- 20 Feb, 2023 40 commits
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Jeff Layton authored
There are two different flavors of the nfsd4_copy struct. One is embedded in the compound and is used directly in synchronous copies. The other is dynamically allocated, refcounted and tracked in the client struture. For the embedded one, the cleanup just involves releasing any nfsd_files held on its behalf. For the async one, the cleanup is a bit more involved, and we need to dequeue it from lists, unhash it, etc. There is at least one potential refcount leak in this code now. If the kthread_create call fails, then both the src and dst nfsd_files in the original nfsd4_copy object are leaked. The cleanup in this codepath is also sort of weird. In the async copy case, we'll have up to four nfsd_file references (src and dst for both flavors of copy structure). They are both put at the end of nfsd4_do_async_copy, even though the ones held on behalf of the embedded one outlive that structure. Change it so that we always clean up the nfsd_file refs held by the embedded copy structure before nfsd4_copy returns. Rework cleanup_async_copy to handle both inter and intra copies. Eliminate nfsd4_cleanup_intra_ssc since it now becomes a no-op. Signed-off-by:
Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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Jeff Layton authored
At first, I thought this might be a source of nfsd_file overputs, but the current callers seem to avoid an extra put when nfsd4_verify_copy returns an error. Still, it's "bad form" to leave the pointers filled out when we don't have a reference to them anymore, and that might lead to bugs later. Zero them out as a defensive coding measure. Signed-off-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
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Jeff Layton authored
This is wrapper is pointless, and just obscures what's going on. Signed-off-by:
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Jeff Layton authored
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Jeff Layton authored
We really don't need an accessor function here. Signed-off-by:
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Jeff Layton authored
We're not doing any blocking operations for OP_OFFLOAD_STATUS, so taking and putting a reference is a waste of effort. Take the client lock, search for the copy and fetch the wr_bytes_written field and return. Also, make find_async_copy a static function. Signed-off-by:
Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com> Signed-off-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
With the KUnit infrastructure recently added, we are free to define other unit tests particular to our implementation. As an example, I've added a self-test that encrypts then decrypts a string, and checks the result. Tested-by:
Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
RFC 8009 provides sample encryption results. Add KUnit tests to ensure our implementation derives the expected results for the provided sample input. I hate how large this test is, but using non-standard key usage values means rfc8009_encrypt_case() can't simply reuse ->import_ctx to allocate and key its ciphers; and the test provides its own confounders, which means krb5_etm_encrypt() can't be used directly. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
RFC 8009 provides sample checksum results. Add KUnit tests to ensure our implementation derives the expected results for the provided sample input. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
RFC 8009 provides sample key derivation results, so Kunit tests are added to ensure our implementation derives the expected keys for the provided sample input. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
Add tests for the new-to-RPCSEC Camellia cipher. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
Test the new-to-RPCSEC CMAC digest algorithm. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
The Camellia enctypes use a new KDF, so add some tests to ensure it is working properly. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
Add Kunit tests for ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96. The test vectors come from RFC 3962 Appendix B. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
RFC 3961 Appendix A provides tests for the KDF specified in that document as well as other parts of Kerberos. The other three usage scenarios in Section 10 are not implemented by the Linux kernel's RPCSEC GSS Kerberos 5 mechanism, so tests are not added for those. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
I plan to add KUnit tests that will need enctype profile information. Export the enctype profile lookup function. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
The Kerberos RFCs provide test vectors to verify the operation of an implementation. Introduce a KUnit test framework to exercise the Linux kernel's implementation of Kerberos. Start with test cases for the RFC 3961-defined n-fold function. The sample vectors for that are found in RFC 3961 Section 10. Run the GSS Kerberos 5 mechanism's unit tests with this command: $ ./tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py run \ --kunitconfig ./net/sunrpc/.kunitconfig Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
