1. 09 Jun, 2020 7 commits
    • Thomas Gleixner's avatar
      x86/vdso: Unbreak paravirt VDSO clocks · 7778d841
      Thomas Gleixner authored
      The conversion of x86 VDSO to the generic clock mode storage broke the
      paravirt and hyperv clocksource logic. These clock sources have their own
      internal sequence counter to validate the clocksource at the point of
      reading it. This is necessary because the hypervisor can invalidate the
      clocksource asynchronously so a check during the VDSO data update is not
      sufficient. If the internal check during read invalidates the clocksource
      the read return U64_MAX. The original code checked this efficiently by
      testing whether the result (casted to signed) is negative, i.e. bit 63 is
      set. This was done that way because an extra indicator for the validity had
      more overhead.
      
      The conversion broke this check because the check was replaced by a check
      for a valid VDSO clock mode.
      
      The wreckage manifests itself when the paravirt clock is installed as a
      valid VDSO clock and during runtime invalidated by the hypervisor,
      e.g. after a host suspend/resume cycle. After the invalidation the read
      function returns U64_MAX which is used as cycles and makes the clock jump
      by ~2200 seconds, and become stale until the 2200 seconds have elapsed
      where it starts to jump again. The period of this effect depends on the
      shift/mult pair of the clocksource and the jumps and staleness are an
      artifact of undefined but reproducible behaviour of math overflow.
      
      Implement an x86 version of the new vdso_cycles_ok() inline which adds this
      check back and a variant of vdso_clocksource_ok() which lets the compiler
      optimize it out to avoid the extra conditional. That's suboptimal when the
      system does not have a VDSO capable clocksource, but that's not the case
      which is optimized for.
      
      Fixes: 5d51bee7 ("clocksource: Add common vdso clock mode storage")
      Reported-by: default avatarMiklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Tested-by: default avatarMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200606221532.080560273@linutronix.de
      7778d841
    • Thomas Gleixner's avatar
      lib/vdso: Provide sanity check for cycles (again) · 72ce7780
      Thomas Gleixner authored
      The original x86 VDSO implementation checked for the validity of the clock
      source read by testing whether the returned signed cycles value is less
      than zero. This check was also used by the vdso read function to signal
      that the current selected clocksource is not VDSO capable.
      
      During the rework of the VDSO code the check was removed and replaced with
      a check for the clocksource mode being != NONE.
      
      This turned out to be a mistake because the check is necessary for paravirt
      and hyperv clock sources. The reason is that these clock sources have their
      own internal sequence counter to validate the clocksource at the point of
      reading it. This is necessary because the hypervisor can invalidate the
      clocksource asynchronously so a check during the VDSO data update is not
      sufficient. Having a separate indicator for the validity is slower than
      just validating the cycles value. The check for it being negative turned
      out to be the fastest implementation and safe as it would require an uptime
      of ~73 years with a 4GHz counter frequency to result in a false positive.
      
      Add an optional function to validate the cycles with a default
      implementation which allows the compiler to optimize it out for
      architectures which do not require it.
      
      Fixes: 5d51bee7 ("clocksource: Add common vdso clock mode storage")
      Reported-by: default avatarMiklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Tested-by: default avatarMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200606221531.963970768@linutronix.de
      72ce7780
    • Thomas Gleixner's avatar
      clocksource: Remove obsolete ifdef · c7f3d43b
      Thomas Gleixner authored
      CONFIG_GENERIC_VDSO_CLOCK_MODE was a transitional config switch which got
      removed after all architectures got converted to the new storage model.
      
      But the removal forgot to remove the #ifdef which guards the
      vdso_clock_mode sanity check, which effectively disables the sanity check.
      
      Remove it now.
      
