- 02 Feb, 2015 40 commits
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Nadav Amit authored
commit 234f3ce4 upstream. Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted to be canonical one, as real CPUs do. During sysret, both target rsp and rip should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception should occur. The exception to this rule are syscall and sysenter instructions in which the assigned rip is checked during the assignment to the relevant MSRs. This patch fixes the emulator to behave as real CPUs do for near branches. Far branches are handled by the next patch. This fixes CVE-2014-3647. Signed-off-by:
Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il> Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> [lizf: Backported to 3.4: - adjust context - use ctxt->regs rather than reg_read() and reg_write()] Signed-off-by:
Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
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Nadav Amit authored
commit 05c83ec9 upstream. Relative jumps and calls do the masking according to the operand size, and not according to the address size as the KVM emulator does today. This patch fixes KVM behavior. Signed-off-by:
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Andy Honig authored
commit 2febc839 upstream. There's a race condition in the PIT emulation code in KVM. In __kvm_migrate_pit_timer the pit_timer object is accessed without synchronization. If the race condition occurs at the wrong time this can crash the host kernel. This fixes CVE-2014-3611. Signed-off-by:
Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Andy Honig authored
commit 8b3c3104 upstream. The previous patch blocked invalid writes directly when the MSR is written. As a precaution, prevent future similar mistakes by gracefulling handle GPs caused by writes to shared MSRs. Signed-off-by:
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Nadav Amit authored
commit 854e8bb1 upstream. Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel (ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top 32-bits). Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP. Some references from Intel and AMD manuals: According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE, IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP." According to AMD manual instruction manual: LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs." IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur." IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must be in canonical form." This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610. Signed-off-by:
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Dirk Brandewie authored
commit c034b02e upstream. Currently the core does not expose scaling_cur_freq for set_policy() drivers this breaks some userspace monitoring tools. Change the core to expose this file for all drivers and if the set_policy() driver supports the get() callback use it to retrieve the current frequency. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=73741Signed-off-by:
Dirk Brandewie <dirk.j.brandewie@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> [lizf: Backported to 3.4: adjust context] Signed-off-by:
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David Daney authored
commit 9e0f162a upstream. In commit 8393c524 (MIPS: tlbex: Fix a missing statement for HUGETLB), the TLB Refill handler was fixed so that non-OCTEON targets would work properly with huge pages. The change was incorrect in that it broke the OCTEON case. The problem is shown here: xxx0: df7a0000 ld k0,0(k1) . . . xxxc0: df610000 ld at,0(k1) xxxc4: 335a0ff0 andi k0,k0,0xff0 xxxc8: e825ffcd bbit1 at,0x5,0x0 xxxcc: 003ad82d daddu k1,at,k0 . . . In the non-octeon case there is a destructive test for the huge PTE bit, and then at 0, $k0 is reloaded (that is what the 8393c524 patch added). In the octeon case, we modify k1 in the branch delay slot, but we never need k0 again, so the new load is not needed, but since k1 is modified, if we do the load, we load from a garbage location and then get a nested TLB Refill, which is seen in userspace as either SIGBUS or SIGSEGV (depending on the garbage). The real fix is to only do this reloading if it is needed, and never where it is harmful. Signed-off-by:
David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com> Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com> Cc: Fuxin Zhang <zhangfx@lemote.com> Cc: Zhangjin Wu <wuzhangjin@gmail.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/8151/Signed-off-by:
Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Signed-off-by:
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Huacai Chen authored
commit 8393c524 upstream. In commit 2c8c53e2 (MIPS: Optimize TLB handlers for Octeon CPUs) build_r4000_tlb_refill_handler() is modified. But it doesn't compatible with the original code in HUGETLB case. Because there is a copy & paste error and one line of code is missing. It is very easy to produce a bug with LTP's hugemmap05 test. Signed-off-by:
Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com> Signed-off-by:
Binbin Zhou <zhoubb@lemote.com> Cc: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org> Cc: Steven J. Hill <Steven.Hill@imgtec.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Fuxin Zhang <zhangfx@lemote.com> Cc: Zhangjin Wu <wuzhangjin@gmail.com> Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/7496/Signed-off-by:
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Michal Hocko authored
commit 5695be14 upstream. PM freezer relies on having all tasks frozen by the time devices are getting frozen so that no task will touch them while they are getting frozen. But OOM killer is allowed to kill an already frozen task in order to handle OOM situtation. In order to protect from late wake ups OOM killer is disabled after all tasks are frozen. This, however, still keeps a window open when a killed task didn't manage to die by the time freeze_processes finishes. Reduce the race window by checking all tasks after OOM killer has been disabled. This is still not race free completely unfortunately because oom_killer_disable cannot stop an already ongoing OOM killer so a task might still wake up from the fridge and get killed without freeze_processes noticing. Full synchronization of OOM and freezer is, however, too heavy weight for this highly unlikely case. Introduce and check oom_kills counter which gets incremented early when the allocator enters __alloc_pages_may_oom path and only check all the tasks if the counter changes during the freezing attempt. The counter is updated so early to reduce the race window since allocator checked oom_killer_disabled which is set by PM-freezing code. A false positive will push the PM-freezer into a slow path but that is not a big deal. Changes since v1 - push the re-check loop out of freeze_processes into check_frozen_processes and invert the condition to make the code more readable as per Rafael Fixes: f660daac (oom: thaw threads if oom killed thread is frozen before deferring) Signed-off-by:
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
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Oleg Nesterov authored
commit 0c740d0a upstream. while_each_thread() and next_thread() should die, almost every lockless usage is wrong. 1. Unless g == current, the lockless while_each_thread() is not safe. while_each_thread(g, t) can loop forever if g exits, next_thread() can't reach the unhashed thread in this case. Note that this can happen even if g is the group leader, it can exec. 2. Even if while_each_thread() itself was correct, people often use it wrongly. It was never safe to just take rcu_read_lock() and loop unless you verify that pid_alive(g) == T, even the first next_thread() can point to the already freed/reused memory. This patch adds signal_struct->thread_head and task->thread_node to create the normal rcu-safe list with the stable head. The new for_each_thread(g, t) helper is always safe under rcu_read_lock() as long as this task_struct can't go away. Note: of course it is ugly to have both task_struct->thread_node and the old task_struct->thread_group, we will kill it later, after we change the users of while_each_thread() to use for_each_thread(). Perhaps we can kill it even before we convert all users, we can reimplement next_thread(t) using the new thread_head/thread_node. But we can't do this right now because this will lead to subtle behavioural changes. For example, do/while_each_thread() always sees at least one task, while for_each_thread() can do nothing if the whole thread group has died. Or thread_group_empty(), currently its semantics is not clear unless thread_group_leader(p) and we need to audit the callers before we can change it. So this patch adds the new interface which has to coexist with the old one for some time, hopefully the next changes will be more or less straightforward and the old one will go away soon. Signed-off-by:
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com> Tested-by:
Sameer Nanda <snanda@chromium.org> Acked-by:
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mandeep Singh Baines <msb@chromium.org> Cc: "Ma, Xindong" <xindong.ma@intel.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: "Tu, Xiaobing" <xiaobing.tu@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Oleg Nesterov authored
commit 80628ca0 upstream. Cleanup and preparation for the next changes. Move the "if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)" code down under "if (likely(p->pid))" and turn it into into the "else" branch. This makes the process/thread initialization more symmetrical and removes one check. Signed-off-by:
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Cong Wang authored
commit 51fae6da upstream. Since f660daac (oom: thaw threads if oom killed thread is frozen before deferring) OOM killer relies on being able to thaw a frozen task to handle OOM situation but a3201227 (freezer: make freezing() test freeze conditions in effect instead of TIF_FREEZE) has reorganized the code and stopped clearing freeze flag in __thaw_task. This means that the target task only wakes up and goes into the fridge again because the freezing condition hasn't changed for it. This reintroduces the bug fixed by f660daac. Fix the issue by checking for TIF_MEMDIE thread flag in freezing_slow_path and exclude the task from freezing completely. If a task was already frozen it would get woken by __thaw_task from OOM killer and get out of freezer after rechecking freezing(). Changes since v1 - put TIF_MEMDIE check into freezing_slowpath rather than in __refrigerator as per Oleg - return __thaw_task into oom_scan_process_thread because oom_kill_process will not wake task in the fridge because it is sleeping uninterruptible [mhocko@suse.cz: rewrote the changelog] Fixes: a3201227 (freezer: make freezing() test freeze conditions in effect instead of TIF_FREEZE) Signed-off-by:
Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Vlad Catoi authored
commit f0b127fb upstream. Adding support for Steinberg UR22 USB interface via quirks table patch See Ubuntu bug report: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1317244 Also see threads: http://linux-audio.4202.n7.nabble.com/Support-for-Steinberg-UR22-Yamaha-USB-chipset-0499-1509-tc82888.html#a82917 http://www.steinberg.net/forums/viewtopic.php?t=62290 Tested by at least 4 people judging by the threads. Did not test MIDI interface, but audio output and capture both are functional. Built 3.17 kernel with this driver on Ubuntu 14.04 & tested with mpg123 Patch applied to 3.13 Ubuntu kernel works well enough for daily use. Signed-off-by:
Vlad Catoi <vladcatoi@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de> Signed-off-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> [lizf: Backported to 3.4: adjust context] Signed-off-by:
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Anatol Pomozov authored
commit a011e213 upstream. This avoids following kernel crash when try to playback on arm64 [ 107.497203] [<ffffffc00046b310>] snd_pcm_mmap_data_fault+0x90/0xd4 [ 107.503405] [<ffffffc0001541ac>] __do_fault+0xb0/0x498 [ 107.508565] [<ffffffc0001576a0>] handle_mm_fault+0x224/0x7b0 [ 107.514246] [<ffffffc000092640>] do_page_fault+0x11c/0x310 [ 107.519738] [<ffffffc000081100>] do_mem_abort+0x38/0x98 Tested: backported to 3.14 and tried to playback on arm64 machine Signed-off-by:
Anatol Pomozov <anatol.pomozov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Borkmann authored
commit d4c5efdb upstream. zatimend has reported that in his environment (3.16/gcc4.8.3/corei7) memset() calls which clear out sensitive data in extract_{buf,entropy, entropy_user}() in random driver are being optimized away by gcc. Add a helper memzero_explicit() (similarly as explicit_bzero() variants) that can be used in such cases where a variable with sensitive data is being cleared out in the end. Other use cases might also be in crypto code. [ I have put this into lib/string.c though, as it's always built-in and doesn't need any dependencies then. ] Fixes kernel bugzilla: 82041 Reported-by: zatimend@hotmail.co.uk Signed-off-by:
Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> [lizf: Backported to 3.4: - adjust context - another memset() in extract_buf() needs to be converted] Signed-off-by:
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Cesar Eduardo Barros authored
commit fe8c8a12 upstream. [Only use the compiler.h portion of this patch, to get the OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR() macro, which we need for other -stable patches - gregkh] Disabling compiler optimizations can be fragile, since a new optimization could be added to -O0 or -Os that breaks the assumptions the code is making. Instead of disabling compiler optimizations, use a dummy inline assembly (based on RELOC_HIDE) to block the problematic kinds of optimization, while still allowing other optimizations to be applied to the code. The dummy inline assembly is added after every OR, and has the accumulator variable as its input and output. The compiler is forced to assume that the dummy inline assembly could both depend on the accumulator variable and change the accumulator variable, so it is forced to compute the value correctly before the inline assembly, and cannot assume anything about its value after the inline assembly. This change should be enough to make crypto_memneq work correctly (with data-independent timing) even if it is inlined at its call sites. That can be done later in a followup patch. Compile-tested on x86_64. Signed-off-by:
Cesar Eduardo Barros <cesarb@cesarb.eti.br> Acked-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Sandeen authored
commit 0ff8947f upstream. Delalloc write journal reservations only reserve 1 credit, to update the inode if necessary. However, it may happen once in a filesystem's lifetime that a file will cross the 2G threshold, and require the LARGE_FILE feature to be set in the superblock as well, if it was not set already. This overruns the transaction reservation, and can be demonstrated simply on any ext4 filesystem without the LARGE_FILE feature already set: dd if=/dev/zero of=testfile bs=1 seek=2147483646 count=1 \ conv=notrunc of=testfile sync dd if=/dev/zero of=testfile bs=1 seek=2147483647 count=1 \ conv=notrunc of=testfile leads to: EXT4-fs: ext4_do_update_inode:4296: aborting transaction: error 28 in __ext4_handle_dirty_super EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_do_update_inode:4301: error 28 EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_reserve_inode_write:4757: Readonly filesystem EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_dirty_inode:4876: error 28 EXT4-fs error (device loop0) in ext4_da_write_end:2685: error 28 Adjust the number of credits based on whether the flag is already set, and whether the current write may extend past the LARGE_FILE limit. Signed-off-by:
Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca> [lizf: Backported to 3.4: - adjust context - ext4_journal_start() has no parameter type] Signed-off-by:
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Theodore Ts'o authored
commit f4bb2981 upstream. If there is a corrupted file system which has directory entries that point at reserved, metadata inodes, prohibit them from being used by treating them the same way we treat Boot Loader inodes --- that is, mark them to be bad inodes. This prohibits them from being opened, deleted, or modified via chmod, chown, utimes, etc. In particular, this prevents a corrupted file system which has a directory entry which points at the journal inode from being deleted and its blocks released, after which point Much Hilarity Ensues. Reported-by:
Sami Liedes <sami.liedes@iki.fi> Signed-off-by:
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Theodore Ts'o authored
commit e2bfb088 upstream. The boot loader inode (inode #5) should never be visible in the directory hierarchy, but it's possible if the file system is corrupted that there will be a directory entry that points at inode #5. In order to avoid accidentally trashing it, when such a directory inode is opened, the inode will be marked as a bad inode, so that it's not possible to modify (or read) the inode from userspace. Unfortunately, when we unlink this (invalid/illegal) directory entry, we will put the bad inode on the ophan list, and then when try to unlink the directory, we don't actually remove the bad inode from the orphan list before freeing in-memory inode structure. This means the in-memory orphan list is corrupted, leading to a kernel oops. In addition, avoid truncating a bad inode in ext4_destroy_inode(), since truncating the boot loader inode is not a smart thing to do. Reported-by:
Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
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Jan Kara authored
commit 90a80202 upstream. ->page_mkwrite() is used by filesystems to allocate blocks under a page which is becoming writeably mmapped in some process' address space. This allows a filesystem to return a page fault if there is not enough space available, user exceeds quota or similar problem happens, rather than silently discarding data later when writepage is called. However VFS fails to call ->page_mkwrite() in all the cases where filesystems need it when blocksize < pagesize. For example when blocksize = 1024, pagesize = 4096 the following is problematic: ftruncate(fd, 0); pwrite(fd, buf, 1024, 0); map = mmap(NULL, 1024, PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); map[0] = 'a'; ----> page_mkwrite() for index 0 is called ftruncate(fd, 10000); /* or even pwrite(fd, buf, 1, 10000) */ mremap(map, 1024, 10000, 0); map[4095] = 'a'; ----> no page_mkwrite() called At the moment ->page_mkwrite() is called, filesystem can allocate only one block for the page because i_size == 1024. Otherwise it would create blocks beyond i_size which is generally undesirable. But later at ->writepage() time, we also need to store data at offset 4095 but we don't have block allocated for it. This patch introduces a helper function filesystems can use to have ->page_mkwrite() called at all the necessary moments. Signed-off-by:
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Quinn Tran authored
commit 082f58ac upstream. During temporary resource starvation at lower transport layer, command is placed on queue full retry path, which expose this problem. The TCM queue full handling of SCF_TRANSPORT_TASK_SENSE currently sends the same cmd twice to lower layer. The 1st time led to cmd normal free path. The 2nd time cause Null pointer access. This regression bug was originally introduced v3.1-rc code in the following commit: commit e057f533 Author: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Date: Mon Oct 17 13:56:41 2011 -0400 target: remove the transport_qf_callback se_cmd callback Signed-off-by:
Quinn Tran <quinn.tran@qlogic.com> Signed-off-by:
Saurav Kashyap <saurav.kashyap@qlogic.com> Signed-off-by:
Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org> Signed-off-by:
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Jan Kara authored
commit 279bf6d3 upstream. The check whether quota format is set even though there are no quota files with journalled quota is pointless and it actually makes it impossible to turn off journalled quotas (as there's no way to unset journalled quota format). Just remove the check. Signed-off-by:
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Darrick J. Wong authored
commit a0626e75 upstream. When loading extended attributes, check each entry's value offset to make sure it doesn't collide with the entries. Without this check it is easy to crash the kernel by mounting a malicious FS containing a file with an EA wherein e_value_offs = 0 and e_value_size > 0 and then deleting the EA, which corrupts the name list. (See the f_ea_value_crash test's FS image in e2fsprogs for an example.) Signed-off-by:
Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Andy Lutomirski authored
