- 16 Sep, 2019 40 commits
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Gustavo Romero authored
[ Upstream commit a8318c13 ] When in userspace and MSR FP=0 the hardware FP state is unrelated to the current process. This is extended for transactions where if tbegin is run with FP=0, the hardware checkpoint FP state will also be unrelated to the current process. Due to this, we need to ensure this hardware checkpoint is updated with the correct state before we enable FP for this process. Unfortunately we get this wrong when returning to a process from a hardware interrupt. A process that starts a transaction with FP=0 can take an interrupt. When the kernel returns back to that process, we change to FP=1 but with hardware checkpoint FP state not updated. If this transaction is then rolled back, the FP registers now contain the wrong state. The process looks like this: Userspace: Kernel Start userspace with MSR FP=0 TM=1 < ----- ... tbegin bne Hardware interrupt ---- > <do_IRQ...> .... ret_from_except restore_math() /* sees FP=0 */ restore_fp() tm_active_with_fp() /* sees FP=1 (Incorrect) */ load_fp_state() FP = 0 -> 1 < ----- Return to userspace with MSR TM=1 FP=1 with junk in the FP TM checkpoint TM rollback reads FP junk When returning from the hardware exception, tm_active_with_fp() is incorrectly making restore_fp() call load_fp_state() which is setting FP=1. The fix is to remove tm_active_with_fp(). tm_active_with_fp() is attempting to handle the case where FP state has been changed inside a transaction. In this case the checkpointed and transactional FP state is different and hence we must restore the FP state (ie. we can't do lazy FP restore inside a transaction that's used FP). It's safe to remove tm_active_with_fp() as this case is handled by restore_tm_state(). restore_tm_state() detects if FP has been using inside a transaction and will set load_fp and call restore_math() to ensure the FP state (checkpoint and transaction) is restored. This is a data integrity problem for the current process as the FP registers are corrupted. It's also a security problem as the FP registers from one process may be leaked to another. Similarly for VMX. A simple testcase to replicate this will be posted to tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c This fixes CVE-2019-15031. Fixes: a7771176 ("powerpc: Don't enable FP/Altivec if not checkpointed") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.15+ Signed-off-by:
Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190904045529.23002-2-gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.comSigned-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Breno Leitao authored
[ Upstream commit 5c784c84 ] Currently msr_tm_active() is a wrapper around MSR_TM_ACTIVE() if CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM is set, or it is just a function that returns false if CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM is not set. This function is not necessary, since MSR_TM_ACTIVE() just do the same and could be used, removing the dualism and simplifying the code. This patchset remove every instance of msr_tm_active() and replaced it by MSR_TM_ACTIVE(). Signed-off-by:
Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> Signed-off-by:
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Lyude Paul authored
[ Upstream commit ad54567a ] quirk_reset_lenovo_thinkpad_50_nvgpu() resets NVIDIA GPUs to work around an apparent BIOS defect. It previously used pci_reset_function(), and the available method was a bus reset, which was fine because there was only one function on the bus. After b516ea58 ("PCI: Enable NVIDIA HDA controllers"), there are now two functions (the HDA controller and the GPU itself) on the bus, so the reset fails. Use pci_reset_bus() explicitly instead of pci_reset_function() since it's OK to reset both devices. [bhelgaas: commit log, add e0547c81] Fixes: b516ea58 ("PCI: Enable NVIDIA HDA controllers") Fixes: e0547c81 ("PCI: Reset Lenovo ThinkPad P50 nvgpu at boot if necessary") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190801220117.14952-1-lyude@redhat.comSigned-off-by:
Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Acked-by:
Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com> Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Cc: Daniel Drake <drake@endlessm.com> Cc: Aaron Plattner <aplattner@nvidia.com> Cc: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl> Cc: Ilia Mirkin <imirkin@alum.mit.edu> Cc: Karol Herbst <kherbst@redhat.com> Cc: Maik Freudenberg <hhfeuer@gmx.de> Signed-off-by:
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Colin Ian King authored
[ Upstream commit fbbbbd2f ] There are two cases where u32 variables n and err are being checked for less than zero error values, the checks is always false because the variables are not signed. Fix this by making the variables ints. Addresses-Coverity: ("Unsigned compared against 0") Fixes: 345c0dbf ("ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity") Signed-off-by:
Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by:
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Theodore Ts'o authored
[ Upstream commit 170417c8 ] Commit 345c0dbf ("ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity") failed to add an exception for the journal inode in ext4_check_blockref(), which is the function used by ext4_get_branch() for indirect blocks. This caused attempts to read from the ext3-style journals to fail with: [ 848.968550] EXT4-fs error (device sdb7): ext4_get_branch:171: inode #8: block 30343695: comm jbd2/sdb7-8: invalid block Fix this by adding the missing exception check. Fixes: 345c0dbf ("ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity") Reported-by:
Arthur Marsh <arthur.marsh@internode.on.net> Signed-off-by:
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Theodore Ts'o authored
[ Upstream commit 0a944e8a ] Since the journal inode is already checked when we added it to the block validity's system zone, if we check it again, we'll just trigger a failure. This was causing failures like this: [ 53.897001] EXT4-fs error (device sda): ext4_find_extent:909: inode #8: comm jbd2/sda-8: pblk 121667583 bad header/extent: invalid extent entries - magic f30a, entries 8, max 340(340), depth 0(0) [ 53.931430] jbd2_journal_bmap: journal block not found at offset 49 on sda-8 [ 53.938480] Aborting journal on device sda-8. ... but only if the system was under enough memory pressure that logical->physical mapping for the journal inode gets pushed out of the extent cache. (This is why it wasn't noticed earlier.) Fixes: 345c0dbf ("ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity") Reported-by:
Dan Rue <dan.rue@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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Lyude Paul authored
[ Upstream commit 34ca26a9 ] It appears when testing my previous fix for some of the legacy modesetting issues with MST, I misattributed some kernel splats that started appearing on my machine after a rebase as being from upstream. But it appears they actually came from my patch series: [ 2.980512] [drm:drm_atomic_helper_check_modeset [drm_kms_helper]] Updating routing for [CONNECTOR:65:eDP-1] [ 2.980516] [drm:drm_atomic_helper_check_modeset [drm_kms_helper]] [CONNECTOR:65:eDP-1] is not registered [ 2.980516] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 2.980519] Could not determine valid watermarks for inherited state [ 2.980553] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 551 at drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c:14983 intel_modeset_init+0x14d7/0x19f0 [i915] [ 2.980556] Modules linked in: i915(O+) i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper(O) syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm(O) intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal iTCO_wdt wmi_bmof coretemp crc32_pclmul psmouse i2c_i801 mei_me mei i2c_core lpc_ich mfd_core tpm_tis tpm_tis_core wmi tpm thinkpad_acpi pcc_cpufreq video ehci_pci crc32c_intel serio_raw ehci_hcd xhci_pci xhci_hcd [ 2.980577] CPU: 3 PID: 551 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G O 4.19.0-rc7Lyude-Test+ #1 [ 2.980579] Hardware name: LENOVO 20BWS1KY00/20BWS1KY00, BIOS JBET63WW (1.27 ) 11/10/2016 [ 2.980605] RIP: 0010:intel_modeset_init+0x14d7/0x19f0 [i915] [ 2.980607] Code: 89 df e8 ec 27 02 00 e9 24 f2 ff ff be 03 00 00 00 48 89 df e8 da 27 02 00 e9 26 f2 ff ff 48 c7 c7 c8 d1 34 a0 e8 23 cf dc e0 <0f> 0b e9 7c fd ff ff f6 c4 04 0f 85 37 f7 ff ff 48 8b 83 60 08 00 [ 2.980611] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000287988 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 2.980614] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88031b488000 RCX: 0000000000000006 [ 2.980617] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000086 RDI: ffff880321ad54d0 [ 2.980620] RBP: ffffc90000287a10 R08: 000000000000040a R09: 0000000000000065 [ 2.980623] R10: ffff88030ebb8f00 R11: ffffffff81416590 R12: ffff88031b488000 [ 2.980626] R13: ffff88031b4883a0 R14: ffffc900002879a8 R15: ffff880319099800 [ 2.980630] FS: 00007f475620d180(0000) GS:ffff880321ac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 2.980633] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 2.980636] CR2: 00007f9ef28018a0 CR3: 000000031b72c001 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [ 2.980639] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 2.980642] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 2.980645] Call Trace: [ 2.980675] i915_driver_load+0xb0e/0xdc0 [i915] [ 2.980681] ? kernfs_add_one+0xe7/0x130 [ 2.980709] i915_pci_probe+0x46/0x60 [i915] [ 2.980715] pci_device_probe+0xd4/0x150 [ 2.980719] really_probe+0x243/0x3b0 [ 2.980722] driver_probe_device+0xba/0x100 [ 2.980726] __driver_attach+0xe4/0x110 [ 2.980729] ? driver_probe_device+0x100/0x100 [ 2.980733] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xb0 [ 2.980736] driver_attach+0x1e/0x20 [ 2.980739] bus_add_driver+0x159/0x230 [ 2.980743] ? 0xffffffffa0393000 [ 2.980746] driver_register+0x70/0xc0 [ 2.980749] ? 0xffffffffa0393000 [ 2.980753] __pci_register_driver+0x57/0x60 [ 2.980780] i915_init+0x55/0x58 [i915] [ 2.980785] do_one_initcall+0x4a/0x1c4 [ 2.980789] ? do_init_module+0x27/0x210 [ 2.980793] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x131/0x190 [ 2.980797] do_init_module+0x60/0x210 [ 2.980800] load_module+0x2063/0x22e0 [ 2.980804] ? vfs_read+0x116/0x140 [ 2.980807] ? vfs_read+0x116/0x140 [ 2.980811] __do_sys_finit_module+0xbd/0x120 [ 2.980814] ? __do_sys_finit_module+0xbd/0x120 [ 2.980818] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x1a/0x20 [ 2.980821] do_syscall_64+0x5a/0x110 [ 2.980824] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 2.980826] RIP: 0033:0x7f4754e32879 [ 2.980828] Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f7 45 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 2.980831] RSP: 002b:00007fff43fd97d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [ 2.980834] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000559a44ca64f0 RCX: 00007f4754e32879 [ 2.980836] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f475599f4cd RDI: 0000000000000018 [ 2.980838] RBP: 00007f475599f4cd R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 2.980839] R10: 0000000000000018 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 2.980841] R13: 0000559a44c92fd0 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 2.980881] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 551 at drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c:14983 intel_modeset_init+0x14d7/0x19f0 [i915] [ 2.980884] ---[ end trace 5eb47a76277d4731 ]--- The cause of this appears to be due to the fact that if there's pre-existing display state that was set by the BIOS when i915 loads, it will attempt to perform a modeset before the driver is registered with userspace. Since this happens before the driver's registered with userspace, it's connectors are also unregistered and thus-states which would turn on DPMS on a connector end up getting rejected since the connector isn't registered. These bugs managed to get past Intel's CI partially due to the fact it never ran a full test on my patches for some reason, but also because all of the tests unload the GPU once before running. Since this bug is only really triggered when the drivers tries to perform a modeset before it's been fully registered with userspace when coming from whatever display configuration the firmware left us with, it likely would never have been picked up by CI in the first place. After some discussion with vsyrjala, we decided the best course of action would be to just move the unregistered connector checks out of update_connector_routing() and into drm_atomic_set_crtc_for_connector(). The reason for this being that legacy modesetting isn't going to be expecting failures anywhere (at least this is the case with X), so ideally we want to ensure that any DPMS changes will still work even on unregistered connectors. Instead, we now only reject new modesets which would change the current CRTC assigned to an unregistered connector unless no new CRTC is being assigned to replace the connector's previous one. Signed-off-by:
Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Fixes: 4d802739 ("drm/atomic_helper: Disallow new modesets on unregistered connectors") Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Halil Pasic authored
[ Upstream commit 4f419eb1 ] The access to airq_areas was racy ever since the adapter interrupts got introduced to virtio-ccw, but since commit 39c7dcb1 ("virtio/s390: make airq summary indicators DMA") this became an issue in practice as well. Namely before that commit the airq_info that got overwritten was still functional. After that commit however the two infos share a summary_indicator, which aggravates the situation. Which means auto-online mechanism occasionally hangs the boot with virtio_blk. Signed-off-by:
Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com> Reported-by:
Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:
Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 96b14536 ("virtio-ccw: virtio-ccw adapter interrupt support.") Signed-off-by:
Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Ville Syrjälä authored
[ Upstream commit a8f196a0 ] On VLV/CHV there is some kind of linkage between the cdclk frequency and the DP link frequency. The spec says: "For DP audio configuration, cdclk frequency shall be set to meet the following requirements: DP Link Frequency(MHz) | Cdclk frequency(MHz) 270 | 320 or higher 162 | 200 or higher" I suspect that would more accurately be expressed as "cdclk >= DP link clock", and in any case we can express it like that in the code because of the limited set of cdclk (200, 266, 320, 400 MHz) and link frequencies (162 and 270 MHz) we support. Without this we can end up in a situation where the cdclk is too low and enabling DP audio will kill the pipe. Happens eg. with 2560x1440 modes where the 266MHz cdclk is sufficient to pump the pixels (241.5 MHz dotclock) but is too low for the DP audio due to the link frequency being 270 MHz. v2: Spell out the cdclk and link frequencies we actually support Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Tested-by:
Stefan Gottwald <gottwald@igel.com> Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111149Signed-off-by:
Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> (cherry picked from commit bffb31f7) Signed-off-by:
Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Coly Li authored
[ Upstream commit 50a260e8 ] There is a race between mca_reap(), btree_node_free() and journal code btree_flush_write(), which results very rare and strange deadlock or panic and are very hard to reproduce. Let me explain how the race happens. In btree_flush_write() one btree node with oldest journal pin is selected, then it is flushed to cache device, the select-and-flush is a two steps operation. Between these two steps, there are something may happen inside the race window, - The selected btree node was reaped by mca_reap() and allocated to other requesters for other btree node. - The slected btree node was selected, flushed and released by mca shrink callback bch_mca_scan(). When btree_flush_write() tries to flush the selected btree node, firstly b->write_lock is held by mutex_lock(). If the race happens and the memory of selected btree node is allocated to other btree node, if that btree node's write_lock is held already, a deadlock very probably happens here. A worse case is the memory of the selected btree node is released, then all references to this btree node (e.g. b->write_lock) will trigger NULL pointer deference panic. This race was introduced in commit cafe5635 ("bcache: A block layer cache"), and enlarged by commit c4dc2497 ("bcache: fix high CPU occupancy during journal"), which selected 128 btree nodes and flushed them one-by-one in a quite long time period. Such race is not easy to reproduce before. On a Lenovo SR650 server with 48 Xeon cores, and configure 1 NVMe SSD as cache device, a MD raid0 device assembled by 3 NVMe SSDs as backing device, this race can be observed around every 10,000 times btree_flush_write() gets called. Both deadlock and kernel panic all happened as aftermath of the race. The idea of the fix is to add a btree flag BTREE_NODE_journal_flush. It is set when selecting btree nodes, and cleared after btree nodes flushed. Then when mca_reap() selects a btree node with this bit set, this btree node will be skipped. Since mca_reap() only reaps btree node without BTREE_NODE_journal_flush flag, such race is avoided. Once corner case should be noticed, that is btree_node_free(). It might be called in some error handling code path. For example the following code piece from btree_split(), 2149 err_free2: 2150 bkey_put(b->c, &n2->key); 2151 btree_node_free(n2); 2152 rw_unlock(true, n2); 2153 err_free1: 2154 bkey_put(b->c, &n1->key); 2155 btree_node_free(n1); 2156 rw_unlock(true, n1); At line 2151 and 2155, the btree node n2 and n1 are released without mac_reap(), so BTREE_NODE_journal_flush also needs to be checked here. If btree_node_free() is called directly in such error handling path, and the selected btree node has BTREE_NODE_journal_flush bit set, just delay for 1 us and retry again. In this case this btree node won't be skipped, just retry until the BTREE_NODE_journal_flush bit cleared, and free the btree node memory. Fixes: cafe5635 ("bcache: A block layer cache") Signed-off-by:
Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> Reported-and-tested-by:
kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by:
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Coly Li authored
[ Upstream commit 41508bb7 ] When accessing or modifying BTREE_NODE_dirty bit, it is not always necessary to acquire b->write_lock. In bch_btree_cache_free() and mca_reap() acquiring b->write_lock is necessary, and this patch adds comments to explain why mutex_lock(&b->write_lock) is necessary for checking or clearing BTREE_NODE_dirty bit there. Signed-off-by:
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Coly Li authored
[ Upstream commit e5ec5f47 ] In bch_btree_cache_free() and btree_node_free(), BTREE_NODE_dirty is always set no matter btree node is dirty or not. The code looks like this, if (btree_node_dirty(b)) btree_complete_write(b, btree_current_write(b)); clear_bit(BTREE_NODE_dirty, &b->flags); Indeed if btree_node_dirty(b) returns false, it means BTREE_NODE_dirty bit is cleared, then it is unnecessary to clear the bit again. This patch only clears BTREE_NODE_dirty when btree_node_dirty(b) is true (the bit is set), to save a few CPU cycles. Signed-off-by:
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Trond Myklebust authored
[ Upstream commit 5eb8d18c ] Once we clear the NFS_DELEGATED_STATE flag, we're telling nfs_delegation_claim_opens() that we're done recovering all open state for that stateid, so we really need to ensure that we test for all open modes that are currently cached and recover them before exiting nfs4_open_delegation_recall(). Fixes: 24311f88 ("NFSv4: Recovery of recalled read delegations...") Signed-off-by:
Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.3+ Signed-off-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
[ Upstream commit 90c6260c ] gcc-9 complains about a blatant uninitialized variable use that all earlier compiler versions missed: drivers/iio/adc/rcar-gyroadc.c:510:5: warning: 'ret' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized] Return -EINVAL instead here and a few lines above it where we accidentally return 0 on failure. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 059c53b3 ("iio: adc: Add Renesas GyroADC driver") Signed-off-by:
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by:
Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com> Signed-off-by:
Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
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Ralph Campbell authored
[ Upstream commit 7b358c6f ] When CONFIG_MIGRATE_VMA_HELPER is enabled, migrate_vma() calls migrate_vma_collect() which initializes a struct mm_walk but didn't initialize mm_walk.pud_entry. (Found by code inspection) Use a C structure initialization to make sure it is set to NULL. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190719233225.12243-1-rcampbell@nvidia.com Fixes: 8763cb45 ("mm/migrate: new memory migration helper for use with device memory") Signed-off-by:
Ralph Campbell <rcampbell@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by:
John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: "Jérôme Glisse" <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Michał Mirosław authored
[ Upstream commit b1ac6704 ] In SAMA5D2 datasheet, TWIHS_CWGR register rescription mentions clock offset of 3 cycles (compared to 4 in eg. SAMA5D3). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.2.x [needs applying to i2c-at91.c instead for earlier kernels] Fixes: 0ef6f321 ("i2c: at91: add support for new alternative command mode") Signed-off-by:
Michał Mirosław <mirq-linux@rere.qmqm.pl> Acked-by:
Ludovic Desroches <ludovic.desroches@microchip.com> Signed-off-by:
Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> Signed-off-by:
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Michał Mirosław authored
[ Upstream commit d12e3aae ] Driver was not disabling TXRDY interrupt after last TX byte. This caused interrupt storm until transfer timeouts for slow or broken device on the bus. The patch fixes the interrupt storm on my SAMA5D2-based board. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.2.x [v5.2 introduced file split; the patch should apply to i2c-at91.c before the split] Fixes: fac368a0 ("i2c: at91: add new driver") Signed-off-by:
Raag Jadav <raagjadav@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Bartosz Golaszewski authored
[ Upstream commit ffe0bbab ] If gpiolib is disabled, we use the inline stubs from gpio/consumer.h instead of regular definitions of GPIO API. The stubs for 'optional' variants of gpiod_get routines return NULL in this case as if the relevant GPIO wasn't found. This is correct so far. Calling other (non-gpio_get) stubs from this header triggers a warning because the GPIO descriptor couldn't have been requested. The warning however is unconditional (WARN_ON(1)) and is emitted even if the passed descriptor pointer is NULL. We don't want to force the users of 'optional' gpio_get to check the returned pointer before calling e.g. gpiod_set_value() so let's only WARN on non-NULL descriptors. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by:
Claus H. Stovgaard <cst@phaseone.com> Signed-off-by:
Bartosz Golaszewski <bgolaszewski@baylibre.com> Signed-off-by:
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Chris Wilson authored
[ Upstream commit 9eed17d3 ] Since the cached32_node is allowed to be advanced above dma_32bit_pfn (to provide a shortcut into the limited range), we need to be careful to remove the to be freed node if it is the cached32_node. [ 48.477773] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __cached_rbnode_delete_update+0x68/0x110 [ 48.477812] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88870fc19020 by task kworker/u8:1/37 [ 48.477843] [ 48.477879] CPU: 1 PID: 37 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Tainted: G U 5.2.0+ #735 [ 48.477915] Hardware name: Intel Corporation NUC7i5BNK/NUC7i5BNB, BIOS BNKBL357.86A.0052.2017.0918.1346 09/18/2017 [ 48.478047] Workqueue: i915 __i915_gem_free_work [i915] [ 48.478075] Call Trace: [ 48.478111] dump_stack+0x5b/0x90 [ 48.478137] print_address_description+0x67/0x237 [ 48.478178] ? __cached_rbnode_delete_update+0x68/0x110 [ 48.478212] __kasan_report.cold.3+0x1c/0x38 [ 48.478240] ? __cached_rbnode_delete_update+0x68/0x110 [ 48.478280] ? __cached_rbnode_delete_update+0x68/0x110 [ 48.478308] __cached_rbnode_delete_update+0x68/0x110 [ 48.478344] private_free_iova+0x2b/0x60 [ 48.478378] iova_magazine_free_pfns+0x46/0xa0 [ 48.478403] free_iova_fast+0x277/0x340 [ 48.478443] fq_ring_free+0x15a/0x1a0 [ 48.478473] queue_iova+0x19c/0x1f0 [ 48.478597] cleanup_page_dma.isra.64+0x62/0xb0 [i915] [ 48.478712] __gen8_ppgtt_cleanup+0x63/0x80 [i915] [ 48.478826] __gen8_ppgtt_cleanup+0x42/0x80 [i915] [ 48.478940] __gen8_ppgtt_clear+0x433/0x4b0 [i915] [ 48.479053] __gen8_ppgtt_clear+0x462/0x4b0 [i915] [ 48.479081] ? __sg_free_table+0x9e/0xf0 [ 48.479116] ? kfree+0x7f/0x150 [ 