      Fixes: f86fd32d ("lib/vdso: Cleanup clock mode storage leftovers")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Tested-by: default avatarMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200606221531.845475036@linutronix.de
      c7f3d43b
    • Bob Haarman's avatar
      x86_64: Fix jiffies ODR violation · d8ad6d39
      Bob Haarman authored
      'jiffies' and 'jiffies_64' are meant to alias (two different symbols that
      share the same address).  Most architectures make the symbols alias to the
      same address via a linker script assignment in their
      arch/<arch>/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S:
      
      jiffies = jiffies_64;
      
      which is effectively a definition of jiffies.
      
      jiffies and jiffies_64 are both forward declared for all architectures in
      include/linux/jiffies.h. jiffies_64 is defined in kernel/time/timer.c.
      
      x86_64 was peculiar in that it wasn't doing the above linker script
      assignment, but rather was:
      1. defining jiffies in arch/x86/kernel/time.c instead via the linker script.
      2. overriding the symbol jiffies_64 from kernel/time/timer.c in
      arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.s via 'jiffies_64 = jiffies;'.
      
      As Fangrui notes:
      
        In LLD, symbol assignments in linker scripts override definitions in
        object files. GNU ld appears to have the same behavior. It would
        probably make sense for LLD to error "duplicate symbol" but GNU ld
        is unlikely to adopt for compatibility reasons.
      
      This results in an ODR violation (UB), which seems to have survived
      thus far. Where it becomes harmful is when;
      
      1. -fno-semantic-interposition is used:
      
      As Fangrui notes:
      
        Clang after LLVM commit 5b22bcc2b70d
        ("[X86][ELF] Prefer to lower MC_GlobalAddress operands to .Lfoo$local")
        defaults to -fno-semantic-interposition similar semantics which help
        -fpic/-fPIC code avoid GOT/PLT when the referenced symbol is defined
        within the same translation unit. Unlike GCC
        -fno-semantic-interposition, Clang emits such relocations referencing
        local symbols for non-pic code as well.
      
      This causes references to jiffies to refer to '.Ljiffies$local' when
      jiffies is defined in the same translation unit. Likewise, references to
      jiffies_64 become references to '.Ljiffies_64$local' in translation units
      that define jiffies_64.  Because these differ from the names used in the
      linker script, they will not be rewritten to alias one another.
      
      2. Full LTO
      
      Full LTO effectively treats all source files as one translation
      unit, causing these local references to be produced everywhere.  When
      the linker processes the linker script, there are no longer any
      references to jiffies_64' anywhere to replace with 'jiffies'.  And
      thus '.Ljiffies$local' and '.Ljiffies_64$local' no longer alias
      at all.
      
      In the process of porting patches enabling Full LTO from arm64 to x86_64,
      spooky bugs have been observed where the kernel appeared to boot, but init
      doesn't get scheduled.
      
      Avoid the ODR violation by matching other architectures and define jiffies
      only by linker script.  For -fno-semantic-interposition + Full LTO, there
      is no longer a global definition of jiffies for the compiler to produce a
      local symbol which the linker script won't ensure aliases to jiffies_64.
      
      Fixes: 40747ffa ("asmlinkage: Make jiffies visible")
      Reported-by: default avatarNathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
      Reported-by: default avatarAlistair Delva <adelva@google.com>
      Debugged-by: default avatarNick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
      Debugged-by: default avatarSami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
      Suggested-by: default avatarFangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarBob Haarman <inglorion@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com> # build+boot on
      Reviewed-by: default avatarAndi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/852
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200602193100.229287-1-inglorion@google.com
      d8ad6d39
    • Anthony Steinhauser's avatar
      x86/speculation: PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE enforcement for indirect branches. · 4d8df8cb
      Anthony Steinhauser authored
      Currently, it is possible to enable indirect branch speculation even after
      it was force-disabled using the PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE option. Moreover, the
      PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL command gives afterwards an incorrect result
      (force-disabled when it is in fact enabled). This also is inconsistent
      vs. STIBP and the documention which cleary states that
      PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE cannot be undone.
      
      Fix this by actually enforcing force-disabled indirect branch
      speculation. PR_SPEC_ENABLE called after PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE now fails
      with -EPERM as described in the documentation.
      
      Fixes: 9137bb27 ("x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAnthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      4d8df8cb
    • Anthony Steinhauser's avatar
      x86/speculation: Prevent rogue cross-process SSBD shutdown · dbbe2ad0
      Anthony Steinhauser authored
      On context switch the change of TIF_SSBD and TIF_SPEC_IB are evaluated
      to adjust the mitigations accordingly. This is optimized to avoid the
      expensive MSR write if not needed.
      
