- 04 Feb, 2021 40 commits
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Michael Roth authored
Now that the set of host user MSRs that need to be individually saved/restored are the same with/without SEV-ES, we can drop the .sev_es_restored flag and just iterate through the list unconditionally for both cases. A subsequent patch can then move these loops to a common path. Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Message-Id: <20210202190126.2185715-3-michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Michael Roth authored
Using a guest workload which simply issues 'hlt' in a tight loop to generate VMEXITs, it was observed (on a recent EPYC processor) that a significant amount of the VMEXIT overhead measured on the host was the result of MSR reads/writes in svm_vcpu_load/svm_vcpu_put according to perf: 67.49%--kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run | |--23.13%--vcpu_put | kvm_arch_vcpu_put | | | |--21.31%--native_write_msr | | | --1.27%--svm_set_cr4 | |--16.11%--vcpu_load | | | --15.58%--kvm_arch_vcpu_load | | | |--13.97%--svm_set_cr4 | | | | | |--12.64%--native_read_msr Most of these MSRs relate to 'syscall'/'sysenter' and segment bases, and can be saved/restored using 'vmsave'/'vmload' instructions rather than explicit MSR reads/writes. In doing so there is a significant reduction in the svm_vcpu_load/svm_vcpu_put overhead measured for the above workload: 50.92%--kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run | |--19.28%--disable_nmi_singlestep | |--13.68%--vcpu_load | kvm_arch_vcpu_load | | | |--9.19%--svm_set_cr4 | | | | | --6.44%--native_read_msr | | | --3.55%--native_write_msr | |--6.05%--kvm_inject_nmi |--2.80%--kvm_sev_es_mmio_read |--2.19%--vcpu_put | | | --1.25%--kvm_arch_vcpu_put | native_write_msr Quantifying this further, if we look at the raw cycle counts for a normal iteration of the above workload (according to 'rdtscp'), kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run() takes ~4600 cycles from start to finish with the current behavior. Using 'vmsave'/'vmload', this is reduced to ~2800 cycles, a savings of 39%. While this approach doesn't seem to manifest in any noticeable improvement for more realistic workloads like UnixBench, netperf, and kernel builds, likely due to their exit paths generally involving IO with comparatively high latencies, it does improve overall overhead of KVM_RUN significantly, which may still be noticeable for certain situations. It also simplifies some aspects of the code. With this change, explicit save/restore is no longer needed for the following host MSRs, since they are documented[1] as being part of the VMCB State Save Area: MSR_STAR, MSR_LSTAR, MSR_CSTAR, MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_GS_BASE and only the following MSR needs individual handling in svm_vcpu_put/svm_vcpu_load: MSR_TSC_AUX We could drop the host_save_user_msrs array/loop and instead handle MSR read/write of MSR_TSC_AUX directly, but we leave that for now as a potential follow-up. Since 'vmsave'/'vmload' also handles the LDTR and FS/GS segment registers (and associated hidden state)[2], some of the code previously used to handle this is no longer needed, so we drop it as well. The first public release of the SVM spec[3] also documents the same handling for the host state in question, so we make these changes unconditionally. Also worth noting is that we 'vmsave' to the same page that is subsequently used by 'vmrun' to record some host additional state. This is okay, since, in accordance with the spec[2], the additional state written to the page by 'vmrun' does not overwrite any fields written by 'vmsave'. This has also been confirmed through testing (for the above CPU, at least). [1] AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual, Rev 3.33, Volume 2, Appendix B, Table B-2 [2] AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual, Rev 3.31, Volume 3, Chapter 4, VMSAVE/VMLOAD [3] Secure Virtual Machine Architecture Reference Manual, Rev 3.01 Suggested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Message-Id: <20210202190126.2185715-2-michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Sean Christopherson authored
Add svm_asm*() macros, a la the existing vmx_asm*() macros, to handle faults on SVM instructions instead of using the generic __ex(), a.k.a. __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(). Using asm goto generates slightly better code as it eliminates the in-line JMP+CALL sequences that are needed by __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot() to avoid triggering BUG() from fixup (which generates bad stack traces). Using SVM specific macros also drops the last user of __ex() and the the last asm linkage to kvm_spurious_fault(), and adds a helper for VMSAVE, which may gain an addition call site in the future (as part of optimizing the SVM context switching). Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20201231002702.22237077-8-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Sean Christopherson authored
