1. 16 Dec, 2015 19 commits
    • Rajmohan Mani's avatar
      xhci: Workaround to get Intel xHCI reset working more reliably · 8eb69c03
      Rajmohan Mani authored
      commit a5964396 upstream.
      
      Existing Intel xHCI controllers require a delay of 1 mS,
      after setting the CMD_RESET bit in command register, before
      accessing any HC registers. This allows the HC to complete
      the reset operation and be ready for HC register access.
      Without this delay, the subsequent HC register access,
      may result in a system hang, very rarely.
      
      Verified CherryView / Braswell platforms go through over
      5000 warm reboot cycles (which was not possible without
      this patch), without any xHCI reset hang.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarRajmohan Mani <rajmohan.mani@intel.com>
      Tested-by: default avatarJoe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@stratus.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      8eb69c03
    • James Hogan's avatar
      MIPS: KVM: Uninit VCPU in vcpu_create error path · bcdaea7f
      James Hogan authored
      commit 585bb8f9 upstream.
      
      If either of the memory allocations in kvm_arch_vcpu_create() fail, the
      vcpu which has been allocated and kvm_vcpu_init'd doesn't get uninit'd
      in the error handling path. Add a call to kvm_vcpu_uninit() to fix this.
      
      Fixes: 669e846e ("KVM/MIPS32: MIPS arch specific APIs for KVM")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
      Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
      Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      [ luis: backported to 3.16:
        - file rename: mips.c -> kvm_mips.c ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLuis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      bcdaea7f
    • James Hogan's avatar
      MIPS: KVM: Fix CACHE immediate offset sign extension · e797d000
      James Hogan authored
      commit c5c2a3b9 upstream.
      
      The immediate field of the CACHE instruction is signed, so ensure that
      it gets sign extended by casting it to an int16_t rather than just
      masking the low 16 bits.
      
      Fixes: e685c689 ("KVM/MIPS32: Privileged instruction/target branch emulation.")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
      Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
      Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      [ luis: backported to 3.16:
        - file rename: emulate.c -> kvm_mips_emul.c ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLuis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      e797d000
    • James Hogan's avatar
      MIPS: KVM: Fix ASID restoration logic · 894d3694
      James Hogan authored
      commit 002374f3 upstream.
      
      ASID restoration on guest resume should determine the guest execution
      mode based on the guest Status register rather than bit 30 of the guest
      PC.
      
      Fix the two places in locore.S that do this, loading the guest status
      from the cop0 area. Note, this assembly is specific to the trap &
      emulate implementation of KVM, so it doesn't need to check the
      supervisor bit as that mode is not implemented in the guest.
      
      Fixes: b680f70f ("KVM/MIPS32: Entry point for trampolining to...")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
      Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
      Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
      Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      [ luis: backported to 3.16:
        - file rename: locore.S -> kvm_locore.S ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLuis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      894d3694
    • Li Jun's avatar
      usb: chipidea: debug: disable usb irq while role switch · b398a0e5
      Li Jun authored
      commit 251b3c8b upstream.
      
      Since the ci->role will be set after the host role start is complete, there
      will be nobody cared irq during start host if usb irq enabled. This error
      can be reproduced on i.mx6 sololite EVK board by:
      1. disable otg id irq(IDIE) and disable all real otg properties of usbotg1
         in dts.
      2. boot up the board with ID cable and usb device connected.
      3. echo gadget > /sys/kernel/debug/ci_hdrc.0/role
      4. echo host > /sys/kernel/debug/ci_hdrc.0/role
      5. irq 212: nobody cared.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLi Jun <jun.li@freescale.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarPeter Chen <peter.chen@freescale.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      b398a0e5
    • Junichi Nomura's avatar
      dm: fix ioctl retry termination with signal · cb2ccb2e
      Junichi Nomura authored
      commit 5bbbfdf6 upstream.
      
      dm-mpath retries ioctl, when no path is readily available and the device
      is configured to queue I/O in such a case. If you want to stop the retry
      before multipathd decides to turn off queueing mode, you could send
      signal for the process to exit from the loop.
      
      However the check of fatal signal has not carried along when commit
      6c182cd8 ("dm mpath: fix ioctl deadlock when no paths") moved the
      loop from dm-mpath to dm core. As a result, we can't terminate such
      a process in the retry loop.
      
      Easy reproducer of the situation is:
      
        # dmsetup create mp --table '0 1024 multipath 0 0 0 0'
        # dmsetup message mp 0 'queue_if_no_path'
        # sg_inq /dev/mapper/mp
      
      then you should be able to terminate sg_inq by pressing Ctrl+C.
      