      This optimization is buggy and allows an attacker to shutdown the SSBD
      protection of a victim process.
      
      The update logic reads the cached base value for the speculation control
      MSR which has neither the SSBD nor the STIBP bit set. It then OR's the
      SSBD bit only when TIF_SSBD is different and requests the MSR update.
      
      That means if TIF_SSBD of the previous and next task are the same, then
      the base value is not updated, even if TIF_SSBD is set. The MSR write is
      not requested.
      
      Subsequently if the TIF_STIBP bit differs then the STIBP bit is updated
      in the base value and the MSR is written with a wrong SSBD value.
      
      This was introduced when the per task/process conditional STIPB
      switching was added on top of the existing SSBD switching.
      
      It is exploitable if the attacker creates a process which enforces SSBD
      and has the contrary value of STIBP than the victim process (i.e. if the
      victim process enforces STIBP, the attacker process must not enforce it;
      if the victim process does not enforce STIBP, the attacker process must
      enforce it) and schedule it on the same core as the victim process. If
      the victim runs after the attacker the victim becomes vulnerable to
      Spectre V4.
      
      To fix this, update the MSR value independent of the TIF_SSBD difference
      and dependent on the SSBD mitigation method available. This ensures that
      a subsequent STIPB initiated MSR write has the correct state of SSBD.
      
      [ tglx: Handle X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD & X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD correctly
              and massaged changelog ]
      
      Fixes: 5bfbe3ad ("x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAnthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      dbbe2ad0
    • Anthony Steinhauser's avatar
      x86/speculation: Avoid force-disabling IBPB based on STIBP and enhanced IBRS. · 21998a35
      Anthony Steinhauser authored
      When STIBP is unavailable or enhanced IBRS is available, Linux
      force-disables the IBPB mitigation of Spectre-BTB even when simultaneous
      multithreading is disabled. While attempts to enable IBPB using
      prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, ...) fail with
      EPERM, the seccomp syscall (or its prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, ...) equivalent)
      which are used e.g. by Chromium or OpenSSH succeed with no errors but the
      application remains silently vulnerable to cross-process Spectre v2 attacks
      (classical BTB poisoning). At the same time the SYSFS reporting
      (/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2) displays that IBPB is
      conditionally enabled when in fact it is unconditionally disabled.
      
      STIBP is useful only when SMT is enabled. When SMT is disabled and STIBP is
      unavailable, it makes no sense to force-disable also IBPB, because IBPB
      protects against cross-process Spectre-BTB attacks regardless of the SMT
      state. At the same time since missing STIBP was only observed on AMD CPUs,
      AMD does not recommend using STIBP, but recommends using IBPB, so disabling
      IBPB because of missing STIBP goes directly against AMD's advice:
      https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Architecture_Guidelines_Update_Indirect_Branch_Control.pdf
      
      Similarly, enhanced IBRS is designed to protect cross-core BTB poisoning
      and BTB-poisoning attacks from user space against kernel (and
      BTB-poisoning attacks from guest against hypervisor), it is not designed
      to prevent cross-process (or cross-VM) BTB poisoning between processes (or
      VMs) running on the same core. Therefore, even with enhanced IBRS it is
      necessary to flush the BTB during context-switches, so there is no reason
      to force disable IBPB when enhanced IBRS is available.
      
      Enable the prctl control of IBPB even when STIBP is unavailable or enhanced
      IBRS is available.
      
      Fixes: 7cc765a6 ("x86/speculation: Enable prctl mode for spectre_v2_user")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAnthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      21998a35
  2. 03 Jun, 2020 1 commit
  3. 01 Jun, 2020 1 commit
  4. 31 May, 2020 15 commits
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Linux 5.7 · 3d77e6a8
      Linus Torvalds authored
      3d77e6a8
    • Joe Perches's avatar
      checkpatch/coding-style: deprecate 80-column warning · bdc48fa1
      Joe Perches authored
      Yes, staying withing 80 columns is certainly still _preferred_.  But
      it's not the hard limit that the checkpatch warnings imply, and other
      concerns can most certainly dominate.
      
