a 'deadly embrace' type deadlock occurring between mutually connected sockets on the same node. This happens when the one-hour peer supervision timers happen to expire simultaneously in both sockets. The scenario is as follows: CPU 1: CPU 2: -------- -------- tipc_sk_timeout(sk1) tipc_sk_timeout(sk2) lock(sk1.slock) lock(sk2.slock) msg_create(probe) msg_create(probe) unlock(sk1.slock) unlock(sk2.slock) tipc_node_xmit_skb() tipc_node_xmit_skb() tipc_node_xmit() tipc_node_xmit() tipc_sk_rcv(sk2) tipc_sk_rcv(sk1) lock(sk2.slock) lock((sk1.slock) filter_rcv() filter_rcv() tipc_sk_proto_rcv() tipc_sk_proto_rcv() msg_create(probe_rsp) msg_create(probe_rsp) tipc_sk_respond() tipc_sk_respond() tipc_node_xmit_skb() tipc_node_xmit_skb() tipc_node_xmit() tipc_node_xmit() tipc_sk_rcv(sk1) tipc_sk_rcv(sk2) lock((sk1.slock) lock((sk2.slock) ===> DEADLOCK ===> DEADLOCK Further analysis reveals that there are three different locations in the socket code where tipc_sk_respond() is called within the context of the socket lock, with ensuing risk of similar deadlocks. We now solve this by passing a buffer queue along with all upcalls where sk_lock.slock may potentially be held. Response or rejected message buffers are accumulated into this queue instead of being sent out directly, and only sent once we know we are safely outside the slock context. Reported-by:
GUNA <gbalasun@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by:
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Parthasarathy Bhuvaragan authored
commit d2f394dc upstream. In a dual bearer configuration, if the second tipc link becomes active while the first link still has pending nametable "bulk" updates, it randomly leads to reset of the second link. When a link is established, the function named_distribute(), fills the skb based on node mtu (allows room for TUNNEL_PROTOCOL) with NAME_DISTRIBUTOR message for each PUBLICATION. However, the function named_distribute() allocates the buffer by increasing the node mtu by INT_H_SIZE (to insert NAME_DISTRIBUTOR). This consumes the space allocated for TUNNEL_PROTOCOL. When establishing the second link, the link shall tunnel all the messages in the first link queue including the "bulk" update. As size of the NAME_DISTRIBUTOR messages while tunnelling, exceeds the link mtu the transmission fails (-EMSGSIZE). Thus, the synch point based on the message count of the tunnel packets is never reached leading to link timeout. In this commit, we adjust the size of name distributor message so that they can be tunnelled. Reviewed-by:
Parthasarathy Bhuvaragan <parthasarathy.bhuvaragan@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
commit 67893f12 upstream. We get a bogus warning about a potential uninitialized variable use in gfs2, because the compiler does not figure out that we never use the leaf number if get_leaf_nr() returns an error: fs/gfs2/dir.c: In function 'get_first_leaf': fs/gfs2/dir.c:802:9: warning: 'leaf_no' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized] fs/gfs2/dir.c: In function 'dir_split_leaf': fs/gfs2/dir.c:1021:8: warning: 'leaf_no' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized] Changing the 'if (!error)' to 'if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(error))' is sufficient to let gcc understand that this is exactly the same condition as in IS_ERR() so it can optimize the code path enough to understand it. Signed-off-by:
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by:
Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
commit 48dc5fb3 upstream. The driver reads a value from hfa384x_from_bap(), which may fail, and then assigns the value to a local variable. gcc detects that in in the failure case, the 'rlen' variable now contains uninitialized data: In file included from ../drivers/net/wireless/intersil/hostap/hostap_pci.c:220:0: drivers/net/wireless/intersil/hostap/hostap_hw.c: In function 'hfa384x_get_rid': drivers/net/wireless/intersil/hostap/hostap_hw.c:842:5: warning: 'rec' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized] if (le16_to_cpu(rec.len) == 0) { This restructures the function as suggested by Russell King, to make it more readable and get more reliable error handling, by handling each failure mode using a goto. Signed-off-by:
Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
