1. 14 Feb, 2013 7 commits
  2. 11 Feb, 2013 27 commits
  3. 04 Feb, 2013 6 commits
    • Greg Kroah-Hartman's avatar
      Linux 3.4.29 · 398cc33f
      Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
      398cc33f
    • Nicholas Bellinger's avatar
      target: fix regression with dev_link_magic in target_fabric_port_link · 9767a242
      Nicholas Bellinger authored
      This is to fix a regression that only affect the stable (not for the mainline)
      that the stable commit fdf9d862 was incorrectly placed dev->dev_link_magic check
      before the *dev assignment in target_fabric_port_link() due to fuzzy automatically
      context adjustment during the back-porting.
      Reported-by: default avatarChris Boot <bootc@bootc.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarNicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarCAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      9767a242
    • H. Peter Anvin's avatar
      x86/Sandy Bridge: Sandy Bridge workaround depends on CONFIG_PCI · ae2bac5c
      H. Peter Anvin authored
      commit e43b3cec upstream.
      
      early_pci_allowed() and read_pci_config_16() are only available if
      CONFIG_PCI is defined.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarH. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAbdallah Chatila <abdallah.chatila@ericsson.com>
      ae2bac5c
    • Matt Fleming's avatar
      x86, efi: Set runtime_version to the EFI spec revision · 40913e0a
      Matt Fleming authored
      commit 712ba9e9 upstream.
      
      efi.runtime_version is erroneously being set to the value of the
      vendor's firmware revision instead of that of the implemented EFI
      specification. We can't deduce which EFI functions are available based
      on the revision of the vendor's firmware since the version scheme is
      likely to be unique to each vendor.
      
      What we really need to know is the revision of the implemented EFI
      specification, which is available in the EFI System Table header.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMatt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
      Cc: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com>
      Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      40913e0a
    • Nathan Zimmer's avatar
      efi, x86: Pass a proper identity mapping in efi_call_phys_prelog · 956b0310
      Nathan Zimmer authored
      commit b8f2c21d upstream.
      
      Update efi_call_phys_prelog to install an identity mapping of all available
      memory.  This corrects a bug on very large systems with more then 512 GB in
      which bios would not be able to access addresses above not in the mapping.
      
      The result is a crash that looks much like this.
      
      BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 000000effd870020
      IP: [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330
      PGD 0
      Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
      Modules linked in:
      CPU 0
      Pid: 0, comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G        W    3.8.0-rc1-next-20121224-medusa_ntz+ #2 Intel Corp. Stoutland Platform
      RIP: 0010:[<0000000078bce331>]  [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330
      RSP: 0000:ffffffff81601d28  EFLAGS: 00010006
      RAX: 0000000078b80e18 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000000004
      RDX: 0000000078bcf958 RSI: 0000000000002400 RDI: 8000000000000000
      RBP: 0000000078bcf760 R08: 000000effd870000 R09: 0000000000000000
      R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000000000c3 R12: 0000000000000030
      R13: 000000effd870000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88effd870000
      FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88effe400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
      CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
      CR2: 000000effd870020 CR3: 000000000160c000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
      DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
      DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
      Process swapper/0 (pid: 0, threadinfo ffffffff81600000, task ffffffff81614400)
      Stack:
       0000000078b80d18 0000000000000004 0000000078bced7b ffff880078b81fff
       0000000000000000 0000000000000082 0000000078bce3a8 0000000000002400
       0000000060000202 0000000078b80da0 0000000078bce45d ffffffff8107cb5a
      Call Trace:
       [<ffffffff8107cb5a>] ? on_each_cpu+0x77/0x83
       [<ffffffff8102f4eb>] ? change_page_attr_set_clr+0x32f/0x3ed
       [<ffffffff81035946>] ? efi_call4+0x46/0x80
       [<ffffffff816c5abb>] ? efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x1f5/0x305
       [<ffffffff816aeb24>] ? start_kernel+0x34a/0x3d2
       [<ffffffff816ae5ed>] ? repair_env_string+0x60/0x60
       [<ffffffff816ae2be>] ? x86_64_start_reservations+0xba/0xc1
       [<ffffffff816ae120>] ? early_idt_handlers+0x120/0x120
       [<ffffffff816ae419>] ? x86_64_start_kernel+0x154/0x163
      Code:  Bad RIP value.
      RIP  [<0000000078bce331>] 0x78bce330
       RSP <ffffffff81601d28>
      CR2: 000000effd870020
      ---[ end trace ead828934fef5eab ]---
      Signed-off-by: default avatarNathan Zimmer <nzimmer@sgi.com>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
      Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarRobin Holt <holt@sgi.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMatt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      956b0310
    • Alan Cox's avatar
      x86/msr: Add capabilities check · 4031dfce
      Alan Cox authored
      commit c903f045 upstream.
      
      At the moment the MSR driver only relies upon file system
      checks. This means that anything as root with any capability set
      can write to MSRs. Historically that wasn't very interesting but
      on modern processors the MSRs are such that writing to them
      provides several ways to execute arbitary code in kernel space.
      Sample code and documentation on doing this is circulating and
      MSR attacks are used on Windows 64bit rootkits already.
      
      In the Linux case you still need to be able to open the device
      file so the impact is fairly limited and reduces the security of
      some capability and security model based systems down towards
      that of a generic "root owns the box" setup.
      
      Therefore they should require CAP_SYS_RAWIO to prevent an
      elevation of capabilities. The impact of this is fairly minimal
      on most setups because they don't have heavy use of
      capabilities. Those using SELinux, SMACK or AppArmor rules might
      want to consider if their rulesets on the MSR driver could be
      tighter.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAlan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      4031dfce