      Increase the default limit to 100 characters.  Not because 100
      characters is some hard limit either, but that's certainly a "what are
      you doing" kind of value and less likely to be about the occasional
      slightly longer lines.
      
      Miscellanea:
      
       - to avoid unnecessary whitespace changes in files, checkpatch will no
         longer emit a warning about line length when scanning files unless
         --strict is also used
      
       - Add a bit to coding-style about alignment to open parenthesis
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJoe Perches <joe@perches.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      bdc48fa1
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge tag 'x86-urgent-2020-05-31' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip · 8fc984ae
      Linus Torvalds authored
      Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
       "A pile of x86 fixes:
      
         - Prevent a memory leak in ioperm which was caused by the stupid
           assumption that the exit cleanup is always called for current,
           which is not the case when fork fails after taking a reference on
           the ioperm bitmap.
      
         - Fix an arithmething overflow in the DMA code on 32bit systems
      
         - Fill gaps in the xstate copy with defaults instead of leaving them
           uninitialized
      
         - Revert: "Make __X32_SYSCALL_BIT be unsigned long" as it turned out
           that existing user space fails to build"
      
      * tag 'x86-urgent-2020-05-31' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
        x86/ioperm: Prevent a memory leak when fork fails
        x86/dma: Fix max PFN arithmetic overflow on 32 bit systems
        copy_xstate_to_kernel(): don't leave parts of destination uninitialized
        x86/syscalls: Revert "x86/syscalls: Make __X32_SYSCALL_BIT be unsigned long"
      8fc984ae
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge tag 'sched-urgent-2020-05-31' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip · 3d042823
      Linus Torvalds authored
      Pull scheduler fix from Thomas Gleixner:
       "A single scheduler fix preventing a crash in NUMA balancing.
      
        The current->mm check is not reliable as the mm might be temporary due
        to use_mm() in a kthread. Check for PF_KTHREAD explictly"
      
      * tag 'sched-urgent-2020-05-31' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
        sched/fair: Don't NUMA balance for kthreads
      3d042823
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net · 19835b1b
      Linus Torvalds authored
      Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
       "Another week, another set of bug fixes:
      
         1) Fix pskb_pull length in __xfrm_transport_prep(), from Xin Long.
      
         2) Fix double xfrm_state put in esp{4,6}_gro_receive(), also from Xin
            Long.
      
         3) Re-arm discovery timer properly in mac80211 mesh code, from Linus
            Lüssing.
      
         4) Prevent buffer overflows in nf_conntrack_pptp debug code, from
            Pablo Neira Ayuso.
      
         5) Fix race in ktls code between tls_sw_recvmsg() and
            tls_decrypt_done(), from Vinay Kumar Yadav.
      
         6) Fix crashes on TCP fallback in MPTCP code, from Paolo Abeni.
      
         7) More validation is necessary of untrusted GSO packets coming from
            virtualization devices, from Willem de Bruijn.
      
         8) Fix endianness of bnxt_en firmware message length accesses, from
            Edwin Peer.
      
         9) Fix infinite loop in sch_fq_pie, from Davide Caratti.
      
        10) Fix lockdep splat in DSA by setting lockless TX in netdev features
            for slave ports, from Vladimir Oltean.
      
        11) Fix suspend/resume crashes in mlx5, from Mark Bloch.
      
        12) Fix use after free in bpf fmod_ret, from Alexei Starovoitov.
      
        13) ARP retransmit timer guard uses wrong offset, from Hongbin Liu.
      
        14) Fix leak in inetdev_init(), from Yang Yingliang.
      
