- 23 Jun, 2014 34 commits
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Boris BREZILLON authored
commit 9dcc87fe upstream. sam9x5 SoCs have the following errata: "RTC: Interrupt Mask Register cannot be used Interrupt Mask Register read always returns 0." Hence we should not rely on what IMR claims about already masked IRQs and just disable all IRQs. Signed-off-by:
Boris BREZILLON <boris.brezillon@free-electrons.com> Reported-by:
Bryan Evenson <bevenson@melinkcorp.com> Reviewed-by:
Johan Hovold <johan@hovold.com> Acked-by:
Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@atmel.com> Cc: Bryan Evenson <bevenson@melinkcorp.com> Cc: Andrew Victor <linux@maxim.org.za> Cc: Jean-Christophe Plagniol-Villard <plagnioj@jcrosoft.com> Cc: Alessandro Zummo <a.zummo@towertech.it> Cc: Mark Roszko <mark.roszko@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Cong Wang authored
[ Upstream commit 2853af6a ] When we mirror packets from a vxlan tunnel to other device, the mirror device should see the same packets (that is, without outer header). Because vxlan tunnel sets dev->hard_header_len, tcf_mirred() resets mac header back to outer mac, the mirror device actually sees packets with outer headers Vxlan tunnel should set dev->needed_headroom instead of dev->hard_header_len, like what other ip tunnels do. This fixes the above problem. Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: stephen hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Cc: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com> Signed-off-by:
Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com> Signed-off-by:
Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
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Michal Schmidt authored
[ Upstream commit e5eca6d4 ] When running RHEL6 userspace on a current upstream kernel, "ip link" fails to show VF information. The reason is a kernel<->userspace API change introduced by commit 88c5b5ce ("rtnetlink: Call nlmsg_parse() with correct header length"), after which the kernel does not see iproute2's IFLA_EXT_MASK attribute in the netlink request. iproute2 adjusted for the API change in its commit 63338dca4513 ("libnetlink: Use ifinfomsg instead of rtgenmsg in rtnl_wilddump_req_filter"). The problem has been noticed before: http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=136692296022182&w=2 (Subject: Re: getting VF link info seems to be broken in 3.9-rc8) We can do better than tell those with old userspace to upgrade. We can recognize the old iproute2 in the kernel by checking the netlink message length. Even when including the IFLA_EXT_MASK attribute, its netlink message is shorter than struct ifinfomsg. With this patch "ip link" shows VF information in both old and new iproute2 versions. Signed-off-by:
Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Xufeng Zhang authored
[ Upstream commit d3217b15 ] Consider the scenario: For a TCP-style socket, while processing the COOKIE_ECHO chunk in sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(), after it has passed a series of sanity check, a new association would be created in sctp_unpack_cookie(), but afterwards, some processing maybe failed, and sctp_association_free() will be called to free the previously allocated association, in sctp_association_free(), sk_ack_backlog value is decremented for this socket, since the initial value for sk_ack_backlog is 0, after the decrement, it will be 65535, a wrap-around problem happens, and if we want to establish new associations afterward in the same socket, ABORT would be triggered since sctp deem the accept queue as full. Fix this issue by only decrementing sk_ack_backlog for associations in the endpoint's list. Fix-suggested-by:
Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by:
Xufeng Zhang <xufeng.zhang@windriver.com> Acked-by:
Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 9709674e ] Alexey gave a AddressSanitizer[1] report that finally gave a good hint at where was the origin of various problems already reported by Dormando in the past [2] Problem comes from the fact that UDP can have a lockless TX path, and concurrent threads can manipulate sk_dst_cache, while another thread, is holding socket lock and calls __sk_dst_set() in ip4_datagram_release_cb() (this was added in linux-3.8) It seems that all we need to do is to use sk_dst_check() and sk_dst_set() so that all the writers hold same spinlock (sk->sk_dst_lock) to prevent corruptions. TCP stack do not need this protection, as all sk_dst_cache