      Fixes: 6c182cd8 ("dm mpath: fix ioctl deadlock when no paths")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJun'ichi Nomura <j-nomura@ce.jp.nec.com>
      Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
      Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
      [ kamal: backport to 3.13-stable: context ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      cb2ccb2e
    • Ben McCauley's avatar
      usb: dwc3: gadget: let us set lower max_speed · 4c747e03
      Ben McCauley authored
      commit b9e51b2b upstream.
      
      In some SoCs, dwc3 is implemented as a USB2.0 only
      core, meaning that it can't ever achieve SuperSpeed.
      
      Currect driver always sets gadget.max_speed to
      USB_SPEED_SUPER unconditionally. This can causes
      issues to some Host stacks where the host will issue
      a GetBOS() request and we will reply with a BOS
      containing Superspeed Capability Descriptor.
      
      At least Windows seems to be upset by this fact and
      prints a warning that we should connect $this device
      to another port.
      
      [ balbi@ti.com : rewrote entire commit, including
      source code comment to make a lot clearer what the
      problem is ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarBen McCauley <ben.mccauley@garmin.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarFelipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com>
      [ luis: backported to 3.16:
        - used dev_vdbg() instead of dwc3_trace() ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLuis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      4c747e03
    • Johannes Berg's avatar
      mac80211: mesh: fix call_rcu() usage · a4307b5d
      Johannes Berg authored
      commit c2e703a5 upstream.
      
      When using call_rcu(), the called function may be delayed quite
      significantly, and without a matching rcu_barrier() there's no
      way to be sure it has finished.
      Therefore, global state that could be gone/freed/reused should
      never be touched in the callback.
      
      Fix this in mesh by moving the atomic_dec() into the caller;
      that's not really a problem since we already unlinked the path
      and it will be destroyed anyway.
      
      This fixes a crash Jouni observed when running certain tests in
      a certain order, in which the mesh interface was torn down, the
      memory reused for a function pointer (work struct) and running
      that then crashed since the pointer had been decremented by 1,
      resulting in an invalid instruction byte stream.
      
      Fixes: eb2b9311 ("mac80211: mesh path table implementation")
      Reported-by: default avatarJouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      a4307b5d
    • Sachin Pandhare's avatar
      ASoC: wm8962: correct addresses for HPF_C_0/1 · 83532357
      Sachin Pandhare authored
      commit e9f96bc5 upstream.
      
      From datasheet:
      R17408 (4400h) HPF_C_1
      R17409 (4401h) HPF_C_0
      17048 -> 17408 (0x4400)
      17049 -> 17409 (0x4401)
      Signed-off-by: default avatarSachin Pandhare <sachinpandhare@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarCharles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      83532357
    • David Woodhouse's avatar
      USB: ti_usb_3410_5052: Add Honeywell HGI80 ID · acc8748f
      David Woodhouse authored
      commit 1bcb49e6 upstream.
      
      The Honeywell HGI80 is a wireless interface to the evohome connected
      thermostat. It uses a TI 3410 USB-serial port.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJohan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      acc8748f
    • Aleksander Morgado's avatar
      USB: serial: option: add support for Novatel MiFi USB620L · bf4bcaee
      Aleksander Morgado authored
      commit e07af133 upstream.
      
      Also known as Verizon U620L.
      
      The device is modeswitched from 1410:9020 to 1410:9022 by selecting the
      4th USB configuration:
      
       $ sudo usb_modeswitch –v 0x1410 –p 0x9020 –u 4
      
      This configuration provides a ECM interface as well as TTYs ('Enterprise
      Mode' according to the U620 Linux integration guide).
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAleksander Morgado <aleksander@aleksander.es>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJohan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      bf4bcaee
    • Clemens Ladisch's avatar
      ALSA: usb-audio: work around CH345 input SysEx corruption · 981cb06b
      Clemens Ladisch authored
      commit a91e627e upstream.
      
      One of the many faults of the QinHeng CH345 USB MIDI interface chip is
      that it does not handle received SysEx messages correctly -- every second
      event packet has a wrong code index number, which is the one from the last
      seen message, instead of 4.  For example, the two messages "FE F0 01 02 03
      04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E F7" result in the following event
      packets:
      
      correct:       CH345:
      0F FE 00 00    0F FE 00 00
      04 F0 01 02    04 F0 01 02
      04 03 04 05    0F 03 04 05
      04 06 07 08    04 06 07 08
      04 09 0A 0B    0F 09 0A 0B
      04 0C 0D 0E    04 0C 0D 0E
      05 F7 00 00    05 F7 00 00
      
      A class-compliant driver must interpret an event packet with CIN 15 as
      having a single data byte, so the other two bytes would be ignored.  The
      message received by the host would then be missing two bytes out of six;
      in this example, "F0 01 02 03 06 07 08 09 0C 0D 0E F7".
      