        15) Don't try to use inet hash and unhash in l2tp code, results in
            crashes. From Eric Dumazet"
      
      * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (77 commits)
        l2tp: add sk_family checks to l2tp_validate_socket
        l2tp: do not use inet_hash()/inet_unhash()
        net: qrtr: Allocate workqueue before kernel_bind
        mptcp: remove msk from the token container at destruction time.
        mptcp: fix race between MP_JOIN and close
        mptcp: fix unblocking connect()
        net/sched: act_ct: add nat mangle action only for NAT-conntrack
        devinet: fix memleak in inetdev_init()
        virtio_vsock: Fix race condition in virtio_transport_recv_pkt
        drivers/net/ibmvnic: Update VNIC protocol version reporting
        NFC: st21nfca: add missed kfree_skb() in an error path
        neigh: fix ARP retransmit timer guard
        bpf, selftests: Add a verifier test for assigning 32bit reg states to 64bit ones
        bpf, selftests: Verifier bounds tests need to be updated
        bpf: Fix a verifier issue when assigning 32bit reg states to 64bit ones
        bpf: Fix use-after-free in fmod_ret check
        net/mlx5e: replace EINVAL in mlx5e_flower_parse_meta()
        net/mlx5e: Fix MLX5_TC_CT dependencies
        net/mlx5e: Properly set default values when disabling adaptive moderation
        net/mlx5e: Fix arch depending casting issue in FEC
        ...
      19835b1b
    • Eric Dumazet's avatar
      l2tp: add sk_family checks to l2tp_validate_socket · d9a81a22
      Eric Dumazet authored
      syzbot was able to trigger a crash after using an ISDN socket
      and fool l2tp.
      
      Fix this by making sure the UDP socket is of the proper family.
      
      BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in setup_udp_tunnel_sock+0x465/0x540 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel.c:78
      Write of size 1 at addr ffff88808ed0c590 by task syz-executor.5/3018
      
      CPU: 0 PID: 3018 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
      Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
      Call Trace:
       __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
       dump_stack+0x188/0x20d lib/dump_stack.c:118
       print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd3/0x413 mm/kasan/report.c:382
       __kasan_report.cold+0x20/0x38 mm/kasan/report.c:511
       kasan_report+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:625
       setup_udp_tunnel_sock+0x465/0x540 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel.c:78
       l2tp_tunnel_register+0xb15/0xdd0 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:1523
       l2tp_nl_cmd_tunnel_create+0x4b2/0xa60 net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c:249
       genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:673 [inline]
       genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:718 [inline]
       genl_rcv_msg+0x627/0xdf0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:735
       netlink_rcv_skb+0x15a/0x410 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2469
       genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:746
       netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1303 [inline]
       netlink_unicast+0x537/0x740 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1329
       netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xe10 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1918
       sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
       sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:672
       ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e6/0x810 net/socket.c:2352
       ___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2406
       __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2439
       do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3
      RIP: 0033:0x45ca29
      Code: 0d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 db b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
      RSP: 002b:00007effe76edc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
      RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004fe1c0 RCX: 000000000045ca29
      RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000005
      RBP: 000000000078bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
      R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
      R13: 000000000000094e R14: 00000000004d5d00 R15: 00007effe76ee6d4
      
      Allocated by task 3018:
       save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:49
       set_track mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline]
       __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:495 [inline]
       __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xbf/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:468
       __do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3656 [inline]
       __kmalloc+0x161/0x7a0 mm/slab.c:3665
       kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:560 [inline]
       sk_prot_alloc+0x223/0x2f0 net/core/sock.c:1612
       sk_alloc+0x36/0x1100 net/core/sock.c:1666
       data_sock_create drivers/isdn/mISDN/socket.c:600 [inline]
       mISDN_sock_create+0x272/0x400 drivers/isdn/mISDN/socket.c:796
       __sock_create+0x3cb/0x730 net/socket.c:1428
       sock_create net/socket.c:1479 [inline]
       __sys_socket+0xef/0x200 net/socket.c:1521
       __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1530 [inline]
       __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1528 [inline]
       __x64_sys_socket+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1528
       do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3
      
      Freed by task 2484:
       save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:49
       set_track mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline]
       kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:317 [inline]
       __kasan_slab_free+0xf7/0x140 mm/kasan/common.c:456
       __cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline]
       kfree+0x109/0x2b0 mm/slab.c:3757
       kvfree+0x42/0x50 mm/util.c:603
       __free_fdtable+0x2d/0x70 fs/file.c:31
       put_files_struct fs/file.c:420 [inline]
       put_files_struct+0x248/0x2e0 fs/file.c:413
       exit_files+0x7e/0xa0 fs/file.c:445
       do_exit+0xb04/0x2dd0 kernel/exit.c:791
       do_group_exit+0x125/0x340 kernel/exit.c:894
       get_signal+0x47b/0x24e0 kernel/signal.c:2739
       do_signal+0x81/0x2240 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:784
       exit_to_usermode_loop+0x26c/0x360 arch/x86/entry/common.c:161
       prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:196 [inline]
       syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:279 [inline]
       do_syscall_64+0x6b1/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:305
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3
      