Drop kvm_cpu_vmxoff() in favor of the kernel's cpu_vmxoff(). Modify the latter to return -EIO on fault so that KVM can invoke kvm_spurious_fault() when appropriate. In addition to the obvious code reuse, dropping kvm_cpu_vmxoff() also eliminates VMX's last usage of the __ex()/__kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot() macros, thus helping pave the way toward dropping them entirely. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20201231002702.22237077-7-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Sean Christopherson authored
Move the Intel PT tracking outside of the VMXON/VMXOFF helpers so that a future patch can drop KVM's kvm_cpu_vmxoff() in favor of the kernel's cpu_vmxoff() without an associated PT functional change, and without losing symmetry between the VMXON and VMXOFF flows. Barring undocumented behavior, this should have no meaningful effects as Intel PT behavior does not interact with CR4.VMXE. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20201231002702.22237077-6-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Uros Bizjak authored
Replace inline assembly in nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw with a call to __vmx_vcpu_run. The function is not performance critical, so (double) GPR save/restore in __vmx_vcpu_run can be tolerated, as far as performance effects are concerned. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-and-tested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com> [sean: dropped versioning info from changelog] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20201231002702.22237077-5-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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David P. Reed authored
Explicitly tell the compiler that VMXOFF modifies flags (like all VMX instructions), and mark memory as clobbered since VMXOFF must not be reordered and also may have memory side effects (though the kernel really shouldn't be accessing the root VMCS anyways). Practically speaking, adding the clobbers is most likely a nop; the primary motivation is to properly document VMXOFF's behavior. For the flags clobber, both Clang and GCC automatically mark flags as clobbered; this is noted in commit 4b1e5478 ("KVM/x86: Use assembly instruction mnemonics instead of .byte streams"), which intentionally removed the previous clobber. But, neither Clang nor GCC documents this behavior, and there's no downside to including the clobber. For the memory clobber, the RFLAGS.IF and CR4.VMXE manipulations that immediately follow VMXOFF have compiler barriers of their own, i.e. VMXOFF can't get reordered after clearing CR4.VMXE, which is really what's of interest. Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: David P. Reed <dpreed@deepplum.com> [sean: rewrote changelog, dropped comment adjustments] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20201231002702.22237077-4-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Sean Christopherson authored
Force all CPUs to do VMXOFF (via NMI shootdown) during an emergency reboot if VMX is _supported_, as VMX being off on the current CPU does not prevent other CPUs from being in VMX root (post-VMXON). This fixes a bug where a crash/panic reboot could leave other CPUs in VMX root and prevent them from being woken via INIT-SIPI-SIPI in the new kernel. Fixes: d176720d ("x86: disable VMX on all CPUs on reboot") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: David P. Reed <dpreed@deepplum.com> [sean: reworked changelog and further tweaked comment] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20201231002702.22237077-3-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Sean Christopherson authored
Silently ignore all faults on VMXOFF in the reboot flows as such faults are all but guaranteed to be due to the CPU not being in VMX root. Because (a) VMXOFF may be executed in NMI context, e.g. after VMXOFF but before CR4.VMXE is cleared, (b) there's no way to query the CPU's VMX state without faulting, and (c) the whole point is to get out of VMX root, eating faults is the simplest way to achieve the desired behaior. Technically, VMXOFF can fault (or fail) for other reasons, but all other fault and failure scenarios are mode related, i.e. the kernel would have to magically end up in RM, V86, compat mode, at CPL>0, or running with the SMI Transfer Monitor active. The kernel is beyond hosed if any of those scenarios are encountered; trying to do something fancy in the error path to handle them cleanly is pointless. Fixes: 1e993114 ("x86: asm/virtext.h: add cpu_vmxoff() inline function") Reported-by: David P. Reed <dpreed@deepplum.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20201231002702.22237077-2-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Jason Baron authored