commit a4f642a8 upstream. The nozomi wireless data driver has its own helper function to transfer data from a FIFO, doing an extra byte swap on big-endian architectures, presumably to bring the data back into byte-serial order after readw() or readl() perform their implicit byteswap. This helper function is used in the receive_data() function to first read the length into a 32-bit variable, which causes a compile-time warning: drivers/tty/nozomi.c: In function 'receive_data': drivers/tty/nozomi.c:857:9: warning: 'size' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized] The problem is that gcc is unsure whether the data was actually read or not. We know that it is at this point, so we can replace it with a single readl() to shut up that warning. I am leaving the byteswap in there, to preserve the existing behavior, even though this seems fishy: Reading the length of the data into a cpu-endian variable should normally not use a second byteswap on big-endian systems, unless the hardware is aware of the CPU endianess. There appears to be a lot more confusion about endianess in this driver, so it probably has not worked on big-endian systems in a long time, if ever, and I have no way to test it. It's well possible that this driver has not been used by anyone in a while, the last patch that looks like it was tested on the hardware is from 2008. Signed-off-by:
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Jon Paul Maloy authored
commit c4282ca7 upstream. commit 88e8ac70 ("tipc: reduce transmission rate of reset messages when link is down") revealed a flaw in the node FSM, as defined in the log of commit 66996b6c ("tipc: extend node FSM"). We see the following scenario: 1: Node B receives a RESET message from node A before its link endpoint is fully up, i.e., the node FSM is in state SELF_UP_PEER_COMING. This event will not change the node FSM state, but the (distinct) link FSM will move to state RESETTING. 2: As an effect of the previous event, the local endpoint on B will declare node A lost, and post the event SELF_DOWN to the its node FSM. This moves the FSM state to SELF_DOWN_PEER_LEAVING, meaning that no messages will be accepted from A until it receives another RESET message that confirms that A's endpoint has been reset. This is wasteful, since we know this as a fact already from the first received RESET, but worse is that the link instance's FSM has not wasted this information, but instead moved on to state ESTABLISHING, meaning that it repeatedly sends out ACTIVATE messages to the reset peer A. 3: Node A will receive one of the ACTIVATE messages, move its link FSM to state ESTABLISHED, and start repeatedly sending out STATE messages to node B. 4: Node B will consistently drop these messages, since it can only accept accept a RESET according to its node FSM. 5: After four lost STATE messages node A will reset its link and start repeatedly sending out RESET messages to B. 6: Because of the reduced send rate for RESET messages, it is very likely that A will receive an ACTIVATE (which is sent out at a much higher frequency) before it gets the chance to send a RESET, and A may hence quickly move back to state ESTABLISHED and continue sending out STATE messages, which will again be dropped by B. 7: GOTO 5. 8: After having repeated the cycle 5-7 a number of times, node A will by chance get in between with sending a RESET, and the situation is resolved. Unfortunately, we have seen that it may take a substantial amount of time before this vicious loop is broken, sometimes in the order of minutes. We correct this by making a small correction to the node FSM: When a node in state SELF_UP_PEER_COMING receives a SELF_DOWN event, it now moves directly back to state SELF_DOWN_PEER_DOWN, instead of as now SELF_DOWN_PEER_LEAVING. This is logically consistent, since we don't need to wait for RESET confirmation from of an endpoint that we alread know has been reset. It also means that node B in the scenario above will not be dropping incoming STATE messages, and the link can come up immediately. Finally, a symmetry comparison reveals that the FSM has a similar error when receiving the event PEER_DOWN in state PEER_UP_SELF_COMING. Instead of moving to PERR_DOWN_SELF_LEAVING, it should move directly to SELF_DOWN_PEER_DOWN. Although we have never seen any negative effect of this logical error, we choose fix this one, too. The node FSM looks as follows after those changes: +----------------------------------------+ | PEER_DOWN_EVT| | | +------------------------+----------------+ | |SELF_DOWN_EVT | | | | | | | | +-----------+ +-----------+ | | |NODE_ | |NODE_ | | | +----------|FAILINGOVER|<---------|SYNCHING |-----------+ | | |SELF_ +-----------+ FAILOVER_+-----------+ PEER_ | | | |DOWN_EVT | A BEGIN_EVT A | DOWN_EVT| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |FAILOVER_ |FAILOVER_ |SYNCH_ |SYNCH_ | | | | |END_EVT |BEGIN_EVT |BEGIN_EVT|END_EVT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +--------------+ | | | | | +-------->| SELF_UP_ |<-------+ | | | | +-----------------| PEER_UP |----------------+ | | | | |SELF_DOWN_EVT +--------------+ PEER_DOWN_EVT| | | | | | A A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | PEER_UP_EVT| |SELF_UP_EVT | | | | | | | | | | | V V V | | V V V +------------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +------------+ |SELF_DOWN_ | |SELF_UP_ | |PEER_UP_ | |PEER_DOWN | |PEER_LEAVING| |PEER_COMING| |SELF_COMING| |SELF_LEAVING| +------------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +------------+ | | A A | | | | | | | | | SELF_ | |SELF_ |PEER_ |PEER_ | | DOWN_EVT| |UP_EVT |UP_EVT |DOWN_EVT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +--------------+ | | |PEER_DOWN_EVT +--->| SELF_DOWN_ |<---+ SELF_DOWN_EVT| +------------------->| PEER_DOWN |<--------------------+ +--------------+ Acked-by:
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Jon Paul Maloy authored
commit 7c8bcfb1 upstream. In the refactoring commit d570d864 ("tipc: enqueue arrived buffers in socket in separate function") we did by accident replace the test if (sk->sk_backlog.len == 0) atomic_set(&tsk->dupl_rcvcnt, 0); with if (sk->sk_backlog.len) atomic_set(&tsk->dupl_rcvcnt, 0); This effectively disables the compensation we have for the double receive buffer accounting that occurs temporarily when buffers are moved from the backlog to the socket receive queue. Until now, this has gone unnoticed because of the large receive buffer limits we are applying, but becomes indispensable when we reduce this buffer limit later in this series. We now fix this by inverting the mentioned condition. Acked-by:
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Erik Hugne authored
commit 541726ab upstream. Nametable updates received from the network that cannot be applied immediately are placed on a defer queue. This queue is global to the TIPC module, which might cause problems when using TIPC in containers. To prevent nametable updates from escaping into the wrong namespace, we make the queue pernet instead. Signed-off-by:
Erik Hugne <erik.hugne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Richard Alpe authored
commit 9bd160bf upstream. Expand headroom further in order to be able to fit the larger IPv6 header. Prior to this patch this caused a skb under panic for certain tipc packets when using IPv6 UDP bearer(s). Signed-off-by:
Richard Alpe <richard.alpe@ericsson.com> Acked-by:
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- 27 Apr, 2017 23 commits
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
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Jon Paul Maloy authored
commit d25a0125 upstream. When the TIPC module is unloaded, we have identified a race condition that allows a node reference counter to go to zero and the node instance being freed before the node timer is finished with accessing it. This leads to occasional crashes, especially in multi-namespace environments. The scenario goes as follows: CPU0:(node_stop) CPU1:(node_timeout) // ref == 2 1: if(!mod_timer()) 2: if (del_timer()) 3: tipc_node_put() // ref -> 1 4: tipc_node_put() // ref -> 0 5: kfree_rcu(node); 6: tipc_node_get(node) 7: // BOOM! We now clean up this functionality as follows: 1) We remove the node pointer from the node lookup table before we attempt deactivating the timer. This way, we reduce the risk that tipc_node_find() may obtain a valid pointer to an instance marked for deletion; a harmless but undesirable situation. 2) We use del_timer_sync() instead of del_timer() to safely deactivate the node timer without any risk that it might be reactivated by the timeout handler. There is no risk of deadlock here, since the two functions never touch the same spinlocks. 3: We remove a pointless tipc_node_get() + tipc_node_put() from the timeout handler. Reported-by:
Zhijiang Hu <huzhijiang@gmail.com> Acked-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit ac34f15e upstream. When tearing down a block device early in its lifetime, userspace may still be performing discovery actions like blkdev_ioctl() to re-read partitions. The nvdimm_revalidate_disk() implementation depends on disk->driverfs_dev to be valid at entry. However, it is set to NULL in del_gendisk() and fatally this is happening *before* the disk device is deleted from userspace view. There's no reason for del_gendisk() to clear ->driverfs_dev. That device is the parent of the disk. It is guaranteed to not be freed until the disk, as a child, drops its ->parent reference. We could also fix this issue locally in nvdimm_revalidate_disk() by using disk_to_dev(disk)->parent, but lets fix it globally since ->driverfs_dev follows the lifetime of the parent. Longer term we should probably just add a @parent parameter to add_disk(), and stop carrying this pointer in the gendisk. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<ffffffffa00340a8>] nvdimm_revalidate_disk+0x18/0x90 [libnvdimm] CPU: 2 PID: 538 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G O 4.4.0-rc5 #2257 [..] Call Trace: [<ffffffff8143e5c7>] rescan_partitions+0x87/0x2c0 [<ffffffff810f37f9>] ? __lock_is_held+0x49/0x70 [<ffffffff81438c62>] __blkdev_reread_part+0x72/0xb0 [<ffffffff81438cc5>] blkdev_reread_part+0x25/0x40 [<ffffffff8143982d>] blkdev_ioctl+0x4fd/0x9c0 [<ffffffff811246c9>] ? current_kernel_time64+0x69/0xd0 [<ffffffff812916dd>] block_ioctl+0x3d/0x50 [<ffffffff81264c38>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x308/0x560 [<ffffffff8115dbd1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xb1/0x100 [<ffffffff810031d6>] ? do_audit_syscall_entry+0x66/0x70 [<ffffffff81264f09>] SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90 [<ffffffff81902672>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76 Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com> Reported-by:
Robert Hu <robert.hu@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit 11e63f6d upstream. Before we rework the "pmem api" to stop abusing __copy_user_nocache() for memcpy_to_pmem() we need to fix cases where we may strand dirty data in the cpu cache. The problem occurs when copy_from_iter_pmem() is used for arbitrary data transfers from userspace. There is no guarantee that these transfers, performed by dax_iomap_actor(), will have aligned destinations or aligned transfer lengths. Backstop the usage __copy_user_nocache() with explicit cache management in these unaligned cases. Yes, copy_from_iter_pmem() is now too big for an inline, but addressing that is saved for a later patch that moves the entirety of the "pmem api" into the pmem driver directly. Fixes: 5de490da ("pmem: add copy_from_iter_pmem() and clear_pmem()") Cc: <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by:
Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Signed-off-by:
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Vitaly Kuznetsov authored
commit 56ef6718 upstream. It may happen that secondary CPUs are still alive and resetting hv_context.tsc_page will cause a consequent crash in read_hv_clock_tsc() as we don't check for it being not NULL there. It is safe as we're not freeing this page anyways. Signed-off-by:
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by:
Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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Vitaly Kuznetsov authored
commit cb7a5724 upstream. I'm observing the following hot add requests from the WS2012 host: hot_add_req: start_pfn = 0x108200 count = 330752 hot_add_req: start_pfn = 0x158e00 count = 193536 hot_add_req: start_pfn = 0x188400 count = 239616 As the host doesn't specify hot add regions we're trying to create 128Mb-aligned region covering the first request, we create the 0x108000 - 0x160000 region and we add 0x108000 - 0x158e00 memory. The second request passes the pfn_covered() check, we enlarge the region to 0x108000 - 0x190000 and add 0x158e00 - 0x188200 memory. The problem emerges with the third request as it starts at 0x188400 so there is a 0x200 gap which is not covered. As the end of our region is 0x190000 now it again passes the pfn_covered() check were we just adjust the covered_end_pfn and make it 0x188400 instead of 0x188200 which means that we'll try to online 0x188200-0x188400 pages but these pages were never assigned to us and we crash. We can't react to such requests by creating new hot add regions as it may happen that the whole suggested range falls into the previously identified 128Mb-aligned area so we'll end up adding nothing or create intersecting regions and our current logic doesn't allow that. Instead, create a list of such 'gaps' and check for them in the page online callback. Signed-off-by:
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Vitaly Kuznetsov authored
commit 7cf3b79e upstream. Windows 2012 (non-R2) does not specify hot add region in hot add requests and the logic in hot_add_req() is trying to find a 128Mb-aligned region covering the request. It may also happen that host's requests are not 128Mb aligned and the created ha_region will start before the first specified PFN. We can't online these non-present pages but we don't remember the real start of the region. This is a regression introduced by the commit 5abbbb75 ("Drivers: hv: hv_balloon: don't lose memory when onlining order is not natural"). While the idea of keeping the 'moving window' was wrong (as there is no guarantee that hot add requests come ordered) we should still keep track of covered_start_pfn. This is not a revert, the logic is different. Signed-off-by:
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Vitaly Kuznetsov authored
commit 26840437 upstream. KVP daemon does fork()/exec() (with popen()) so we need to close our fds to avoid sharing them with child processes. The immediate implication of not doing so I see is SELinux complaining about 'ip' trying to access '/dev/vmbus/hv_kvp'. Signed-off-by:
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Suzuki K Poulose authored
commit 8b3405e3 upstream. In kvm_free_stage2_pgd() we don't hold the kvm->mmu_lock while calling unmap_stage2_range() on the entire memory range for the guest. This could cause problems with other callers (e.g, munmap on a memslot) trying to unmap a range. And since we have to unmap the entire Guest memory range holding a spinlock, make sure we yield the lock if necessary, after we unmap each PUD range. Fixes: commit d5d8184d ("KVM: ARM: Memory virtualization setup") Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzin@redhat.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> [ Avoid vCPU starvation and lockup detector warnings ] Signed-off-by:
Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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Yazen Ghannam authored
commit 29f72ce3 upstream. MCA bank 3 is reserved on systems pre-Fam17h, so it didn't have a name. However, MCA bank 3 is defined on Fam17h systems and can be accessed using legacy MSRs. Without a name we get a stack trace on Fam17h systems when trying to register sysfs files for bank 3 on kernels that don't recognize Scalable MCA. Call MCA bank 3 "decode_unit" since this is what it represents on Fam17h. This will allow kernels without SMCA support to see this bank on Fam17h+ and prevent the stack trace. This will not affect older systems since this bank is reserved on them, i.e. it'll be ignored. Tested on AMD Fam15h and Fam17h systems. WARNING: CPU: 26 PID: 1 at lib/kobject.c:210 kobject_add_internal kobject: (ffff88085bb256c0): attempted to be registered with empty name! ... Call Trace: kobject_add_internal kobject_add kobject_create_and_add threshold_create_device threshold_init_device Signed-off-by:
Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1490102285-3659-1-git-send-email-Yazen.Ghannam@amd.comSigned-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
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Ravi Bangoria authored
commit 9e1ba4f2 upstream. If we set a kprobe on a 'stdu' instruction on powerpc64, we see a kernel OOPS: Bad kernel stack pointer cd93c840 at c000000000009868 Oops: Bad kernel stack pointer, sig: 6 [#1] ... GPR00: c000001fcd93cb30 00000000cd93c840 c0000000015c5e00 00000000cd93c840 ... NIP [c000000000009868] resume_kernel+0x2c/0x58 LR [c000000000006208] program_check_common+0x108/0x180 On a 64-bit system when the user probes on a 'stdu' instruction, the kernel does not emulate actual store in emulate_step() because it may corrupt the exception frame. So the kernel does the actual store operation in exception return code i.e. resume_kernel(). resume_kernel() loads the saved stack pointer from memory using lwz, which only loads the low 32-bits of the address, causing the kernel crash. Fix this by loading the 64-bit value instead. Fixes: be96f633 ("powerpc: Split out instruction analysis part of emulate_step()") Signed-off-by:
Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:
Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:
Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> [mpe: Change log massage, add stable tag] Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by:
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Sebastian Siewior authored
commit 9cd9a21c upstream. In commit 6afaf8a4 ("UBI: flush wl before clearing update marker") I managed to trigger and fix a similar bug. Now here is another version of which I assumed it wouldn't matter back then but it turns out UBI has a check for it and will error out like this: |ubi0 warning: validate_vid_hdr: inconsistent used_ebs |ubi0 error: validate_vid_hdr: inconsistent VID header at PEB 592 All you need to trigger this is? "ubiupdatevol /dev/ubi0_0 file" + a powercut in the middle of the operation. ubi_start_update() sets the update-marker and puts all EBs on the erase list. After that userland can proceed to write new data while the old EB aren't erased completely. A powercut at this point is usually not that much of a tragedy. UBI won't give read access to the static volume because it has the update marker. It will most likely set the corrupted flag because it misses some EBs. So we are all good. Unless the size of the image that has been written differs from the old image in the magnitude of at least one EB. In that case UBI will find two different values for `used_ebs' and refuse to attach the image with the error message mentioned above. So in order not to get in the situation, the patch will ensure that we wait until everything is removed before it tries to write any data. The alternative would be to detect such a case and remove all EBs at the attached time after we processed the volume-table and see the update-marker set. The patch looks bigger and I doubt it is worth it since usually the write() will wait from time to time for a new EB since usually there not that many spare EB that can be used. Signed-off-by:
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by:
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Johannes Berg authored
commit 3018e947 upstream. AP/AP_VLAN modes don't accept any real 802.11 multicast data frames, but since they do need to accept broadcast management frames the same is currently permitted for data frames. This opens a security problem because such frames would be decrypted with the GTK, and could even contain unicast L3 frames. Since the spec says that ToDS frames must always have the BSSID as the RA (addr1), reject any other data frames. The problem was originally reported in "Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys" at usenix https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity16/technical-sessions/presentation/vanhoef and brought to my attention by Jouni. Reported-by:
Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Signed-off-by:
Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Haibo Chen authored
commit 9f327845 upstream. Currently for DDR50 card, it need tuning in default. We meet tuning fail issue for DDR50 card and some data CRC error when DDR50 sd card works. This is because the default pad I/O drive strength can't make sure DDR50 card work stable. So increase the pad I/O drive strength for DDR50 card, and use pins_100mhz. This fixes DDR50 card support for IMX since DDR50 tuning was enabled from commit 9faac7b9 ("mmc: sdhci: enable tuning for DDR50") Tested-and-reported-by:
Tim Harvey <tharvey@gateworks.com> Signed-off-by:
Haibo Chen <haibo.chen@nxp.com> Acked-by:
Dong Aisheng <aisheng.dong@nxp.com> Acked-by:
Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
commit fe8c470a upstream. gcc -O2 cannot always prove that the loop in acpi_power_get_inferred_state() is enterered at least once, so it assumes that cur_state might not get initialized: drivers/acpi/power.c: In function 'acpi_power_get_inferred_state': drivers/acpi/power.c:222:9: error: 'cur_state' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized] This sets the variable to zero at the start of the loop, to ensure that there is well-defined behavior even for an empty list. This gets rid of the warning. The warning first showed up when the -Os flag got removed in a bug fix patch in linux-4.11-rc5. I would suggest merging this addon patch on top of that bug fix to avoid introducing a new warning in the stable kernels. Fixes: 61b79e16 (ACPI: Fix incompatibility with mcount-based function graph tracing) Signed-off-by:
Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Thorsten Leemhuis authored