commit d974baa3 upstream. CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary. TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks like it's correct. This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4 after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow, reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a branch. Signed-off-by:
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Acked-by:
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Catalin Marinas authored
commit 76835b0e upstream. Commit b0c29f79 (futexes: Avoid taking the hb->lock if there's nothing to wake up) changes the futex code to avoid taking a lock when there are no waiters. This code has been subsequently fixed in commit 11d4616b (futex: revert back to the explicit waiter counting code). Both the original commit and the fix-up rely on get_futex_key_refs() to always imply a barrier. However, for private futexes, none of the cases in the switch statement of get_futex_key_refs() would be hit and the function completes without a memory barrier as required before checking the "waiters" in futex_wake() -> hb_waiters_pending(). The consequence is a race with a thread waiting on a futex on another CPU, allowing the waker thread to read "waiters == 0" while the waiter thread to have read "futex_val == locked" (in kernel). Without this fix, the problem (user space deadlocks) can be seen with Android bionic's mutex implementation on an arm64 multi-cluster system. Signed-off-by:
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Reported-by:
Matteo Franchin <Matteo.Franchin@arm.com> Fixes: b0c29f79 (futexes: Avoid taking the hb->lock if there's nothing to wake up) Acked-by:
Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Tested-by:
Mike Galbraith <umgwanakikbuti@gmail.com> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Stephen Smalley authored
commit 923190d3 upstream. sb_finish_set_opts() can race with inode_free_security() when initializing inode security structures for inodes created prior to initial policy load or by the filesystem during ->mount(). This appears to have always been a possible race, but commit 3dc91d43 ("SELinux: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference in selinux_inode_permission()") made it more evident by immediately reusing the unioned list/rcu element of the inode security structure for call_rcu() upon an inode_free_security(). But the underlying issue was already present before that commit as a possible use-after-free of isec. Shivnandan Kumar reported the list corruption and proposed a patch to split the list and rcu elements out of the union as separate fields of the inode_security_struct so that setting the rcu element would not affect the list element. However, this would merely hide the issue and not truly fix the code. This patch instead moves up the deletion of the list entry prior to dropping the sbsec->isec_lock initially. Then, if the inode is dropped subsequently, there will be no further references to the isec. Reported-by:
Shivnandan Kumar <shivnandan.k@samsung.com> Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by:
Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Michael S. Tsirkin authored
commit 6fbc198c upstream. On restore, virtio pci does the following: + set features + init vqs etc - device can be used at this point! + set ACKNOWLEDGE,DRIVER and DRIVER_OK status bits This is in violation of the virtio spec, which requires the following order: - ACKNOWLEDGE - DRIVER - init vqs - DRIVER_OK This behaviour will break with hypervisors that assume spec compliant behaviour. It seems like a good idea to have this patch applied to stable branches to reduce the support butden for the hypervisors. Cc: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by:
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Eric W. Biederman authored
commit 0d082601 upstream. Andy Lutomirski recently demonstrated that when chroot is used to set the root path below the path for the new ``root'' passed to pivot_root the pivot_root system call succeeds and leaks mounts. In examining the code I see that starting with a new root that is below the current root in the mount tree will result in a loop in the mount tree after the mounts are detached and then reattached to one another. Resulting in all kinds of ugliness including a leak of that mounts involved in the leak of the mount loop. Prevent this problem by ensuring that the new mount is reachable from the current root of the mount tree. [Added stable cc. Fixes CVE-2014-7970. --Andy] Reported-by:
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
commit 95926035 upstream. The emu10k1 voice allocator takes voice_lock spinlock. When there is no empty stream available, it tries to release a voice used by synth, and calls get_synth_voice. The callback function, snd_emu10k1_synth_get_voice(), however, also takes the voice_lock, thus it deadlocks. The fix is simply removing the voice_lock holds in snd_emu10k1_synth_get_voice(), as this is always called in the spinlock context. Reported-and-tested-by:
Arthur Marsh <arthur.marsh@internode.on.net> Signed-off-by:
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Sasha Levin authored
