- 25 Apr, 2019 4 commits
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Colin Ian King authored
There is a spelling mistake in an error message in the qi_error_list array. Fix this. Signed-off-by:
Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Reviewed-by:
Mukesh Ojha <mojha@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Eric Biggers authored
The flags field in 'struct shash_desc' never actually does anything. The only ostensibly supported flag is CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP. However, no shash algorithm ever sleeps, making this flag a no-op. With this being the case, inevitably some users who can't sleep wrongly pass MAY_SLEEP. These would all need to be fixed if any shash algorithm actually started sleeping. For example, the shash_ahash_*() functions, which wrap a shash algorithm with the ahash API, pass through MAY_SLEEP from the ahash API to the shash API. However, the shash functions are called under kmap_atomic(), so actually they're assumed to never sleep. Even if it turns out that some users do need preemption points while hashing large buffers, we could easily provide a helper function crypto_shash_update_large() which divides the data into smaller chunks and calls crypto_shash_update() and cond_resched() for each chunk. It's not necessary to have a flag in 'struct shash_desc', nor is it necessary to make individual shash algorithms aware of this at all. Therefore, remove shash_desc::flags, and document that the crypto_shash_*() functions can be called from any context. Signed-off-by:
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
The nx driver uses the MAY_SLEEP flag in shash_desc::flags as an indicator to not retry sending the operation to the hardware as many times before returning -EBUSY. This is bogus because (1) that's not what the MAY_SLEEP flag is for, and (2) the shash API doesn't allow failing if the hardware is busy anyway. For now, just make it always retry the larger number of times. This doesn't actually fix this driver, but it at least makes it not use the shash_desc::flags field anymore. Then this field can be removed, as no other drivers use it. Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
The crypto_yield() in shash_ahash_digest() occurs after the entire digest operation already happened, so there's no real point. Remove it. Signed-off-by:
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- 19 Apr, 2019 2 commits
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Eric Biggers authored
CCM instances can be created by either the "ccm" template, which only allows choosing the block cipher, e.g. "ccm(aes)"; or by "ccm_base", which allows choosing the ctr and cbcmac implementations, e.g. "ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))". However, a "ccm_base" instance prevents a "ccm" instance from being registered using the same implementations. Nor will the instance be found by lookups of "ccm". This can be used as a denial of service. Moreover, "ccm_base" instances are never tested by the crypto self-tests, even if there are compatible "ccm" tests. The root cause of these problems is that instances of the two templates use different cra_names. Therefore, fix these problems by making "ccm_base" instances set the same cra_name as "ccm" instances, e.g. "ccm(aes)" instead of "ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))". This requires extracting the block cipher name from the name of the ctr and cbcmac algorithms. It also requires starting to verify that the algorithms are really ctr and cbcmac using the same block cipher, not something else entirely. But it would be bizarre if anyone were actually using non-ccm-compatible algorithms with ccm_base, so this shouldn't break anyone in practice. Fixes: 4a49b499 ("[CRYPTO] ccm: Added CCM mode") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
GCM instances can be created by either the "gcm" template, which only allows choosing the block cipher, e.g. "gcm(aes)"; or by "gcm_base", which allows choosing the ctr and ghash implementations, e.g. "gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic)". However, a "gcm_base" instance prevents a "gcm" instance from being registered using the same implementations. Nor will the instance be found by lookups of "gcm". This can be used as a denial of service. Moreover, "gcm_base" instances are never tested by the crypto self-tests, even if there are compatible "gcm" tests. The root cause of these problems is that instances of the two templates use different cra_names. Therefore, fix these problems by making "gcm_base" instances set the same cra_name as "gcm" instances, e.g. "gcm(aes)" instead of "gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic)". This requires extracting the block cipher name from the name of the ctr algorithm. It also requires starting to verify that the algorithms are really ctr and ghash, not something else entirely. But it would be bizarre if anyone were actually using non-gcm-compatible algorithms with gcm_base, so this shouldn't break anyone in practice. Fixes: d00aa19b ("[CRYPTO] gcm: Allow block cipher parameter") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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- 18 Apr, 2019 34 commits
