- 24 Mar, 2014 7 commits
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Emmanuel Grumbach authored
commit 1d147bfa upstream. There is a race between the TX path and the STA wakeup: while a station is sleeping, mac80211 buffers frames until it wakes up, then the frames are transmitted. However, the RX and TX path are concurrent, so the packet indicating wakeup can be processed while a packet is being transmitted. This can lead to a situation where the buffered frames list is emptied on the one side, while a frame is being added on the other side, as the station is still seen as sleeping in the TX path. As a result, the newly added frame will not be send anytime soon. It might be sent much later (and out of order) when the station goes to sleep and wakes up the next time. Additionally, it can lead to the crash below. Fix all this by synchronising both paths with a new lock. Both path are not fastpath since they handle PS situations. In a later patch we'll remove the extra skb queue locks to reduce locking overhead. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000b0 IP: [<ff6f1791>] ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211] *pde = 00000000 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC EIP: 0060:[<ff6f1791>] EFLAGS: 00210282 CPU: 1 EIP is at ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211] EAX: e5900da0 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000000 ESI: e41d00c0 EDI: e5900da0 EBP: ebe458e4 ESP: ebe458b0 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 CR0: 8005003b CR2: 000000b0 CR3: 25a78000 CR4: 000407d0 DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000 DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400 Process iperf (pid: 3934, ti=ebe44000 task=e757c0b0 task.ti=ebe44000) iwlwifi 0000:02:00.0: I iwl_pcie_enqueue_hcmd Sending command LQ_CMD (#4e), seq: 0x0903, 92 bytes at 3[3]:9 Stack: e403b32c ebe458c4 00200002 00200286 e403b338 ebe458cc c10960bb e5900da0 ff76a6ec ebe458d8 00000000 e41d00c0 e5900da0 ebe458f0 ff6f1b75 e403b210 ebe4598c ff723dc1 00000000 ff76a6ec e597c978 e403b758 00000002 00000002 Call Trace: [<ff6f1b75>] ieee80211_free_txskb+0x15/0x20 [mac80211] [<ff723dc1>] invoke_tx_handlers+0x1661/0x1780 [mac80211] [<ff7248a5>] ieee80211_tx+0x75/0x100 [mac80211] [<ff7249bf>] ieee80211_xmit+0x8f/0xc0 [mac80211] [<ff72550e>] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x4fe/0xe20 [mac80211] [<c149ef70>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x450/0x950 [<c14b9aa9>] sch_direct_xmit+0xa9/0x250 [<c14b9c9b>] __qdisc_run+0x4b/0x150 [<c149f732>] dev_queue_xmit+0x2c2/0xca0 Reported-by:
Yaara Rozenblum <yaara.rozenblum@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Reviewed-by:
Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> [reword commit log, use a separate lock] Signed-off-by:
Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Daniel Borkmann authored
[ Upstream commit ec0223ec ] RFC4895 introduced AUTH chunks for SCTP; during the SCTP handshake RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO are negotiated (CHUNKS being optional though): ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ----------> <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] --------- -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- A special case is when an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO chunks to be authenticated: ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ----------> <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] --------- ------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ECHO ----------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- RFC4895, section 6.3. Receiving Authenticated Chunks says: The receiver MUST use the HMAC algorithm indicated in the HMAC Identifier field. If this algorithm was not specified by the receiver in the HMAC-ALGO parameter in the INIT or INIT-ACK chunk during association setup, the AUTH chunk and all the chunks after it MUST be discarded and an ERROR chunk SHOULD be sent with the error cause defined in Section 4.1. [...] If no endpoint pair shared key has been configured for that Shared Key Identifier, all authenticated chunks MUST be silently discarded. [...] When an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO chunks to be authenticated, some special procedures have to be followed because the reception of a COOKIE-ECHO chunk might result in the creation of an SCTP association. If a packet arrives containing an