commit 71458cfc upstream. We're missing include/linux/compiler-gcc5.h which is required now because gcc branched off to v5 in trunk. Just copy the relevant bits out of include/linux/compiler-gcc4.h, no new code is added as of now. This fixes a build error when using gcc 5. Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Hans de Goede authored
commit 9ff84a17 upstream. Without this the aux port does not get detected, and consequently the touchpad will not work. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1110011Signed-off-by:
Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Dmitry Torokhov authored
commit aa972409 upstream. Unfortunately, ForcePad capability is not actually exported over PS/2, so we have to resort to DMI checks. Reported-by:
Nicole Faerber <nicole.faerber@kernelconcepts.de> Signed-off-by:
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Yann Droneaud authored
commit 0b37e097 upstream. According to commit 80af2588 ("fanotify: groups can specify their f_flags for new fd"), file descriptors created as part of file access notification events inherit flags from the event_f_flags argument passed to syscall fanotify_init(2)[1]. Unfortunately O_CLOEXEC is currently silently ignored. Indeed, event_f_flags are only given to dentry_open(), which only seems to care about O_ACCMODE and O_PATH in do_dentry_open(), O_DIRECT in open_check_o_direct() and O_LARGEFILE in generic_file_open(). It's a pity, since, according to some lookup on various search engines and http://codesearch.debian.net/, there's already some userspace code which use O_CLOEXEC: - in systemd's readahead[2]: fanotify_fd = fanotify_init(FAN_CLOEXEC|FAN_NONBLOCK, O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOATIME); - in clsync[3]: #define FANOTIFY_EVFLAGS (O_LARGEFILE|O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) int fanotify_d = fanotify_init(FANOTIFY_FLAGS, FANOTIFY_EVFLAGS); - in examples [4] from "Filesystem monitoring in the Linux kernel" article[5] by Aleksander Morgado: if ((fanotify_fd = fanotify_init (FAN_CLOEXEC, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC | O_LARGEFILE)) < 0) Additionally, since commit 48149e9d ("fanotify: check file flags passed in fanotify_init"). having O_CLOEXEC as part of fanotify_init() second argument is expressly allowed. So it seems expected to set close-on-exec flag on the file descriptors if userspace is allowed to request it with O_CLOEXEC. But Andrew Morton raised[6] the concern that enabling now close-on-exec might break existing applications which ask for O_CLOEXEC but expect the file descriptor to be inherited across exec(). In the other hand, as reported by Mihai Dontu[7] close-on-exec on the file descriptor returned as part of file access notify can break applications due to deadlock. So close-on-exec is needed for most applications. More, applications asking for close-on-exec are likely expecting it to be enabled, relying on O_CLOEXEC being effective. If not, it might weaken their security, as noted by Jan Kara[8]. So this patch replaces call to macro get_unused_fd() by a call to function get_unused_fd_flags() with event_f_flags value as argument. This way O_CLOEXEC flag in the second argument of fanotify_init(2) syscall is interpreted and close-on-exec get enabled when requested. [1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/fanotify_init.2.html [2] http://cgit.freedesktop.org/systemd/systemd/tree/src/readahead/readahead-collect.c?id=v208#n294 [3] https://github.com/xaionaro/clsync/blob/v0.2.1/sync.c#L1631 https://github.com/xaionaro/clsync/blob/v0.2.1/configuration.h#L38 [4] http://www.lanedo.com/~aleksander/fanotify/fanotify-example.c [5] http://www.lanedo.com/2013/filesystem-monitoring-linux-kernel/ [6] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141001153621.65e9258e65a6167bf2e4cb50@linux-foundation.org [7] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141002095046.3715eb69@mdontu-l [8] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141002104410.GB19748@quack.suse.cz Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1411562410.git.ydroneaud@opteya.comSigned-off-by:
Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com> Reviewed-by:
Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> Cc: Mihai Don\u021bu <mihai.dontu@gmail.com> Cc: Pádraig Brady <P@draigBrady.com> Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Cc: Michael Kerrisk-manpages <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Lino Sanfilippo <LinoSanfilippo@gmx.de> Cc: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mike Snitzer authored
commit b8839b8c upstream. The math in both blk_stack_limits() and queue_limit_alignment_offset() assume that a block device's io_min (aka minimum_io_size) is always a power-of-2. Fix the math such that it works for non-power-of-2 io_min. This issue (of alignment_offset != 0) became apparent when testing dm-thinp with a thinp blocksize that matches a RAID6 stripesize of 1280K. Commit fdfb4c8c ("dm thin: set minimum_io_size to pool's data block size") unlocked the potential for alignment_offset != 0 due to the dm-thin-pool's io_min possibly being a non-power-of-2. Signed-off-by:
Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
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Al Viro authored
