[ Upstream commit 4ccb9272 ]

We've witnessed a few TLB events causing the machine to power off because
of prom_halt. In one case it was some nfs related area during rmmod. Another
was an mmapper of /dev/mem. A more recent one is an ITLB issue with
a bad pagesize which could be a hardware bug. Bugs happen but we should
attempt to not power off the machine and/or hang it when possible.

This is a DTLB error from an mmapper of /dev/mem:
[root@sparcie ~]# SUN4V-DTLB: Error at TPC[fffff80100903e6c], tl 1
SUN4V-DTLB: TPC<0xfffff80100903e6c>
SUN4V-DTLB: O7[fffff801081979d0]
SUN4V-DTLB: O7<0xfffff801081979d0>
SUN4V-DTLB: vaddr[fffff80100000000] ctx[1250] pte[98000000000f0610] error[2]
.

This is recent mainline for ITLB:
[ 3708.179864] SUN4V-ITLB: TPC<0xfffffc010071cefc>
[ 3708.188866] SUN4V-ITLB: O7[fffffc010071cee8]
[ 3708.197377] SUN4V-ITLB: O7<0xfffffc010071cee8>
[ 3708.206539] SUN4V-ITLB: vaddr[e0003] ctx[1a3c] pte[2900000dcc800eeb] error[4]
.

Normally sun4v_itlb_error_report() and sun4v_dtlb_error_report() would call
prom_halt() and drop us to OF command prompt "ok". This isn't the case for
LDOMs and the machine powers off.

For the HV reported error of HV_ENORADDR for HV HV_MMU_MAP_ADDR_TRAP we cause
a SIGBUS error by qualifying it within do_sparc64_fault() for fault code mask
of FAULT_CODE_BAD_RA. This is done when trap level (%tl) is less or equal
one("1"). Otherwise, for %tl > 1,  we proceed eventually to die_if_kernel().

The logic of this patch was partially inspired by David Miller's feedback.

Power off of large sparc64 machines is painful. Plus die_if_kernel provides
more context. A reset sequence isn't a brief period on large sparc64 but
better than power-off/power-on sequence.

Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bob Picco <bob.picco@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit d1105287 ]

dma_zalloc_coherent() calls dma_alloc_coherent(__GFP_ZERO)
but the sparc32 implementations sbus_alloc_coherent() and
pci32_alloc_coherent() doesn't take the gfp flags into
account.

Tested on the SPARC32/LEON GRETH Ethernet driver which fails
due to dma_alloc_coherent(__GFP_ZERO) returns non zeroed
pages.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Hellstrom <daniel@gaisler.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 8bccf5b3 ]

Christopher reports that perf_event_print_debug() can crash in uniprocessor
builds.  The crash is due to pcr_ops being NULL.

This happens because pcr_arch_init() is only invoked by smp_cpus_done() which
only executes in SMP builds.

init_hw_perf_events() is closely intertwined with pcr_ops being setup properly,
therefore:

1) Call pcr_arch_init() early on from init_hw_perf_events(), instead of
   from smp_cpus_done().

2) Do not hook up a PMU type if pcr_ops is NULL after pcr_arch_init().

3) Move init_hw_perf_events to a later initcall so that it we will be
   sure to invoke pcr_arch_init() after all cpus are brought up.

Finally, guard the one naked sequence of pcr_ops dereferences in
__global_pmu_self() with an appropriate NULL check.
Reported-by: Christopher Alexander Tobias Schulze <cat.schulze@alice-dsl.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 58556104 ]

nmi_cpu_busy() is a SMP function call that just makes sure that all of the
cpus are spinning using cpu cycles while the NMI test runs.

It does not need to disable IRQs because we just care about NMIs executing
which will even with 'normal' IRQs disabled.

It is not legal to enable hard IRQs in a SMP cross call, in fact this bug
triggers the BUG check in irq_work_run_list():

	BUG_ON(!irqs_disabled());

Because now irq_work_run() is invoked from the tail of
generic_smp_call_function_single_interrupt().
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit bef1909e ]

Fix to a problem observed when losing a FIN segment that does not
contain data.  In such situations, TLP is unable to recover from
*any* tail loss and instead adds at least PTO ms to the
retransmission process, i.e., RTO = RTO + PTO.
Signed-off-by: Per Hurtig <per.hurtig@kau.se>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Nandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit bdf6fa52 ]

Currently association restarts do not take into consideration the
state of the socket.  When a restart happens, the current assocation
simply transitions into established state.  This creates a condition
where a remote system, through a the restart procedure, may create a
local association that is no way reachable by user.  The conditions
to trigger this are as follows:
  1) Remote does not acknoledge some data causing data to remain
     outstanding.
  2) Local application calls close() on the socket.  Since data
     is still outstanding, the association is placed in SHUTDOWN_PENDING
     state.  However, the socket is closed.
  3) The remote tries to create a new association, triggering a restart
     on the local system.  The association moves from SHUTDOWN_PENDING
     to ESTABLISHED.  At this point, it is no longer reachable by
     any socket on the local system.

