1. 05 Apr, 2022 1 commit
    • Jason A. Donenfeld's avatar
      random: opportunistically initialize on /dev/urandom reads · 48bff105
      Jason A. Donenfeld authored
      In 6f98a4bf ("random: block in /dev/urandom"), we tried to make a
      successful try_to_generate_entropy() call *required* if the RNG was not
      already initialized. Unfortunately, weird architectures and old
      userspaces combined in TCG test harnesses, making that change still not
      realistic, so it was reverted in 0313bc27 ("Revert "random: block in
      /dev/urandom"").
      
      However, rather than making a successful try_to_generate_entropy() call
      *required*, we can instead make it *best-effort*.
      
      If try_to_generate_entropy() fails, it fails, and nothing changes from
      the current behavior. If it succeeds, then /dev/urandom becomes safe to
      use for free. This way, we don't risk the regression potential that led
      to us reverting the required-try_to_generate_entropy() call before.
      
      Practically speaking, this means that at least on x86, /dev/urandom
      becomes safe. Probably other architectures with working cycle counters
      will also become safe. And architectures with slow or broken cycle
      counters at least won't be affected at all by this change.
      
      So it may not be the glorious "all things are unified!" change we were
      hoping for initially, but practically speaking, it makes a positive
      impact.
      
      Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
      48bff105
  2. 04 Apr, 2022 1 commit
    • Jan Varho's avatar
      random: do not split fast init input in add_hwgenerator_randomness() · 527a9867
      Jan Varho authored
      add_hwgenerator_randomness() tries to only use the required amount of input
      for fast init, but credits all the entropy, rather than a fraction of
      it. Since it's hard to determine how much entropy is left over out of a
      non-unformly random sample, either give it all to fast init or credit
      it, but don't attempt to do both. In the process, we can clean up the
      injection code to no longer need to return a value.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJan Varho <jan.varho@gmail.com>
      [Jason: expanded commit message]
      Fixes: 73c7733f ("random: do not throw away excess input to crng_fast_load")
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.17+, requires af704c85Signed-off-by: default avatarJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
      527a9867
  3. 03 Apr, 2022 8 commits
  4. 02 Apr, 2022 30 commits