Convert kvm_x86_ops to use static calls. Note that all kvm_x86_ops are covered here except for 'pmu_ops and 'nested ops'. Here are some numbers running cpuid in a loop of 1 million calls averaged over 5 runs, measured in the vm (lower is better). Intel Xeon 3000MHz: |default |mitigations=off ------------------------------------- vanilla |.671s |.486s static call|.573s(-15%)|.458s(-6%) AMD EPYC 2500MHz: |default |mitigations=off ------------------------------------- vanilla |.710s |.609s static call|.664s(-6%) |.609s(0%) Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Message-Id: <e057bf1b8a7ad15652df6eeba3f907ae758d3399.1610680941.git.jbaron@akamai.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Jason Baron authored
Use static calls to improve kvm_x86_ops performance. Introduce the definitions that will be used by a subsequent patch to actualize the savings. Add a new kvm-x86-ops.h header that can be used for the definition of static calls. This header is also intended to be used to simplify the defition of svm_kvm_ops and vmx_x86_ops. Note that all functions in kvm_x86_ops are covered here except for 'pmu_ops' and 'nested ops'. I think they can be covered by static calls in a simlilar manner, but were omitted from this series to reduce scope and because I don't think they have as large of a performance impact. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Message-Id: <e5cc82ead7ab37b2dceb0837a514f3f8bea4f8d1.1610680941.git.jbaron@akamai.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Jason Baron authored
A subsequent patch introduces macros in preparation for simplifying the definition for vmx_x86_ops and svm_x86_ops. Making the naming more uniform expands the coverage of the macros. Add vmx/svm prefix to the following functions: update_exception_bitmap(), enable_nmi_window(), enable_irq_window(), update_cr8_intercept and enable_smi_window(). Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Message-Id: <ed594696f8e2c2b2bfc747504cee9bbb2a269300.1610680941.git.jbaron@akamai.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Cun Li authored
The use of 'struct static_key' and 'static_key_false' is deprecated. Use the new API. Signed-off-by: Cun Li <cun.jia.li@gmail.com> Message-Id: <20210111152435.50275-1-cun.jia.li@gmail.com> [Make it compile. While at it, rename kvm_no_apic_vcpu to kvm_has_noapic_vcpu; the former reads too much like "true if no vCPU has an APIC". - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Wei Huang authored
Under the case of nested on nested (L0, L1, L2 are all hypervisors), we do not support emulation of the vVMLOAD/VMSAVE feature, the L0 hypervisor can inject the proper #VMEXIT to inform L1 of what is happening and L1 can avoid invoking the #GP workaround. For this reason we turns on guest VM's X86_FEATURE_SVME_ADDR_CHK bit for KVM running inside VM to receive the notification and change behavior. Similarly we check if vcpu is under guest mode before emulating the vmware-backdoor instructions. For the case of nested on nested, we let the guest handle it. Co-developed-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei.huang2@amd.com> Tested-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210126081831.570253-5-wei.huang2@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Wei Huang authored
New AMD CPUs have a change that checks #VMEXIT intercept on special SVM instructions before checking their EAX against reserved memory region. This change is indicated by CPUID_0x8000000A_EDX[28]. If it is 1, #VMEXIT is triggered before #GP. KVM doesn't need to intercept and emulate #GP faults as #GP is supposed to be triggered. Co-developed-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei.huang2@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210126081831.570253-4-wei.huang2@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Bandan Das authored
While running SVM related instructions (VMRUN/VMSAVE/VMLOAD), some AMD CPUs check EAX against reserved memory regions (e.g. SMM memory on host) before checking VMCB's instruction intercept. If EAX falls into such memory areas, #GP is triggered before VMEXIT. This causes problem under nested virtualization. To solve this problem, KVM needs to trap #GP and check the instructions triggering #GP. For VM execution instructions, KVM emulates these instructions. Co-developed-by: Wei Huang <wei.huang2@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei.huang2@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210126081831.570253-3-wei.huang2@amd.com> [Conditionally enable #GP intercept. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Wei Huang authored
Move the instruction decode part out of x86_emulate_instruction() for it to be used in other places. Also kvm_clear_exception_queue() is moved inside the if-statement as it doesn't apply when KVM are coming back from userspace. Co-developed-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei.huang2@amd.com> Message-Id: <20210126081831.570253-2-wei.huang2@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Chenyi Qiang authored