      The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88808ed0c000
       which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
      The buggy address is located 1424 bytes inside of
       2048-byte region [ffff88808ed0c000, ffff88808ed0c800)
      The buggy address belongs to the page:
      page:ffffea00023b4300 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
      flags: 0xfffe0000000200(slab)
      raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea0002838208 ffffea00015ba288 ffff8880aa000e00
      raw: 0000000000000000 ffff88808ed0c000 0000000100000001 0000000000000000
      page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
      
      Memory state around the buggy address:
       ffff88808ed0c480: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
       ffff88808ed0c500: 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
      >ffff88808ed0c580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                               ^
       ffff88808ed0c600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
       ffff88808ed0c680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
      
      Fixes: 6b9f3423 ("l2tp: fix races in tunnel creation")
      Fixes: fd558d18 ("l2tp: Split pppol2tp patch into separate l2tp and ppp parts")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Cc: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
      Cc: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
      Reported-by: default avatarsyzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarGuillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      d9a81a22
    • Eric Dumazet's avatar
      l2tp: do not use inet_hash()/inet_unhash() · 02c71b14
      Eric Dumazet authored
      syzbot recently found a way to crash the kernel [1]
      
      Issue here is that inet_hash() & inet_unhash() are currently
      only meant to be used by TCP & DCCP, since only these protocols
      provide the needed hashinfo pointer.
      
      L2TP uses a single list (instead of a hash table)
      
      This old bug became an issue after commit 61023658
      ("bpf: Add new cgroup attach type to enable sock modifications")
      since after this commit, sk_common_release() can be called
      while the L2TP socket is still considered 'hashed'.
      
      general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
      KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
      CPU: 0 PID: 7063 Comm: syz-executor654 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
      Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
      RIP: 0010:inet_unhash+0x11f/0x770 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:600
      Code: 03 0f b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e dd 04 00 00 48 8d 7d 08 44 8b 73 08 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 55 05 00 00 48 8d 7d 14 4c 8b 6d 08 48 b8 00 00
      RSP: 0018:ffffc90001777d30 EFLAGS: 00010202
      RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88809a6df940 RCX: ffffffff8697c242
      RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff8697c251 RDI: 0000000000000008
      RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff88809f3ae1c0 R09: fffffbfff1514cc1
      R10: ffffffff8a8a6607 R11: fffffbfff1514cc0 R12: ffff88809a6df9b0
      R13: 0000000000000007 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffff873a4d00
      FS:  0000000001d2b880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
      CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
      CR2: 00000000006cd090 CR3: 000000009403a000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
      DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
      DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
      Call Trace:
       sk_common_release+0xba/0x370 net/core/sock.c:3210
       inet_create net/ipv4/af_inet.c:390 [inline]
       inet_create+0x966/0xe00 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:248
       __sock_create+0x3cb/0x730 net/socket.c:1428
       sock_create net/socket.c:1479 [inline]
       __sys_socket+0xef/0x200 net/socket.c:1521
       __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1530 [inline]
       __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1528 [inline]
       __x64_sys_socket+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1528
       do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3
      RIP: 0033:0x441e29
      Code: e8 fc b3 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 eb 08 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
      RSP: 002b:00007ffdce184148 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000029
      RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000441e29
      RDX: 0000000000000073 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000002
      RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
      R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
      R13: 0000000000402c30 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
      Modules linked in:
      ---[ end trace 23b6578228ce553e ]---
      RIP: 0010:inet_unhash+0x11f/0x770 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:600
      Code: 03 0f b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e dd 04 00 00 48 8d 7d 08 44 8b 73 08 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 55 05 00 00 48 8d 7d 14 4c 8b 6d 08 48 b8 00 00
      RSP: 0018:ffffc90001777d30 EFLAGS: 00010202
      RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88809a6df940 RCX: ffffffff8697c242
      RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff8697c251 RDI: 0000000000000008
      RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff88809f3ae1c0 R09: fffffbfff1514cc1
      R10: ffffffff8a8a6607 R11: fffffbfff1514cc0 R12: ffff88809a6df9b0
      R13: 0000000000000007 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffff873a4d00
      FS:  0000000001d2b880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
      CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
      CR2: 00000000006cd090 CR3: 000000009403a000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
      DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
      DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
      