      These corrupted SysEx event packages contain only data bytes, while the
      CH345 uses event packets with a correct CIN value only for messages with
      a status byte, so it is possible to distinguish between these two cases by
      checking for the presence of this status byte.
      
      (Other bugs in the CH345's input handling, such as the corruption resulting
      from running status, cannot be worked around.)
      Signed-off-by: default avatarClemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTakashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      981cb06b
    • Clemens Ladisch's avatar
      ALSA: usb-audio: prevent CH345 multiport output SysEx corruption · 3372bcbd
      Clemens Ladisch authored
      commit 1ca8b201 upstream.
      
      The CH345 USB MIDI chip has two output ports.  However, they are
      multiplexed through one pin, and the number of ports cannot be reduced
      even for hardware that implements only one connector, so for those
      devices, data sent to either port ends up on the same hardware output.
      This becomes a problem when both ports are used at the same time, as
      longer MIDI commands (such as SysEx messages) are likely to be
      interrupted by messages from the other port, and thus to get lost.
      
      It would not be possible for the driver to detect how many ports the
      device actually has, except that in practice, _all_ devices built with
      the CH345 have only one port.  So we can just ignore the device's
      descriptors, and hardcode one output port.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarClemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTakashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
      [ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLuis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      3372bcbd
    • Clemens Ladisch's avatar
      cd687b62
    • Dave Hansen's avatar
      x86/fpu: Fix 32-bit signal frame handling · 2d08f031
      Dave Hansen authored
      commit ab6b5294 upstream.
      
      (This should have gone to LKML originally. Sorry for the extra
       noise, folks on the cc.)
      
      Background:
      
      Signal frames on x86 have two formats:
      
        1. For 32-bit executables (whether on a real 32-bit kernel or
           under 32-bit emulation on a 64-bit kernel) we have a
          'fpregset_t' that includes the "FSAVE" registers.
      
        2. For 64-bit executables (on 64-bit kernels obviously), the
           'fpregset_t' is smaller and does not contain the "FSAVE"
           state.
      
      When creating the signal frame, we have to be aware of whether
      we are running a 32 or 64-bit executable so we create the
      correct format signal frame.
      
      Problem:
      
      save_xstate_epilog() uses 'fx_sw_reserved_ia32' whenever it is
      called for a 32-bit executable.  This is for real 32-bit and
      ia32 emulation.
      
      But, fpu__init_prepare_fx_sw_frame() only initializes
      'fx_sw_reserved_ia32' when emulation is enabled, *NOT* for real
      32-bit kernels.
      
      This leads to really wierd situations where 32-bit programs
      lose their extended state when returning from a signal handler.
      The kernel copies the uninitialized (zero) 'fx_sw_reserved_ia32'
      out to userspace in save_xstate_epilog().  But when returning
      from the signal, the kernel errors out in check_for_xstate()
      when it does not see FP_XSTATE_MAGIC1 present (because it was
      zeroed).  This leads to the FPU/XSAVE state being initialized.
      
      For MPX, this leads to the most permissive state and means we
      silently lose bounds violations.  I think this would also mean
      that we could lose *ANY* FPU/SSE/AVX state.  I'm not sure why
      no one has spotted this bug.
      
      I believe this was broken by:
      
      	72a671ce ("x86, fpu: Unify signal handling code paths for x86 and x86_64 kernels")
      
      way back in 2012.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: dave@sr71.net
      Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
      Cc: yu-cheng.yu@intel.com
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151111002354.A0799571@viggo.jf.intel.comSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      [ luis: backported to 3.16:
        - file and function rename:
          * arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c -> arch/x86/kernel/xsave.c
          * fpu__init_prepare_fx_sw_frame() -> prepare_fx_sw_frame()
        - use 'i387_fsave_struct' instead of 'fregs_state'
        - adjusted context ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLuis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      2d08f031
    • Lars-Peter Clausen's avatar
      iio:ad7793: Fix ad7785 product ID · 20e45115
      Lars-Peter Clausen authored
      commit 785171fd upstream.
      
      While the datasheet for the AD7785 lists 0xXB as the product ID the actual
      product ID is 0xX3.
      
      Fix the product ID otherwise the driver will reject the device due to non
      matching IDs.
      
      Fixes: e786cc26 ("staging:iio:ad7793: Implement stricter id checking")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      20e45115
    • Lars-Peter Clausen's avatar
      iio: ad5064: Fix ad5629/ad5669 shift · a253556c
      Lars-Peter Clausen authored
      commit 5dcbe97b upstream.
      