This patch addresses the above situation by moving the newly ESTABLISHED
association into SHUTDOWN-SENT state and bundling a SHUTDOWN after
the COOKIE-ACK chunk.  This way, the restarted associate immidiately
enters the shutdown procedure and forces the termination of the
unreachable association.
Reported-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 47549650 ]

When team_notify_peers and team_mcast_rejoin are called, they both reset
their respective .count_pending atomic variable. Then when the actual
worker function is executed, the variable is atomically decremented.
This pattern introduces a potential race condition where the
.count_pending rolls over and the worker function keeps rescheduling
until .count_pending decrements to zero again:

THREAD 1                           THREAD 2

========                           ========
team_notify_peers(teamX)
  atomic_set count_pending = 1
  schedule_delayed_work
                                   team_notify_peers(teamX)
                                   atomic_set count_pending = 1
team_notify_peers_work
  atomic_dec_and_test
    count_pending = 0
  (return)
                                   schedule_delayed_work
                                   team_notify_peers_work
                                   atomic_dec_and_test
                                     count_pending = -1
                                   schedule_delayed_work
                                   (repeat until count_pending = 0)

Instead of assigning a new value to .count_pending, use atomic_add to
tack-on the additional desired worker function invocations.
Signed-off-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@stratus.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Fixes: fc423ff0 ("team: add peer notification")
Fixes: 492b200e ("team: add support for sending multicast rejoins")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 3be07244 ]

In xmit path, we build a flowi6 which will be used for the output route lookup.
We are sending a GRE packet, neither IPv4 nor IPv6 encapsulated packet, thus the
protocol should be IPPROTO_GRE.

Fixes: c12b395a ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6")
Reported-by: Matthieu Ternisien d'Ouville <matthieu.tdo@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit dedb845d ]

After the packet is successfully sent, we should not touch the skb
as it may have been freed. This patch is based on the work done by
Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>.

In this version of the patch I have fixed issues pointed out by David.
David, please queue this up for stable.
Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Sitsofe Wheeler <sitsofe@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 73d3fe6d ]

In commit 8a29111c ("net: gro: allow to build full sized skb")
I added a regression for linear skb that traditionally force GRO
to use the frag_list fallback.

Erez Shitrit found that at most two segments were aggregated and
the "if (skb_gro_len(p) != pinfo->gso_size)" test was failing.

This is because pinfo at this spot still points to the last skb in the
chain, instead of the first one, where we find the correct gso_size
information.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Fixes: 8a29111c ("net: gro: allow to build full sized skb")
Reported-by: Erez Shitrit <erezsh@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 9026968a ]

This reverts commit 8ef29f8a.
The driver core already calls pinctrl_get() and claims the default
state. There is no need to replicate this in the driver.
Acked-by: Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@atmel.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@atmel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 40b8fe45 ]

In macvtap device delete and open calls can race and
this causes a list curruption of the vlan queue_list.

The race intself is triggered by the idr accessors
that located the vlan device.  The device is stored
into and removed from the idr under both an rtnl and
a mutex.  However, when attempting to locate the device
in idr, only a mutex is taken.  As a result, once cpu
perfoming a delete may take an rtnl and wait for the mutex,
while another cput doing an open() will take the idr
mutex first to fetch the device pointer and later take
an rtnl to add a queue for the device which may have
just gotten deleted.

With this patch, we now hold the rtnl for the duration
of the macvtap_open() call thus making sure that
open will not race with delete.

CC: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
CC: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit b8c203b2 ]

Currently we genarate a queueing route if we have matching policies
but can not resolve the states and the sysctl xfrm_larval_drop is
disabled. Here we assume that dst_output() is called to kill the
queued packets. Unfortunately this assumption is not true in all
cases, so it is possible that these packets leave the system unwanted.

We fix this by generating queueing routes only from the
route lookup functions, here we can guarantee a call to
dst_output() afterwards.

Fixes: a0073fe1 ("xfrm: Add a state resolution packet queue")
Reported-by: Konstantinos Kolelis <k.kolelis@sirrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit f92ee619 ]

Currently we genarate a blackhole route route whenever we have
matching policies but can not resolve the states. Here we assume
that dst_output() is called to kill the balckholed packets.
Unfortunately this assumption is not true in all cases, so
it is possible that these packets leave the system unwanted.

We fix this by generating blackhole routes only from the
route lookup functions, here we can guarantee a call to
dst_output() afterwards.

Fixes: 2774c131 ("xfrm: Handle blackhole route creation via afinfo.")
Reported-by: Konstantinos Kolelis <k.kolelis@sirrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 7d3083ee ]

When receiving a vlan-tagged frame that still contains
a vlan header, the length of the packet will be greater
then MTU+ETH_HLEN since it will account of the extra
vlan header.  TG3 checks this for the case for 802.1Q,
but not for 802.1ad.  As a result, full sized 802.1ad
frames get dropped by the card.

Add a check for 802.1ad protocol when receving full
sized frames.
Suggested-by: Prashant Sreedharan <prashant@broadcom.com>
CC: Prashant Sreedharan <prashant@broadcom.com>
CC: Michael Chan <mchan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 476c1885 ]

TG3 appears to have an issue performing TSO and checksum offloading
correclty when the frame has been vlan encapsulated (non-accelrated).
In these cases, tcp checksum is not correctly updated.

This patch attempts to work around this issue.  After the patch,
802.1ad vlans start working correctly over tg3 devices.

CC: Prashant Sreedharan <prashant@broadcom.com>
CC: Michael Chan <mchan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 0d0162e7 ]

I cannot move a macvlan interface created on top of a bonding interface
to a different namespace:

% ip netns add dummy0
% ip link add link bond0 mac0 type macvlan
% ip link set mac0 netns dummy0
RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument
%

The problem seems to be that commit f9399814 ("bonding: Don't allow
bond devices to change network namespaces.") sets NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL
on bonding interfaces, and commit 797f87f8 ("macvlan: fix netdev
feature propagation from lower device") causes macvlan interfaces
to inherit its features from the lower device.

NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL should not be inherited from the lower device
by a macvlan.
Patch tested on 3.16.
Signed-off-by: Francesco Ruggeri <fruggeri@arista.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit c095f248 ]

As Toshiaki Makita pointed out, the BRIDGE_INPUT_SKB_CB will
not be initialized in br_should_learn() as that function
is called only from br_handle_local_finish().  That is
an input handler for link-local ethernet traffic so it perfectly
correct to check br->vlan_enabled here.