commit 24dff96a upstream. we used to check for "nobody else could start doing anything with that opened file" by checking that refcount was 2 or less - one for descriptor table and one we'd acquired in fget() on the way to wherever we are. That was race-prone (somebody else might have had a reference to descriptor table and do fget() just as we'd been checking) and it had become flat-out incorrect back when we switched to fget_light() on those codepaths - unlike fget(), it doesn't grab an extra reference unless the descriptor table is shared. The same change allowed a race-free check, though - we are safe exactly when refcount is less than 2. It was a long time ago; pre-2.6.12 for ioctl() (the codepath leading to ppp one) and 2.6.17 for sendmsg() (netlink one). OTOH, netlink hadn't grown that check until 3.9 and ppp used to live in drivers/net, not drivers/net/ppp until 3.1. The bug existed well before that, though, and the same fix used to apply in old location of file. Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> [lizf: Backported to 3.4: drop the change to netlink_mmap_sendmsg()] Signed-off-by:
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Mikulas Patocka authored
commit c2ca0fcd upstream. This patch makes it possible to kill a process looping in cont_expand_zero. A process may spend a lot of time in this function, so it is desirable to be able to kill it. It happened to me that I wanted to copy a piece data from the disk to a file. By mistake, I used the "seek" parameter to dd instead of "skip". Due to the "seek" parameter, dd attempted to extend the file and became stuck doing so - the only possibility was to reset the machine or wait many hours until the filesystem runs out of space and cont_expand_zero fails. We need this patch to be able to terminate the process. Signed-off-by:
Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Tetsuo Handa authored
commit 475d0db7 upstream. total_objects could be 0 and is used as a denom. While total_objects is a "long", total_objects == 0 unlikely happens for 3.12 and later kernels because 32-bit architectures would not be able to hold (1 << 32) objects. However, total_objects == 0 may happen for kernels between 3.1 and 3.11 because total_objects in prune_super() was an "int" and (e.g.) x86_64 architecture might be able to hold (1 << 32) objects. Signed-off-by:
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reviewed-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by:
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Ben Hutchings authored
commit 0e6d3112 upstream. It is currently possible to execve() an x32 executable on an x86_64 kernel that has only ia32 compat enabled. However all its syscalls will fail, even _exit(). This usually causes it to segfault. Change the ELF compat architecture check so that x32 executables are rejected if we don't support the x32 ABI. Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1410120305.6822.9.camel@decadent.org.ukSigned-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
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Scott Carter authored
commit 37017ac6 upstream. The Broadcom OSB4 IDE Controller (vendor and device IDs: 1166:0211) does not support 64-KB DMA transfers. Whenever a 64-KB DMA transfer is attempted, the transfer fails and messages similar to the following are written to the console log: [ 2431.851125] sr 0:0:0:0: [sr0] Unhandled sense code [ 2431.851139] sr 0:0:0:0: [sr0] Result: hostbyte=DID_OK driverbyte=DRIVER_SENSE [ 2431.851152] sr 0:0:0:0: [sr0] Sense Key : Hardware Error [current] [ 2431.851166] sr 0:0:0:0: [sr0] Add. Sense: Logical unit communication time-out [ 2431.851182] sr 0:0:0:0: [sr0] CDB: Read(10): 28 00 00 00 76 f4 00 00 40 00 [ 2431.851210] end_request: I/O error, dev sr0, sector 121808 When the libata and pata_serverworks modules are recompiled with ATA_DEBUG and ATA_VERBOSE_DEBUG defined in libata.h, the 64-KB transfer size in the scatter-gather list can be seen in the console log: [ 2664.897267] sr 9:0:0:0: [sr0] Send: [ 2664.897274] 0xf63d85e0 [ 2664.897283] sr 9:0:0:0: [sr0] CDB: [ 2664.897288] Read(10): 28 00 00 00 7f b4 00 00 40 00 [ 2664.897319] buffer = 0xf6d6fbc0, bufflen = 131072, queuecommand 0xf81b7700 [ 2664.897331] ata_scsi_dump_cdb: CDB (1:0,0,0) 28 00 00 00 7f b4 00 00 40 [ 2664.897338] ata_scsi_translate: ENTER [ 2664.897345] ata_sg_setup: ENTER, ata1 [ 2664.897356] ata_sg_setup: 3 sg elements mapped [ 2664.897364] ata_bmdma_fill_sg: PRD[0] = (0x66FD2000, 0xE000) [ 2664.897371] ata_bmdma_fill_sg: PRD[1] = (0x65000000, 0x10000) ------------------------------------------------------> ======= [ 2664.897378] ata_bmdma_fill_sg: PRD[2] = (0x66A10000, 0x2000) [ 2664.897386] ata1: ata_dev_select: ENTER, device 0, wait 1 [ 2664.897422] ata_sff_tf_load: feat 0x1 nsect 0x0 lba 0x0 0x0 0xFC [ 2664.897428] ata_sff_tf_load: device 0xA0 [ 2664.897448] ata_sff_exec_command: ata1: cmd 0xA0 [ 2664.897457] ata_scsi_translate: EXIT [ 2664.897462] leaving scsi_dispatch_cmnd() [ 2664.897497] Doing sr request, dev = sr0, block = 0 [ 2664.897507] sr0 : reading 64/256 512 byte blocks. [ 2664.897553] ata_sff_hsm_move: ata1: protocol 7 task_state 1 (dev_stat 0x58) [ 2664.897560] atapi_send_cdb: send cdb [ 2666.910058] ata_bmdma_port_intr: ata1: host_stat 0x64 [ 2666.910079] __ata_sff_port_intr: ata1: protocol 7 task_state 3 [ 2666.910093] ata_sff_hsm_move: ata1: protocol 7 task_state 3 (dev_stat 0x51) [ 