      Fixes: 0d76751f ("l2tp: Add L2TPv3 IP encapsulation (no UDP) support")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Cc: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
      Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
      Reported-by: syzbot+3610d489778b57cc8031@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
      02c71b14
    • Chris Lew's avatar
      net: qrtr: Allocate workqueue before kernel_bind · c6e08d62
      Chris Lew authored
      A null pointer dereference in qrtr_ns_data_ready() is seen if a client
      opens a qrtr socket before qrtr_ns_init() can bind to the control port.
      When the control port is bound, the ENETRESET error will be broadcasted
      and clients will close their sockets. This results in DEL_CLIENT
      packets being sent to the ns and qrtr_ns_data_ready() being called
      without the workqueue being allocated.
      
      Allocate the workqueue before setting sk_data_ready and binding to the
      control port. This ensures that the work and workqueue structs are
      allocated and initialized before qrtr_ns_data_ready can be called.
      
      Fixes: 0c2204a4 ("net: qrtr: Migrate nameservice to kernel from userspace")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarChris Lew <clew@codeaurora.org>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarBjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarManivannan Sadhasivam <manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      c6e08d62
    • David S. Miller's avatar
      Merge branch 'mptcp-a-bunch-of-fixes' · e237659c
      David S. Miller authored
      Paolo Abeni says:
      
      ====================
      mptcp: a bunch of fixes
      
      This patch series pulls together a few bugfixes for MPTCP bug observed while
      doing stress-test with apache bench - forced to use MPTCP and multiple
      subflows.
      ====================
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      e237659c
    • Paolo Abeni's avatar
      mptcp: remove msk from the token container at destruction time. · c5c79763
      Paolo Abeni authored
      Currently we remote the msk from the token container only
      via mptcp_close(). The MPTCP master socket can be destroyed
      also via other paths (e.g. if not yet accepted, when shutting
      down the listener socket). When we hit the latter scenario,
      dangling msk references are left into the token container,
      leading to memory corruption and/or UaF.
      
      This change addresses the issue by moving the token removal
      into the msk destructor.
      
      Fixes: 79c0949e ("mptcp: Add key generation and token tree")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarMat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      c5c79763
    • Paolo Abeni's avatar
      mptcp: fix race between MP_JOIN and close · 10f6d46c
      Paolo Abeni authored
      If a MP_JOIN subflow completes the 3whs while another
      CPU is closing the master msk, we can hit the
      following race:
      
      CPU1                                    CPU2
      
      close()
       mptcp_close
                                              subflow_syn_recv_sock
                                               mptcp_token_get_sock
                                               mptcp_finish_join
                                                inet_sk_state_load
        mptcp_token_destroy
        inet_sk_state_store(TCP_CLOSE)
        __mptcp_flush_join_list()
                                                mptcp_sock_graft
                                                list_add_tail
        sk_common_release
         sock_orphan()
       <socket free>
      
      The MP_JOIN socket will be leaked. Additionally we can hit
      UaF for the msk 'struct socket' referenced via the 'conn'
      field.
      
      This change try to address the issue introducing some
      synchronization between the MP_JOIN 3whs and mptcp_close
      via the join_list spinlock. If we detect the msk is closing
      the MP_JOIN socket is closed, too.
      
      Fixes: f296234c ("mptcp: Add handling of incoming MP_JOIN requests")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarMat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      10f6d46c
    • Paolo Abeni's avatar
      mptcp: fix unblocking connect() · 41be81a8
      Paolo Abeni authored
      Currently unblocking connect() on MPTCP sockets fails frequently.
      If mptcp_stream_connect() is invoked to complete a previously
      attempted unblocking connection, it will still try to create
      the first subflow via __mptcp_socket_create(). If the 3whs is
      completed and the 'can_ack' flag is already set, the latter
      will fail with -EINVAL.
      