Reported-by: Toshiaki Makita<toshiaki.makita1@gmail.com>
Fixes: 20adfa1a bridge: Check if vlan filtering is enabled only once.
Signed-off-by: Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 20adfa1a ]

The bridge code checks if vlan filtering is enabled on both
ingress and egress.   When the state flip happens, it
is possible for the bridge to currently be forwarding packets
and forwarding behavior becomes non-deterministic.  Bridge
may drop packets on some interfaces, but not others.

This patch solves this by caching the filtered state of the
packet into skb_cb on ingress.  The skb_cb is guaranteed to
not be over-written between the time packet entres bridge
forwarding path and the time it leaves it.  On egress, we
can then check the cached state to see if we need to
apply filtering information.
Signed-off-by: Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 9a72c2da ]

The problem is that the slave is first linked and slave_cnt is
incremented afterwards leading to a div by zero in the modes that use it
as a modulus. What happens is that in bond_start_xmit()
bond_has_slaves() is used to evaluate further transmission and it becomes
true after the slave is linked in, but when slave_cnt is used in the xmit
path it is still 0, so fetch it once and transmit based on that. Since
it is used only in round-robin and XOR modes, the fix is only for them.
Thanks to Eric Dumazet for pointing out the fault in my first try to fix
this.

Call trace (took it out of net-next kernel, but it's the same with net):
[46934.330038] divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP
[46934.330041] Modules linked in: bonding(O) 9p fscache
snd_hda_codec_generic crct10dif_pclmul
[46934.330041] bond0: Enslaving eth1 as an active interface with an up
link
[46934.330051]  ppdev joydev crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel 9pnet_virtio
ghash_clmulni_intel snd_hda_intel 9pnet snd_hda_controller parport_pc
serio_raw pcspkr snd_hda_codec parport virtio_balloon virtio_console
snd_hwdep snd_pcm pvpanic i2c_piix4 snd_timer i2ccore snd soundcore
virtio_blk virtio_net virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio ata_generic
pata_acpi floppy [last unloaded: bonding]
[46934.330053] CPU: 1 PID: 3382 Comm: ping Tainted: G           O
3.17.0-rc4+ #27
[46934.330053] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[46934.330054] task: ffff88005aebf2c0 ti: ffff88005b728000 task.ti:
ffff88005b728000
[46934.330059] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0198c33>]  [<ffffffffa0198c33>]
bond_start_xmit+0x1c3/0x450 [bonding]
[46934.330060] RSP: 0018:ffff88005b72b7f8  EFLAGS: 00010246
[46934.330060] RAX: 0000000000000679 RBX: ffff88004b077000 RCX:
000000000000002a
[46934.330061] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88004b3f0500 RDI:
ffff88004b077940
[46934.330061] RBP: ffff88005b72b830 R08: 00000000000000c0 R09:
ffff88004a83e000
[46934.330062] R10: 000000000000ffff R11: ffff88004b1f12c0 R12:
ffff88004b3f0500
[46934.330062] R13: ffff88004b3f0500 R14: 000000000000002a R15:
ffff88004b077940
[46934.330063] FS:  00007fbd91a4c740(0000) GS:ffff88005f080000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[46934.330064] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[46934.330064] CR2: 00007f803a8bb000 CR3: 000000004b2c9000 CR4:
00000000000406e0
[46934.330069] Stack:
[46934.330071]  ffffffff811e6169 00000000e772fa05 ffff88004b077000
ffff88004b3f0500
[46934.330072]  ffffffff81d17d18 000000000000002a 0000000000000000
ffff88005b72b8a0
[46934.330073]  ffffffff81620108 ffffffff8161fe0e ffff88005b72b8c4
ffff88005b302000
[46934.330073] Call Trace:
[46934.330077]  [<ffffffff811e6169>] ?
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x119/0x300
[46934.330084]  [<ffffffff81620108>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x188/0x410
[46934.330086]  [<ffffffff8161fe0e>] ? harmonize_features+0x2e/0x90
[46934.330088]  [<ffffffff81620b06>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x456/0x590
[46934.330089]  [<ffffffff81620c50>] dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x20
[46934.330090]  [<ffffffff8168f022>] arp_xmit+0x22/0x60
[46934.330091]  [<ffffffff8168f090>] arp_send.part.16+0x30/0x40
[46934.330092]  [<ffffffff8168f1e5>] arp_solicit+0x115/0x2b0
[46934.330094]  [<ffffffff8160b5d7>] ? copy_skb_header+0x17/0xa0
[46934.330096]  [<ffffffff8162875a>] neigh_probe+0x4a/0x70
[46934.330097]  [<ffffffff8162979c>] __neigh_event_send+0xac/0x230
[46934.330098]  [<ffffffff8162a00b>] neigh_resolve_output+0x13b/0x220
[46934.330100]  [<ffffffff8165f120>] ? ip_forward_options+0x1c0/0x1c0
[46934.330101]  [<ffffffff81660478>] ip_finish_output+0x1f8/0x860
[46934.330102]  [<ffffffff81661f08>] ip_output+0x58/0x90
[46934.330103]  [<ffffffff81661602>] ? __ip_local_out+0xa2/0xb0
[46934.330104]  [<ffffffff81661640>] ip_local_out_sk+0x30/0x40
[46934.330105]  [<ffffffff81662a66>] ip_send_skb+0x16/0x50
[46934.330106]  [<ffffffff81662ad3>] ip_push_pending_frames+0x33/0x40
[46934.330107]  [<ffffffff8168854c>] raw_sendmsg+0x88c/0xa30
[46934.330110]  [<ffffffff81612b31>] ? skb_recv_datagram+0x41/0x60
[46934.330111]  [<ffffffff816875a9>] ? raw_recvmsg+0xa9/0x1f0
[46934.330113]  [<ffffffff816978d4>] inet_sendmsg+0x74/0xc0
[46934.330114]  [<ffffffff81697a9b>] ? inet_recvmsg+0x8b/0xb0
[46934.330115] bond0: Adding slave eth2
[46934.330116]  [<ffffffff8160357c>] sock_sendmsg+0x9c/0xe0
[46934.330118]  [<ffffffff81603248>] ?
move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x28/0x80
[46934.330121]  [<ffffffff811b4477>] ? might_fault+0x47/0x50
[46934.330122]  [<ffffffff816039b9>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3a9/0x3c0
[46934.330125]  [<ffffffff8144a14a>] ? n_tty_write+0x3aa/0x530
[46934.330127]  [<ffffffff810d1ae4>] ? __wake_up+0x44/0x50
[46934.330129]  [<ffffffff81242b38>] ? fsnotify+0x238/0x310
[46934.330130]  [<ffffffff816048a1>] __sys_sendmsg+0x51/0x90
[46934.330131]  [<ffffffff816048f2>] SyS_sendmsg+0x12/0x20
[46934.330134]  [<ffffffff81738b29>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[46934.330144] Code: 48 8b 10 4c 89 ee 4c 89 ff e8 aa bc ff ff 31 c0 e9
1a ff ff ff 0f 1f 00 4c 89 ee 4c 89 ff e8 65 fb ff ff 31 d2 4c 89 ee 4c
89 ff <f7> b3 64 09 00 00 e8 02 bd ff ff 31 c0 e9 f2 fe ff ff 0f 1f 00
[46934.330146] RIP  [<ffffffffa0198c33>] bond_start_xmit+0x1c3/0x450
[bonding]
[46934.330146]  RSP <ffff88005b72b7f8>

