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  1. 11 Jun, 2014 33 commits
  3. 07 Jun, 2014 7 commits
    • Greg Kroah-Hartman's avatar
      Linux 3.10.42 · c2f7eb80
      Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
      c2f7eb80
    • Thomas Gleixner's avatar
      futex: Make lookup_pi_state more robust · efccdcdb
      Thomas Gleixner authored 
      commit 54a21788 upstream.

The current implementation of lookup_pi_state has ambigous handling of
the TID value 0 in the user space futex.  We can get into the kernel
even if the TID value is 0, because either there is a stale waiters bit
or the owner died bit is set or we are called from the requeue_pi path
or from user space just for fun.

The current code avoids an explicit sanity check for pid = 0 in case
that kernel internal state (waiters) are found for the user space
address.  This can lead to state leakage and worse under some
circumstances.

Handle the cases explicit:

       Waiter | pi_state | pi->owner | uTID      | uODIED | ?

  [1]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | 0         | 0/1    | Valid
  [2]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | >0        | 0/1    | Valid

  [3]  Found  | NULL     | --        | Any       | 0/1    | Invalid

  [4]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | 0         | 1      | Valid
  [5]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | >0        | 1      | Invalid

  [6]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 1      | Valid

  [7]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | Any       | 0      | Invalid

  [8]  Found  | Found    | task      | ==taskTID | 0/1    | Valid
  [9]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 0      | Invalid
  [10] Found  | Found    | task      | !=taskTID | 0/1    | Invalid

 [1] Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We
     came came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit.

 [2] Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching
     thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died.

 [3] Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex

 [4] Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space
     value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED.

 [5] The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list()
     and exit_pi_state_list()

 [6] Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in
     the pi_state but cannot access the user space value.

 [7] pi_state->owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set.

 [8] Owner and user space value match

 [9] There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0
     except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the
     FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4]

[10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space
     TID out of sync.
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      efccdcdb
    • Thomas Gleixner's avatar
      futex: Always cleanup owner tid in unlock_pi · 9ad5dabd
      Thomas Gleixner authored 
      commit 13fbca4c upstream.

If the owner died bit is set at futex_unlock_pi, we currently do not
cleanup the user space futex.  So the owner TID of the current owner
(the unlocker) persists.  That's observable inconsistant state,
especially when the ownership of the pi state got transferred.

Clean it up unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      9ad5dabd
    • Thomas Gleixner's avatar
      futex: Validate atomic acquisition in futex_lock_pi_atomic() · 63d6ad59
      Thomas Gleixner authored 
      commit b3eaa9fc upstream.

We need to protect the atomic acquisition in the kernel against rogue
user space which sets the user space futex to 0, so the kernel side
acquisition succeeds while there is existing state in the kernel
associated to the real owner.

Verify whether the futex has waiters associated with kernel state.  If
it has, return -EINVAL.  The state is corrupted already, so no point in
cleaning it up.  Subsequent calls will fail as well.  Not our problem.

[ tglx: Use futex_top_waiter() and explain why we do not need to try
  	restoring the already corrupted user space state. ]
Signed-off-by: default avatarDarren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      63d6ad59
    • Thomas Gleixner's avatar
      futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in... · b58623fb
      Thomas Gleixner authored 
      futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)

commit e9c243a5 upstream.

If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call.  If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.

This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")

[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
  	different depending on the mapping ]

Fixes CVE-2014-3153.

Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: default avatarWill Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: default avatarDarren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      b58623fb
    • Stanislaw Gruszka's avatar
      ath9k: protect tid->sched check · 4237cc8e
      Stanislaw Gruszka authored 
      [ Upstream commit 21f8aaee ]

We check tid->sched without a lock taken on ath_tx_aggr_sleep(). That
is race condition which can result of doing list_del(&tid->list) twice
(second time with poisoned list node) and cause crash like shown below:

[424271.637220] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00100104
[424271.637328] IP: [<f90fc072>] ath_tx_aggr_sleep+0x62/0xe0 [ath9k]
...
[424271.639953] Call Trace:
[424271.639998]  [<f90f6900>] ? ath9k_get_survey+0x110/0x110 [ath9k]
[424271.640083]  [<f90f6942>] ath9k_sta_notify+0x42/0x50 [ath9k]
[424271.640177]  [<f809cfef>] sta_ps_start+0x8f/0x1c0 [mac80211]
[424271.640258]  [<c10f730e>] ? free_compound_page+0x2e/0x40
[424271.640346]  [<f809e915>] ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x9d5/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.640437]  [<c112f048>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1d8/0x1f0
[424271.640510]  [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640578]  [<c10fc23c>] ? put_page+0x2c/0x40
[424271.640640]  [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640706]  [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640787]  [<f809dde3>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers_result+0x73/0x1d0 [mac80211]
[424271.640897]  [<f80a07a0>] ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x520/0xad0 [mac80211]
[424271.641009]  [<f809e22d>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x2ed/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.641104]  [<c13846ce>] ? ip_output+0x7e/0xd0
[424271.641182]  [<f80a1057>] ieee80211_rx+0x307/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641266]  [<f90fa6ee>] ath_rx_tasklet+0x88e/0xf70 [ath9k]
[424271.641358]  [<f80a0f2c>] ? ieee80211_rx+0x1dc/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641445]  [<f90f82db>] ath9k_tasklet+0xcb/0x130 [ath9k]

Bug report:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70551Reported-and-tested-by: default avatarMax Sydorenko <maxim.stargazer@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarStanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJohn W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
[ xl: backported to 3.10: adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: default avatarXiangyu Lu <luxiangyu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      4237cc8e
    • Guennadi Liakhovetski's avatar
      media: V4L2: fix VIDIOC_CREATE_BUFS in 64- / 32-bit compatibility mode · 3c3fa08f
      Guennadi Liakhovetski authored 
      commit 97d9d23d upstream.

If a struct contains 64-bit fields, it is aligned on 64-bit boundaries
within containing structs in 64-bit compilations. This is the case with
struct v4l2_window, which contains pointers and is embedded into struct
v4l2_format, and that one is embedded into struct v4l2_create_buffers.
Unlike some other structs, used as a part of the kernel ABI as ioctl()
arguments, that are packed, these structs aren't packed. This isn't a
problem per se, but the ioctl-compat code for VIDIOC_CREATE_BUFS contains
a bug, that triggers in such 64-bit builds. That code wrongly assumes,
that in struct v4l2_create_buffers, struct v4l2_format immediately follows
the __u32 memory field, which in fact isn't the case. This bug wasn't
visible until now, because until recently hardly any applications used
this ioctl() and mostly embedded 32-bit only drivers implemented it. This
is changing now with addition of this ioctl() to some USB drivers, e.g.
UVC. This patch fixes the bug by copying parts of struct
v4l2_create_buffers separately.
Signed-off-by: default avatarGuennadi Liakhovetski <g.liakhovetski@gmx.de>
Acked-by: default avatarLaurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMauro Carvalho Chehab <m.chehab@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      3c3fa08f
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