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  1. 06 May, 2016 1 commit
  3. 18 Apr, 2016 4 commits
    • Lv Zheng's avatar
      ACPI / tables: Convert initrd table override to table upgrade mechanism · 5d881327
      Lv Zheng authored 
      This patch converts the initrd table override mechanism to the table
upgrade mechanism by restricting its usage to the tables released with
compatibility and more recent revision.

This use case has been encouraged by the ACPI specification:

 1. OEMID:
    An OEM-supplied string that identifies the OEM.

 2. OEM Table ID:
    An OEM-supplied string that the OEM uses to identify the particular data
    table. This field is particularly useful when defining a definition
    block to distinguish definition block functions. OEM assigns each
    dissimilar table a new OEM Table Id.

 3. OEM Revision:
    An OEM-supplied revision number. Larger numbers are assumed to be newer
    revisions.

For OEMs, good practices will ensure consistency when assigning OEMID and
OEM Table ID fields in any table. The intent of these fields is to allow
for a binary control system that support services can use. Because many
support function can be automated, it is useful when a tool can
programatically determine which table release is a compatible and more
recent revision of a prior table on the same OEMID and OEM Table ID.

The facility can now be used by the vendors to upgrade wrong tables for bug
fixing purpose, thus lockdep disabling taint is not suitable for it and it
should be a default 'y' option to implement the spec encouraged use case.

Note that, by implementing table upgrade inside of ACPICA itself, it is
possible to remove acpi_table_initrd_override() and tables can be upgraded
by acpi_install_table() automatically. Though current ACPICA impelentation
hasn't implemented this, this patched changes the table flag setting timing
to allow this to be implemented in ACPICA without changing the code here.

Documentation of initrd override mechanism is upgraded accordingly.
Original-by: default avatarOctavian Purdila <octavian.purdila@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
      5d881327
    • Lv Zheng's avatar
      ACPI / x86: Cleanup initrd related code · af06f8b7
      Lv Zheng authored 
      In arch/x86/kernel/setup.c, the #ifdef kept for CONFIG_ACPI actually is
related to the accessibility of initrd_start/initrd_end, so the stub should
be provided from this source file and should only be dependent on
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD.

Note that when ACPI=n and BLK_DEV_INITRD=y, early_initrd_acpi_init() is
still a stub because of the stub prepared for early_acpi_table_init().
Signed-off-by: default avatarLv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
      af06f8b7
    • Lv Zheng's avatar
      ACPI / tables: Move table override mechanisms to tables.c · 5ae74f2c
      Lv Zheng authored 
      This patch moves acpi_os_table_override() and
acpi_os_physical_table_override() to tables.c.

Along with the mechanisms, acpi_initrd_initialize_tables() is also moved to
tables.c to form a static function. The following functions are renamed
according to this change:
 1. acpi_initrd_override() -> renamed to early_acpi_table_init(), which
    invokes acpi_table_initrd_init()
 2. acpi_os_physical_table_override() -> which invokes
    acpi_table_initrd_override()
 3. acpi_initialize_initrd_tables() -> renamed to acpi_table_initrd_scan()
Signed-off-by: default avatarLv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
      5ae74f2c
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Linux 4.6-rc4 · c3b46c73
      Linus Torvalds authored
      c3b46c73
  5. 17 Apr, 2016 5 commits
  7. 16 Apr, 2016 7 commits
  9. 15 Apr, 2016 17 commits
  11. 14 Apr, 2016 6 commits
    • Mike Snitzer's avatar
      dm cache metadata: fix READ_LOCK macros and cleanup WRITE_LOCK macros · 9567366f
      Mike Snitzer authored 
      The READ_LOCK macro was incorrectly returning -EINVAL if
dm_bm_is_read_only() was true -- it will always be true once the cache
metadata transitions to read-only by dm_cache_metadata_set_read_only().