writers hold the socket lock. [1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free in ipv4_dst_check Read of size 2 by thread T15453: [<ffffffff817daa3a>] ipv4_dst_check+0x1a/0x90 ./net/ipv4/route.c:1116 [<ffffffff8175b789>] __sk_dst_check+0x89/0xe0 ./net/core/sock.c:531 [<ffffffff81830a36>] ip4_datagram_release_cb+0x46/0x390 ??:0 [<ffffffff8175eaea>] release_sock+0x17a/0x230 ./net/core/sock.c:2413 [<ffffffff81830882>] ip4_datagram_connect+0x462/0x5d0 ??:0 [<ffffffff81846d06>] inet_dgram_connect+0x76/0xd0 ./net/ipv4/af_inet.c:534 [<ffffffff817580ac>] SYSC_connect+0x15c/0x1c0 ./net/socket.c:1701 [<ffffffff817596ce>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 ./net/socket.c:1682 [<ffffffff818b0a29>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b ./arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:629 Freed by thread T15455: [<ffffffff8178d9b8>] dst_destroy+0xa8/0x160 ./net/core/dst.c:251 [<ffffffff8178de25>] dst_release+0x45/0x80 ./net/core/dst.c:280 [<ffffffff818304c1>] ip4_datagram_connect+0xa1/0x5d0 ??:0 [<ffffffff81846d06>] inet_dgram_connect+0x76/0xd0 ./net/ipv4/af_inet.c:534 [<ffffffff817580ac>] SYSC_connect+0x15c/0x1c0 ./net/socket.c:1701 [<ffffffff817596ce>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 ./net/socket.c:1682 [<ffffffff818b0a29>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b ./arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:629 Allocated by thread T15453: [<ffffffff8178d291>] dst_alloc+0x81/0x2b0 ./net/core/dst.c:171 [<ffffffff817db3b7>] rt_dst_alloc+0x47/0x50 ./net/ipv4/route.c:1406 [< inlined >] __ip_route_output_key+0x3e8/0xf70 __mkroute_output ./net/ipv4/route.c:1939 [<ffffffff817dde08>] __ip_route_output_key+0x3e8/0xf70 ./net/ipv4/route.c:2161 [<ffffffff817deb34>] ip_route_output_flow+0x14/0x30 ./net/ipv4/route.c:2249 [<ffffffff81830737>] ip4_datagram_connect+0x317/0x5d0 ??:0 [<ffffffff81846d06>] inet_dgram_connect+0x76/0xd0 ./net/ipv4/af_inet.c:534 [<ffffffff817580ac>] SYSC_connect+0x15c/0x1c0 ./net/socket.c:1701 [<ffffffff817596ce>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 ./net/socket.c:1682 [<ffffffff818b0a29>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b ./arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:629 [2] <4>[196727.311203] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP <4>[196727.311224] Modules linked in: xt_TEE xt_dscp xt_DSCP macvlan bridge coretemp crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel gpio_ich microcode ipmi_watchdog ipmi_devintf sb_edac edac_core lpc_ich mfd_core tpm_tis tpm tpm_bios ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler isci igb libsas i2c_algo_bit ixgbe ptp pps_core mdio <4>[196727.311333] CPU: 17 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/17 Not tainted 3.10.26 #1 <4>[196727.311344] Hardware name: Supermicro X9DRi-LN4+/X9DR3-LN4+/X9DRi-LN4+/X9DR3-LN4+, BIOS 3.0 07/05/2013 <4>[196727.311364] task: ffff885e6f069700 ti: ffff885e6f072000 task.ti: ffff885e6f072000 <4>[196727.311377] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff815f8c7f>] [<ffffffff815f8c7f>] ipv4_dst_destroy+0x4f/0x80 <4>[196727.311399] RSP: 0018:ffff885effd23a70 EFLAGS: 00010282 <4>[196727.311409] RAX: dead000000200200 RBX: ffff8854c398ecc0 RCX: 0000000000000040 <4>[196727.311423] RDX: dead000000100100 RSI: dead000000100100 RDI: dead000000200200 <4>[196727.311437] RBP: ffff885effd23a80 R08: ffffffff815fd9e0 R09: ffff885d5a590800 <4>[196727.311451] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 <4>[196727.311464] R13: ffffffff81c8c280 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff880e85ee16ce <4>[196727.311510] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff885effd20000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 <4>[196727.311554] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 <4>[196727.311581] CR2: 00007a46751eb000 CR3: 0000005e65688000 CR4: 00000000000407e0 <4>[196727.311625] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 <4>[196727.311669] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 <4>[196727.311713] Stack: <4>[196727.311733] ffff8854c398ecc0 ffff8854c398ecc0 ffff885effd23ab0 ffffffff815b7f42 <4>[196727.311784] ffff88be6595bc00 ffff8854c398ecc0 0000000000000000 ffff8854c398ecc0 <4>[196727.311834] ffff885effd23ad0 ffffffff815b86c6 ffff885d5a590800 ffff8816827821c0 <4>[196727.311885] Call Trace: <4>[196727.311907] <IRQ> <4>[196727.311912] [<ffffffff815b7f42>] dst_destroy+0x32/0xe0 <4>[196727.311959] [<ffffffff815b86c6>] dst_release+0x56/0x80 <4>[196727.311986] [<ffffffff81620bd5>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x2a5/0x4a0 <4>[196727.312013] [<ffffffff81622b5a>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x7da/0x820 <4>[196727.312041] [<ffffffff815fd9e0>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x360/0x360 <4>[196727.312070] [<ffffffff815de02d>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x7d/0x150 <4>[196727.312097] [<ffffffff815fd9e0>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x360/0x360 <4>[196727.312125] [<ffffffff815fda92>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xb2/0x230 <4>[196727.312154] [<ffffffff815fdd9a>] ip_local_deliver+0x4a/0x90 <4>[196727.312183] [<ffffffff815fd799>] ip_rcv_finish+0x119/0x360 <4>[196727.312212] [<ffffffff815fe00b>] ip_rcv+0x22b/0x340 <4>[196727.312242] [<ffffffffa0339680>] ? macvlan_broadcast+0x160/0x160 [macvlan] <4>[196727.312275] [<ffffffff815b0c62>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x512/0x640 <4>[196727.312308] [<ffffffff811427fb>] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x13b/0x150 <4>[196727.312338] [<ffffffff815b0db1>] __netif_receive_skb+0x21/0x70 <4>[196727.312368] [<ffffffff815b0fa1>] netif_receive_skb+0x31/0xa0 <4>[196727.312397] [<ffffffff815b1ae8>] napi_gro_receive+0xe8/0x140 <4>[196727.312433] [<ffffffffa00274f1>] ixgbe_poll+0x551/0x11f0 [ixgbe] <4>[196727.312463] [<ffffffff815fe00b>] ? ip_rcv+0x22b/0x340 <4>[196727.312491] [<ffffffff815b1691>] net_rx_action+0x111/0x210 <4>[196727.312521] [<ffffffff815b0db1>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x21/0x70 <4>[196727.312552] [<ffffffff810519d0>] __do_softirq+0xd0/0x270 <4>[196727.312583] [<ffffffff816cef3c>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30 <4>[196727.312613] [<ffffffff81004205>] do_softirq+0x55/0x90 <4>[196727.312640] [<ffffffff81051c85>] irq_exit+0x55/0x60 <4>[196727.312668] [<ffffffff816cf5c3>] do_IRQ+0x63/0xe0 <4>[196727.312696] [<ffffffff816c5aaa>] common_interrupt+0x6a/0x6a <4>[196727.312722] <EOI> <1>[196727.313071] RIP [<ffffffff815f8c7f>] ipv4_dst_destroy+0x4f/0x80 <4>[196727.313100] RSP <ffff885effd23a70> <4>[196727.313377] ---[ end trace 64b3f14fae0f2e29 ]--- <0>[196727.380908] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Reported-by:
Alexey Preobrazhensky <preobr@google.com> Reported-by:
dormando <dormando@rydia.ne> Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Fixes: 8141ed9f ("ipv4: Add a socket release callback for datagram sockets") Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by:
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Dmitry Popov authored
[ Upstream commit 2346829e ] ipv4_{update_pmtu,redirect} were called with tunnel's ifindex (t->dev is a tunnel netdevice). It caused wrong route lookup and failure of pmtu update or redirect. We should use the same ifindex that we use in ip_route_output_* in *tunnel_xmit code. It is t->parms.link . Signed-off-by:
Dmitry Popov <ixaphire@qrator.net> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 87757a91 ] unregister_netdevice_many() API is error prone and we had too many bugs because of dangling LIST_HEAD on stacks. See commit f87e6f47 ("net: dont leave active on stack LIST_HEAD") In fact, instead of making sure no caller leaves an active list_head, just force a list_del() in the callee. No one seems to need to access the list after unregister_netdevice_many() Signed-off-by:
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Bjørn Mork authored
[ Upstream commit ba6de0f5 ] Lars writes: "I'm only 99% sure that the net interfaces are qmi interfaces, nothing to lose by adding them in my opinion." And I tend to agree based on the similarity with the two Olicard modems we already have here. Reported-by:
Lars Melin <larsm17@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Signed-off-by:
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Alexei Starovoitov authored
[ Upstream commit 588f5d62 ] Fixes: 569810d1 ("net: filter: fix typo in sparc BPF JIT") Signed-off-by:
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by:
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Alexei Starovoitov authored
[ Upstream commit 569810d1 ] fix typo in sparc codegen for SKF_AD_IFINDEX and SKF_AD_HATYPE classic BPF extensions Fixes: 2809a208 ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for sparc") Signed-off-by:
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Sergei Shtylyov authored