AUTH chunk as a first chunk, a COOKIE-ECHO chunk as the second chunk, and possibly more chunks after them, and the receiver does not have an STCB for that packet, then authentication is based on the contents of the COOKIE-ECHO chunk. In this situation, the receiver MUST authenticate the chunks in the packet by using the RANDOM parameters, CHUNKS parameters and HMAC_ALGO parameters obtained from the COOKIE-ECHO chunk, and possibly a local shared secret as inputs to the authentication procedure specified in Section 6.3. If authentication fails, then the packet is discarded. If the authentication is successful, the COOKIE-ECHO and all the chunks after the COOKIE-ECHO MUST be processed. If the receiver has an STCB, it MUST process the AUTH chunk as described above using the STCB from the existing association to authenticate the COOKIE-ECHO chunk and all the chunks after it. [...] Commit bbd0d598 introduced the possibility to receive and verification of AUTH chunk, including the edge case for authenticated COOKIE-ECHO. On reception of COOKIE-ECHO, the function sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() handles processing, unpacks and creates a new association if it passed sanity checks and also tests for authentication chunks being present. After a new association has been processed, it invokes sctp_process_init() on the new association and walks through the parameter list it received from the INIT chunk. It checks SCTP_PARAM_RANDOM, SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO and SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS, and copies them into asoc->peer meta data (peer_random, peer_hmacs, peer_chunks) in case sysctl -w net.sctp.auth_enable=1 is set. If in INIT's SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_EXT parameter SCTP_CID_AUTH is set, peer_random != NULL and peer_hmacs != NULL the peer is to be assumed asoc->peer.auth_capable=1, in any other case asoc->peer.auth_capable=0. Now, if in sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() chunk->auth_chunk is available, we set up a fake auth chunk and pass that on to sctp_sf_authenticate(), which at latest in sctp_auth_calculate_hmac() reliably dereferences a NULL pointer at position 0..0008 when setting up the crypto key in crypto_hash_setkey() by using asoc->asoc_shared_key that is NULL as condition key_id == asoc->active_key_id is true if the AUTH chunk was injected correctly from remote. This happens no matter what net.sctp.auth_enable sysctl says. The fix is to check for net->sctp.auth_enable and for asoc->peer.auth_capable before doing any operations like sctp_sf_authenticate() as no key is activated in sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() for each case. Now as RFC4895 section 6.3 states that if the used HMAC-ALGO passed from the INIT chunk was not used in the AUTH chunk, we SHOULD send an error; however in this case it would be better to just silently discard such a maliciously prepared handshake as we didn't even receive a parameter at all. Also, as our endpoint has no shared key configured, section 6.3 says that MUST silently discard, which we are doing from now onwards. Before calling sctp_sf_pdiscard(), we need not only to free the association, but also the chunk->auth_chunk skb, as commit bbd0d598 created a skb clone in that case. I have tested this locally by using netfilter's nfqueue and re-injecting packets into the local stack after maliciously modifying the INIT chunk (removing RANDOM; HMAC-ALGO param) and the SCTP packet containing the COOKIE_ECHO (injecting AUTH chunk before COOKIE_ECHO). Fixed with this patch applied. Fixes: bbd0d598 ("[SCTP]: Implement the receive and verification of AUTH chunk") Signed-off-by:
Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Cc: Vlad Yasevich <yasevich@gmail.com> Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by:
Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
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Michael Chan authored
[ Upstream commit d7b95315 ] Redefine the RXD_ERR_MASK to include only relevant error bits. This fixes a customer reported issue of randomly dropping packets on the 5719. Signed-off-by:
Michael Chan <mchan@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jason Wang authored
[ Upstream commit 0e7ede80 ] We should alloc big buffers also when guest can receive UFO packets to let the big packets fit into guest rx buffer. Fixes 5c516751 (virtio-net: Allow UFO feature to be set and advertised.) Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Sridhar Samudrala <sri@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by:
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George McCollister authored
commit 791c9e02 upstream. dequeue_entity() is called when p->on_rq and sets se->on_rq = 0 which appears to guarentee that the !se->on_rq condition is met. If the task has done set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE) without schedule() the second condition will be met and vruntime will be incorrectly adjusted twice. In certain cases this can result in the task's vruntime never increasing past the vruntime of other tasks on the CFS' run queue, starving them of CPU time. This patch changes switched_from_fair() to use !p->on_rq instead of !se->on_rq. I'm able to cause a task with a priority of 120 to starve all other tasks with the same priority on an ARM platform running 3.2.51-rt72 PREEMPT RT by writing one character at time to a serial tty (16550 UART) in a tight loop. I'm also able to verify making this change corrects the problem on that platform and kernel version. Signed-off-by:
George McCollister <george.mccollister@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392767811-28916-1-git-send-email-george.mccollister@gmail.comSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
commit 1b56e989 upstream. Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Jan Kara authored
commit 15c34a76 upstream. Global quota files are accessed from different nodes. Thus we cannot cache offset of quota structure in the quota file after we drop our node reference count to it because after that moment quota structure may be freed and reallocated elsewhere by a different node resulting in corruption of quota file. Fix the problem by clearing dq_off when we are releasing dquot structure. We also remove the DB_READ_B handling because it is useless - DQ_ACTIVE_B is set iff DQ_READ_B is set. Signed-off-by:
Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.de> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Reviewed-by:
Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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- 11 Mar, 2014 33 commits
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
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Emil Goode authored
commit d43ff4cd upstream. The struct driver_info ax88178_info is assigned the function asix_rx_fixup_common as it's rx_fixup callback. This means that FLAG_MULTI_PACKET must be set as this function is cloning the data and calling usbnet_skb_return. Not setting this flag leads to usbnet_skb_return beeing called a second time from within the rx_process function in the usbnet module. Signed-off-by:
Emil Goode <emilgoode@gmail.com> Reported-by:
Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Signed-off-by:
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Lucas Stach authored
commit 8b5b6f54 upstream. ASIX AX88772B started to pack data even more tightly. Packets and the ASIX packet header may now cross URB boundaries. To handle this we have to introduce some state between individual calls to asix_rx_fixup(). Signed-off-by:
Lucas Stach <dev@lynxeye.de> Signed-off-by:
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Mark Cave-Ayland authored
commit 0c5d63f0 upstream. All of the rtlwifi drivers have an error in the routine that tests if the data is "special". If it is, the subsequant transmission will be at the lowest rate to enhance reliability. The 16-bit quantity is big-endian, but was being extracted in native CPU mode. One of the effects of this bug is to inhibit association under some conditions as the TX rate is too high. Based on suggestions by Joe Perches, the entire routine is rewritten. One of the local headers contained duplicates of some of the ETH_P_XXX definitions. These are deleted. Signed-off-by:
Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net> Cc: Mark Cave-Ayland <mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> [wujg: Backported to 3.4: - adjust context - remove rtlpriv->enter_ps = false - use schedule_work(&rtlpriv->works.lps_leave_work)] Signed-off-by:
Jianguo Wu <wujianguo@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
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Emmanuel Grumbach authored
commit 08a5dd38 upstream. Add some new PCI IDs to the table for 6000, 6005 and 6235 series. Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> [wujg: Backported to 3.4: - Adjust context - Do not drop const from struct iwl_cfg] Signed-off-by:
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Stanislaw Gruszka authored
commit 9186a1fd upstream. If channel switch is pending and we remove interface we can crash like showed below due to passing NULL vif to mac80211: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffffffffff8cc IP: [<ffffffff8130924d>] strnlen+0xd/0x40 Call Trace: [<ffffffff8130ad2e>] string.isra.3+0x3e/0xd0 [<ffffffff8130bf99>] vsnprintf+0x219/0x640 [<ffffffff8130c481>] vscnprintf+0x11/0x30 [<ffffffff81061585>] vprintk_emit+0x115/0x4f0 [<ffffffff81657bd5>] printk+0x61/0x63 [<ffffffffa048987f>] ieee80211_chswitch_done+0xaf/0xd0 [mac80211] [<ffffffffa04e7b34>] iwl_chswitch_done+0x34/0x40 [iwldvm] [<ffffffffa04f83c3>] iwlagn_commit_rxon+0x2a3/0xdc0 [iwldvm] [<ffffffffa04ebc50>] ? iwlagn_set_rxon_chain+0x180/0x2c0 [iwldvm] [<ffffffffa04e5e76>] iwl_set_mode+0x36/0x40 [iwldvm] [<ffffffffa04e5f0d>] iwlagn_mac_remove_interface+0x8d/0x1b0 [iwldvm] [<ffffffffa0459b3d>] ieee80211_do_stop+0x29d/0x7f0 [mac80211] This is because we nulify ctx->vif in iwlagn_mac_remove_interface() before calling some other functions that teardown interface. To fix just check ctx->vif on iwl_chswitch_done(). We should not call ieee80211_chswitch_done() as channel switch works were already canceled by mac80211 in ieee80211_do_stop() -> ieee80211_mgd_stop(). Resolve: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=979581Reported-by:
Lukasz Jagiello <jagiello.lukasz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Johannes Berg authored
commit 707aee40 upstream. The BT_CONFIG command that is sent to the device during startup will enable BT coex unless the module parameter turns it off, but on devices without Bluetooth this may cause problems, as reported in Redhat BZ 885407. Fix this by sending the BT_CONFIG command only when the device has Bluetooth. Reviewed-by:
Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: - Adjust filename - s/priv->lib/priv->cfg/] Signed-off-by:
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Johannes Berg authored
commit 8a964f44 upstream. The FH hardware will always write back to the scratch field in commands, even host commands not just TX commands, which can overwrite parts of the command. This is problematic if the command is re-used (with IWL_HCMD_DFL_NOCOPY) and can cause calibration issues. Address this problem by always putting at least the first 16 bytes into the buffer we also use for the command header and therefore make the DMA engine write back into this. For commands that are smaller than 16 bytes also always map enough memory for the DMA engine to write back to. Reviewed-by:
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Johannes Berg authored
commit 7c341582 upstream. The RX replenish code doesn't handle DMA mapping failures, which will cause issues if there actually is a failure. This was reported by Shuah Khan who found a DMA mapping framework warning ("device driver failed to check map error"). Reported-by:
Shuah Khan <shuah.khan@hp.com> Reviewed-by:
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Emmanuel Grumbach authored
commit 25a17265 upstream. This can lead to a panic if the driver isn't ready to handle them. Since our interrupt line is shared, we can get an interrupt at any time (and CONFIG_DEBUG_SHIRQ checks that even when the interrupt is being freed). If the op_mode has gone away, we musn't call it. To avoid this the transport disables the interrupts when the hw is stopped and the op_mode is leaving. If there is an event that would cause an interrupt the INTA register is updated regardless of the enablement of the interrupts: even if the interrupts are disabled, the INTA will be changed, but the device won't issue an interrupt. But the ISR can be called at any time, so we ought ignore the value in the INTA otherwise we can call the op_mode after it was freed. I found this bug when the op_mode_start failed, and called iwl_trans_stop_hw(trans, true). Then I played with the RFKILL button, and removed the module. While removing the module, the IRQ is freed, and the ISR is called (CONFIG_DEBUG_SHIRQ enabled). Panic. Signed-off-by:
Gregory Greenman <gregory.greenman@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Johannes Berg authored
commit 4fc79db1 upstream. If the device is not started, we can't read its SRAM and attempting to do so will cause issues. Protect the debugfs read. Signed-off-by:
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Johannes Berg authored
commit 94543a8d upstream. iwl_dbgfs_fh_reg_read() can cause crashes and/or BUG_ON in slub because the ifdefs are wrong, the code in iwl_dump_fh() should use DEBUGFS, not DEBUG to protect the buffer writing code. Also, while at it, clean up the arguments to the function, some code and make it generally safer. Reported-by:
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
commit 60478295 upstream. snd_pcm_stop() must be called in the PCM substream lock context. Signed-off-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Cc: Weng Meiling <wengmeiling.weng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
commit 86f0b5b8 upstream. snd_pcm_stop() must be called in the PCM substream lock context. Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
commit 61be2b9a upstream. snd_pcm_stop() must be called in the PCM substream lock context. Acked-by:
Mark Brown <broonie@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
commit 46f6c1aa upstream. snd_pcm_stop() must be called in the PCM substream lock context. Acked-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
commit 5be1efb4 upstream. snd_pcm_stop() must be called in the PCM substream lock context. Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
commit 9538aa46 upstream. snd_pcm_stop() must be called in the PCM substream lock context. Acked-by:
Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de> Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
commit 5b9ab3f7 upstream. snd_pcm_stop() must be called in the PCM substream lock context. Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
commit cc7282b8 upstream. snd_pcm_stop() must be called in the PCM substream lock context. Signed-off-by:
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Fabio Estevam authored
commit 016fcab8 upstream. According to the sgtl5000 reference manual, the default value of CHIP_SSS_CTRL is 0x10. Reported-by:
Oskar Schirmer <oskar@scara.com> Signed-off-by:
Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@freescale.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sascha Hauer authored
commit b6e51600 upstream. Signed-off-by:
Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
Markus Pargmann <mpa@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
Mark Brown <broonie@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename] Signed-off-by:
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Trond Myklebust authored
commit a3c3cac5 upstream. The lockless RPC_IS_QUEUED() test in __rpc_execute means that we need to be careful about ordering the calls to rpc_test_and_set_running(task) and rpc_clear_queued(task). If we get the order wrong, then we may end up testing the RPC_TASK_RUNNING flag after __rpc_execute() has looped and changed the state of the rpc_task. Signed-off-by:
Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jeff Layton authored
commit 506026c3 upstream. rpc_make_runnable is not generally called with the queue lock held, unless it's waking up a task that has been sitting on a waitqueue. This is safe when the task has not entered the FSM yet, but the comments don't really spell this out. Signed-off-by:
Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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David Vrabel authored
commit 5e72fdb8 upstream. commit 4704fe4f upstream. When a event is being bound to a VCPU there is a window between the EVTCHNOP_bind_vpcu call and the adjustment of the local per-cpu masks where an event may be lost. The hypervisor upcalls the new VCPU but the kernel thinks that event is still bound to the old VCPU and ignores it. There is even a problem when the event is being bound to the same VCPU as there is a small window beween the clear_bit() and set_bit() calls in bind_evtchn_to_cpu(). When scanning for pending events, the kernel may read the bit when it is momentarily clear and ignore the event. Avoid this by masking the event during the whole bind operation. Signed-off-by:
David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by:
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: remove the BM() cast] Signed-off-by:
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Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk authored