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Eric Biggers authored
shash_ahash_digest(), which is the ->digest() method for ahash tfms that use an shash algorithm, has an optimization where crypto_shash_digest() is called if the data is in a single page. But an off-by-one error prevented this path from being taken unless the user happened to provide extra data in the scatterlist. Fix it. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
Replace all calls to in_interrupt() in the PowerPC crypto code with !crypto_simd_usable(). This causes the crypto self-tests to test the no-SIMD code paths when CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS=y. The p8_ghash algorithm is currently failing and needs to be fixed, as it produces the wrong digest when no-SIMD updates are mixed with SIMD ones. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
The cavium crypto driver adds 'sizeof(struct ablkcipher_request)' to its request size because "the cryptd daemon uses this memory for request_ctx information". This is incorrect and unnecessary; cryptd doesn't require wrapped algorithms to reserve extra request space. So remove this. Also remove the unneeded memset() of the tfm context to 0. It's already zeroed on allocation. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
Remove cryptd_alloc_ablkcipher() and the ability of cryptd to create algorithms with the deprecated "ablkcipher" type. This has been unused since commit 0e145b47 ("crypto: ablk_helper - remove ablk_helper"). Instead, cryptd_alloc_skcipher() is used. Signed-off-by:
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Sebastian Andrzej Siewior authored
In commit 71052dcf ("crypto: scompress - Use per-CPU struct instead multiple variables") I accidentally initialized multiple times the memory on a random CPU. I should have initialize the memory on every CPU like it has been done earlier. I didn't notice this because the scheduler didn't move the task to another CPU. Guenter managed to do that and the code crashed as expected. Allocate / free per-CPU memory on each CPU. Fixes: 71052dcf ("crypto: scompress - Use per-CPU struct instead multiple variables") Reported-by:
Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by:
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Tested-by:
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Zhang Zhijie authored
The Kernel Crypto API request output the next IV data to IV buffer for CBC implementation. So the last block data of ciphertext should be copid into assigned IV buffer. Reported-by:
Zhang Zhijie <zhangzj@rock-chips.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
Use subsys_initcall for registration of all templates and generic algorithm implementations, rather than module_init. Then change cryptomgr to use arch_initcall, to place it before the subsys_initcalls. This is needed so that when both a generic and optimized implementation of an algorithm are built into the kernel (not loadable modules), the generic implementation is registered before the optimized one. Otherwise, the self-tests for the optimized implementation are unable to allocate the generic implementation for the new comparison fuzz tests. Note that on arm, a side effect of this change is that self-tests for generic implementations may run before the unaligned access handler has been installed. So, unaligned accesses will crash the kernel. This is arguably a good thing as it makes it easier to detect that type of bug. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
When the extra crypto self-tests are enabled, test each AEAD algorithm against its generic implementation when one is available. This involves: checking the algorithm properties for consistency, then randomly generating test vectors using the generic implementation and running them against the implementation under test. Both good and bad inputs are tested. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
When the extra crypto self-tests are enabled, test each skcipher algorithm against its generic implementation when one is available. This involves: checking the algorithm properties for consistency, then randomly generating test vectors using the generic implementation and running them against the implementation under test. Both good and bad inputs are tested. This has already detected a bug in the skcipher_walk API, a bug in the LRW template, and an inconsistency in the cts implementations. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
When the extra crypto self-tests are enabled, test each hash algorithm against its generic implementation when one is available. This involves: checking the algorithm properties for consistency, then randomly generating test vectors using the generic implementation and running them against the implementation under test. Both good and bad inputs are tested. This has already detected a bug in the x86 implementation of poly1305, bugs in crct10dif, and an inconsistency in cbcmac. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
Add some helper functions in preparation for fuzz testing algorithms against their generic implementation. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