[ Upstream commit d8b0426a ] Commit 4a55530f (net: sh_eth: modify the definitions of register) managed to leave out the E-DMAC register entries in sh_eth_offset_fast_sh3_sh2[], thus totally breaking SH7619/771x support. Add the missing entries using the data from before that commit. Signed-off-by:
Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@cogentembedded.com> Acked-by:
Yoshihiro Shimoda <yoshihiro.shimoda.uh@renesas.com> Signed-off-by:
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Ben Dooks authored
[ Upstream commit 530aa2d0 ] The current behaviour of the sh_eth driver is not to use the RNC bit for the receive ring. This means that every packet recieved is not only generating an IRQ but it also stops the receive ring DMA as well until the driver re-enables it after unloading the packet. This means that a number of the following errors are generated due to the receive packet FIFO overflowing due to nowhere to put packets: net eth0: Receive FIFO Overflow Since feedback from Yoshihiro Shimoda shows that every supported LSI for this driver should have the bit enabled it seems the best way is to remove the RMCR default value from the per-system data and just write it when initialising the RMCR value. This is discussed in the message (http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg284912.html). I have tested the 0x00000001 configuration with NFS root filesystem and the driver has not failed yet. There are further test reports from Sergei Shtylov and others for both the R8A7790 and R8A7791. There is also feedback fron Cao Minh Hiep[1] which reports the same issue in (http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/316285) showing this fixes issues with losing UDP datagrams under iperf. Tested-by:
Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk> Acked-by:
Simon Horman <horms+renesas@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by:
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Yuchung Cheng authored
[ Upstream commit 0cfa5c07 ] This bug is discovered by an recent F-RTO issue on tcpm list https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tcpm/current/msg08794.html The bug is that currently F-RTO does not use DSACK to undo cwnd in certain cases: upon receiving an ACK after the RTO retransmission in F-RTO, and the ACK has DSACK indicating the retransmission is spurious, the sender only calls tcp_try_undo_loss() if some never retransmisted data is sacked (FLAG_ORIG_DATA_SACKED). The correct behavior is to unconditionally call tcp_try_undo_loss so the DSACK information is used properly to undo the cwnd reduction. Signed-off-by:
Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jiri Pirko authored
[ Upstream commit 9d0d68fa ] Now it is not possible to set mtu to team device which has a port enslaved to it. The reason is that when team_change_mtu() calls dev_set_mtu() for port device, notificator for NETDEV_PRECHANGEMTU event is called and team_device_event() returns NOTIFY_BAD forbidding the change. So fix this by returning NOTIFY_DONE here in case team is changing mtu in team_change_mtu(). Introduced-by: 3d249d4c "net: introduce ethernet teaming device" Signed-off-by:
Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us> Acked-by:
Flavio Leitner <fbl@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 39c36094 ] I noticed we were sending wrong IPv4 ID in TCP flows when MTU discovery is disabled. Note how GSO/TSO packets do not have monotonically incrementing ID. 06:37:41.575531 IP (id 14227, proto: TCP (6), length: 4396) 06:37:41.575534 IP (id 14272, proto: TCP (6), length: 65212) 06:37:41.575544 IP (id 14312, proto: TCP (6), length: 57972) 06:37:41.575678 IP (id 14317, proto: TCP (6), length: 7292) 06:37:41.575683 IP (id 14361, proto: TCP (6), length: 63764) It appears I introduced this bug in linux-3.1. inet_getid() must return the old value of peer->ip_id_count, not the new one. Lets revert this part, and remove the prevention of a null identification field in IPv6 Fragment Extension Header, which is dubious and not even done properly. Fixes: 87c48fa3 ("ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable") Signed-off-by:
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Tom Gundersen authored
[ Upstream commit f98f89a0 ] Enable the module alias hookup to allow tunnel modules to be autoloaded on demand. This is in line with how most other netdev kinds work, and will allow userspace to create tunnels without having CAP_SYS_MODULE. Signed-off-by:
Tom Gundersen <teg@jklm.no> Signed-off-by:
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Toshiaki Makita authored