48.479234] i915_vma_unbind+0x1e2/0x240 [i915] [ 48.479352] i915_vma_destroy+0x3a/0x280 [i915] [ 48.479465] __i915_gem_free_objects+0xf0/0x2d0 [i915] [ 48.479579] __i915_gem_free_work+0x41/0xa0 [i915] [ 48.479607] process_one_work+0x495/0x710 [ 48.479642] worker_thread+0x4c7/0x6f0 [ 48.479687] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710 [ 48.479724] kthread+0x1b2/0x1d0 [ 48.479774] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0xa0/0xa0 [ 48.479820] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 48.479864] [ 48.479907] Allocated by task 631: [ 48.479944] save_stack+0x19/0x80 [ 48.479994] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.6+0xc1/0xd0 [ 48.480038] kmem_cache_alloc+0x91/0xf0 [ 48.480082] alloc_iova+0x2b/0x1e0 [ 48.480125] alloc_iova_fast+0x58/0x376 [ 48.480166] intel_alloc_iova+0x90/0xc0 [ 48.480214] intel_map_sg+0xde/0x1f0 [ 48.480343] i915_gem_gtt_prepare_pages+0xb8/0x170 [i915] [ 48.480465] huge_get_pages+0x232/0x2b0 [i915] [ 48.480590] ____i915_gem_object_get_pages+0x40/0xb0 [i915] [ 48.480712] __i915_gem_object_get_pages+0x90/0xa0 [i915] [ 48.480834] i915_gem_object_prepare_write+0x2d6/0x330 [i915] [ 48.480955] create_test_object.isra.54+0x1a9/0x3e0 [i915] [ 48.481075] igt_shared_ctx_exec+0x365/0x3c0 [i915] [ 48.481210] __i915_subtests.cold.4+0x30/0x92 [i915] [ 48.481341] __run_selftests.cold.3+0xa9/0x119 [i915] [ 48.481466] i915_live_selftests+0x3c/0x70 [i915] [ 48.481583] i915_pci_probe+0xe7/0x220 [i915] [ 48.481620] pci_device_probe+0xe0/0x180 [ 48.481665] really_probe+0x163/0x4e0 [ 48.481710] device_driver_attach+0x85/0x90 [ 48.481750] __driver_attach+0xa5/0x180 [ 48.481796] bus_for_each_dev+0xda/0x130 [ 48.481831] bus_add_driver+0x205/0x2e0 [ 48.481882] driver_register+0xca/0x140 [ 48.481927] do_one_initcall+0x6c/0x1af [ 48.481970] do_init_module+0x106/0x350 [ 48.482010] load_module+0x3d2c/0x3ea0 [ 48.482058] __do_sys_finit_module+0x110/0x180 [ 48.482102] do_syscall_64+0x62/0x1f0 [ 48.482147] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 48.482190] [ 48.482224] Freed by task 37: [ 48.482273] save_stack+0x19/0x80 [ 48.482318] __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x180 [ 48.482363] kmem_cache_free+0x70/0x140 [ 48.482406] __free_iova+0x1d/0x30 [ 48.482445] fq_ring_free+0x15a/0x1a0 [ 48.482490] queue_iova+0x19c/0x1f0 [ 48.482624] cleanup_page_dma.isra.64+0x62/0xb0 [i915] [ 48.482749] __gen8_ppgtt_cleanup+0x63/0x80 [i915] [ 48.482873] __gen8_ppgtt_cleanup+0x42/0x80 [i915] [ 48.482999] __gen8_ppgtt_clear+0x433/0x4b0 [i915] [ 48.483123] __gen8_ppgtt_clear+0x462/0x4b0 [i915] [ 48.483250] i915_vma_unbind+0x1e2/0x240 [i915] [ 48.483378] i915_vma_destroy+0x3a/0x280 [i915] [ 48.483500] __i915_gem_free_objects+0xf0/0x2d0 [i915] [ 48.483622] __i915_gem_free_work+0x41/0xa0 [i915] [ 48.483659] process_one_work+0x495/0x710 [ 48.483704] worker_thread+0x4c7/0x6f0 [ 48.483748] kthread+0x1b2/0x1d0 [ 48.483787] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 48.483831] [ 48.483868] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88870fc19000 [ 48.483868] which belongs to the cache iommu_iova of size 40 [ 48.483920] The buggy address is located 32 bytes inside of [ 48.483920] 40-byte region [ffff88870fc19000, ffff88870fc19028) [ 48.483964] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 48.484006] page:ffffea001c3f0600 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8888181a91c0 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 48.484045] flags: 0x8000000000010200(slab|head) [ 48.484096] raw: 8000000000010200 ffffea001c421a08 ffffea001c447e88 ffff8888181a91c0 [ 48.484141] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000120012 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 48.484188] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 48.484230] [ 48.484265] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 48.484314] ffff88870fc18f00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 48.484361] ffff88870fc18f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 48.484406] >ffff88870fc19000: fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 48.484451] ^ [ 48.484494] ffff88870fc19080: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 48.484530] ffff88870fc19100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=108602 Fixes: e60aa7b5 ("iommu/iova: Extend rbtree node caching") Signed-off-by:
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Suraj Jitindar Singh authored
[ Upstream commit da0ef933 ] The virtual real mode addressing (VRMA) mechanism is used when a partition is using HPT (Hash Page Table) translation and performs real mode accesses (MSR[IR|DR] = 0) in non-hypervisor mode. In this mode effective address bits 0:23 are treated as zero (i.e. the access is aliased to 0) and the access is performed using an implicit 1TB SLB entry. The size of the RMA (Real Memory Area) is communicated to the guest as the size of the first memory region in the device tree. And because of the mechanism described above can be expected to not exceed 1TB. In the event that the host erroneously represents the RMA as being larger than 1TB, guest accesses in real mode to memory addresses above 1TB will be aliased down to below 1TB. This means that a memory access performed in real mode may differ to one performed in virtual mode for the same memory address, which would likely have unintended consequences. To avoid this outcome have the guest explicitly limit the size of the RMA to the current maximum, which is 1TB. This means that even if the first memory block is larger than 1TB, only the first 1TB should be accessed in real mode. Fixes: c610d65c ("powerpc/pseries: lift RTAS limit for hash") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.16+ Signed-off-by:
Suraj Jitindar Singh <sjitindarsingh@gmail.com> Tested-by:
Satheesh Rajendran <sathnaga@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:
David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
[ Upstream commit 2756d914 ] It turned out that the recent Intel HD-audio controller chips show a significant stall during the system PM resume intermittently. It doesn't happen so often and usually it may read back successfully after one or more seconds, but in some rare worst cases the driver went into fallback mode. After trial-and-error, we found out that the communication stall seems covered by issuing the sync after each verb write, as already done for AMD and other chipsets. So this patch enables the write-sync flag for the recent Intel chips, Skylake and onward, as a workaround. Also, since Broxton and co have the very same driver flags as Skylake, refer to the Skylake driver flags instead of defining the same contents again for simplification. BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201901Reported-and-tested-by:
Todd Brandt <todd.e.brandt@linux.intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Sébastien Szymanski authored
[ Upstream commit c479450f ] This patch adds support for the Armadeus ST0700 Adapt. It comes with a Santek ST0700I5Y-RBSLW 7.0" WVGA (800x480) TFT and an adapter board so that it can be connected on the TFT header of Armadeus Dev boards. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.19 Reviewed-by:
Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Sébastien Szymanski <sebastien.szymanski@armadeus.com> Signed-off-by:
Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190507152713.27494-1-sebastien.szymanski@armadeus.comSigned-off-by:
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Mike Snitzer authored
[ Upstream commit 54fa16ee ] Check if in fail_io mode at start of dm_pool_metadata_set_needs_check(). Otherwise dm_pool_metadata_set_needs_check()'s superblock_lock() can crash in dm_bm_write_lock() while accessing the block manager object that was previously destroyed as part of a failed dm_pool_abort_metadata() that ultimately set fail_io to begin with. Also, update DMERR() message to more accurately describe superblock_lock() failure. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by:
Zdenek Kabelac <zkabelac@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Norbert Manthey authored
[ Upstream commit 4c6d80e1 ] The pstore_mkfile() function is passed a pointer to a struct pstore_record. On success it consumes this 'record' pointer and references it from the created inode. On failure, however, it may or may not free the record. There are even two different code paths which return -ENOMEM -- one of which does and the other doesn't free the record. Make the behaviour deterministic by never consuming and freeing the record when returning failure, allowing the caller to do the cleanup consistently. Signed-off-by:
Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@amazon.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1562331960-26198-1-git-send-email-nmanthey@amazon.de Fixes: 83f70f07 ("pstore: Do not duplicate record metadata") Fixes: 1dfff7dd ("pstore: Pass record contents instead of copying") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [kees: also move "private" allocation location, rename inode cleanup label] Signed-off-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by:
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Nadav Amit authored
[ Upstream commit 49f17c26 ] Since resources can be removed, locking should ensure that the resource is not removed while accessing it. However, find_next_iomem_res() does not hold the lock while copying the data of the resource. Keep holding the lock while the data is copied. While at it, change the return value to a more informative value. It is disregarded by the callers. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix find_next_iomem_res() documentation] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190613045903.4922-2-namit@vmware.com Fixes: ff3cc952 ("resource: Add remove_resource interface") Signed-off-by:
Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Reviewed-by:
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Bjorn Helgaas authored
[ Upstream commit 010a93bf ] Previously find_next_iomem_res() used "*res" as both an input parameter for the range to search and the type of resource to search for, and an output parameter for the resource we found, which makes the interface confusing. The current callers use find_next_iomem_res() incorrectly because they allocate a single struct resource and use it for repeated calls to find_next_iomem_res(). When find_next_iomem_res() returns a resource, it overwrites the start, end, flags, and desc members of the struct. If we call find_next_iomem_res() again, we must update or restore these fields. The previous code restored res.start and res.end, but not res.flags or res.desc. Since the callers did not restore res.flags, if they searched for flags IORESOURCE_MEM | IORESOURCE_BUSY and found a resource with flags IORESOURCE_MEM | IORESOURCE_BUSY | IORESOURCE_SYSRAM, the next search would incorrectly skip resources unless they were also marked as IORESOURCE_SYSRAM. Fix this by restructuring the interface so it takes explicit "start, end, flags" parameters and uses "*res" only as an output parameter. Based on a patch by Lianbo Jiang <lijiang@redhat.com>. [ bp: While at it: - make comments kernel-doc style. - Originally-by: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180921073211.20097-2-lijiang@redhat.comSigned-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> CC: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> CC: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> CC: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> CC: Lianbo Jiang <lijiang@redhat.com> CC: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> CC: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> CC: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> CC: Yaowei Bai <baiyaowei@cmss.chinamobile.com> CC: bhe@redhat.com CC: dan.j.williams@intel.com CC: dyoung@redhat.com CC: kexec@lists.infradead.org CC: mingo@redhat.com CC: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/153805812916.1157.177580438135143788.stgit@bhelgaas-glaptop.roam.corp.google.comSigned-off-by:
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Bjorn Helgaas authored
[ Upstream commit a98959fd ] find_next_iomem_res() finds an iomem resource that covers part of a range described by "start, end". All callers expect that range to be inclusive, i.e., both start and end are included, but find_next_iomem_res() doesn't handle the end address correctly. If it finds an iomem resource that contains exactly the end address, it skips it, e.g., if "start, end" is [0x0-0x10000] and there happens to be an iomem resource [mem 0x10000-0x10000] (the single byte at 0x10000), we skip it: find_next_iomem_res(...) { start = 0x0; end = 0x10000; for (p = next_resource(...)) { # p->start = 0x10000; # p->end = 0x10000; # we *should* return this resource, but this condition is false: if ((p->end >= start) && (p->start < end)) break; Adjust find_next_iomem_res() so it allows a resource that includes the single byte at the end of the range. This is a corner case that we probably don't see in practice. Fixes: 58c1b5b0 ("[PATCH] memory hotadd fixes: find_next_system_ram catch range fix") Signed-off-by:
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Johannes Thumshirn authored
[ Upstream commit aa53e3bf ] Nikolay reported the following KASAN splat when running btrfs/048: [ 1843.470920] ================================================================== [ 1843.471971] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strncmp+0x66/0xb0 [ 1843.472775] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888111e369e2 by task btrfs/3979 [ 1843.473904] CPU: 3 PID: 3979 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.2.0-rc3-default #536 [ 1843.475009] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 1843.476322] Call Trace: [ 1843.476674] dump_stack+0x7c/0xbb [ 1843.477132] ? strncmp+0x66/0xb0 [ 1843.477587] print_address_description+0x114/0x320 [ 1843.478256] ? strncmp+0x66/0xb0 [ 1843.478740] ? strncmp+0x66/0xb0 [ 1843.479185] __kasan_report+0x14e/0x192 [ 1843.479759] ? strncmp+0x66/0xb0 [ 1843.480209] kasan_report+0xe/0x20 [ 1843.480679] strncmp+0x66/0xb0 [ 1843.481105] prop_compression_validate+0x24/0x70 [ 1843.481798] btrfs_xattr_handler_set_prop+0x65/0x160 [ 1843.482509] __vfs_setxattr+0x71/0x90 [ 1843.483012] __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x84/0x130 [ 1843.483606] vfs_setxattr+0xac/0xb0 [ 1843.484085] setxattr+0x18c/0x230 [ 1843.484546] ? vfs_setxattr+0xb0/0xb0 [ 1843.485048] ? __mod_node_page_state+0x1f/0xa0 [ 1843.485672] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x24/0x40 [ 1843.486233] ? __handle_mm_fault+0x988/0x1290 [ 1843.486823] ? lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1e0 [ 1843.487330] ? lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1e0 [ 1843.487842] ? mnt_want_write_file+0x3c/0x80 [ 1843.488442] ? debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled+0x22/0x40 [ 1843.489089] ? rcu_sync_lockdep_assert+0xe/0x70 [ 1843.489707] ? __sb_start_write+0x158/0x200 [ 1843.490278] ? mnt_want_write_file+0x3c/0x80 [ 1843.490855] ? __mnt_want_write+0x98/0xe0 [ 1843.491397] __x64_sys_fsetxattr+0xba/0xe0 [ 1843.492201] ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c [ 1843.493201] do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x230 [ 1843.493988] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 1843.495041] RIP: 0033:0x7fa7a8a7707a [ 1843.495819] Code: 48 8b 0d 21 de 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 be 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d ee dd 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 1843.499203] RSP: 002b:00007ffcb73bca38 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000be [ 1843.500210] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffcb73bda9d RCX: 00007fa7a8a7707a [ 1843.501170] RDX: 00007ffcb73bda9d RSI: 00000000006dc050 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 1843.502152] RBP: 00000000006dc050 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 1843.503109] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007ffcb73bda91 [ 1843.504055] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00007ffcb73bda82 R15: ffffffffffffffff [ 1843.505268] Allocated by task 3979: [ 1843.505771] save_stack+0x19/0x80 [ 1843.506211] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.5+0xa0/0xd0 [ 1843.506836] setxattr+0xeb/0x230 [ 1843.507264] __x64_sys_fsetxattr+0xba/0xe0 [ 1843.507886] do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x230 [ 1843.508429] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 1843.509558] Freed by task 0: [ 1843.510188] (stack is not available) [ 1843.511309] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888111e369e0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 [ 1843.514095] The buggy address is located 2 bytes inside of 8-byte region [ffff888111e369e0, ffff888111e369e8) [ 1843.516524] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 1843.517561] page:ffff88813f478d80 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88811940c300 index:0xffff888111e373b8 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 1843.519993] flags: 0x4404000010200(slab|head) [ 1843.520951] raw: 0004404000010200 ffff88813f48b008 ffff888119403d50 ffff88811940c300 [ 1843.522616] raw: ffff888111e373b8 000000000016000f 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 1843.524281] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 1843.525936] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 1843.526975] ffff888111e36880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 1843.528479] ffff888111e36900: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 1843.530138] >ffff888111e36980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 02 fc fc fc [ 1843.531877] ^ [ 1843.533287] ffff888111e36a00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 1843.534874] ffff888111e36a80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 1843.536468] ================================================================== This is caused by supplying a too short compression value ('lz') in the test-case and comparing it to 'lzo' with strncmp() and a length of 3. strncmp() read past the 'lz' when looking for the 'o' and thus caused an out-of-bounds read. Introduce a new check 'btrfs_compress_is_valid_type()' which not only checks the user-supplied value against known compression types, but also employs checks for too short values. Reported-by:
Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Fixes: 272e5326 ("btrfs: prop: fix vanished compression property after failed set") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.1+ Reviewed-by:
Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Reviewed-by:
David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
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Bart Van Assche authored
[ Upstream commit bcef5b72 ] The function srp_parse_in() is used both for parsing source address specifications and for target address specifications. Target addresses must have a port number. Having to specify a port number for source addresses is inconvenient. Make sure that srp_parse_in() supports again parsing addresses with no port number. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: c62adb7d ("IB/srp: Fix IPv6 address parsing") Signed-off-by:
Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Signed-off-by:
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by:
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Bart Van Assche authored
[ Upstream commit e37df2d5 ] This patch avoids that a warning is reported when building with W=1. Cc: Sergey Gorenko <sergeygo@mellanox.com> Cc: Max Gurtovoy <maxg@mellanox.com> Cc: Laurence Oberman <loberman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Linus Walleij authored
[ Upstream commit f90b8fda ] The SPI to the display on the DIR-685 is active low, we were just saved by the SPI library enforcing active low on everything before, so set it as active low to avoid ambiguity. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190715202101.16060-1-linus.walleij@linaro.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Signed-off-by:
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Michael Neuling authored
[ Upstream commit 3fefd1cd ] When emulating tsr, treclaim and trechkpt, we incorrectly set CR0. The code currently sets: CR0 <- 00 || MSR[TS] but according to the ISA it should be: CR0 <- 0 || MSR[TS] || 0 This fixes the bit shift to put the bits in the correct location. This is a data integrity issue as CR0 is corrupted. Fixes: 4bb3c7a0 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Work around transactional memory bugs in POWER9") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.17+ Tested-by:
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Paul Mackerras authored
[ Upstream commit fd0944ba ] When the 'regs' field was added to struct kvm_vcpu_arch, the code was changed to use several of the fields inside regs (e.g., gpr, lr, etc.) but not the ccr field, because the ccr field in struct pt_regs is 64 bits on 64-bit platforms, but the cr field in kvm_vcpu_arch is only 32 bits. This changes the code to use the regs.ccr field instead of cr, and changes the assembly code on 64-bit platforms to use 64-bit loads and stores instead of 32-bit ones. Reviewed-by:
Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Signed-off-by:
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Wanpeng Li authored
[ Upstream commit 4d763b16 ] Raise #GP when guest read/write IA32_XSS, but the CPUID bits say that it shouldn't exist. Fixes: 20300099 (kvm: vmx: add MSR logic for XSAVES) Reported-by:
Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@linux.intel.com> Reported-by:
Tao Xu <tao3.xu@intel.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
[ Upstream commit beb8d93b ] A previous fix to prevent KVM from consuming stale VMCS state after a failed VM-Entry inadvertantly blocked KVM's handling of machine checks that occur during VM-Entry. Per Intel's SDM, a #MC during VM-Entry is handled in one of three ways, depending on when the #MC is recognoized. As it pertains to this bug fix, the third case explicitly states EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY is handled like any other VM-Exit during VM-Entry, i.e. sets bit 31 to indicate the VM-Entry failed. If a machine-check event occurs during a VM entry, one of the following occurs: - The machine-check event is handled as if it occurred before the VM entry: ... - The machine-check event is handled after VM entry completes: ... - A VM-entry failure occurs as described in Section 26.7. The basic exit reason is 41, for "VM-entry failure due to machine-check event". Explicitly handle EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY as a one-off case in vmx_vcpu_run() instead of binning it into vmx_complete_atomic_exit(). Doing so allows vmx_vcpu_run() to handle VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY in a sane fashion and also simplifies vmx_complete_atomic_exit() since VMCS.VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO is guaranteed to be fresh. Fixes: b060ca3b ("kvm: vmx: Handle VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME failure properly") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Reviewed-by:
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
[ Upstream commit d28f4290 ] The behavior of WRMSR is in no way dependent on whether or not KVM consumes the value. Fixes: 4566654b ("KVM: vmx: Inject #GP on invalid PAT CR") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
[ Upstream commit 674ea351 ] This check will soon be done on every nested vmentry and vmexit, "parallelize" it using bitwise operations. Reviewed-by:
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Yan, Zheng authored
[ Upstream commit 87bc5b89 ] remove_session_caps() relies on __wait_on_freeing_inode(), to wait for freeing inode to remove its caps. But VFS wakes freeing inode waiters before calling destroy_inode(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/40102Signed-off-by:
"Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
[ Upstream commit 4914da2f ] We apply the codec resume forcibly at system resume callback for updating and syncing the jack detection state that may have changed during sleeping. This is, however, superfluous for the codec like Intel HDMI/DP, where the jack detection is managed via the audio component notification; i.e. the jack state change shall be reported sooner or later from the graphics side at mode change. This patch changes the codec resume callback to avoid the forcible resume conditionally with a new flag, codec->relaxed_resume, for reducing the resume time. The flag is set in the codec probe. Although this doesn't fix the entire bug mentioned in the bugzilla entry below, it's still a good optimization and some improvements are seen. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201901 Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) authored
[ Upstream commit 29fbeb7a ] Fix mount options comparison when serverino option is turned off later in cifs_autodisable_serverino() and thus avoiding mismatch of new cifs mounts. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <paulo@paulo.ac> Signed-off-by:
Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by:
Pavel Shilovsky <pshilove@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by:
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