- 13 Nov, 2015 15 commits
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Kosuke Tatsukawa authored
commit e81107d4 upstream. My colleague ran into a program stall on a x86_64 server, where n_tty_read() was waiting for data even if there was data in the buffer in the pty. kernel stack for the stuck process looks like below. #0 [ffff88303d107b58] __schedule at ffffffff815c4b20 #1 [ffff88303d107bd0] schedule at ffffffff815c513e #2 [ffff88303d107bf0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff815c7818 #3 [ffff88303d107ca0] wait_woken at ffffffff81096bd2 #4 [ffff88303d107ce0] n_tty_read at ffffffff8136fa23 #5 [ffff88303d107dd0] tty_read at ffffffff81368013 #6 [ffff88303d107e20] __vfs_read at ffffffff811a3704 #7 [ffff88303d107ec0] vfs_read at ffffffff811a3a57 #8 [ffff88303d107f00] sys_read at ffffffff811a4306 #9 [ffff88303d107f50] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath at ffffffff815c86d7 There seems to be two problems causing this issue. First, in drivers/tty/n_tty.c, __receive_buf() stores the data and updates ldata->commit_head using smp_store_release() and then checks the wait queue using waitqueue_active(). However, since there is no memory barrier, __receive_buf() could return without calling wake_up_interactive_poll(), and at the same time, n_tty_read() could start to wait in wait_woken() as in the following chart. __receive_buf() n_tty_read() ------------------------------------------------------------------------ if (waitqueue_active(&tty->read_wait)) /* Memory operations issued after the RELEASE may be completed before the RELEASE operation has completed */ add_wait_queue(&tty->read_wait, &wait); ... if (!input_available_p(tty, 0)) { smp_store_release(&ldata->commit_head, ldata->read_head); ... timeout = wait_woken(&wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, timeout); ------------------------------------------------------------------------ The second problem is that n_tty_read() also lacks a memory barrier call and could also cause __receive_buf() to return without calling wake_up_interactive_poll(), and n_tty_read() to wait in wait_woken() as in the chart below. __receive_buf() n_tty_read() ------------------------------------------------------------------------ spin_lock_irqsave(&q->lock, flags); /* from add_wait_queue() */ ... if (!input_available_p(tty, 0)) { /* Memory operations issued after the RELEASE may be completed before the RELEASE operation has completed */ smp_store_release(&ldata->commit_head, ldata->read_head); if (waitqueue_active(&tty->read_wait)) __add_wait_queue(q, wait); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&q->lock,flags); /* from add_wait_queue() */ ... timeout = wait_woken(&wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, timeout); ------------------------------------------------------------------------ There are also other places in drivers/tty/n_tty.c which have similar calls to waitqueue_active(), so instead of adding many memory barrier calls, this patch simply removes the call to waitqueue_active(), leaving just wake_up*() behind. This fixes both problems because, even though the memory access before or after the spinlocks in both wake_up*() and add_wait_queue() can sneak into the critical section, it cannot go past it and the critical section assures that they will be serialized (please see "INTER-CPU ACQUIRING BARRIER EFFECTS" in Documentation/memory-barriers.txt for a better explanation). Moreover, the resulting code is much simpler. Latency measurement using a ping-pong test over a pty doesn't show any visible performance drop. Signed-off-by:
Kosuke Tatsukawa <tatsu@ab.jp.nec.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
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Vincent Palatin authored
commit 72194739 upstream. Add a device quirk for the Logitech PTZ Pro Camera and its sibling the ConferenceCam CC3000e Camera. This fixes the failed camera enumeration on some boot, particularly on machines with fast CPU. Tested by connecting a Logitech PTZ Pro Camera to a machine with a Haswell Core i7-4600U CPU @ 2.10GHz, and doing thousands of reboot cycles while recording the kernel logs and taking camera picture after each boot. Before the patch, more than 7% of the boots show some enumeration transfer failures and in a few of them, the kernel is giving up before actually enumerating the webcam. After the patch, the enumeration has been correct on every reboot. Signed-off-by:
Vincent Palatin <vpalatin@chromium.org> Signed-off-by:
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Yao-Wen Mao authored
commit 8484bf29 upstream. These two headphones need a reset-resume quirk to properly resume to original volume level. Signed-off-by:
Yao-Wen Mao <yaowen@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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John Flatness authored
commit e8ff581f upstream. The MacBookPro 12,1 has the same setup as the 11 for controlling the status of the optical audio light. Simply apply the existing workaround to the subsystem ID for the 12,1. [sorted the fixup entry by tiwai] Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105401Signed-off-by:
John Flatness <john@zerocrates.org> Signed-off-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Laura Abbott authored
commit d05ea7da upstream. Much like all the other Lenovo laptops, add a quirk to make sound work with docking. Reported-and-tested-by: lacknerflo@gmail.com Signed-off-by:
Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org> Signed-off-by:
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Mikulas Patocka authored
commit 042745ee upstream. Commit 3a0f9aae ("dm raid: round region_size to power of two") intended to make sure that the default region size is a power of two. However, the logic in that commit is incorrect and sets the variable region_size to 0 or 1, depending on whether min_region_size is a power of two. Fix this logic, using roundup_pow_of_two(), so that region_size is properly rounded up to the next power of two. Signed-off-by:
Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Fixes: 3a0f9aae ("dm raid: round region_size to power of two") Signed-off-by:
Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Yitian Bu authored
commit 4873867e upstream. from Designware I2S datasheet, tx/rx XRUN irq is cleared by reading register TOR/ROR, rather than by writing into them. Signed-off-by:
Yitian Bu <yitian.bu@tangramtek.com> Signed-off-by:
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Ben Dooks authored
commit 19e79687 upstream. On the OMAP AM3517 platform the uart4_ick gets registered twice, causing any power management to /dev/ttyO3 to fail when trying to wake the device up. This solves the following oops: [] Unhandled fault: external abort on non-linefetch (0x1028) at 0xfa09e008 [] PC is at serial_omap_pm+0x48/0x15c [] LR is at _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x30/0x5c Fixes: aafd900c ("CLK: TI: add omap3 clock init file") Cc: mturquette@baylibre.com Cc: sboyd@codeaurora.org Cc: linux-clk@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-omap@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@lists.codethink.co.uk Signed-off-by:
Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
Tero Kristo <t-kristo@ti.com> Signed-off-by:
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Steve French authored
commit 646200a0 upstream. The error paths in set_file_size for cifs and smb3 are incorrect. In the unlikely event that a server did not support set file info of the file size, the code incorrectly falls back to trying SMBWriteX (note that only the original core SMB Write, used for example by DOS, can set the file size this way - this actually does not work for the more recent SMBWriteX). The idea was since the old DOS SMB Write could set the file size if you write zero bytes at that offset then use that if server rejects the normal set file info call. Fortunately the SMBWriteX will never be sent on the wire (except when file size is zero) since the length and offset fields were reversed in the two places in this function that call SMBWriteX causing the fall back path to return an error. It is also important to never call an SMB request from an SMB2/sMB3 session (which theoretically would be possible, and can cause a brief session drop, although the client recovers) so this should be fixed. In practice this path does not happen with modern servers but the error fall back to SMBWriteX is clearly wrong. Removing the calls to SMBWriteX in the error paths in cifs_set_file_size Pointed out by PaX/grsecurity team Signed-off-by:
Steve French <steve.french@primarydata.com> Reported-by:
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> CC: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com> CC: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by:
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Junichi Nomura authored