[ Upstream commit e0d7968a ] br_handle_local_finish() is allowing us to insert an FDB entry with disallowed vlan. For example, when port 1 and 2 are communicating in vlan 10, and even if vlan 10 is disallowed on port 3, port 3 can interfere with their communication by spoofed src mac address with vlan id 10. Note: Even if it is judged that a frame should not be learned, it should not be dropped because it is destined for not forwarding layer but higher layer. See IEEE 802.1Q-2011 8.13.10. Signed-off-by:
Toshiaki Makita <makita.toshiaki@lab.ntt.co.jp> Acked-by:
Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Michal Schmidt authored
[ Upstream commit bfc5184b ] Any process is able to send netlink messages with leftover bytes. Make the warning rate-limited to prevent too much log spam. The warning is supposed to help find userspace bugs, so print the triggering command name to implicate the buggy program. [v2: Use pr_warn_ratelimited instead of printk_ratelimited.] Signed-off-by:
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Dan Carpenter authored
[ Upstream commit 7df566bb ] This function is called from dcbnl_build_peer_app(). The "info" struct isn't initialized at all so we disclose 2 bytes of uninitialized stack data. We should clear it before passing it to the user. Fixes: 48365e48 ('qlcnic: dcb: Add support for CEE Netlink interface.') Signed-off-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric W. Biederman authored
[ Upstream commit 2d7a85f4 ] It was possible to get a setuid root or setcap executable to write to it's stdout or stderr (which has been set made a netlink socket) and inadvertently reconfigure the networking stack. To prevent this we check that both the creator of the socket and the currentl applications has permission to reconfigure the network stack. Unfortunately this breaks Zebra which always uses sendto/sendmsg and creates it's socket without any privileges. To keep Zebra working don't bother checking if the creator of the socket has privilege when a destination address is specified. Instead rely exclusively on the privileges of the sender of the socket. Note from Andy: This is exactly Eric's code except for some comment clarifications and formatting fixes. Neither I nor, I think, anyone else is thrilled with this approach, but I'm hesitant to wait on a better fix since 3.15 is almost here. Note to stable maintainers: This is a mess. An earlier series of patches in 3.15 fix a rather serious security issue (CVE-2014-0181), but they did so in a way that breaks Zebra. The offending series includes: commit aa4cf945 Author: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Date: Wed Apr 23 14:28:03 2014 -0700 net: Add variants of capable for use on netlink messages If a given kernel version is missing that series of fixes, it's probably worth backporting it and this patch. if that series is present, then this fix is critical if you care about Zebra. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by:
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by:
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Eric W. Biederman authored
[ Upstream commit 90f62cf3 ] It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that privileged executable did not intend to do. To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls. Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well. Reported-by:
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Eric W. Biederman authored
[ Upstream commit aa4cf945 ] netlink_net_capable - The common case use, for operations that are safe on a network namespace netlink_capable - For operations that are only known to be safe for the global root netlink_ns_capable - The general case of capable used to handle special cases __netlink_ns_capable - Same as netlink_ns_capable except taking a netlink_skb_parms instead of the skbuff of a netlink message. Signed-off-by:
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Eric W. Biederman authored
[ Upstream commit a3b299da ] sk_net_capable - The common case, operations that are safe in a network namespace. sk_capable - Operations that are not known to be safe in a network namespace sk_ns_capable - The general case for special cases. Signed-off-by:
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Eric W. Biederman authored
[ Upstream commit a53b72c8 ] The permission check in sock_diag_put_filterinfo is wrong, and it is so removed from it's sources it is not clear why it is wrong. Move the computation into packet_diag_dump and pass a bool of the result into sock_diag_filterinfo. This does not yet correct the capability check but instead simply moves it to make it clear what is going on. Reported-by:
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Eric W. Biederman authored
[ Upstream commit 5187cd05 ] netlink_capable is a static internal function in af_netlink.c and we have better uses for the name netlink_capable. Signed-off-by:
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Mimi Zohar authored
commit 2fb1c9a4 upstream. Calculating the 'security.evm' HMAC value requires access to the EVM encrypted key. Only the kernel should have access to it. This patch prevents userspace tools(eg. setfattr, cp --preserve=xattr) from setting/modifying the 'security.evm' HMAC value directly. Signed-off-by:
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Dmitry Kasatkin authored
commit 0430e49b upstream. Commit 8aac6270 "move exit_task_namespaces() outside of exit_notify" introduced the kernel opps since the kernel v3.10, which happens when Apparmor and IMA-appraisal are enabled at the same time. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- [ 106.750167] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018 [ 106.750221] IP: [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30 [ 106.750241] PGD 0 [ 106.750254] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 106.750272] Modules linked in: cuse parport_pc ppdev bnep rfcomm bluetooth rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl nfs lockd sunrpc fscache dm_crypt intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp kvm_intel snd_hda_codec_hdmi kvm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 glue_helper lrw gf128mul ablk_helper cryptd snd_hda_codec_realtek dcdbas snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_page_alloc snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi psmouse snd_seq microcode serio_raw snd_timer snd_seq_device snd soundcore video lpc_ich coretemp mac_hid lp parport mei_me mei nbd hid_generic e1000e usbhid ahci ptp hid libahci pps_core [ 106.750658] CPU: 6 PID: 1394 Comm: mysqld Not tainted 3.13.0-rc7-kds+ #15 [ 106.750673] Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 9010/0M9KCM, BIOS A08 09/19/2012 [ 106.750689] task: ffff8800de804920 ti: ffff880400fca000 task.ti: ffff880400fca000 [ 106.750704] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811ec7da>] [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30 [ 106.750725] RSP: 0018:ffff880400fcba60 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 106.750738] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000100 RCX: ffff8800d51523e7 [ 106.750764] RDX: ffffffffffffffea RSI: ffff880400fcba34 RDI: ffff880402d20020 [ 106.750791] RBP: ffff880400fcbae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 106.750817] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8800d5152300 [ 106.750844] R13: ffff8803eb8df510 R14: ffff880400fcbb28 R15: ffff8800d51523e7 [ 106.750871] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88040d200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 106.750910] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 106.750935] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000001c0e000 CR4: 00000000001407e0 [ 106.750962] Stack: [ 106.750981] ffffffff813434eb ffff880400fcbb20 ffff880400fcbb18 0000000000000000 [ 106.751037] ffff8800de804920 ffffffff8101b9b9 0001800000000000 0000000000000100 [ 106.751093] 0000010000000000 0000000000000002 000000000000000e ffff8803eb8df500 [ 106.751149] Call Trace: [ 106.751172] [<ffffffff813434eb>] ? aa_path_name+0x2ab/0x430 [ 106.751199] [<ffffffff8101b9b9>] ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10 [ 106.751225] [<ffffffff8134a68d>] aa_path_perm+0x7d/0x170 [ 106.751250] [<ffffffff8101b945>] ? native_sched_clock+0x15/0x80 [ 106.751276] [<ffffffff8134aa73>] aa_file_perm+0x33/0x40 [ 106.751301] [<ffffffff81348c5e>] common_file_perm+0x8e/0xb0 [ 106.751327] [<ffffffff81348d78>] apparmor_file_permission+0x18/0x20 [ 106.751355] [<ffffffff8130c853>] security_file_permission+0x23/0xa0 [ 106.751382] [<ffffffff811c77a2>] rw_verify_area+0x52/0xe0 [ 106.751407] [<ffffffff811c789d>] vfs_read+0x6d/0x170 [ 106.751432] [<ffffffff811cda31>] kernel_read+0x41/0x60 [ 106.751457] [<ffffffff8134fd45>] ima_calc_file_hash+0x225/0x280 [ 106.751483] [<ffffffff8134fb52>] ? ima_calc_file_hash+0x32/0x280 [ 106.751509] [<ffffffff8135022d>] ima_collect_measurement+0x9d/0x160 [ 