CC: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <j.vosburgh@gmail.com>
CC: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@gmail.com>
Fixes: 278b2083 ("bonding: initial RCU conversion")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit eed4d839 ]

Use dst_entry held by sk_dst_get() to retrieve tunnel's PMTU.

The dst_mtu(__sk_dst_get(tunnel->sock)) call was racy. __sk_dst_get()
could return NULL if tunnel->sock->sk_dst_cache was reset just before the
call, thus making dst_mtu() dereference a NULL pointer:

[ 1937.661598] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
[ 1937.664005] IP: [<ffffffffa049db88>] pppol2tp_connect+0x33d/0x41e [l2tp_ppp]
[ 1937.664005] PGD daf0c067 PUD d9f93067 PMD 0
[ 1937.664005] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 1937.664005] Modules linked in: l2tp_ppp l2tp_netlink l2tp_core ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter ip_tables ebtable_nat ebtables x_tables udp_tunnel pppoe pppox ppp_generic slhc deflate ctr twofish_generic twofish_x86_64_3way xts lrw gf128mul glue_helper twofish_x86_64 twofish_common blowfish_generic blowfish_x86_64 blowfish_common des_generic cbc xcbc rmd160 sha512_generic hmac crypto_null af_key xfrm_algo 8021q garp bridge stp llc tun atmtcp clip atm ext3 mbcache jbd iTCO_wdt coretemp kvm_intel iTCO_vendor_support kvm pcspkr evdev ehci_pci lpc_ich mfd_core i5400_edac edac_core i5k_amb shpchp button processor thermal_sys xfs crc32c_generic libcrc32c dm_mod usbhid sg hid sr_mod sd_mod cdrom crc_t10dif crct10dif_common ata_generic ahci ata_piix tg3 libahci libata uhci_hcd ptp ehci_hcd pps_core usbcore scsi_mod libphy usb_common [last unloaded: l2tp_core]
[ 1937.664005] CPU: 0 PID: 10022 Comm: l2tpstress Tainted: G           O   3.17.0-rc1 #1
[ 1937.664005] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL160 G5, BIOS O12 08/22/2008
[ 1937.664005] task: ffff8800d8fda790 ti: ffff8800c43c4000 task.ti: ffff8800c43c4000
[ 1937.664005] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa049db88>]  [<ffffffffa049db88>] pppol2tp_connect+0x33d/0x41e [l2tp_ppp]
[ 1937.664005] RSP: 0018:ffff8800c43c7de8  EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 1937.664005] RAX: ffff8800da8a7240 RBX: ffff8800d8c64600 RCX: 000001c325a137b5
[ 1937.664005] RDX: 8c6318c6318c6320 RSI: 000000000000010c RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 1937.664005] RBP: ffff8800c43c7ea8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 1937.664005] R10: ffffffffa048e2c0 R11: ffff8800d8c64600 R12: ffff8800ca7a5000
[ 1937.664005] R13: ffff8800c439bf40 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000009
[ 1937.664005] FS:  00007fd7f610f700(0000) GS:ffff88011a600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1937.664005] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 1937.664005] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 00000000d9d75000 CR4: 00000000000027e0
[ 1937.664005] Stack:
[ 1937.664005]  ffffffffa049da80 ffff8800d8fda790 000000000000005b ffff880000000009
[ 1937.664005]  ffff8800daf3f200 0000000000000003 ffff8800c43c7e48 ffffffff81109b57
[ 1937.664005]  ffffffff81109b0e ffffffff8114c566 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 1937.664005] Call Trace:
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffffa049da80>] ? pppol2tp_connect+0x235/0x41e [l2tp_ppp]
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff81109b57>] ? might_fault+0x9e/0xa5
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff81109b0e>] ? might_fault+0x55/0xa5
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff8114c566>] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x1c/0x26
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff81309196>] SYSC_connect+0x87/0xb1
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff813e56f7>] ? sysret_check+0x1b/0x56
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff8107590d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x145/0x1a1
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff81213dee>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff8114c262>] ? spin_lock+0x9/0xb
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff813092b4>] SyS_connect+0x9/0xb
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff813e56d2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 1937.664005] Code: 10 2a 84 81 e8 65 76 bd e0 65 ff 0c 25 10 bb 00 00 4d 85 ed 74 37 48 8b 85 60 ff ff ff 48 8b 80 88 01 00 00 48 8b b8 10 02 00 00 <48> 8b 47 20 ff 50 20 85 c0 74 0f 83 e8 28 89 83 10 01 00 00 89
[ 1937.664005] RIP  [<ffffffffa049db88>] pppol2tp_connect+0x33d/0x41e [l2tp_ppp]
[ 1937.664005]  RSP <ffff8800c43c7de8>
[ 1937.664005] CR2: 0000000000000020
[ 1939.559375] ---[ end trace 82d44500f28f8708 ]---