commit 9371cadb upstream. commit 8e3f8755 upstream. Check that the ring does not have an insane amount of requests (more than there could fit on the ring). If we detect this case we will stop processing the requests and wait until the XenBus disconnects the ring. The existing check RING_REQUEST_CONS_OVERFLOW which checks for how many responses we have created in the past (rsp_prod_pvt) vs requests consumed (req_cons) and whether said difference is greater or equal to the size of the ring, does not catch this case. Wha the condition does check if there is a need to process more as we still have a backlog of responses to finish. Note that both of those values (rsp_prod_pvt and req_cons) are not exposed on the shared ring. To understand this problem a mini crash course in ring protocol response/request updates is in place. There are four entries: req_prod and rsp_prod; req_event and rsp_event to track the ring entries. We are only concerned about the first two - which set the tone of this bug. The req_prod is a value incremented by frontend for each request put on the ring. Conversely the rsp_prod is a value incremented by the backend for each response put on the ring (rsp_prod gets set by rsp_prod_pvt when pushing the responses on the ring). Both values can wrap and are modulo the size of the ring (in block case that is 32). Please see RING_GET_REQUEST and RING_GET_RESPONSE for the more details. The culprit here is that if the difference between the req_prod and req_cons is greater than the ring size we have a problem. Fortunately for us, the '__do_block_io_op' loop: rc = blk_rings->common.req_cons; rp = blk_rings->common.sring->req_prod; while (rc != rp) { .. blk_rings->common.req_cons = ++rc; /* before make_response() */ } will loop up to the point when rc == rp. The macros inside of the loop (RING_GET_REQUEST) is smart and is indexing based on the modulo of the ring size. If the frontend has provided a bogus req_prod value we will loop until the 'rc == rp' - which means we could be processing already processed requests (or responses) often. The reason the RING_REQUEST_CONS_OVERFLOW is not helping here is b/c it only tracks how many responses we have internally produced and whether we would should process more. The astute reader will notice that the macro RING_REQUEST_CONS_OVERFLOW provides two arguments - more on this later. For example, if we were to enter this function with these values: blk_rings->common.sring->req_prod = X+31415 (X is the value from the last time __do_block_io_op was called). blk_rings->common.req_cons = X blk_rings->common.rsp_prod_pvt = X The RING_REQUEST_CONS_OVERFLOW(&blk_rings->common, blk_rings->common.req_cons) is doing: req_cons - rsp_prod_pvt >= 32 Which is, X - X >= 32 or 0 >= 32 And that is false, so we continue on looping (this bug). If we re-use said macro RING_REQUEST_CONS_OVERFLOW and pass in the rp instead (sring->req_prod) of rc, the this macro can do the check: req_prod - rsp_prov_pvt >= 32 Which is, X + 31415 - X >= 32 , or 31415 >= 32 which is true, so we can error out and break out of the function. Unfortunatly the difference between rsp_prov_pvt and req_prod can be at 32 (which would error out in the macro). This condition exists when the backend is lagging behind with the responses and still has not finished responding to all of them (so make_response has not been called), and the rsp_prov_pvt + 32 == req_cons. This ends up with us not being able to use said macro. Hence introducing a new macro called RING_REQUEST_PROD_OVERFLOW which does a simple check of: req_prod - rsp_prod_pvt > RING_SIZE And with the X values from above: X + 31415 - X > 32 Returns true. Also not that if the ring is full (which is where the RING_REQUEST_CONS_OVERFLOW triggered), we would not hit the same condition: X + 32 - X > 32 Which is false. Lets use that macro. Note that in v5 of this patchset the macro was different - we used an earlier version. [v1: Move the check outside the loop] [v2: Add a pr_warn as suggested by David] [v3: Use RING_REQUEST_CONS_OVERFLOW as suggested by Jan] [v4: Move wake_up after kthread_stop as suggested by Jan] [v5: Use RING_REQUEST_PROD_OVERFLOW instead] [v6: Use RING_REQUEST_PROD_OVERFLOW - Jan's version] Signed-off-by:
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Jan Beulich authored
commit 8d925690 upstream. Backends may need to protect themselves against an insane number of produced requests stored by a frontend, in case they iterate over requests until reaching the req_prod value. There can't be more requests on the ring than the difference between produced requests and produced (but possibly not yet published) responses. This is a more strict alternative to a patch previously posted by Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>. Signed-off-by:
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Wei Liu authored
commit 03393fd5 upstream. Some frontend drivers are sending packets > 64 KiB in length. This length overflows the length field in the first slot making the following slots have an invalid length. Turn this error back into a non-fatal error by dropping the packet. To avoid having the following slots having fatal errors, consume all slots in the packet. This does not reopen the security hole in XSA-39 as if the packet as an invalid number of slots it will still hit fatal error case. Signed-off-by:
Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com> Acked-by:
Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by:
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Wei Liu authored
commit 2810e5b9 upstream. This patch tries to coalesce tx requests when constructing grant copy structures. It enables netback to deal with situation when frontend's MAX_SKB_FRAGS is larger than backend's MAX_SKB_FRAGS. With the help of coalescing, this patch tries to address two regressions avoid reopening the security hole in XSA-39. Regression 1. The reduction of the number of supported ring entries (slots) per packet (from 18 to 17). This regression has been around for some time but remains unnoticed until XSA-39 security fix. This is fixed by coalescing slots. Regression 2. The XSA-39 security fix turning "too many frags" errors from just dropping the packet to a fatal error and disabling the VIF. This is fixed by coalescing slots (handling 18 slots when backend's MAX_SKB_FRAGS is 17) which rules out false positive (using 18 slots is legit) and dropping packets using 19 to `max_skb_slots` slots. To avoid reopening security hole in XSA-39, frontend sending packet using more than max_skb_slots is considered malicious. The behavior of netback for packet is thus: 1-18 slots: valid 19-max_skb_slots slots: drop and respond with an error max_skb_slots+ slots: fatal error max_skb_slots is configurable by admin, default value is 20. Also change variable name from "frags" to "slots" in netbk_count_requests. Please note that RX path still has dependency on MAX_SKB_FRAGS. This will be fixed with separate patch. Signed-off-by:
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stephen hemminger authored
commit 9eaee8be upstream. Fix warning about 0 used as NULL. Signed-off-by:
Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Signed-off-by:
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Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk authored
commit 66ff0fe9 upstream. While we don't use the spinlock interrupt line (see for details commit f10cd522 - xen: disable PV spinlocks on HVM) - we should still do the proper init / deinit sequence. We did not do that correctly and for the CPU init for PVHVM guest we would allocate an interrupt line - but failed to deallocate the old interrupt line. This resulted in leakage of an irq_desc but more importantly this splat as we online an offlined CPU: genirq: Flags mismatch irq 71. 0002cc20 (spinlock1) vs. 0002cc20 (spinlock1) Pid: 2542, comm: init.late Not tainted 3.9.0-rc6upstream #1 Call Trace: [<ffffffff811156de>] __setup_irq+0x23e/0x4a0 [<ffffffff81194191>] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x221/0x250 [<ffffffff811161bb>] request_threaded_irq+0xfb/0x160 [<ffffffff8104c6f0>] ? xen_spin_trylock+0x20/0x20 [<ffffffff813a8423>] bind_ipi_to_irqhandler+0xa3/0x160 [<ffffffff81303758>] ? kasprintf+0x38/0x40 [<ffffffff8104c6f0>] ? xen_spin_trylock+0x20/0x20 [<ffffffff810cad35>] ? update_max_interval+0x15/0x40 [<ffffffff816605db>] xen_init_lock_cpu+0x3c/0x78 [<ffffffff81660029>] xen_hvm_cpu_notify+0x29/0x33 [<ffffffff81676bdd>] notifier_call_chain+0x4d/0x70 [<ffffffff810bb2a9>] __raw_notifier_call_chain+0x9/0x10 [<ffffffff8109402b>] __cpu_notify+0x1b/0x30 [<ffffffff8166834a>] _cpu_up+0xa0/0x14b [<ffffffff816684ce>] cpu_up+0xd9/0xec [<ffffffff8165f754>] store_online+0x94/0xd0 [<ffffffff8141d15b>] dev_attr_store+0x1b/0x20 [<ffffffff81218f44>] sysfs_write_file+0xf4/0x170 [<ffffffff811a2864>] vfs_write+0xb4/0x130 [<ffffffff811a302a>] sys_write+0x5a/0xa0 [<ffffffff8167ada9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b cpu 1 spinlock event irq -16 smpboot: Booting Node 0 Processor 1 APIC 0x2 And if one looks at the /proc/interrupts right after offlining (CPU1): 70: 0 0 xen-percpu-ipi spinlock0 71: 0 0 xen-percpu-ipi spinlock1 77: 0 0 xen-percpu-ipi spinlock2 There is the oddity of the 'spinlock1' still being present. Signed-off-by:
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Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk authored
commit 888b65b4 upstream. In the PVHVM path when we do CPU online/offline path we would leak the timer%d IRQ line everytime we do a offline event. The online path (xen_hvm_setup_cpu_clockevents via x86_cpuinit.setup_percpu_clockev) would allocate a new interrupt line for the timer%d. But we would still use the old interrupt line leading to: kernel BUG at /home/konrad/ssd/konrad/linux/kernel/hrtimer.c:1261! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810b9e21>] [<ffffffff810b9e21>] hrtimer_interrupt+0x261/0x270 .. snip.. <IRQ> [<ffffffff810445ef>] xen_timer_interrupt+0x2f/0x1b0 [<ffffffff81104825>] ? stop_machine_cpu_stop+0xb5/0xf0 [<ffffffff8111434c>] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x7c/0x240 [<ffffffff811175b9>] handle_percpu_irq+0x49/0x70 [<ffffffff813a74a3>] __xen_evtchn_do_upcall+0x1c3/0x2f0 [<ffffffff813a760a>] xen_evtchn_do_upcall+0x2a/0x40 [<ffffffff8167c26d>] xen_hvm_callback_vector+0x6d/0x80 <EOI> [<ffffffff81666d01>] ? start_secondary+0x193/0x1a8 [<ffffffff81666cfd>] ? start_secondary+0x18f/0x1a8 There is also the oddity (timer1) in the /proc/interrupts after offlining CPU1: 64: 1121 0 xen-percpu-virq timer0 78: 0 0 xen-percpu-virq timer1 84: 0 2483 xen-percpu-virq timer2 This patch fixes it. Signed-off-by:
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Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk authored
commit bd49940a upstream. As the initial domain we are able to search/map certain regions of memory to harvest configuration data. For all low-level we use ACPI tables - for interrupts we use exclusively ACPI _PRT (so DSDT) and MADT for INT_SRC_OVR. The SMP MP table is not used at all. As a matter of fact we do not even support machines that only have SMP MP but no ACPI tables. Lets follow how Moorestown does it and just disable searching for BIOS SMP tables. This also fixes an issue on HP Proliant BL680c G5 and DL380 G6: 9f->100 for 1:1 PTE Freeing 9f-100 pfn range: 97 pages freed 1-1 mapping on 9f->100 .. snip.. e820: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000000009efff] usable Xen: [mem 0x000000000009f400-0x00000000000fffff] reserved Xen: [mem 0x0000000000100000-0x00000000cfd1dfff] usable .. snip.. Scan for SMP in [mem 0x00000000-0x000003ff] Scan for SMP in [mem 0x0009fc00-0x0009ffff] Scan for SMP in [mem 0x000f0000-0x000fffff] found SMP MP-table at [mem 0x000f4fa0-0x000f4faf] mapped at [ffff8800000f4fa0] (XEN) mm.c:908:d0 Error getting mfn 100 (pfn 5555555555555555) from L1 entry 0000000000100461 for l1e_owner=0, pg_owner=0 (XEN) mm.c:4995:d0 ptwr_emulate: could not get_page_from_l1e() BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<ffffffff81ac07e2>] xen_set_pte_init+0x66/0x71 . snip.. Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 3.6.0-rc6upstream-00188-gb6fb969-dirty #2 HP ProLiant BL680c G5 .. snip.. Call Trace: [<ffffffff81ad31c6>] __early_ioremap+0x18a/0x248 [<ffffffff81624731>] ? printk+0x48/0x4a [<ffffffff81ad32ac>] early_ioremap+0x13/0x15 [<ffffffff81acc140>] get_mpc_size+0x2f/0x67 [<ffffffff81acc284>] smp_scan_config+0x10c/0x136 [<ffffffff81acc2e4>] default_find_smp_config+0x36/0x5a [<ffffffff81ac3085>] setup_arch+0x5b3/0xb5b [<ffffffff81624731>] ? printk+0x48/0x4a [<ffffffff81abca7f>] start_kernel+0x90/0x390 [<ffffffff81abc356>] x86_64_start_reservations+0x131/0x136 [<ffffffff81abfa83>] xen_start_kernel+0x65f/0x661 (XEN) Domain 0 crashed: 'noreboot' set - not rebooting. which is that ioremap would end up mapping 0xff using _PAGE_IOMAP (which is what early_ioremap sticks as a flag) - which meant we would get MFN 0xFF (pte ff461, which is OK), and then it would also map 0x100 (b/c ioremap tries to get page aligned request, and it was trying to map 0xf4fa0 + PAGE_SIZE - so it mapped the next page) as _PAGE_IOMAP. Since 0x100 is actually a RAM page, and the _PAGE_IOMAP bypasses the P2M lookup we would happily set the PTE to 1000461. Xen would deny the request since we do not have access to the Machine Frame Number (MFN) of 0x100. The P2M[0x100] is for example 0x80140. Fixes-Oracle-Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.oracle.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=13665Acked-by:
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