Wrap READ_LOCK and WRITE_LOCK multi-statement macros in do {} while(0).
Also, all accesses of the 'cmd' argument passed to these related macros
are now encapsulated in parenthesis.

A follow-up patch can be developed to eliminate the use of macros in
favor of pure C code.  Avoiding that now given that this needs to apply
to stable@.
Reported-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Fixes: d14fcf3d ("dm cache: make sure every metadata function checks fail_io")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      9567366f
    • Keith Busch's avatar
      NVMe: Always use MSI/MSI-x interrupts · a5229050
      Keith Busch authored 
      Multiple users have reported device initialization failure due the driver
not receiving legacy PCI interrupts. This is not unique to any particular
controller, but has been observed on multiple platforms.

There have been no issues reported or observed when with message signaled
interrupts, so this patch attempts to use MSI-x during initialization,
falling back to MSI. If that fails, legacy would become the default.

The setup_io_queues error handling had to change as a result: the admin
queue's msix_entry used to be initialized to the legacy IRQ. The case
where nr_io_queues is 0 would fail request_irq when setting up the admin
queue's interrupt since re-enabling MSI-x fails with 0 vectors, leaving
the admin queue's msix_entry invalid. Instead, return success immediately.
Reported-by: default avatarTim Muhlemmer <muhlemmer@gmail.com>
Reported-by: default avatarJon Derrick <jonathan.derrick@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKeith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
      a5229050
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      /proc/iomem: only expose physical resource addresses to privileged users · 51d7b120
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      In commit c4004b02 ("x86: remove the kernel code/data/bss resources
from /proc/iomem") I was hoping to remove the phyiscal kernel address
data from /proc/iomem entirely, but that had to be reverted because some
system programs actually use it.

This limits all the detailed resource information to properly
credentialed users instead.
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      51d7b120
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      pci-sysfs: use proper file capability helper function · ab0fa82b
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      The PCI config access checked the file capabilities correctly, but used
the itnernal security capability check rather than the helper function
that is actually meant for that.

The security_capable() has unusual return values and is not meant to be
used elsewhere (the only other use is in the capability checking
functions that we actually intend people to use, and this odd PCI usage
really stood out when looking around the capability code.
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      ab0fa82b
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Make file credentials available to the seqfile interfaces · 34dbbcdb
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      A lot of seqfile users seem to be using things like %pK that uses the
credentials of the current process, but that is actually completely
wrong for filesystem interfaces.

The unix semantics for permission checking files is to check permissions
at _open_ time, not at read or write time, and that is not just a small
detail: passing off stdin/stdout/stderr to a suid application and making
the actual IO happen in privileged context is a classic exploit
technique.

So if we want to be able to look at permissions at read time, we need to
use the file open credentials, not the current ones.  Normal file
accesses can just use "f_cred" (or any of the helper functions that do
that, like file_ns_capable()), but the seqfile interfaces do not have
any such options.

It turns out that seq_file _does_ save away the user_ns information of
the file, though.  Since user_ns is just part of the full credential
information, replace that special case with saving off the cred pointer
instead, and suddenly seq_file has all the permission information it
needs.
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      34dbbcdb
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Revert "x86: remove the kernel code/data/bss resources from /proc/iomem" · 4046d6e8
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      This reverts commit c4004b02.

Sadly, my hope that nobody would actually use the special kernel entries
in /proc/iomem were dashed by kexec.  Which reads /proc/iomem explicitly
to find the kernel base address.  Nasty.

Anyway, that means we can't do the sane and simple thing and just remove
the entries, and we'll instead have to mask them out based on permissions.
Reported-by: default avatarZhengyu Zhang <zhezhang@redhat.com>
Reported-by: default avatarDave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Reported-by: default avatarFreeman Zhang <freeman.zhang1992@gmail.com>
Reported-by: default avatarEmrah Demir <ed@abdsec.com>
Reported-by: default avatarBaoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      4046d6e8
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