Fixes: f34c4a35 ("l2tp: take PMTU from tunnel UDP socket")
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit a45e92a5 ]

The first initializer in the following

        union vxlan_addr ipa = {
            .sin.sin_addr.s_addr = tip,
            .sa.sa_family = AF_INET,
        };

is optimised away by the compiler, due to the second initializer,
therefore initialising .sin.sin_addr.s_addr always to 0.
This results in netlink messages indicating a L3 miss never contain the
missed IP address. This was observed with GCC 4.8 and 4.9. I do not know about previous versions.
The problem affects user space programs relying on an IP address being
sent as part of a netlink message indicating a L3 miss.

Changing
            .sa.sa_family = AF_INET,
to
            .sin.sin_family = AF_INET,
fixes the problem.
Signed-off-by: Gerhard Stenzel <gerhard.stenzel@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 2ba5af42 ]

When there are multiple vlan headers present in a received frame, the first
one is put into vlan_tci and protocol is set to ETH_P_8021Q. Anything in the
skb beyond the VLAN TPID may be still non-linear, including the inner TCI
and ethertype. While ovs_flow_extract takes care of IP and IPv6 headers, it
does nothing with ETH_P_8021Q. Later, if OVS_ACTION_ATTR_POP_VLAN is
executed, __pop_vlan_tci pulls the next vlan header into vlan_tci.

This leads to two things:

1. Part of the resulting ethernet header is in the non-linear part of the
   skb. When eth_type_trans is called later as the result of
   OVS_ACTION_ATTR_OUTPUT, kernel BUGs in __skb_pull. Also, __pop_vlan_tci
   is in fact accessing random data when it reads past the TPID.

2. network_header points into the ethernet header instead of behind it.
   mac_len is set to a wrong value (10), too.
Reported-by: Yulong Pei <ypei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit dc808110 ]

af_packet can currently overwrite kernel memory by out of bound
accesses, because it assumed a [new] block can always hold one frame.

This is not generally the case, even if most existing tools do it right.

This patch clamps too long frames as API permits, and issue a one time
error on syslog.

[  394.357639] tpacket_rcv: packet too big, clamped from 5042 to 3966. macoff=82

In this example, packet header tp_snaplen was set to 3966,
and tp_len was set to 5042 (skb->len)
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Fixes: f6fb8f10 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 0c9ab092 ]

Fix TCP FRTO logic so that it always notices when snd_una advances,
indicating that any RTO after that point will be a new and distinct
loss episode.

Previously there was a very specific sequence that could cause FRTO to
fail to notice a new loss episode had started:

(1) RTO timer fires, enter FRTO and retransmit packet 1 in write queue
(2) receiver ACKs packet 1
(3) FRTO sends 2 more packets
(4) RTO timer fires again (should start a new loss episode)

The problem was in step (3) above, where tcp_process_loss() returned
early (in the spot marked "Step 2.b"), so that it never got to the
logic to clear icsk_retransmits. Thus icsk_retransmits stayed
non-zero. Thus in step (4) tcp_enter_loss() would see the non-zero
icsk_retransmits, decide that this RTO is not a new episode, and
decide not to cut ssthresh and remember the current cwnd and ssthresh
for undo.

There were two main consequences to the bug that we have
observed. First, ssthresh was not decreased in step (4). Second, when
there was a series of such FRTO (1-4) sequences that happened to be
followed by an FRTO undo, we would restore the cwnd and ssthresh from
before the entire series started (instead of the cwnd and ssthresh
from before the most recent RTO). This could result in cwnd and
ssthresh being restored to values much bigger than the proper values.
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Fixes: e33099f9 ("tcp: implement RFC5682 F-RTO")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 4fab9071 ]

Make sure we use the correct address-family-specific function for
handling MTU reductions from within tcp_release_cb().

Previously AF_INET6 sockets were incorrectly always using the IPv6
code path when sometimes they were handling IPv4 traffic and thus had
an IPv4 dst.
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Diagnosed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Fixes: 563d34d0 ("tcp: dont drop MTU reduction indications")
Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit bc8fc7b8 ]

As of 4fddbf5d ("sit: strictly restrict incoming traffic to tunnel link device"),
when looking up a tunnel, tunnel's underlying interface (t->parms.link)
is verified to match incoming traffic's ingress device.

However the comparison was incorrectly based on skb->dev->iflink.

Instead, dev->ifindex should be used, which correctly represents the
interface from which the IP stack hands the ipip6 packets.

This allows setting up sit tunnels bound to vlan interfaces (otherwise
incoming ipip6 traffic on the vlan interface was dropped due to
ipip6_tunnel_lookup match failure).
Signed-off-by: Shmulik Ladkani <shmulik.ladkani@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 9d186cac ]

We don't know right timestamp for repaired skb-s. Wrong RTT estimations
isn't good, because some congestion modules heavily depends on it.

This patch adds the TCPCB_REPAIRED flag, which is included in
TCPCB_RETRANS.

