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  1. 27 Apr, 2017 6 commits
    • Steven Rostedt (VMware)'s avatar
      ring-buffer: Have ring_buffer_iter_empty() return true when empty · 64d25336
      Steven Rostedt (VMware) authored 
      commit 78f7a45d upstream.

I noticed that reading the snapshot file when it is empty no longer gives a
status. It suppose to show the status of the snapshot buffer as well as how
to allocate and use it. For example:

 ># cat snapshot
 # tracer: nop
 #
 #
 # * Snapshot is allocated *
 #
 # Snapshot commands:
 # echo 0 > snapshot : Clears and frees snapshot buffer
 # echo 1 > snapshot : Allocates snapshot buffer, if not already allocated.
 #                      Takes a snapshot of the main buffer.
 # echo 2 > snapshot : Clears snapshot buffer (but does not allocate or free)
 #                      (Doesn't have to be '2' works with any number that
 #                       is not a '0' or '1')

But instead it just showed an empty buffer:

 ># cat snapshot
 # tracer: nop
 #
 # entries-in-buffer/entries-written: 0/0   #P:4
 #
 #                              _-----=> irqs-off
 #                             / _----=> need-resched
 #                            | / _---=> hardirq/softirq
 #                            || / _--=> preempt-depth
 #                            ||| /     delay
 #           TASK-PID   CPU#  ||||    TIMESTAMP  FUNCTION
 #              | |       |   ||||       |         |

What happened was that it was using the ring_buffer_iter_empty() function to
see if it was empty, and if it was, it showed the status. But that function
was returning false when it was empty. The reason was that the iter header
page was on the reader page, and the reader page was empty, but so was the
buffer itself. The check only tested to see if the iter was on the commit
page, but the commit page was no longer pointing to the reader page, but as
all pages were empty, the buffer is also.

Fixes: 651e22f2 ("ring-buffer: Always reset iterator to reader page")
Signed-off-by: default avatarSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      64d25336
    • Jason Gerecke's avatar
      HID: wacom: Treat HID_DG_TOOLSERIALNUMBER as unsigned · eff24861
      Jason Gerecke authored 
      commit 286f3f47 upstream.

Because HID_DG_TOOLSERIALNUMBER doesn't first cast the value recieved from HID
to an unsigned type, sign-extension rules can cause the value of
wacom_wac->serial[0] to inadvertently wind up with all 32 of its highest bits
set if the highest bit of "value" was set.

This can cause problems for Tablet PC devices which use AES sensors and the
xf86-input-wacom userspace driver. It is not uncommon for AES sensors to send a
serial number of '0' while the pen is entering or leaving proximity. The
xf86-input-wacom driver ignores events with a serial number of '0' since it
cannot match them up to an in-use tool.  To ensure the xf86-input-wacom driver
does not ignore the final out-of-proximity event, the kernel does not send
MSC_SERIAL events when the value of wacom_wac->serial[0] is '0'. If the highest
bit of HID_DG_TOOLSERIALNUMBER is set by an in-prox pen which later leaves
proximity and sends a '0' for HID_DG_TOOLSERIALNUMBER, then only the lowest 32
bits of wacom_wac->serial[0] are actually cleared, causing the kernel to send
an MSC_SERIAL event. Since the 'input_event' function takes an 'int' as
argument, only those lowest (now-cleared) 32 bits of wacom_wac->serial[0] are
sent to userspace, causing xf86-input-wacom to ignore the event. If the event
was the final out-of-prox event, then xf86-input-wacom may remain in a state
where it believes the pen is in proximity and refuses to allow other devices
under its control (e.g. the touchscreen) to move the cursor.

It should be noted that EMR devices and devices which use both the
HID_DG_TOOLSERIALNUMBER and WACOM_HID_WD_SERIALHI usages (in that order) would
be immune to this issue. It appears only AES devices are affected.

Fixes: f85c9dc6 ("HID: wacom: generic: Support tool ID and additional tool types")
Signed-off-by: default avatarJason Gerecke <jason.gerecke@wacom.com>
Acked-by: default avatarBenjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      eff24861
    • Steven Rostedt (VMware)'s avatar
      tracing: Allocate the snapshot buffer before enabling probe · 838a281c
      Steven Rostedt (VMware) authored 
      commit df62db5b upstream.

Currently the snapshot trigger enables the probe and then allocates the
snapshot. If the probe triggers before the allocation, it could cause the
snapshot to fail and turn tracing off. It's best to allocate the snapshot
buffer first, and then enable the trigger. If something goes wrong in the
enabling of the trigger, the snapshot buffer is still allocated, but it can
also be freed by the user by writting zero into the snapshot buffer file.

Also add a check of the return status of alloc_snapshot().

Fixes: 77fd5c15 ("tracing: Add snapshot trigger to function probes")
Signed-off-by: default avatarSteven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      838a281c
    • Eric Biggers's avatar
      KEYS: fix keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring() to not leak thread keyrings · 523ae2e9
      Eric Biggers authored 
      commit c9f838d1 upstream.

This fixes CVE-2017-7472.

Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel
memory by leaking thread keyrings:

	#include <keyutils.h>

	int main()
	{
		for (;;)
			keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING);
	}

Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before.
To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred()
and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding
keyring is already present.

Fixes: d84f4f99 ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      523ae2e9
    • David Howells's avatar
      KEYS: Change the name of the dead type to ".dead" to prevent user access · cc4f9841
      David Howells authored 
      commit c1644fe0 upstream.

This fixes CVE-2017-6951.

Userspace should not be able to do things with the "dead" key type as it
doesn't have some of the helper functions set upon it that the kernel
needs.  Attempting to use it may cause the kernel to crash.

Fix this by changing the name of the type to ".dead" so that it's rejected
up front on userspace syscalls by key_get_type_from_user().

Though this doesn't seem to affect recent kernels, it does affect older
ones, certainly those prior to:

	commit c06cfb08
	Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
	Date:   Tue Sep 16 17:36:06 2014 +0100
	KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse

which went in before 3.18-rc1.
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      cc4f9841
    • David Howells's avatar
      KEYS: Disallow keyrings beginning with '.' to be joined as session keyrings · 4cbbfd6a
      David Howells authored 
      commit ee8f844e upstream.

This fixes CVE-2016-9604.

Keyrings whose name begin with a '.' are special internal keyrings and so
userspace isn't allowed to create keyrings by this name to prevent
shadowing.  However, the patch that added the guard didn't fix
KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING.  Not only can that create dot-named keyrings,
it can also subscribe to them as a session keyring if they grant SEARCH
permission to the user.

This, for example, allows a root process to set .builtin_trusted_keys as
its session keyring, at which point it has full access because now the
possessor permissions are added.  This permits root to add extra public
keys, thereby bypassing module verification.

This also affects kexec and IMA.

This can be tested by (as root):

	keyctl session .builtin_trusted_keys
	keyctl add user a a @s
	keyctl list @s

which on my test box gives me:

	2 keys in keyring:
	180010936: ---lswrv     0     0 asymmetric: Build time autogenerated kernel key: ae3d4a31b82daa8e1a75b49dc2bba949fd992a05
	801382539: --alswrv     0     0 user: a


Fix this by rejecting names beginning with a '.' in the keyctl.
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: default avatarMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      4cbbfd6a
  3. 21 Apr, 2017 34 commits
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