      The ad5629/ad5669 are the I2C variant of the ad5628/ad5668, which has a SPI
      interface. They are mostly identical with the exception that the shift
      factor is different. Currently the driver does not take care of this
      difference which leads to incorrect DAC output values.
      
      Fix this by introducing a custom channel spec for the ad5629/ad5669 with
      the correct shift factor.
      
      Fixes: commit 6a17a076 ("iio:dac:ad5064: Add support for the ad5629r and ad5669r")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>
      [ kamal: backport to 3.13-stable: context ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      a253556c
    • Michael Hennerich's avatar
      iio:ad5064: Make sure ad5064_i2c_write() returns 0 on success · ec2f9639
      Michael Hennerich authored
      commit 03fe472e upstream.
      
      i2c_master_send() returns the number of bytes transferred on success while
      the ad5064 driver expects that the write() callback returns 0 on success.
      Fix that by translating any non negative return value of i2c_master_send()
      to 0.
      
      Fixes: commit 6a17a076 ("iio:dac:ad5064: Add support for the ad5629r and ad5669r")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMichael Hennerich <michael.hennerich@analog.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      ec2f9639
    • Vladimir Zapolskiy's avatar
      iio: lpc32xx_adc: fix warnings caused by enabling unprepared clock · 19d17708
      Vladimir Zapolskiy authored
      commit 01bb70ae upstream.
      
      If common clock framework is configured, the driver generates a warning,
      which is fixed by this change:
      
          root@devkit3250:~# cat /sys/bus/iio/devices/iio\:device0/in_voltage0_raw
          ------------[ cut here ]------------
          WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 724 at drivers/clk/clk.c:727 clk_core_enable+0x2c/0xa4()
          Modules linked in: sc16is7xx snd_soc_uda1380
          CPU: 0 PID: 724 Comm: cat Not tainted 4.3.0-rc2+ #198
          Hardware name: LPC32XX SoC (Flattened Device Tree)
          Backtrace:
          [<>] (dump_backtrace) from [<>] (show_stack+0x18/0x1c)
          [<>] (show_stack) from [<>] (dump_stack+0x20/0x28)
          [<>] (dump_stack) from [<>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x90/0xb8)
          [<>] (warn_slowpath_common) from [<>] (warn_slowpath_null+0x24/0x2c)
          [<>] (warn_slowpath_null) from [<>] (clk_core_enable+0x2c/0xa4)
          [<>] (clk_core_enable) from [<>] (clk_enable+0x24/0x38)
          [<>] (clk_enable) from [<>] (lpc32xx_read_raw+0x38/0x80)
          [<>] (lpc32xx_read_raw) from [<>] (iio_read_channel_info+0x70/0x94)
          [<>] (iio_read_channel_info) from [<>] (dev_attr_show+0x28/0x4c)
          [<>] (dev_attr_show) from [<>] (sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x8c/0xf0)
          [<>] (sysfs_kf_seq_show) from [<>] (kernfs_seq_show+0x2c/0x30)
          [<>] (kernfs_seq_show) from [<>] (seq_read+0x1c8/0x440)
          [<>] (seq_read) from [<>] (kernfs_fop_read+0x38/0x170)
          [<>] (kernfs_fop_read) from [<>] (do_readv_writev+0x16c/0x238)
          [<>] (do_readv_writev) from [<>] (vfs_readv+0x50/0x58)
          [<>] (vfs_readv) from [<>] (default_file_splice_read+0x1a4/0x308)
          [<>] (default_file_splice_read) from [<>] (do_splice_to+0x78/0x84)
          [<>] (do_splice_to) from [<>] (splice_direct_to_actor+0xc8/0x1cc)
          [<>] (splice_direct_to_actor) from [<>] (do_splice_direct+0xa0/0xb8)
          [<>] (do_splice_direct) from [<>] (do_sendfile+0x1a8/0x30c)
          [<>] (do_sendfile) from [<>] (SyS_sendfile64+0x104/0x10c)
          [<>] (SyS_sendfile64) from [<>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x38)
      Signed-off-by: default avatarVladimir Zapolskiy <vz@mleia.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      19d17708
  2. 11 Dec, 2015 3 commits
    • Kees Cook's avatar
      stackprotector: Introduce CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG · 3952e744
      Kees Cook authored
      commit 8779657d upstream.
      
      This changes the stack protector config option into a choice of
      "None", "Regular", and "Strong":
      
         CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE
         CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR
         CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG
      
      "Regular" means the old CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y option.
      