DR6_INIT contains the 1-reserved bits as well as the bit that is cleared to 0 when the condition (e.g. RTM) happens. The value can be used to initialize dr6 and also be the XOR mask between the #DB exit qualification (or payload) and DR6. Concerning that DR6_INIT is used as initial value only once, rename it to DR6_ACTIVE_LOW and apply it in other places, which would make the incoming changes for bus lock debug exception more simple. Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com> Message-Id: <20210202090433.13441-2-chenyi.qiang@intel.com> [Define DR6_FIXED_1 from DR6_ACTIVE_LOW and DR6_VOLATILE. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Like Xu authored
This test will check the effect of various CPUID settings on the MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES MSR, check that whatever user space writes with KVM_SET_MSR is _not_ modified from the guest and can be retrieved with KVM_GET_MSR, and check that invalid LBR formats are rejected. Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com> Message-Id: <20210201051039.255478-12-like.xu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Like Xu authored
Userspace could enable guest LBR feature when the exactly supported LBR format value is initialized to the MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES and the LBR is also compatible with vPMU version and host cpu model. The LBR could be enabled on the guest if host perf supports LBR (checked via x86_perf_get_lbr()) and the vcpu model is compatible with the host one. Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com> Message-Id: <20210201051039.255478-11-like.xu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Like Xu authored
The vPMU uses GUEST_LBR_IN_USE_IDX (bit 58) in 'pmu->pmc_in_use' to indicate whether a guest LBR event is still needed by the vcpu. If the vcpu no longer accesses LBR related registers within a scheduling time slice, and the enable bit of LBR has been unset, vPMU will treat the guest LBR event as a bland event of a vPMC counter and release it as usual. Also, the pass-through state of LBR records msrs is cancelled. Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com> Message-Id: <20210201051039.255478-10-like.xu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Like Xu authored
The current vPMU only supports Architecture Version 2. According to Intel SDM "17.4.7 Freezing LBR and Performance Counters on PMI", if IA32_DEBUGCTL.Freeze_LBR_On_PMI = 1, the LBR is frozen on the virtual PMI and the KVM would emulate to clear the LBR bit (bit 0) in IA32_DEBUGCTL. Also, guest needs to re-enable IA32_DEBUGCTL.LBR to resume recording branches. Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Message-Id: <20210201051039.255478-9-like.xu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Like Xu authored
When the LBR records msrs has already been pass-through, there is no need to call vmx_update_intercept_for_lbr_msrs() again and again, and vice versa. Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Message-Id: <20210201051039.255478-8-like.xu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Like Xu authored
In addition to DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR, any KVM trap caused by LBR msrs access will result in a creation of guest LBR event per-vcpu. If the guest LBR event is scheduled on with the corresponding vcpu context, KVM will pass-through all LBR records msrs to the guest. The LBR callstack mechanism implemented in the host could help save/restore the guest LBR records during the event context switches, which reduces a lot of overhead if we save/restore tens of LBR msrs (e.g. 32 LBR records entries) in the much more frequent VMX transitions. To avoid reclaiming LBR resources from any higher priority event on host, KVM would always check the exist of guest LBR event and its state before vm-entry as late as possible. A negative result would cancel the pass-through state, and it also prevents real registers accesses and potential data leakage. If host reclaims the LBR between two checks, the interception state and LBR records can be safely preserved due to native save/restore support from guest LBR event. The KVM emits a pr_warn() when the LBR hardware is unavailable to the guest LBR event. The administer is supposed to reminder users that the guest result may be inaccurate if someone is using LBR to record hypervisor on the host side. Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Co-developed-by: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Message-Id: <20210201051039.255478-7-like.xu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Like Xu authored
When vcpu sets DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR in the MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, the KVM handler would create a guest LBR event which enables the callstack mode and none of hardware counter is assigned. The host perf would schedule and enable this event as usual but in an exclusive way. The guest LBR event will be released when the vPMU is reset but soon, the lazy release mechanism would be applied to this event like a vPMC. Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Co-developed-by: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Message-Id: <20210201051039.255478-6-like.xu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Like Xu authored
