Skip to content

L
linux
Switch branch/tag
  1. 25 Oct, 2009 1 commit
  3. 24 Oct, 2009 1 commit
  5. 20 Oct, 2009 2 commits
  7. 13 Oct, 2009 1 commit
  9. 11 Oct, 2009 3 commits
  11. 07 Oct, 2009 3 commits
    • Stephen Smalley's avatar
      selinux: drop remapping of netlink classes · 941fc5b2
      Stephen Smalley authored 
      Drop remapping of netlink classes and bypass of permission checking
based on netlink message type for policy version < 18.  This removes
compatibility code introduced when the original single netlink
security class used for all netlink sockets was split into
finer-grained netlink classes based on netlink protocol and when
permission checking was added based on netlink message type in Linux
2.6.8.  The only known distribution that shipped with SELinux and
policy < 18 was Fedora Core 2, which was EOL'd on 2005-04-11.

Given that the remapping code was never updated to address the
addition of newer netlink classes, that the corresponding userland
support was dropped in 2005, and that the assumptions made by the
remapping code about the fixed ordering among netlink classes in the
policy may be violated in the future due to the dynamic class/perm
discovery support, we should drop this compatibility code now.
Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      941fc5b2
    • Stephen Smalley's avatar
      selinux: generate flask headers during kernel build · 8753f6be
      Stephen Smalley authored 
      Add a simple utility (scripts/selinux/genheaders) and invoke it to
generate the kernel-private class and permission indices in flask.h
and av_permissions.h automatically during the kernel build from the
security class mapping definitions in classmap.h.  Adding new kernel
classes and permissions can then be done just by adding them to classmap.h.
Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      8753f6be
    • Stephen Smalley's avatar
      selinux: dynamic class/perm discovery · c6d3aaa4
      Stephen Smalley authored 
      Modify SELinux to dynamically discover class and permission values
upon policy load, based on the dynamic object class/perm discovery
logic from libselinux.  A mapping is created between kernel-private
class and permission indices used outside the security server and the
policy values used within the security server.

The mappings are only applied upon kernel-internal computations;
similar mappings for the private indices of userspace object managers
is handled on a per-object manager basis by the userspace AVC.  The
interfaces for compute_av and transition_sid are split for kernel
vs. userspace; the userspace functions are distinguished by a _user
suffix.

The kernel-private class indices are no longer tied to the policy
values and thus do not need to skip indices for userspace classes;
thus the kernel class index values are compressed.  The flask.h
definitions were regenerated by deleting the userspace classes from
refpolicy's definitions and then regenerating the headers.  Going
forward, we can just maintain the flask.h, av_permissions.h, and
classmap.h definitions separately from policy as they are no longer
tied to the policy values.  The next patch introduces a utility to
automate generation of flask.h and av_permissions.h from the
classmap.h definitions.

The older kernel class and permission string tables are removed and
replaced by a single security class mapping table that is walked at
policy load to generate the mapping.  The old kernel class validation
logic is completely replaced by the mapping logic.

The handle unknown logic is reworked.  reject_unknown=1 is handled
when the mappings are computed at policy load time, similar to the old
handling by the class validation logic.  allow_unknown=1 is handled
when computing and mapping decisions - if the permission was not able
to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then it is
automatically added to the allowed vector.  If the class was not able
to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then all permissions
are allowed for it if allow_unknown=1.

avc_audit leverages the new security class mapping table to lookup the
class and permission names from the kernel-private indices.

The mdp program is updated to use the new table when generating the
class definitions and allow rules for a minimal boot policy for the
kernel.  It should be noted that this policy will not include any
userspace classes, nor will its policy index values for the kernel
classes correspond with the ones in refpolicy (they will instead match
the kernel-private indices).
Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      c6d3aaa4
  13. 30 Sep, 2009 2 commits
  15. 29 Sep, 2009 1 commit
  17. 27 Sep, 2009 14 commits
  19. 26 Sep, 2009 12 commits
GitLab Nexedi Edition | About GitLab | About Nexedi | 沪ICP备2021021310号-2 | 沪ICP备2021021310号-7