1. 09 Aug, 2016 1 commit
  2. 08 Aug, 2016 23 commits
  3. 03 Aug, 2016 1 commit
    • Florian Westphal's avatar
      netfilter: x_tables: speed up jump target validation · f5bba514
      Florian Westphal authored
      [ Upstream commit f4dc7771 ]
      
      The dummy ruleset I used to test the original validation change was broken,
      most rules were unreachable and were not tested by mark_source_chains().
      
      In some cases rulesets that used to load in a few seconds now require
      several minutes.
      
      sample ruleset that shows the behaviour:
      
      echo "*filter"
      for i in $(seq 0 100000);do
              printf ":chain_%06x - [0:0]\n" $i
      done
      for i in $(seq 0 100000);do
         printf -- "-A INPUT -j chain_%06x\n" $i
         printf -- "-A INPUT -j chain_%06x\n" $i
         printf -- "-A INPUT -j chain_%06x\n" $i
      done
      echo COMMIT
      
      [ pipe result into iptables-restore ]
      
      This ruleset will be about 74mbyte in size, with ~500k searches
      though all 500k[1] rule entries. iptables-restore will take forever
      (gave up after 10 minutes)
      
      Instead of always searching the entire blob for a match, fill an
      array with the start offsets of every single ipt_entry struct,
      then do a binary search to check if the jump target is present or not.
      
      After this change ruleset restore times get again close to what one
      gets when reverting 36472341 (~3 seconds on my workstation).
      
      [1] every user-defined rule gets an implicit RETURN, so we get
      300k jumps + 100k userchains + 100k returns -> 500k rule entries
      
      Fixes: 36472341 ("netfilter: x_tables: validate targets of jumps")
      Reported-by: default avatarJeff Wu <wujiafu@gmail.com>
      Tested-by: default avatarJeff Wu <wujiafu@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarFlorian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarFlorian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarSasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
      f5bba514
  4. 01 Aug, 2016 2 commits
  5. 30 Jul, 2016 1 commit
  6. 20 Jul, 2016 9 commits
  7. 19 Jul, 2016 3 commits
    • Ursula Braun's avatar
      qeth: delete napi struct when removing a qeth device · 8c2cb775
      Ursula Braun authored
      [ Upstream commit 7831b4ff ]
      
      A qeth_card contains a napi_struct linked to the net_device during
      device probing. This struct must be deleted when removing the qeth
      device, otherwise Panic on oops can occur when qeth devices are
      repeatedly removed and added.
      
      Fixes: a1c3ed4c ("qeth: NAPI support for l2 and l3 discipline")
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.37+
      Signed-off-by: default avatarUrsula Braun <ubraun@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Tested-by: default avatarAlexander Klein <ALKL@de.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarSasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
      8c2cb775
    • Takashi Iwai's avatar
      ALSA: timer: Fix negative queue usage by racy accesses · a851e568
      Takashi Iwai authored
      [ Upstream commit 3fa6993f ]
      
      The user timer tu->qused counter may go to a negative value when
      multiple concurrent reads are performed since both the check and the
      decrement of tu->qused are done in two individual locked contexts.
      This results in bogus read outs, and the endless loop in the
      user-space side.
      
      The fix is to move the decrement of the tu->qused counter into the
      same spinlock context as the zero-check of the counter.
      
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTakashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarSasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
      a851e568
    • Omar Sandoval's avatar
      block: fix use-after-free in sys_ioprio_get() · b86ef7ef
      Omar Sandoval authored
      [ Upstream commit 8ba86821 ]
      
      get_task_ioprio() accesses the task->io_context without holding the task
      lock and thus can race with exit_io_context(), leading to a
      use-after-free. The reproducer below hits this within a few seconds on
      my 4-core QEMU VM:
      
      #define _GNU_SOURCE
      #include <assert.h>
      #include <unistd.h>
      #include <sys/syscall.h>
      #include <sys/wait.h>
      
      int main(int argc, char **argv)
      {
      	pid_t pid, child;
      	long nproc, i;
      
      	/* ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0, IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_IDLE, 0)); */
      	syscall(SYS_ioprio_set, 1, 0, 0x6000);
      
      	nproc = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN);
      
      	for (i = 0; i < nproc; i++) {
      		pid = fork();
      		assert(pid != -1);
      		if (pid == 0) {
      			for (;;) {
      				pid = fork();
      				assert(pid != -1);
      				if (pid == 0) {
      					_exit(0);
      				} else {
      					child = wait(NULL);
      					assert(child == pid);
      				}
      			}
      		}
      
      		pid = fork();
      		assert(pid != -1);
      		if (pid == 0) {
      			for (;;) {
      				/* ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PGRP, 0); */
      				syscall(SYS_ioprio_get, 2, 0);
      			}
      		}
      	}
      
      	for (;;) {
      		/* ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PGRP, 0); */
      		syscall(SYS_ioprio_get, 2, 0);
      	}
      
      	return 0;
      }
      
      This gets us KASAN dumps like this:
      
      [   35.526914] ==================================================================
      [   35.530009] BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in get_task_ioprio+0x7b/0x90 at addr ffff880066f34e6c
      [   35.530009] Read of size 2 by task ioprio-gpf/363
      [   35.530009] =============================================================================
      [   35.530009] BUG blkdev_ioc (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
      [   35.530009] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
      
      [   35.530009] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
      [   35.530009] INFO: Allocated in create_task_io_context+0x2b/0x370 age=0 cpu=0 pid=360
      [   35.530009] 	___slab_alloc+0x55d/0x5a0
      [   35.530009] 	__slab_alloc.isra.20+0x2b/0x40
      [   35.530009] 	kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x84/0x200
      [   35.530009] 	create_task_io_context+0x2b/0x370
      [   35.530009] 	get_task_io_context+0x92/0xb0
      [   35.530009] 	copy_process.part.8+0x5029/0x5660
      [   35.530009] 	_do_fork+0x155/0x7e0
      [   35.530009] 	SyS_clone+0x19/0x20
      [   35.530009] 	do_syscall_64+0x195/0x3a0
      [   35.530009] 	return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
      [   35.530009] INFO: Freed in put_io_context+0xe7/0x120 age=0 cpu=0 pid=1060
      [   35.530009] 	__slab_free+0x27b/0x3d0
      [   35.530009] 	kmem_cache_free+0x1fb/0x220
      [   35.530009] 	put_io_context+0xe7/0x120
      [   35.530009] 	put_io_context_active+0x238/0x380
      [   35.530009] 	exit_io_context+0x66/0x80
      [   35.530009] 	do_exit+0x158e/0x2b90
      [   35.530009] 	do_group_exit+0xe5/0x2b0
      [   35.530009] 	SyS_exit_group+0x1d/0x20
      [   35.530009] 	entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa4
      [   35.530009] INFO: Slab 0xffffea00019bcd00 objects=20 used=4 fp=0xffff880066f34ff0 flags=0x1fffe0000004080
      [   35.530009] INFO: Object 0xffff880066f34e58 @offset=3672 fp=0x0000000000000001
      [   35.530009] ==================================================================
      
      Fix it by grabbing the task lock while we poke at the io_context.
      
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Reported-by: default avatarDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarOmar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarSasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
      b86ef7ef