In preparation for fuzz testing algorithms against their generic implementation, make error messages in testmgr identify test vectors by name rather than index. Built-in test vectors are simply "named" by their index in testmgr.h, as before. But (in later patches) generated test vectors will be given more descriptive names to help developers debug problems detected with them. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
Update testmgr to support testing for specific errors from setkey() and digest() for hashes; setkey() and encrypt()/decrypt() for skciphers and ciphers; and setkey(), setauthsize(), and encrypt()/decrypt() for AEADs. This is useful because algorithms usually restrict the lengths or format of the message, key, and/or authentication tag in some way. And bad inputs should be tested too, not just good inputs. As part of this change, remove the ambiguously-named 'fail' flag and replace it with 'setkey_error = -EINVAL' for the only test vector that used it -- the DES weak key test vector. Note that this tightens the test to require -EINVAL rather than any error code, but AFAICS this won't cause any test failure. Other than that, these new fields aren't set on any test vectors yet. Later patches will do so. Signed-off-by:
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Vitaly Chikunov authored
Allow to use EC-RDSA signatures for IMA by determining signature type by the hash algorithm name. This works good for EC-RDSA since Streebog and EC-RDSA should always be used together. Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Reviewed-by:
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Vitaly Chikunov authored
Add testmgr test vectors for EC-RDSA algorithm for every of five supported parameters (curves). Because there are no officially published test vectors for the curves, the vectors are generated by gost-engine. Signed-off-by:
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Vitaly Chikunov authored
Add Elliptic Curve Russian Digital Signature Algorithm (GOST R 34.10-2012, RFC 7091, ISO/IEC 14888-3) is one of the Russian (and since 2018 the CIS countries) cryptographic standard algorithms (called GOST algorithms). Only signature verification is supported, with intent to be used in the IMA. Summary of the changes: * crypto/Kconfig: - EC-RDSA is added into Public-key cryptography section. * crypto/Makefile: - ecrdsa objects are added. * crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c: - Recognize EC-RDSA and Streebog OIDs. * include/linux/oid_registry.h: - EC-RDSA OIDs are added to the enum. Also, a two currently not implemented curve OIDs are added for possible extension later (to not change numbering and grouping). * crypto/ecc.c: - Kenneth MacKay copyright date is updated to 2014, because vli_mmod_slow, ecc_point_add, ecc_point_mult_shamir are based on his code from micro-ecc. - Functions needed for ecrdsa are EXPORT_SYMBOL'ed. - New functions: vli_is_negative - helper to determine sign of vli; vli_from_be64 - unpack big-endian array into vli (used for a signature); vli_from_le64 - unpack little-endian array into vli (used for a public key); vli_uadd, vli_usub - add/sub u64 value to/from vli (used for increment/decrement); mul_64_64 - optimized to use __int128 where appropriate, this speeds up point multiplication (and as a consequence signature verification) by the factor of 1.5-2; vli_umult - multiply vli by a small value (speeds up point multiplication by another factor of 1.5-2, depending on vli sizes); vli_mmod_special - module reduction for some form of Pseudo-Mersenne primes (used for the curves A); vli_mmod_special2 - module reduction for another form of Pseudo-Mersenne primes (used for the curves B); vli_mmod_barrett - module reduction using pre-computed value (used for the curve C); vli_mmod_slow - more general module reduction which is much slower (used when the modulus is subgroup order); vli_mod_mult_slow - modular multiplication; ecc_point_add - add two points; ecc_point_mult_shamir - add two points multiplied by scalars in one combined multiplication (this gives speed up by another factor 2 in compare to two separate multiplications). ecc_is_pubkey_valid_partial - additional samity check is added. - Updated vli_mmod_fast with non-strict heuristic to call optimal module reduction function depending on the prime value; - All computations for the previously defined (two NIST) curves should not unaffected. * crypto/ecc.h: - Newly exported functions are documented. * crypto/ecrdsa_defs.h - Five curves are defined. * crypto/ecrdsa.c: - Signature verification is implemented. * crypto/ecrdsa_params.asn1, crypto/ecrdsa_pub_key.asn1: - Templates for BER decoder for EC-RDSA parameters and public key. Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: -
Vitaly Chikunov authored
ecc.c have algorithms that could be used togeter by ecdh and ecrdsa. Make it separate module. Add CRYPTO_ECC into Kconfig. EXPORT_SYMBOL and document to what seems appropriate. Move structs ecc_point and ecc_curve from ecc_curve_defs.h into ecc.h. No code changes. Signed-off-by:
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Vitaly Chikunov authored
Group RSA, DH, and ECDH into Public-key cryptography config section. Signed-off-by:
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Vitaly Chikunov authored
Some public key algorithms (like EC-DSA) keep in parameters field important data such as digest and curve OIDs (possibly more for different EC-DSA variants). Thus, just setting a public key (as for RSA) is not enough. Append parameters into the key stream for akcipher_set_{pub,priv}_key. Appended data is: (u32) algo OID, (u32) parameters length, parameters data. This does not affect current akcipher API nor RSA ciphers (they could ignore it). Idea of appending parameters to the key stream is by Herbert Xu. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Vitaly Chikunov authored
Treat (struct public_key_signature)'s digest same as its signature (s). Since digest should be already in the kmalloc'd memory do not kmemdup digest value before calling {public,tpm}_key_verify_signature. Patch is split from the previous as suggested by Herbert Xu. Suggested-by:David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Vitaly Chikunov authored
Previous akcipher .verify() just `decrypts' (using RSA encrypt which is using public key) signature to uncover message hash, which was then compared in upper level public_key_verify_signature() with the expected hash value, which itself was never passed into verify(). This approach was incompatible with EC-DSA family of algorithms, because, to verify a signature EC-DSA algorithm also needs a hash value as input; then it's used (together with a signature divided into halves `r||s') to produce a witness value, which is then compared with `r' to determine if the signature is correct. Thus, for EC-DSA, nor requirements of .verify() itself, nor its output expectations in public_key_verify_signature() wasn't sufficient. Make improved .verify() call which gets hash value as input and produce complete signature check without any output besides status. Now for the top level verification only crypto_akcipher_verify() needs to be called and its return value inspected. Make sure that `digest' is in kmalloc'd memory (in place of `output`) in {public,tpm}_key_verify_signature() as insisted by Herbert Xu, and will be changed in the following commit. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: -
Vitaly Chikunov authored
In preparation for new akcipher verify call remove sign/verify callbacks from RSA backends and make PKCS1 driver call encrypt/decrypt instead. This also complies with the well-known idea that raw RSA should never be used for sign/verify. It only should be used with proper padding scheme such as PKCS1 driver provides. Cc: Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com> Cc: qat-linux@intel.com Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Cc: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Cc: Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@nxp.com> Signed-off-by:
Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Acked-by:
Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
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Vitaly Chikunov authored
Because with the introduction of EC-RDSA and change in workings of RSA in regard to sign/verify, akcipher could have not all callbacks defined, check the presence of callbacks in crypto_register_akcipher() and provide default implementation if the callback is not implemented. This is suggested by Herbert Xu instead of checking the presence of the callback on every request. Signed-off-by:
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Herbert Xu authored
This patch forbids the use of 2-key 3DES (K1 == K3) in FIPS mode. It also removes the registration of the non-standard des/des3 ablkcipher algorithms. Signed-off-by: -
Herbert Xu authored
This patch forbids the use of 2-key 3DES (K1 == K3) in FIPS mode. Signed-off-by: -
Herbert Xu authored
This patch forbids the use of 2-key 3DES (K1 == K3) in FIPS mode. Signed-off-by:
Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com> Tested-by:
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Herbert Xu authored
This patch forbids the use of 2-key 3DES (K1 == K3) in FIPS mode. Signed-off-by:
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Herbert Xu authored
This patch forbids the use of 2-key 3DES (K1 == K3) in FIPS mode. It also removes a couple of unnecessary key length checks that are already performed by the crypto API. Signed-off-by: -
Herbert Xu authored
This patch forbids the use of 2-key 3DES (K1 == K3) in FIPS mode. Signed-off-by: -
Herbert Xu authored
This patch forbids the use of 2-key 3DES (K1 == K3) in FIPS mode. It also removes an unnecessary key length checks that are already performed by the crypto API. Signed-off-by: -
Herbert Xu authored
This patch forbids the use of 2-key 3DES (K1 == K3) in FIPS mode. It also removes a couple of unnecessary key length checks that are already performed by the crypto API. Signed-off-by: -
Herbert Xu authored
This patch forbids the use of 2-key 3DES (K1 == K3) in FIPS mode. Signed-off-by: -
Herbert Xu authored
This patch forbids the use of 2-key 3DES (K1 == K3) in FIPS mode. Signed-off-by: -
Herbert Xu authored
This patch forbids the use of 2-key 3DES (K1 == K3) in FIPS mode. Signed-off-by:
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