106.751536] [<ffffffff810b552d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [ 106.751562] [<ffffffff8134f07c>] ? ima_file_free+0x6c/0xd0 [ 106.751587] [<ffffffff81352824>] ima_update_xattr+0x34/0x60 [ 106.751612] [<ffffffff8134f0d0>] ima_file_free+0xc0/0xd0 [ 106.751637] [<ffffffff811c9635>] __fput+0xd5/0x300 [ 106.751662] [<ffffffff811c98ae>] ____fput+0xe/0x10 [ 106.751687] [<ffffffff81086774>] task_work_run+0xc4/0xe0 [ 106.751712] [<ffffffff81066fad>] do_exit+0x2bd/0xa90 [ 106.751738] [<ffffffff8173c958>] ? retint_swapgs+0x13/0x1b [ 106.751763] [<ffffffff8106780c>] do_group_exit+0x4c/0xc0 [ 106.751788] [<ffffffff81067894>] SyS_exit_group+0x14/0x20 [ 106.751814] [<ffffffff8174522d>] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f [ 106.751839] Code: c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 e8 22 fe ff ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 c9 00 00 48 8b 80 28 06 00 00 48 89 e5 5d <48> 8b 40 18 48 39 87 c0 00 00 00 0f 94 c0 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 [ 106.752185] RIP [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30 [ 106.752214] RSP <ffff880400fcba60> [ 106.752236] CR2: 0000000000000018 [ 106.752258] ---[ end trace 3c520748b4732721 ]--- ---------------------------------------------------------------------- The reason for the oops is that IMA-appraisal uses "kernel_read()" when file is closed. kernel_read() honors LSM security hook which calls Apparmor handler, which uses current->nsproxy->mnt_ns. The 'guilty' commit changed the order of cleanup code so that nsproxy->mnt_ns was not already available for Apparmor. Discussion about the issue with Al Viro and Eric W. Biederman suggested that kernel_read() is too high-level for IMA. Another issue, except security checking, that was identified is mandatory locking. kernel_read honors it as well and it might prevent IMA from calculating necessary hash. It was suggested to use simplified version of the function without security and locking checks. This patch introduces special version ima_kernel_read(), which skips security and mandatory locking checking. It prevents the kernel oops to happen. Signed-off-by:
Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Suggested-by:
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Nicholas Bellinger authored
commit 1d2b60a5 upstream. This patch adds an explicit check in chap_server_compute_md5() to ensure the CHAP_C value received from the initiator during mutual authentication does not match the original CHAP_C provided by the target. This is in line with RFC-3720, section 8.2.1: Originators MUST NOT reuse the CHAP challenge sent by the Responder for the other direction of a bidirectional authentication. Responders MUST check for this condition and close the iSCSI TCP connection if it occurs. Reported-by:
Tejas Vaykole <tejas.vaykole@calsoftinc.com> Signed-off-by:
Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org> Signed-off-by:
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Boris BREZILLON authored
commit 2fe121e1 upstream. The rtc user must wait at least 1 sec between each time/calandar update (see atmel's datasheet chapter "Updating Time/Calendar"). Use the 1Hz interrupt to update the at91_rtc_upd_rdy flag and wait for the at91_rtc_wait_upd_rdy event if the rtc is not ready. This patch fixes a deadlock in an uninterruptible wait when the RTC is updated more than once every second. AFAICT the bug is here from the beginning, but I think we should at least backport this fix to 3.10 and the following longterm and stable releases. Signed-off-by:
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Michael S. Tsirkin authored
[ Upstream commit 1fd819ec ] skb_segment copies frags around, so we need to copy them carefully to avoid accessing user memory after reporting completion to userspace through a callback. skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath: TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy in this case does not look like a big deal. Signed-off-by:
Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by:
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Michael S. Tsirkin authored
[ Upstream commit 1a4cedaf ] fskb is unrelated to frag: it's coming from frag_list. Rename it list_skb to avoid confusion. Signed-off-by:
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Michael S. Tsirkin authored
[ Upstream commit df5771ff ] rename local variable to make it easier to tell at a glance that we are dealing with a head skb. Signed-off-by:
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Michael S. Tsirkin authored