2666.910101] ata_sff_hsm_move: ata1: protocol 7 task_state 4 (dev_stat 0x51) [ 2666.910129] sr 9:0:0:0: [sr0] Done: [ 2666.910136] 0xf63d85e0 TIMEOUT lspci shows that the driver used for the Broadcom OSB4 IDE Controller is pata_serverworks: 00:0f.1 IDE interface: Broadcom OSB4 IDE Controller (prog-if 8e [Master SecP SecO PriP]) Flags: bus master, medium devsel, latency 64 [virtual] Memory at 000001f0 (32-bit, non-prefetchable) [size=8] [virtual] Memory at 000003f0 (type 3, non-prefetchable) [size=1] I/O ports at 0170 [size=8] I/O ports at 0374 [size=4] I/O ports at 1440 [size=16] Kernel driver in use: pata_serverworks The pata_serverworks driver supports five distinct device IDs, one being the OSB4 and the other four belonging to the CSB series. The CSB series appears to support 64-KB DMA transfers, as tests on a machine with an SAI2 motherboard containing a Broadcom CSB5 IDE Controller (vendor and device IDs: 1166:0212) showed no problems with 64-KB DMA transfers. This problem was first discovered when attempting to install openSUSE from a DVD on a machine with an STL2 motherboard. Using the pata_serverworks module, older releases of openSUSE will not install at all due to the timeouts. Releases of openSUSE prior to 11.3 can be installed by disabling the pata_serverworks module using the brokenmodules boot parameter, which causes the serverworks module to be used instead. Recent releases of openSUSE (12.2 and later) include better error recovery and will install, though very slowly. On all openSUSE releases, the problem can be recreated on a machine containing a Broadcom OSB4 IDE Controller by mounting an install DVD and running a command similar to the following: find /mnt -type f -print | xargs cat > /dev/null The patch below corrects the problem. Similar to the other ATA drivers that do not support 64-KB DMA transfers, the patch changes the ata_port_operations qc_prep vector to point to a routine that breaks any 64-KB segment into two 32-KB segments and changes the scsi_host_template sg_tablesize element to reduce by half the number of scatter/gather elements allowed. These two changes affect only the OSB4. Signed-off-by:
Scott Carter <ccscott@funsoft.com> Signed-off-by:
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Chao Yu authored
commit 35425ea2 upstream. Christopher Head 2014-06-28 05:26:20 UTC described: "I tried to reproduce this on 3.12.21. Instead, when I do "echo hello > foo" in an ecryptfs mount with ecryptfs_xattr specified, I get a kernel crash: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<ffffffff8110eb39>] fsstack_copy_attr_all+0x2/0x61 PGD d7840067 PUD b2c3c067 PMD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: nvidia(PO) CPU: 3 PID: 3566 Comm: bash Tainted: P O 3.12.21-gentoo-r1 #2 Hardware name: ASUSTek Computer Inc. G60JX/G60JX, BIOS 206 03/15/2010 task: ffff8801948944c0 ti: ffff8800bad70000 task.ti: ffff8800bad70000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8110eb39>] [<ffffffff8110eb39>] fsstack_copy_attr_all+0x2/0x61 RSP: 0018:ffff8800bad71c10 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 00000000000181a4 RBX: ffff880198648480 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: ffff880172010450 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff880198490e40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff880172010450 R11: ffffea0002c51e80 R12: 0000000000002000 R13: 000000000000001a R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff880198490e40 FS: 00007ff224caa700(0000) GS:ffff88019fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000bb07f000 CR4: 00000000000007e0 Stack: ffffffff811826e8 ffff8800a39d8000 0000000000000000 000000000000001a ffff8800a01d0000 ffff8800a39d8000 ffffffff81185fd5 ffffffff81082c2c 00000001a39d8000 53d0abbc98490e40 0000000000000037 ffff8800a39d8220 Call Trace: [<ffffffff811826e8>] ? ecryptfs_setxattr+0x40/0x52 [<ffffffff81185fd5>] ? ecryptfs_write_metadata+0x1b3/0x223 [<ffffffff81082c2c>] ? should_resched+0x5/0x23 [<ffffffff8118322b>] ? ecryptfs_initialize_file+0xaf/0xd4 [<ffffffff81183344>] ? ecryptfs_create+0xf4/0x142 [<ffffffff810f8c0d>] ? vfs_create+0x48/0x71 [<ffffffff810f9c86>] ? do_last.isra.68+0x559/0x952 [<ffffffff810f7ce7>] ? link_path_walk+0xbd/0x458 [<ffffffff810fa2a3>] ? path_openat+0x224/0x472 [<ffffffff810fa7bd>] ? do_filp_open+0x2b/0x6f [<ffffffff81103606>] ? __alloc_fd+0xd6/0xe7 [<ffffffff810ee6ab>] ? do_sys_open+0x65/0xe9 [<ffffffff8157d022>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b RIP [<ffffffff8110eb39>] fsstack_copy_attr_all+0x2/0x61 RSP <ffff8800bad71c10> CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace df9dba5f1ddb8565 ]---" If we create a file when we mount with ecryptfs_xattr_metadata option, we will encounter a crash in this path: ->ecryptfs_create ->ecryptfs_initialize_file ->ecryptfs_write_metadata ->ecryptfs_write_metadata_to_xattr ->ecryptfs_setxattr ->fsstack_copy_attr_all It's because our dentry->d_inode used in fsstack_copy_attr_all is NULL, and it will be initialized when ecryptfs_initialize_file finish. So we should skip copying attr from lower inode when the value of ->d_inode is invalid. Signed-off-by:
Chao Yu <chao2.yu@samsung.com> Signed-off-by:
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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