      "Strong" is a new mode introduced by this patch. With "Strong" the
      kernel is built with -fstack-protector-strong (available in
      gcc 4.9 and later). This option increases the coverage of the stack
      protector without the heavy performance hit of -fstack-protector-all.
      
      For reference, the stack protector options available in gcc are:
      
      -fstack-protector-all:
        Adds the stack-canary saving prefix and stack-canary checking
        suffix to _all_ function entry and exit. Results in substantial
        use of stack space for saving the canary for deep stack users
        (e.g. historically xfs), and measurable (though shockingly still
        low) performance hit due to all the saving/checking. Really not
        suitable for sane systems, and was entirely removed as an option
        from the kernel many years ago.
      
      -fstack-protector:
        Adds the canary save/check to functions that define an 8
        (--param=ssp-buffer-size=N, N=8 by default) or more byte local
        char array. Traditionally, stack overflows happened with
        string-based manipulations, so this was a way to find those
        functions. Very few total functions actually get the canary; no
        measurable performance or size overhead.
      
      -fstack-protector-strong
        Adds the canary for a wider set of functions, since it's not
        just those with strings that have ultimately been vulnerable to
        stack-busting. With this superset, more functions end up with a
        canary, but it still remains small compared to all functions
        with only a small change in performance. Based on the original
        design document, a function gets the canary when it contains any
        of:
      
          - local variable's address used as part of the right hand side
            of an assignment or function argument
          - local variable is an array (or union containing an array),
            regardless of array type or length
          - uses register local variables
      
        https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/1xXBH6rRZue4f296vGt9YQcuLVQHeE516stHwt8M9xyU
      
      Find below a comparison of "size" and "objdump" output when built with
      gcc-4.9 in three configurations:
      
        - defconfig
      	11430641 kernel text size
      	36110 function bodies
      
        - defconfig + CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR
      	11468490 kernel text size (+0.33%)
      	1015 of 36110 functions are stack-protected (2.81%)
      
        - defconfig + CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG via this patch
      	11692790 kernel text size (+2.24%)
      	7401 of 36110 functions are stack-protected (20.5%)
      
      With -strong, ARM's compressed boot code now triggers stack
      protection, so a static guard was added. Since this is only used
      during decompression and was never used before, the exposure
      here is very small. Once it switches to the full kernel, the
      stack guard is back to normal.
      
      Chrome OS has been using -fstack-protector-strong for its kernel
      builds for the last 8 months with no problems.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
      Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
      Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
      Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
      Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
      Cc: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
      Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1387481759-14535-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
      [ Improved the changelog and descriptions some more. ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      [ kamal: 3.13-stable: need these arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.c __stack_chk
        canary functions, even for just the old CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      3952e744
    • Kees Cook's avatar
      stackprotector: Unify the HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR logic between architectures · 1ccdfa13
      Kees Cook authored
      commit 19952a92 upstream.
      
      Instead of duplicating the CC_STACKPROTECTOR Kconfig and
      Makefile logic in each architecture, switch to using
      HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR and keep everything in one place. This
      retains the x86-specific bug verification scripts.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
      Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
      Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
      Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
      Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
      Cc: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
      Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
      Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1387481759-14535-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      [ kamal: 3.13-stable prereq for
        8779657d stackprotector: Introduce CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      1ccdfa13
    • Kosuke Tatsukawa's avatar
      tty: fix stall caused by missing memory barrier in drivers/tty/n_tty.c · 68366789
      Kosuke Tatsukawa authored
      commit e81107d4 upstream.
      
      My colleague ran into a program stall on a x86_64 server, where
      n_tty_read() was waiting for data even if there was data in the buffer
      in the pty.  kernel stack for the stuck process looks like below.
       #0 [ffff88303d107b58] __schedule at ffffffff815c4b20
       #1 [ffff88303d107bd0] schedule at ffffffff815c513e
       #2 [ffff88303d107bf0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff815c7818
       #3 [ffff88303d107ca0] wait_woken at ffffffff81096bd2
       #4 [ffff88303d107ce0] n_tty_read at ffffffff8136fa23
       #5 [ffff88303d107dd0] tty_read at ffffffff81368013
       #6 [ffff88303d107e20] __vfs_read at ffffffff811a3704
       #7 [ffff88303d107ec0] vfs_read at ffffffff811a3a57
       #8 [ffff88303d107f00] sys_read at ffffffff811a4306
       #9 [ffff88303d107f50] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath at ffffffff815c86d7
      
      There seems to be two problems causing this issue.
      