[ Upstream commit 4e1beba1 ] skb_frag can in fact point at either skb or fskb so rename it generally "frag". Signed-off-by:
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Michael S. Tsirkin authored
[ Upstream commit 8cb19905 ] frag points at nskb, so name it appropriately Signed-off-by:
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- 20 Jun, 2014 6 commits
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Mimi Zohar authored
commit f9b2a735 upstream. Files are measured or appraised based on the IMA policy. When a file, in policy, is opened with the O_DIRECT flag, a deadlock occurs. The first attempt at resolving this lockdep temporarily removed the O_DIRECT flag and restored it, after calculating the hash. The second attempt introduced the O_DIRECT_HAVELOCK flag. Based on this flag, do_blockdev_direct_IO() would skip taking the i_mutex a second time. The third attempt, by Dmitry Kasatkin, resolves the i_mutex locking issue, by re-introducing the IMA mutex, but uncovered another problem. Reading a file with O_DIRECT flag set, writes directly to userspace pages. A second patch allocates a user-space like memory. This works for all IMA hooks, except ima_file_free(), which is called on __fput() to recalculate the file hash. Until this last issue is addressed, do not 'collect' the measurement for measuring, appraising, or auditing files opened with the O_DIRECT flag set. Based on policy, permit or deny file access. This patch defines a new IMA policy rule option named 'permit_directio'. Policy rules could be defined, based on LSM or other criteria, to permit specific applications to open files with the O_DIRECT flag set. Changelog v1: - permit or deny file access based IMA policy rules Signed-off-by:
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Ville Syrjälä authored
commit 40478455 upstream. In commit commit 6375b768 Author: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Date: Mon Mar 3 11:33:36 2014 +0200 drm/i915: Reject >165MHz modes w/ DVI monitors the driver started to filter out display modes which exceed the single-link DVI 165Mz dotclock limits when the monitor doesn't report itself as being HDMI compliant. The intent was to filter out all EDID derived modes that require dual-link DVI to operate since we don't support dual-link. However the patch went a bit too far and also causes the driver to reject such modes even when specified by the user. Normally we don't check the sink limitations when setting a mode from the user. This allows the user to specify any mode whether the sink reports to support it or not. This can be useful since often the sinks support more modes than they report in the EDID. So relax the checks a bit, and apply the single-link DVI dotclock limit only when filtering the mode list, and ignore the limit when setting a user specified mode. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=72961Tested-by:
Nicholas Vinson <nvinson@comcast.net> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [3.14] Reviewed-by:
Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch> Signed-off-by:
Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Andreas Schrägle authored
commit 754a292f upstream. Add support for Marvell Technology Group Ltd. 88SE91A0 SATA 6Gb/s Controller by adding its PCI ID. Signed-off-by:
Andreas Schrägle <ajs124.ajs124@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Jérôme Carretero authored
commit d2518365 upstream. This device normally comes with a proprietary driver, using a web GUI to configure RAID: http://www.highpoint-tech.com/USA_new/series_rr600-download.htm But thankfully it also works out of the box with the AHCI driver, being just a Marvell 88SE9235. Devices 640L, 644L, 644LS should also be supported but not tested here. Signed-off-by:
Jérôme Carretero <cJ-ko@zougloub.eu> Signed-off-by:
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Alessandro Miceli authored
commit 74a86272 upstream. Added support for Sveon STV27 device (rtl2832u + FC0013 tuner) Signed-off-by:
Alessandro Miceli <angelofsky1980@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Antti Palosaari <crope@iki.fi> Signed-off-by:
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <m.chehab@samsung.com> Signed-off-by:
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Alessandro Miceli authored
commit f27f5b0e upstream. Added Sveon STV20 device based on Realtek RTL2832U and FC0012 tuner Signed-off-by:
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