commit 704de489 upstream. Temporary got a Lifebook E547 into my hands and noticed the touchpad only works after running: echo "1" > /sys/devices/platform/i8042/serio2/crc_enabled Add it to the list of machines that need this workaround. Signed-off-by:
Thorsten Leemhuis <linux@leemhuis.info> Reviewed-by:
Ulrik De Bie <ulrik.debie-os@e2big.org> Signed-off-by:
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jorgen Hansen authored
commit 8ab18d71 upstream. The check in vmci_transport_peer_detach_cb should only allow a detach when the qp handle of the transport matches the one in the detach message. Testing: Before this change, a detach from a peer on a different socket would cause an active stream socket to register a detach. Reviewed-by:
George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com> Signed-off-by:
Jorgen Hansen <jhansen@vmware.com> Signed-off-by:
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K. Y. Srinivasan authored
commit 8de0d7e9 upstream. The current delay between retries is unnecessarily high and is negatively affecting the time it takes to boot the system. Signed-off-by:
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Vitaly Kuznetsov authored
commit 396e287f upstream. vmbus_teardown_gpadl() can result in infinite wait when it is called on 5 second timeout in vmbus_open(). The issue is caused by the fact that gpadl teardown operation won't ever succeed for an opened channel and the timeout isn't always enough. As a guest, we can always trust the host to respond to our request (and there is nothing we can do if it doesn't). Signed-off-by:
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Vitaly Kuznetsov authored
commit 7cc80c98 upstream. In some cases create_gpadl_header() allocates submessages but we never free them. [sumits] Note for stable: Upstream commit 4d637632: (Drivers: hv: get rid of redundant messagecount in create_gpadl_header()) changes the list usage to initialize list header in all cases; that patch isn't added to stable, so the current patch is modified a little bit from the upstream commit to check if the list is valid or not. Signed-off-by:
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Christian Borntraeger authored
commit a8f60d1f upstream. On heavy paging with KSM I see guest data corruption. Turns out that KSM will add pages to its tree, where the mapping return true for pte_unused (or might become as such later). KSM will unmap such pages and reinstantiate with different attributes (e.g. write protected or special, e.g. in replace_page or write_protect_page)). This uncovered a bug in our pagetable handling: We must remove the unused flag as soon as an entry becomes present again. Signed-of-by:
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Germano Percossi authored
commit a0918f1c upstream. STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME can be received during node failover, causing the flag to be set and making the reconnect thread always unsuccessful, thereafter. Once the only place where it is set is removed, the remaining bits are rendered moot. Removing it does not prevent "mount" from failing when a non existent share is passed. What happens when the share really ceases to exist while the share is mounted is undefined now as much as it was before. Signed-off-by:
Germano Percossi <germano.percossi@citrix.com> Reviewed-by:
Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by:
Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sachin Prabhu authored
commit 62a6cfdd upstream. commit 4fcd1813 ("Fix reconnect to not defer smb3 session reconnect long after socket reconnect") added support for Negotiate requests to be initiated by echo calls. To avoid delays in calling echo after a reconnect, I added the patch introduced by the commit b8c60012 ("Call echo service immediately after socket reconnect"). This has however caused a regression with cifs shares which do not have support for echo calls to trigger Negotiate requests. On connections which need to call Negotiation, the echo calls trigger an error which triggers a reconnect which in turn triggers another echo call. This results in a loop which is only broken when an operation is performed on the cifs share. For an idle share, it can DOS a server. The patch uses the smb_operation can_echo() for cifs so that it is called only if connection has been already been setup. kernel bz: 194531 Signed-off-by:
Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Tested-by:
Jonathan Liu <net147@gmail.com> Acked-by:
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