      First, in drivers/tty/n_tty.c, __receive_buf() stores the data and
      updates ldata->commit_head using smp_store_release() and then checks
      the wait queue using waitqueue_active().  However, since there is no
      memory barrier, __receive_buf() could return without calling
      wake_up_interactive_poll(), and at the same time, n_tty_read() could
      start to wait in wait_woken() as in the following chart.
      
              __receive_buf()                         n_tty_read()
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------
      if (waitqueue_active(&tty->read_wait))
      /* Memory operations issued after the
         RELEASE may be completed before the
         RELEASE operation has completed */
                                              add_wait_queue(&tty->read_wait, &wait);
                                              ...
                                              if (!input_available_p(tty, 0)) {
      smp_store_release(&ldata->commit_head,
                        ldata->read_head);
                                              ...
                                              timeout = wait_woken(&wait,
                                                TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, timeout);
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------
      
      The second problem is that n_tty_read() also lacks a memory barrier
      call and could also cause __receive_buf() to return without calling
      wake_up_interactive_poll(), and n_tty_read() to wait in wait_woken()
      as in the chart below.
      
              __receive_buf()                         n_tty_read()
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              spin_lock_irqsave(&q->lock, flags);
                                              /* from add_wait_queue() */
                                              ...
                                              if (!input_available_p(tty, 0)) {
                                              /* Memory operations issued after the
                                                 RELEASE may be completed before the
                                                 RELEASE operation has completed */
      smp_store_release(&ldata->commit_head,
                        ldata->read_head);
      if (waitqueue_active(&tty->read_wait))
                                              __add_wait_queue(q, wait);
                                              spin_unlock_irqrestore(&q->lock,flags);
                                              /* from add_wait_queue() */
                                              ...
                                              timeout = wait_woken(&wait,
                                                TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, timeout);
      ------------------------------------------------------------------------
      
      There are also other places in drivers/tty/n_tty.c which have similar
      calls to waitqueue_active(), so instead of adding many memory barrier
      calls, this patch simply removes the call to waitqueue_active(),
      leaving just wake_up*() behind.
      
      This fixes both problems because, even though the memory access before
      or after the spinlocks in both wake_up*() and add_wait_queue() can
      sneak into the critical section, it cannot go past it and the critical
      section assures that they will be serialized (please see "INTER-CPU
      ACQUIRING BARRIER EFFECTS" in Documentation/memory-barriers.txt for a
      better explanation).  Moreover, the resulting code is much simpler.
      
      Latency measurement using a ping-pong test over a pty doesn't show any
      visible performance drop.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKosuke Tatsukawa <tatsu@ab.jp.nec.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      [jsalisbury: Backported to 3.13.y:
       - Use wake_up_interruptible(), not wake_up_interruptible_poll()
       - There are only two spurious uses of waitqueue_active() to remove]
      BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1512815Signed-off-by: default avatarJoseph Salisbury <joseph.salisbury@canonical.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      68366789
  3. 07 Dec, 2015 4 commits
    • Kamal Mostafa's avatar
      Linux 3.13.11-ckt31 · f5a8c549
      Kamal Mostafa authored
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      f5a8c549
    • Filipe Manana's avatar
      Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents · 476d2aa4
      Filipe Manana authored
      commit 0305cd5f upstream.
      
      When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
      extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
      data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
      space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
      corruption/loss mentioned below.
      We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
      inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
      the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
      between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
      
      Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
      was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
      that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
      access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
      scenario is the following:
      
         1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
            extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
            any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
            else);
      
         2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
      
         3) User A makes the file world readable;
      
         4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
      
         5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
            file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
      
         6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
            its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
            the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
            that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
            user A that was never supposed to be public.
      
      Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
      bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
      this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
      of 0x00, instead of the original data.
      
      This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
      and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
      ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
      inline extents").
      
      So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
      non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
      in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
      the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
      
      The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
      the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
      that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
      which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
      inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
      different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
      destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
      has a larger inline extent than the source).
      
        seq=`basename $0`
        seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
        echo "QA output created by $seq"
        tmp=/tmp/$$
        status=1	# failure is the default!
        trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
      
        _cleanup()
        {
            rm -f $tmp.*
        }
      
        # get standard environment, filters and checks
        . ./common/rc
        . ./common/filter
      
        # real QA test starts here
        _need_to_be_root
        _supported_fs btrfs
        _supported_os Linux
        _require_scratch
        _require_cloner
      
        rm -f $seqres.full
      
        _scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
        _scratch_mount "-o compress"
      
        # Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
        # and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
        # while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
        # 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
        # extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
        $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128"   \
                -c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
                $SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
        $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
      
        # Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
        # on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
        sync
      
        # Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
        # compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
        # new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
        # bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
        $XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
      
        # Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
        # This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
        # file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
        # the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
        # clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
        # than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
        # inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
        # file into the destination file.
        #
        # Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
        # inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
        # source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
        # inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
        # extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
        # file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
        # inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
        # done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
        # (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
        # it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
        # where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
        # space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
        $CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
      
        # Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
        # extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
        # inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
        # which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
        # truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
        # stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
        # filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
        # size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
        # [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
      
        # We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
        # not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
        # long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
        #
        # Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
        # leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
        # [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
        # file gave us the following content:
        #
        # 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
        # *
        # 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
        # *
        # 0000400
        echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
        od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
      
        # Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
        # operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
        # test completes, failed reporting the following error:
        #
        #  root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
      
        status=0
        exit
      Signed-off-by: default avatarFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
      [ kamal: backport 3.13-stable: root->ref_cows vs BTRFS_ROOT_REF_COWS; context ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      476d2aa4
    • Chris Mason's avatar
      Btrfs: don't use ram_bytes for uncompressed inline items · d40c5ee1
      Chris Mason authored
      commit 514ac8ad upstream.
      
      If we truncate an uncompressed inline item, ram_bytes isn't updated to reflect
      the new size.  The fixe uses the size directly from the item header when
      reading uncompressed inlines, and also fixes truncate to update the
      size as it goes.
      Reported-by: default avatarJens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
      [ kamal: backport to 3.13-stable: applied to all _inline_len callers ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      d40c5ee1
    • Filipe Manana's avatar
      Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning inline extents · 59f996d0
      Filipe Manana authored
      commit 8039d87d upstream.
      
      Currently the clone ioctl allows to clone an inline extent from one file
      to another that already has other (non-inlined) extents. This is a problem
      because btrfs is not designed to deal with files having inline and regular
      extents, if a file has an inline extent then it must be the only extent
      in the file and must start at file offset 0. Having a file with an inline
      extent followed by regular extents results in EIO errors when doing reads
      or writes against the first 4K of the file.
      
      Also, the clone ioctl allows one to lose data if the source file consists
      of a single inline extent, with a size of N bytes, and the destination
      file consists of a single inline extent with a size of M bytes, where we
      have M > N. In this case the clone operation removes the inline extent
      from the destination file and then copies the inline extent from the
      source file into the destination file - we lose the M - N bytes from the
      destination file, a read operation will get the value 0x00 for any bytes
      in the the range [N, M] (the destination inode's i_size remained as M,
      that's why we can read past N bytes).
      
      So fix this by not allowing such destructive operations to happen and
      return errno EOPNOTSUPP to user space.
      
      Currently the fstest btrfs/035 tests the data loss case but it totally
      ignores this - i.e. expects the operation to succeed and does not check
      the we got data loss.
      
      The following test case for fstests exercises all these cases that result
      in file corruption and data loss:
      
        seq=`basename $0`
        seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
        echo "QA output created by $seq"
        tmp=/tmp/$$
        status=1	# failure is the default!
        trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
      
        _cleanup()
        {
            rm -f $tmp.*
        }
      
        # get standard environment, filters and checks
        . ./common/rc
        . ./common/filter
      
        # real QA test starts here
        _need_to_be_root
        _supported_fs btrfs
        _supported_os Linux
        _require_scratch
        _require_cloner
        _require_btrfs_fs_feature "no_holes"
        _require_btrfs_mkfs_feature "no-holes"
      
        rm -f $seqres.full
      
        test_cloning_inline_extents()
        {
            local mkfs_opts=$1
            local mount_opts=$2
      
            _scratch_mkfs $mkfs_opts >>$seqres.full 2>&1
            _scratch_mount $mount_opts
      
            # File bar, the source for all the following clone operations, consists
            # of a single inline extent (50 bytes).
            $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 50" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar \
                | _filter_xfs_io
      
            # Test cloning into a file with an extent (non-inlined) where the
            # destination offset overlaps that extent. It should not be possible to
            # clone the inline extent from file bar into this file.
            $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xaa 0K 16K" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo \
                | _filter_xfs_io
            $CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
      
            # Doing IO against any range in the first 4K of the file should work.
            # Due to a past clone ioctl bug which allowed cloning the inline extent,
            # these operations resulted in EIO errors.
            echo "File foo data after clone operation:"
            # All bytes should have the value 0xaa (clone operation failed and did
            # not modify our file).
            od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
            $XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0xcc 0 100" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
      