The goal is to leave only protocol-defined items in gss_krb5.h so that it can be easily replaced by a generic header. Implementation specific items are moved to the new internal header. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
Add the RFC 6803 encryption types to the string of integers that is reported to gssd during upcalls. This enables gssd to utilize keys with these encryption types when support for them is built into the kernel. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
The Camellia enctypes use the KDF_FEEDBACK_CMAC Key Derivation Function defined in RFC 6803 Section 3. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
RFC 6803 defines two encryption types that use Camellia ciphers (RFC 3713) and CMAC digests. Implement support for those in SunRPC's GSS Kerberos 5 mechanism. There has not been an explicit request to support these enctypes. However, this new set of enctypes provides a good alternative to the AES-SHA1 enctypes that are to be deprecated at some point. As this implementation is still a "beta", the default is to not build it automatically. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
Add the RFC 8009 encryption types to the string of integers that is reported to gssd during upcalls. This enables gssd to utilize keys with these encryption types when support for them is built into the kernel. Link: https://bugzilla.linux-nfs.org/show_bug.cgi?id=400Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
RFC 8009 enctypes use different crypt formulae than previous Kerberos 5 encryption types. Section 1 of RFC 8009 explains the reason for this change: > The new types conform to the framework specified in [RFC3961], > but do not use the simplified profile, as the simplified profile > is not compliant with modern cryptographic best practices such as > calculating Message Authentication Codes (MACs) over ciphertext > rather than plaintext. Add new .encrypt and .decrypt functions to handle this variation. The new approach described above is referred to as Encrypt-then-MAC (or EtM). Hence the names of the new functions added here are prefixed with "krb5_etm_". A critical second difference with previous crypt formulae is that the cipher state is included in the computed HMAC. Note however that for RPCSEC, the initial cipher state is easy to compute on both initiator and acceptor because it is always all zeroes. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
The RFC 8009 encryption types use a different key derivation function than the RFC 3962 encryption types. The new key derivation function is defined in Section 3 of RFC 8009. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
Fill in entries in the supported_gss_krb5_enctypes array for the encryption types defined in RFC 8009. These new enctypes use the SHA-256 and SHA-384 message digest algorithms (as defined in FIPS-180) instead of the deprecated SHA-1 algorithm, and are thus more secure. Note that NIST has scheduled SHA-1 for deprecation: https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2022/12/nist-retires-sha-1-cryptographic-algorithm Thus these new encryption types are placed under a separate CONFIG option to enable distributors to separately introduce support for the AES-SHA2 enctypes and deprecate support for the current set of AES-SHA1 encryption types as their user space allows. As this implementation is still a "beta", the default is to not build it automatically. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
Cryptosystem profile enctypes all use cipher block chaining with ciphertext steal (CBC-with-CTS). However enctypes that are currently supported in the Linux kernel SunRPC implementation use only the encrypt-&-MAC approach. The RFC 8009 enctypes use encrypt-then-MAC, which performs encryption and checksumming in a different order. Refactor to make it possible to share the CBC with CTS encryption and decryption mechanisms between e&M and etM enctypes. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
The aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192 enctype specifies the length of its checksum and integrity subkeys as 192 bits, but the length of its encryption subkey (Ke) as 256 bits. Add new fields to struct gss_krb5_enctype that specify the key lengths individually, and where needed, use the correct new field instead of ->keylength. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
Although the Kerberos specs have always listed separate subkey lengths, the Linux kernel's SunRPC GSS Kerberos enctype profiles assume the base key and the derived keys have identical lengths. The aes256-cts-hmac-sha384-192 enctype specifies the length of its checksum and integrity subkeys as 192 bits, but the length of its encryption subkey (Ke) as 256 bits. To support that enctype, parametrize context_v2_alloc_cipher() so that each of its call sites can pass in its desired key length. For now it will be the same length as before (gk5e->keylength), but a subsequent patch will change this. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