      This change addresses the issue checking for pending connect and
      delegating the completion to the first subflow. Additionally
      do msk addresses and sk_state changes only when needed.
      
      Fixes: 2303f994 ("mptcp: Associate MPTCP context with TCP socket")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarMat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      41be81a8
    • wenxu's avatar
      net/sched: act_ct: add nat mangle action only for NAT-conntrack · 05aa69e5
      wenxu authored
      Currently add nat mangle action with comparing invert and orig tuple.
      It is better to check IPS_NAT_MASK flags first to avoid non necessary
      memcmp for non-NAT conntrack.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarwenxu <wenxu@ucloud.cn>
      Acked-by: default avatarMarcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      05aa69e5
    • Yang Yingliang's avatar
      devinet: fix memleak in inetdev_init() · 1b49cd71
      Yang Yingliang authored
      When devinet_sysctl_register() failed, the memory allocated
      in neigh_parms_alloc() should be freed.
      
      Fixes: 20e61da7 ("ipv4: fail early when creating netdev named all or default")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarYang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarCong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      1b49cd71
    • Jia He's avatar
      virtio_vsock: Fix race condition in virtio_transport_recv_pkt · 8692cefc
      Jia He authored
      When client on the host tries to connect(SOCK_STREAM, O_NONBLOCK) to the
      server on the guest, there will be a panic on a ThunderX2 (armv8a server):
      
      [  463.718844] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
      [  463.718848] Mem abort info:
      [  463.718849]   ESR = 0x96000044
      [  463.718852]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
      [  463.718853]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
      [  463.718854]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
      [  463.718855] Data abort info:
      [  463.718856]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000044
      [  463.718857]   CM = 0, WnR = 1
      [  463.718859] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000008f6f6e9000
      [  463.718861] [0000000000000000] pgd=0000000000000000
      [  463.718866] Internal error: Oops: 96000044 [#1] SMP
      [...]
      [  463.718977] CPU: 213 PID: 5040 Comm: vhost-5032 Tainted: G           O      5.7.0-rc7+ #139
      [  463.718980] Hardware name: GIGABYTE R281-T91-00/MT91-FS1-00, BIOS F06 09/25/2018
      [  463.718982] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO)
      [  463.718995] pc : virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x4c8/0xd40 [vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common]
      [  463.718999] lr : virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x1fc/0xd40 [vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common]
      [  463.719000] sp : ffff80002dbe3c40
      [...]
      [  463.719025] Call trace:
      [  463.719030]  virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x4c8/0xd40 [vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common]
      [  463.719034]  vhost_vsock_handle_tx_kick+0x360/0x408 [vhost_vsock]
      [  463.719041]  vhost_worker+0x100/0x1a0 [vhost]
      [  463.719048]  kthread+0x128/0x130
      [  463.719052]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
      
      The race condition is as follows:
      Task1                                Task2
      =====                                =====
      __sock_release                       virtio_transport_recv_pkt
        __vsock_release                      vsock_find_bound_socket (found sk)
          lock_sock_nested
          vsock_remove_sock
          sock_orphan
            sk_set_socket(sk, NULL)
          sk->sk_shutdown = SHUTDOWN_MASK
          ...
          release_sock
                                          lock_sock
                                             virtio_transport_recv_connecting
                                               sk->sk_socket->state (panic!)
      
      The root cause is that vsock_find_bound_socket can't hold the lock_sock,
      so there is a small race window between vsock_find_bound_socket() and
      lock_sock(). If __vsock_release() is running in another task,
      sk->sk_socket will be set to NULL inadvertently.
      
      This fixes it by checking sk->sk_shutdown(suggested by Stefano) after
      lock_sock since sk->sk_shutdown is set to SHUTDOWN_MASK under the
      protection of lock_sock_nested.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJia He <justin.he@arm.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarStefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      8692cefc
  5. 30 May, 2020 4 commits
  6. 29 May, 2020 12 commits