            # Test cloning the inline extent against a file which has a hole in its
            # first 4K followed by a non-inlined extent. It should not be possible
            # as well to clone the inline extent from file bar into this file.
            $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xdd 4K 12K" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo2 \
                | _filter_xfs_io
            $CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo2
      
            # Doing IO against any range in the first 4K of the file should work.
            # Due to a past clone ioctl bug which allowed cloning the inline extent,
            # these operations resulted in EIO errors.
            echo "File foo2 data after clone operation:"
            # All bytes should have the value 0x00 (clone operation failed and did
            # not modify our file).
            od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo2
            $XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0xee 0 90" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo2 | _filter_xfs_io
      
            # Test cloning the inline extent against a file which has a size of zero
            # but has a prealloc extent. It should not be possible as well to clone
            # the inline extent from file bar into this file.
            $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "falloc -k 0 1M" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo3 | _filter_xfs_io
            $CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo3
      
            # Doing IO against any range in the first 4K of the file should work.
            # Due to a past clone ioctl bug which allowed cloning the inline extent,
            # these operations resulted in EIO errors.
            echo "First 50 bytes of foo3 after clone operation:"
            # Should not be able to read any bytes, file has 0 bytes i_size (the
            # clone operation failed and did not modify our file).
            od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo3
            $XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0xff 0 90" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo3 | _filter_xfs_io
      
            # Test cloning the inline extent against a file which consists of a
            # single inline extent that has a size not greater than the size of
            # bar's inline extent (40 < 50).
            # It should be possible to do the extent cloning from bar to this file.
            $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0x01 0 40" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo4 \
                | _filter_xfs_io
            $CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo4
      
            # Doing IO against any range in the first 4K of the file should work.
            echo "File foo4 data after clone operation:"
            # Must match file bar's content.
            od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo4
            $XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0x02 0 90" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo4 | _filter_xfs_io
      
            # Test cloning the inline extent against a file which consists of a
            # single inline extent that has a size greater than the size of bar's
            # inline extent (60 > 50).
            # It should not be possible to clone the inline extent from file bar
            # into this file.
            $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0x03 0 60" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo5 \
                | _filter_xfs_io
            $CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo5
      
            # Reading the file should not fail.
            echo "File foo5 data after clone operation:"
            # Must have a size of 60 bytes, with all bytes having a value of 0x03
            # (the clone operation failed and did not modify our file).
            od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo5
      
            # Test cloning the inline extent against a file which has no extents but
            # has a size greater than bar's inline extent (16K > 50).
            # It should not be possible to clone the inline extent from file bar
            # into this file.
            $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "truncate 16K" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo6 | _filter_xfs_io
            $CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo6
      
            # Reading the file should not fail.
            echo "File foo6 data after clone operation:"
            # Must have a size of 16K, with all bytes having a value of 0x00 (the
            # clone operation failed and did not modify our file).
            od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo6
      
            # Test cloning the inline extent against a file which has no extents but
            # has a size not greater than bar's inline extent (30 < 50).
            # It should be possible to clone the inline extent from file bar into
            # this file.
            $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "truncate 30" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo7 | _filter_xfs_io
            $CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo7
      
            # Reading the file should not fail.
            echo "File foo7 data after clone operation:"
            # Must have a size of 50 bytes, with all bytes having a value of 0xbb.
            od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo7
      
            # Test cloning the inline extent against a file which has a size not
            # greater than the size of bar's inline extent (20 < 50) but has
            # a prealloc extent that goes beyond the file's size. It should not be
            # possible to clone the inline extent from bar into this file.
            $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "falloc -k 0 1M" \
                            -c "pwrite -S 0x88 0 20" \
                            $SCRATCH_MNT/foo8 | _filter_xfs_io
            $CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo8
      
            echo "File foo8 data after clone operation:"
            # Must have a size of 20 bytes, with all bytes having a value of 0x88
            # (the clone operation did not modify our file).
            od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo8
      
            _scratch_unmount
        }
      
        echo -e "\nTesting without compression and without the no-holes feature...\n"
        test_cloning_inline_extents
      
        echo -e "\nTesting with compression and without the no-holes feature...\n"
        test_cloning_inline_extents "" "-o compress"
      
        echo -e "\nTesting without compression and with the no-holes feature...\n"
        test_cloning_inline_extents "-O no-holes" ""
      
        echo -e "\nTesting with compression and with the no-holes feature...\n"
        test_cloning_inline_extents "-O no-holes" "-o compress"
      
        status=0
        exit
      Signed-off-by: default avatarFilipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
      [ kamal: backport to 3.13-stable: context ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      59f996d0
  4. 04 Dec, 2015 2 commits
  5. 02 Dec, 2015 12 commits