Thanks to Eric for the advice how to fix this issue.

This patch fixes the warning:
[  879.562947] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2825 at net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3078 tcp_ack+0x11f5/0x1380()
[  879.567253] CPU: 0 PID: 2825 Comm: socket-tcpbuf-l Not tainted 3.16.0-next-20140811 #1
[  879.567829] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[  879.568177]  0000000000000000 00000000c532680c ffff880039643d00 ffffffff817aa2d2
[  879.568776]  0000000000000000 ffff880039643d38 ffffffff8109afbd ffff880039d6ba80
[  879.569386]  ffff88003a449800 000000002983d6bd 0000000000000000 000000002983d6bc
[  879.569982] Call Trace:
[  879.570264]  [<ffffffff817aa2d2>] dump_stack+0x4d/0x66
[  879.570599]  [<ffffffff8109afbd>] warn_slowpath_common+0x7d/0xa0
[  879.570935]  [<ffffffff8109b0ea>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20
[  879.571292]  [<ffffffff816d0a05>] tcp_ack+0x11f5/0x1380
[  879.571614]  [<ffffffff816d10bd>] tcp_rcv_established+0x1ed/0x710
[  879.571958]  [<ffffffff816dc9da>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x10a/0x370
[  879.572315]  [<ffffffff81657459>] release_sock+0x89/0x1d0
[  879.572642]  [<ffffffff816c81a0>] do_tcp_setsockopt.isra.36+0x120/0x860
[  879.573000]  [<ffffffff8110a52e>] ? rcu_read_lock_held+0x6e/0x80
[  879.573352]  [<ffffffff816c8912>] tcp_setsockopt+0x32/0x40
[  879.573678]  [<ffffffff81654ac4>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
[  879.574031]  [<ffffffff816537b0>] SyS_setsockopt+0x80/0xf0
[  879.574393]  [<ffffffff817b40a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[  879.574730] ---[ end trace a17cbc38eb8c5c00 ]---

v2: moving setting of skb->when for repaired skb-s in tcp_write_xmit,
    where it's set for other skb-s.

Fixes: 431a9124 ("tcp: timestamp SYN+DATA messages")
Fixes: 740b0f18 ("tcp: switch rtt estimations to usec resolution")
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 10545937 ]

On IOMMU systems DMA mapping can fail, we need to check for
that possibility.
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 945a3676 ]

Commit 1d8faf48 ("net/core: Add VF link state control") added new
attribute to IFLA_VF_INFO group in rtnl_fill_ifinfo but did not adjust size
of the allocated memory in if_nlmsg_size/rtnl_vfinfo_size. As the result, we
may trigger warnings in rtnl_getlink and similar functions when many VF
links are enabled, as the information does not fit into the allocated skb.

Fixes: 1d8faf48 ("net/core: Add VF link state control")
Reported-by: Yulong Pei <ypei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 4e48ed88 ]

netlink doesn't set any network header offset thus when the skb is
being passed to tap devices via dev_queue_xmit_nit(), it emits klog
false positives due to it being unset like:

  ...
  [  124.990397] protocol 0000 is buggy, dev nlmon0
  [  124.990411] protocol 0000 is buggy, dev nlmon0
  ...

So just reset the network header before passing to the device; for
packet sockets that just means nothing will change - mac and net
offset hold the same value just as before.
Reported-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit 307fd543 upstream.

Replace equivalent (and partially incorrect) scatter-gather functions
with ones from crypto-API.

The replacement is motivated by page-faults in sg_copy_part triggered
by successive calls to crypto_hash_update. The following fault appears
after calling crypto_ahash_update twice, first with 13 and then
with 285 bytes:

Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000008
Faulting instruction address: 0xf9bf9a8c
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
SMP NR_CPUS=8 CoreNet Generic
Modules linked in: tcrypt(+) caamhash caam_jr caam tls
CPU: 6 PID: 1497 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted
3.12.19-rt30-QorIQ-SDK-V1.6+g9fda9f2 #75
task: e9308530 ti: e700e000 task.ti: e700e000
NIP: f9bf9a8c LR: f9bfcf28 CTR: c0019ea0
REGS: e700fb80 TRAP: 0300   Not tainted
(3.12.19-rt30-QorIQ-SDK-V1.6+g9fda9f2)
MSR: 00029002 <CE,EE,ME>  CR: 44f92024  XER: 20000000
DEAR: 00000008, ESR: 00000000

GPR00: f9bfcf28 e700fc30 e9308530 e70b1e55 00000000 ffffffdd e70b1e54 0bebf888
GPR08: 902c7ef5 c0e771e2 00000002 00000888 c0019ea0 00000000 00000000 c07a4154
GPR16: c08d0000 e91a8f9c 00000001 e98fb400 00000100 e9c83028 e70b1e08 e70b1d48
GPR24: e992ce10 e70b1dc8 f9bfe4f4 e70b1e55 ffffffdd e70b1ce0 00000000 00000000
NIP [f9bf9a8c] sg_copy+0x1c/0x100 [caamhash]
LR [f9bfcf28] ahash_update_no_ctx+0x628/0x660 [caamhash]
Call Trace:
[e700fc30] [f9bf9c50] sg_copy_part+0xe0/0x160 [caamhash] (unreliable)
[e700fc50] [f9bfcf28] ahash_update_no_ctx+0x628/0x660 [caamhash]
[e700fcb0] [f954e19c] crypto_tls_genicv+0x13c/0x300 [tls]
[e700fd10] [f954e65c] crypto_tls_encrypt+0x5c/0x260 [tls]
[e700fd40] [c02250ec] __test_aead.constprop.9+0x2bc/0xb70
[e700fe40] [c02259f0] alg_test_aead+0x50/0xc0
[e700fe60] [c02241e4] alg_test+0x114/0x2e0
[e700fee0] [c022276c] cryptomgr_test+0x4c/0x60
[e700fef0] [c004f658] kthread+0x98/0xa0
[e700ff40] [c000fd04] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit d974baa3 upstream.

CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.

TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.

This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry.  Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact.  A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit 76835b0e upstream.

Commit b0c29f79 (futexes: Avoid taking the hb->lock if there's
nothing to wake up) changes the futex code to avoid taking a lock when
there are no waiters. This code has been subsequently fixed in commit
11d4616b (futex: revert back to the explicit waiter counting code).
Both the original commit and the fix-up rely on get_futex_key_refs() to
always imply a barrier.

However, for private futexes, none of the cases in the switch statement
of get_futex_key_refs() would be hit and the function completes without
a memory barrier as required before checking the "waiters" in
futex_wake() -> hb_waiters_pending(). The consequence is a race with a
thread waiting on a futex on another CPU, allowing the waker thread to
read "waiters == 0" while the waiter thread to have read "futex_val ==
locked" (in kernel).

Without this fix, the problem (user space deadlocks) can be seen with
Android bionic's mutex implementation on an arm64 multi-cluster system.
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reported-by: Matteo Franchin <Matteo.Franchin@arm.com>
Fixes: b0c29f79 (futexes: Avoid taking the hb->lock if there's nothing to wake up)
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Tested-by: Mike Galbraith <umgwanakikbuti@gmail.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit d4bf205d upstream.

The pstore filesystem still creates duplicate filename/inode pairs for
some pstore types.  Add the id to the filename to prevent that.

Before patch:

[/sys/fs/pstore] ls -li
total 0
1250 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 67 Sep 29 17:09 console-efi
1250 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 67 Sep 29 17:09 console-efi
1250 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 67 Sep 29 17:09 console-efi
1250 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 67 Sep 29 17:09 console-efi
1250 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 67 Sep 29 17:09 console-efi
1250 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 67 Sep 29 17:09 console-efi
1250 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 67 Sep 29 17:09 console-efi
1250 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 67 Sep 29 17:09 console-efi
1250 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 67 Sep 29 17:09 console-efi

After:

[/sys/fs/pstore] ls -li
total 0
1232 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 148 Sep 29 17:09 console-efi-141202499100000
1231 -r--r--r--. 1 root root  67 Sep 29 17:09 console-efi-141202499200000
1230 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 148 Sep 29 17:44 console-efi-141202705400000
1229 -r--r--r--. 1 root root  67 Sep 29 17:44 console-efi-141202705500000
1228 -r--r--r--. 1 root root  67 Sep 29 20:42 console-efi-141203772600000
1227 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 148 Sep 29 23:42 console-efi-141204854900000
1226 -r--r--r--. 1 root root  67 Sep 29 23:42 console-efi-141204855000000
1225 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 148 Sep 29 23:59 console-efi-141204954200000
1224 -r--r--r--. 1 root root  67 Sep 29 23:59 console-efi-141204954400000
Signed-off-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit 923190d3 upstream.

sb_finish_set_opts() can race with inode_free_security()
when initializing inode security structures for inodes
created prior to initial policy load or by the filesystem
during ->mount().   This appears to have always been
a possible race, but commit 3dc91d43 ("SELinux:  Fix possible
NULL pointer dereference in selinux_inode_permission()")
made it more evident by immediately reusing the unioned
list/rcu element  of the inode security structure for call_rcu()
upon an inode_free_security().  But the underlying issue
was already present before that commit as a possible use-after-free
of isec.

Shivnandan Kumar reported the list corruption and proposed
a patch to split the list and rcu elements out of the union
as separate fields of the inode_security_struct so that setting
the rcu element would not affect the list element.  However,
this would merely hide the issue and not truly fix the code.

This patch instead moves up the deletion of the list entry
prior to dropping the sbsec->isec_lock initially.  Then,
if the inode is dropped subsequently, there will be no further
references to the isec.
Reported-by: Shivnandan Kumar <shivnandan.k@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit 6fbc198c upstream.

On restore, virtio pci does the following:
+ set features
+ init vqs etc - device can be used at this point!
+ set ACKNOWLEDGE,DRIVER and DRIVER_OK status bits

This is in violation of the virtio spec, which
requires the following order:
- ACKNOWLEDGE
- DRIVER
- init vqs
- DRIVER_OK

This behaviour will break with hypervisors that assume spec compliant
behaviour.  It seems like a good idea to have this patch applied to
stable branches to reduce the support butden for the hypervisors.

Cc: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit d3051b48 upstream.

A panic was seen in the following sitation.

There are two threads running on the system. The first thread is a system
monitoring thread that is reading /proc/modules. The second thread is
loading and unloading a module (in this example I'm using my simple
dummy-module.ko).  Note, in the "real world" this occurred with the qlogic
driver module.

When doing this, the following panic occurred:

 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 kernel BUG at kernel/module.c:3739!
 invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
 Modules linked in: binfmt_misc sg nfsv3 rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs fscache intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel lrw igb gf128mul glue_helper iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support ablk_helper ptp sb_edac cryptd pps_core edac_core shpchp i2c_i801 pcspkr wmi lpc_ich ioatdma mfd_core dca ipmi_si nfsd ipmi_msghandler auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd sunrpc xfs libcrc32c sr_mod cdrom sd_mod crc_t10dif crct10dif_common mgag200 syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper ttm isci drm libsas ahci libahci scsi_transport_sas libata i2c_core dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: dummy_module]
 CPU: 37 PID: 186343 Comm: cat Tainted: GF          O--------------   3.10.0+ #7
 Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600CP/S2600CP, BIOS RMLSDP.86I.00.29.D696.1311111329 11/11/2013
 task: ffff8807fd2d8000 ti: ffff88080fa7c000 task.ti: ffff88080fa7c000
 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810d64c5>]  [<ffffffff810d64c5>] module_flags+0xb5/0xc0
 RSP: 0018:ffff88080fa7fe18  EFLAGS: 00010246
 RAX: 0000000000000003 RBX: ffffffffa03b5200 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: ffff88080fa7fe38 RDI: ffffffffa03b5000
 RBP: ffff88080fa7fe28 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffa03b5000
 R13: ffffffffa03b5008 R14: ffffffffa03b5200 R15: ffffffffa03b5000
 FS:  00007f6ae57ef740(0000) GS:ffff88101e7a0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000404f70 CR3: 0000000ffed48000 CR4: 00000000001407e0
 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
 Stack:
  ffffffffa03b5200 ffff8810101e4800 ffff88080fa7fe70 ffffffff810d666c
  ffff88081e807300 000000002e0f2fbf 0000000000000000 ffff88100f257b00
  ffffffffa03b5008 ffff88080fa7ff48 ffff8810101e4800 ffff88080fa7fee0
 Call Trace:
  [<ffffffff810d666c>] m_show+0x19c/0x1e0
  [<ffffffff811e4d7e>] seq_read+0x16e/0x3b0
  [<ffffffff812281ed>] proc_reg_read+0x3d/0x80
  [<ffffffff811c0f2c>] vfs_read+0x9c/0x170
  [<ffffffff811c1a58>] SyS_read+0x58/0xb0
  [<ffffffff81605829>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
 Code: 48 63 c2 83 c2 01 c6 04 03 29 48 63 d2 eb d9 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 63 d2 c6 04 13 2d 41 8b 0c 24 8d 50 02 83 f9 01 75 b2 eb cb <0f> 0b 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41
 RIP  [<ffffffff810d64c5>] module_flags+0xb5/0xc0
  RSP <ffff88080fa7fe18>

    Consider the two processes running on the system.

    CPU 0 (/proc/modules reader)
    CPU 1 (loading/unloading module)

    CPU 0 opens /proc/modules, and starts displaying data for each module by
    traversing the modules list via fs/seq_file.c:seq_open() and
    fs/seq_file.c:seq_read().  For each module in the modules list, seq_read
    does

            op->start()  <-- this is a pointer to m_start()
            op->show()   <- this is a pointer to m_show()
            op->stop()   <-- this is a pointer to m_stop()

    The m_start(), m_show(), and m_stop() module functions are defined in
    kernel/module.c. The m_start() and m_stop() functions acquire and release
    the module_mutex respectively.

    ie) When reading /proc/modules, the module_mutex is acquired and released
    for each module.

    m_show() is called with the module_mutex held.  It accesses the module
    struct data and attempts to write out module data.  It is in this code
    path that the above BUG_ON() warning is encountered, specifically m_show()
    calls

    static char *module_flags(struct module *mod, char *buf)
    {
            int bx = 0;

            BUG_ON(mod->state == MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED);
    ...

    The other thread, CPU 1, in unloading the module calls the syscall
    delete_module() defined in kernel/module.c.  The module_mutex is acquired
    for a short time, and then released.  free_module() is called without the
    module_mutex.  free_module() then sets mod->state = MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED,
    also without the module_mutex.  Some additional code is called and then the
    module_mutex is reacquired to remove the module from the modules list:

        /* Now we can delete it from the lists */
        mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
        stop_machine(__unlink_module, mod, NULL);
        mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);

This is the sequence of events that leads to the panic.

CPU 1 is removing dummy_module via delete_module().  It acquires the
module_mutex, and then releases it.  CPU 1 has NOT set dummy_module->state to
MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED yet.

CPU 0, which is reading the /proc/modules, acquires the module_mutex and
acquires a pointer to the dummy_module which is still in the modules list.
CPU 0 calls m_show for dummy_module.  The check in m_show() for
MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED passed for dummy_module even though it is being
torn down.

Meanwhile CPU 1, which has been continuing to remove dummy_module without
holding the module_mutex, now calls free_module() and sets
dummy_module->state to MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED.

CPU 0 now calls module_flags() with dummy_module and ...

static char *module_flags(struct module *mod, char *buf)
{
        int bx = 0;

        BUG_ON(mod->state == MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED);

and BOOM.

Acquire and release the module_mutex lock around the setting of
MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED in the teardown path, which should resolve the
problem.

Testing: In the unpatched kernel I can panic the system within 1 minute by
doing

while (true) do insmod dummy_module.ko; rmmod dummy_module.ko; done

and

while (true) do cat /proc/modules; done

in separate terminals.

In the patched kernel I was able to run just over one hour without seeing
any issues.  I also verified the output of panic via sysrq-c and the output
of /proc/modules looks correct for all three states for the dummy_module.

        dummy_module 12661 0 - Unloading 0xffffffffa03a5000 (OE-)
        dummy_module 12661 0 - Live 0xffffffffa03bb000 (OE)
        dummy_module 14015 1 - Loading 0xffffffffa03a5000 (OE+)
Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit 0d082601 upstream.

Andy Lutomirski recently demonstrated that when chroot is used to set
the root path below the path for the new ``root'' passed to pivot_root
the pivot_root system call succeeds and leaks mounts.

In examining the code I see that starting with a new root that is
below the current root in the mount tree will result in a loop in the
mount tree after the mounts are detached and then reattached to one
another.  Resulting in all kinds of ugliness including a leak of that
mounts involved in the leak of the mount loop.

Prevent this problem by ensuring that the new mount is reachable from
the current root of the mount tree.

[Added stable cc.  Fixes CVE-2014-7970.  --Andy]
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87bnpmihks.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.orgSigned-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>