Usespace could set the bits [0, 5] of the IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES MSR which tells about the record format stored in the LBR records. The LBR will be enabled on the guest if host perf supports LBR (checked via x86_perf_get_lbr()) and the vcpu model is compatible with the host one. Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com> Message-Id: <20210201051039.255478-4-like.xu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Paolo Bonzini authored
Usespace could set the bits [0, 5] of the IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES MSR which tells about the record format stored in the LBR records. The LBR will be enabled on the guest if host perf supports LBR (checked via x86_perf_get_lbr()) and the vcpu model is compatible with the host one. Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com> Message-Id: <20210201051039.255478-4-like.xu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Paolo Bonzini authored
Once MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES is changed via vmx_set_msr(), the value should not be changed by cpuid(). To ensure that the new value is kept, the default initialization path is moved to intel_pmu_init(). The effective value of the MSR will be 0 if PDCM is clear, however. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Like Xu authored
To make code responsibilities clear, we may resue and invoke the vmx_set_intercept_for_msr() in other vmx-specific files (e.g. pmu_intel.c), so expose it to passthrough LBR msrs later. Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Message-Id: <20210201051039.255478-2-like.xu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Like Xu authored
SVM already has specific handlers of MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR in the svm_get/set_msr, so the x86 common part can be safely moved to VMX. This allows KVM to store the bits it supports in GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL. Add vmx_supported_debugctl() to refactor the throwing logic of #GP. Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Message-Id: <20210108013704.134985-2-like.xu@linux.intel.com> [Merge parts of Chenyi Qiang's "KVM: X86: Expose bus lock debug exception to guest". - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Sean Christopherson authored
Use x2apic_mode instead of x2apic_enabled() when adjusting the destination ID during Posted Interrupt updates. This avoids the costly RDMSR that is hidden behind x2apic_enabled(). Reported-by: luferry <luferry@163.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210115220354.434807-3-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Sean Christopherson authored
Export x2apic_mode so that KVM can query whether x2APIC is active without having to incur the RDMSR in x2apic_enabled(). When Posted Interrupts are in use for a guest with an assigned device, KVM ends up checking for x2APIC at least once every time a vCPU halts. KVM could obviously snapshot x2apic_enabled() to avoid the RDMSR, but that's rather silly given that x2apic_mode holds the exact info needed by KVM. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210115220354.434807-2-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Chenyi Qiang authored
Introduce a new capability named KVM_CAP_X86_BUS_LOCK_EXIT, which is used to handle bus locks detected in guest. It allows the userspace to do custom throttling policies to mitigate the 'noisy neighbour' problem. Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com> Message-Id: <20201106090315.18606-5-chenyi.qiang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Chenyi Qiang authored
Virtual Machine can exploit bus locks to degrade the performance of system. Bus lock can be caused by split locked access to writeback(WB) memory or by using locks on uncacheable(UC) memory. The bus lock is typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can complete). To address the threat, bus lock VM exit is introduced to notify the VMM when a bus lock was acquired, allowing it to enforce throttling or other policy based mitigations. A VMM can enable VM exit due to bus locks by setting a new "Bus Lock Detection" VM-execution control(bit 30 of Secondary Processor-based VM execution controls). If delivery of this VM exit was preempted by a higher priority VM exit (e.g. EPT misconfiguration, EPT violation, APIC access VM exit, APIC write VM exit, exception bitmap exiting), bit 26 of exit reason in vmcs field is set to 1. In current implementation, the KVM exposes this capability through KVM_CAP_X86_BUS_LOCK_EXIT. The user can get the supported mode bitmap (i.e. off and exit) and enable it explicitly (disabled by default). If bus locks in guest are detected by KVM, exit to user space even when current exit reason is handled by KVM internally. Set a new field KVM_RUN_BUS_LOCK in vcpu->run->flags to inform the user space that there is a bus lock detected in guest. Document for Bus Lock VM exit is now available at the latest "Intel Architecture Instruction Set Extensions Programming Reference". Document Link: https://software.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/download/intel-architecture-instruction-set-extensions-programming-reference.htmlCo-developed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com> Message-Id: <20201106090315.18606-4-chenyi.qiang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Chenyi Qiang authored