De-duplicate some common code. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
Each Kerberos enctype can have a different KDF. Refactor the key derivation path to support different KDFs for the enctypes introduced in subsequent patches. In particular, expose the key derivation function in struct gss_krb5_enctype instead of the enctype's preferred random-to-key function. The latter is usually the identity function and is only ever called during key derivation, so have each KDF call it directly. A couple of extra clean-ups: - Deduplicate the set_cdata() helper - Have ->derive_key return negative errnos, in accordance with usual kernel coding conventions This patch is a little bigger than I'd like, but these are all mechanical changes and they are all to the same areas of code. No behavior change is intended. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
Clean up: there is now only one encrypt and only one decrypt method, thus there is no longer a need for the v2-suffixed method names. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
Clean up: ->encrypt is set to only one value. Replace the two remaining call sites with direct calls to krb5_encrypt(). There have never been any call sites for the ->decrypt() method. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
Because the DES block cipher has been deprecated by Internet standard, highly secure configurations might require that DES support be blacklisted or not installed. NFS Kerberos should still be able to work correctly with only the AES-based enctypes in that situation. Also note that MIT Kerberos has begun a deprecation process for DES encryption types. Their README for 1.19.3 states: > Beginning with the krb5-1.19 release, a warning will be issued > if initial credentials are acquired using the des3-cbc-sha1 > encryption type. In future releases, this encryption type will > be disabled by default and eventually removed. > > Beginning with the krb5-1.18 release, single-DES encryption > types have been removed. Aside from the CONFIG option name change, there are two important policy changes: 1. The 'insecure enctype' group is now disabled by default. Distributors have to take action to enable support for deprecated enctypes. Implementation of these enctypes will be removed in a future kernel release. 2. des3-cbc-sha1 is now considered part of the 'insecure enctype' group, having been deprecated by RFC 8429, and is thus disabled by default After this patch is applied, SunRPC support can be built with Kerberos 5 support but without CRYPTO_DES enabled in the kernel. And, when these enctypes are disabled, the Linux kernel's SunRPC RPCSEC GSS implementation fully complies with BCP 179 / RFC 6649 and BCP 218 / RFC 8429. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
Now that all consumers of the KRB5_SUPPORTED_ENCTYPES macro are within the SunRPC layer, the macro can be replaced with something private and more flexible. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
Now that I've added a file under /proc/net/rpc that is managed by the SunRPC's Kerberos mechanism, replace NFSD's supported_krb5_enctypes file with a symlink to the new SunRPC proc file, which contains exactly the same content. Remarkably, commit b0b0c0a2 ("nfsd: add proc file listing kernel's gss_krb5 enctypes") added the nfsd_supported_krb5_enctypes file in 2011, but this file has never been documented in nfsd(7). Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
I would like to replace the KRB5_SUPPORTED_ENCTYPES macro so that there is finer granularity about what enctype support is built in to the kernel and then advertised by it. The /proc/fs/nfsd/supported_krb5_enctypes file is a legacy API that advertises supported enctypes to rpc.svcgssd (I think?). It simply prints the value of the KRB5_SUPPORTED_ENCTYPES macro, so it will need to be replaced with something that can instead display exactly which enctypes are configured and built into the SunRPC layer. Completely decommissioning such APIs is hard. Instead, add a file that is managed by SunRPC's GSS Kerberos mechanism, which is authoritative about enctype support status. A subsequent patch will replace /proc/fs/nfsd/supported_krb5_enctypes with a symlink to this new file. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
Replace another switch on encryption type so that it does not have to be modified when adding or removing support for an enctype. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
Replace a number of switches on encryption type so that all of them don't have to be modified when adding or removing support for an enctype. Tested-by:
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Chuck Lever authored
There's no need to keep the integrity keys around if we instead allocate and key a pair of ahashes and keep those. This not only enables the subkeys to be destroyed immediately after deriving them, but it makes the Kerberos integrity code path more efficient. Tested-by:
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