Reset the vcpu->run->flags at the beginning of kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run. It can avoid every thunk of code that needs to set the flag clear it, which increases the odds of missing a case and ending up with a flag in an undefined state. Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com> Message-Id: <20201106090315.18606-3-chenyi.qiang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Sean Christopherson authored
Convert vcpu_vmx.exit_reason from a u32 to a union (of size u32). The full VM_EXIT_REASON field is comprised of a 16-bit basic exit reason in bits 15:0, and single-bit modifiers in bits 31:16. Historically, KVM has only had to worry about handling the "failed VM-Entry" modifier, which could only be set in very specific flows and required dedicated handling. I.e. manually stripping the FAILED_VMENTRY bit was a somewhat viable approach. But even with only a single bit to worry about, KVM has had several bugs related to comparing a basic exit reason against the full exit reason store in vcpu_vmx. Upcoming Intel features, e.g. SGX, will add new modifier bits that can be set on more or less any VM-Exit, as opposed to the significantly more restricted FAILED_VMENTRY, i.e. correctly handling everything in one-off flows isn't scalable. Tracking exit reason in a union forces code to explicitly choose between consuming the full exit reason and the basic exit, and is a convenient way to document and access the modifiers. No functional change intended. Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com> Message-Id: <20201106090315.18606-2-chenyi.qiang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Brijesh Singh authored
The SEV FW version >= 0.23 added a new command that can be used to query the attestation report containing the SHA-256 digest of the guest memory encrypted through the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_{DATA, VMSA} commands and sign the report with the Platform Endorsement Key (PEK). See the SEV FW API spec section 6.8 for more details. Note there already exist a command (KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE) that can be used to get the SHA-256 digest. The main difference between the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE and KVM_SEV_ATTESTATION_REPORT is that the latter can be called while the guest is running and the measurement value is signed with PEK. Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Tested-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Message-Id: <20210104151749.30248-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Ben Gardon authored
Disabling dirty logging is much more intestesting from a testing perspective if the vCPUs are still running. This also excercises the code-path in which collapsible SPTEs must be faulted back in at a higher level after disabling dirty logging. To: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org CC: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> CC: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> CC: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com> Message-Id: <20210202185734.1680553-29-bgardon@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Ben Gardon authored
Add a parameter to control the backing memory type for dirty_log_perf_test so that the test can be run with hugepages. To: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org CC: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> CC: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> CC: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com> Message-Id: <20210202185734.1680553-28-bgardon@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Ben Gardon authored
Add a memslot modification stress test in which a memslot is repeatedly created and removed while vCPUs access memory in another memslot. Most userspaces do not create or remove memslots on running VMs which makes it hard to test races in adding and removing memslots without a dedicated test. Adding and removing a memslot also has the effect of tearing down the entire paging structure, which leads to more page faults and pressure on the page fault handling path than a one-and-done memory population test. Reviewed-by: Jacob Xu <jacobhxu@google.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com> Message-Id: <20210112214253.463999-7-bgardon@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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