commit 2a708cff upstream. __dm_destroy() takes io_barrier SRCU lock (dm_get_live_table) and suspend_lock in reverse order. Doing so can cause AB-BA deadlock: __dm_destroy dm_swap_table --------------------------------------------------- mutex_lock(suspend_lock) dm_get_live_table() srcu_read_lock(io_barrier) dm_sync_table() synchronize_srcu(io_barrier) .. waiting for dm_put_live_table() mutex_lock(suspend_lock) .. waiting for suspend_lock Fix this by taking the locks in proper order. Signed-off-by:
Jun'ichi Nomura <j-nomura@ce.jp.nec.com> Fixes: ab7c7bb6 ("dm: hold suspend_lock while suspending device during device deletion") Acked-by:
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Gianluca Renzi authored
commit e256da84 upstream. Signed-off-by:
Gianluca Renzi <gianlucarenzi@eurekelettronica.it> Signed-off-by:
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Steve Wise authored
commit c91aed98 upstream. The server rdma_read_chunk_lcl() and rdma_read_chunk_frmr() functions were not taking into account the initial page_offset when determining the rdma read length. This resulted in a read who's starting address and length exceeded the base/bounds of the frmr. The server gets an async error from the rdma device and kills the connection, and the client then reconnects and resends. This repeats indefinitely, and the application hangs. Most work loads don't tickle this bug apparently, but one test hit it every time: building the linux kernel on a 16 core node with 'make -j 16 O=/mnt/0' where /mnt/0 is a ramdisk mounted via NFSRDMA. This bug seems to only be tripped with devices having small fastreg page list depths. I didn't see it with mlx4, for instance. Fixes: 0bf48289 ('svcrdma: refactor marshalling logic') Signed-off-by:
Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com> Tested-by:
Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> [ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ] Signed-off-by:
Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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Christian Borntraeger authored
commit adc0b7fb upstream. my gcc 5.1 used an ldgr instruction with a register != 0,2,4,6 for spilling/filling into a floating point register in our decompressor. This will cause an AFP-register data exception as the decompressor did not setup the additional floating point registers via cr0. That causes a program check loop that looked like a hang with one "Uncompressing Linux... " message (directly booted via kvm) or a loop of "Uncompressing Linux... " messages (when booted via zipl boot loader). The offending code in my build was 48e400: e3 c0 af ff ff 71 lay %r12,-1(%r10) -->48e406: b3 c1 00 1c ldgr %f1,%r12 48e40a: ec 6c 01 22 02 7f clij %r6,2,12,0x48e64e but gcc could do spilling into an fpr at any function. We can simply disable floating point support at that early stage. Signed-off-by:
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Acked-by:
Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Malcolm Crossley authored
commit 64c98e7f upstream. Sanitizing the e820 map may produce extra E820 entries which would result in the topmost E820 entries being removed. The removed entries would typically include the top E820 usable RAM region and thus result in the domain having signicantly less RAM available to it. Fix by allowing sanitize_e820_map to use the full size of the allocated E820 array. Signed-off-by:
Malcolm Crossley <malcolm.crossley@citrix.com> Reviewed-by:
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [ kamal: backport to 3.19-stable: context ] Signed-off-by:
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Vitaly Kuznetsov authored
commit 0b34a166 upstream. Currently there is a number of issues preventing PVHVM Xen guests from doing successful kexec/kdump: - Bound event channels. - Registered vcpu_info. - PIRQ/emuirq mappings. - shared_info frame after XENMAPSPACE_shared_info operation. - Active grant mappings. Basically, newly booted kernel stumbles upon already set up Xen interfaces and there is no way to reestablish them. In Xen-4.7 a new feature called 'soft reset' is coming. A guest performing kexec/kdump operation is supposed to call SCHEDOP_shutdown hypercall with SHUTDOWN_soft_reset reason before jumping to new kernel. Hypervisor (with some help from toolstack) will do full domain cleanup (but keeping its memory and vCPU contexts intact) returning the guest to the state it had when it was first booted and thus allowing it to start over. Doing SHUTDOWN_soft_reset on Xen hypervisors which don't support it is probably OK as by default all unknown shutdown reasons cause domain destroy with a message in toolstack log: 'Unknown shutdown reason code 5. Destroying domain.' which gives a clue to what the problem is and eliminates false expectations. Signed-off-by:
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 12 Nov, 2015 25 commits
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Lars-Peter Clausen authored
commit e74679b3 upstream. Commit b4508d0f ("ASoC: db1200: Use static DAI format setup") switched the db1200 driver over to using static DAI format setup instead of a callback function. But the commit only added the dai_fmt field to one of the three DAI links in the driver. This breaks audio on db1300 and db1550. Add the two missing dai_fmt settings to fix the issue. Fixes: b4508d0f ("ASoC: db1200: Use static DAI format setup") Reported-by:
Manuel Lauss <manuel.lauss@gmail.com> Tested-by:
Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de> Signed-off-by:
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Felipe F. Tonello authored
commit 0af82211 upstream. This fixes a duplicated pin control causing this error: imx6q-pinctrl 20e0000.iomuxc: pin MX6Q_PAD_GPIO_1 already requested by regulators:regulator@2; cannot claim for 2184000.usb imx6q-pinctrl 20e0000.iomuxc: pin-137 (2184000.usb) status -22 imx6q-pinctrl 20e0000.iomuxc: could not request pin 137 (MX6Q_PAD_GPIO_1) from group usbotggrp on device 20e0000.iomuxc imx_usb 2184000.usb: Error applying setting, reverse things back imx6q-pinctrl 20e0000.iomuxc: pin MX6Q_PAD_EIM_D31 already requested by regulators:regulator@1; cannot claim for 2184200.usb imx6q-pinctrl 20e0000.iomuxc: pin-52 (2184200.usb) status -22 imx6q-pinctrl 20e0000.iomuxc: could not request pin 52 (MX6Q_PAD_EIM_D31) from group usbh1grp on device 20e0000.iomuxc imx_usb 2184200.usb: Error applying setting, reverse things back Signed-off-by:
Felipe F. Tonello <eu@felipetonello.com> Fixes: e2047e33 ("ARM: dts: add initial Rex Pro board support") Signed-off-by:
Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Boris BREZILLON authored
commit 8e375ccd upstream. The sunxi_nand_chips_cleanup() function is missing a call to list_del() which generates a double free error. Reported-by:
Priit Laes <plaes@plaes.org> Signed-off-by:
Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@free-electrons.com> Fixes: 1fef62c1 ("mtd: nand: add sunxi NAND flash controller support") Tested-by:
Brian Norris <computersforpeace@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Boris BREZILLON authored
commit 03a0e8a7 upstream. The USER_DATA register cannot be accessed using byte accessors on A13 SoCs, thus triggering a bug when using memcpy_toio on this register. Declare an helper macros to convert an OOB buffer into a suitable USER_DATA value and vice-versa. This patch also fixes an error in the oob_required logic (some OOB data are not written even if the user required it) by removing the oob_required condition, which is perfectly valid since the core already fill ->oob_poi with FFs when oob_required is false. Signed-off-by:
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Mark Brown authored
commit 176fc2d5 upstream. The in kernel snprintf() will conveniently return the actual length of the printed string even if not given an output beffer at all so just do that rather than relying on the user to pass in a suitable buffer, ensuring that we don't need to worry if the buffer was truncated due to the size of the buffer passed in. Reported-by:
Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Signed-off-by:
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Mark Brown authored
commit b763ec17 upstream. If a read is attempted which is smaller than the line length then we may underflow the subtraction we're doing with the unsigned size_t type so move some of the calculation to be additions on the right hand side instead in order to avoid this. Reported-by:
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Joonsoo Kim authored
commit 03a2d2a3 upstream. Commit description is copied from the original post of this bug: http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.mm/135349 Kernels after v3.9 use kmalloc_size(INDEX_NODE + 1) to get the next larger cache size than the size index INDEX_NODE mapping. In kernels 3.9 and earlier we used malloc_sizes[INDEX_L3 + 1].cs_size. However, sometimes we can't get the right output we expected via kmalloc_size(INDEX_NODE + 1), causing a BUG(). The mapping table in the latest kernel is like: index = {0, 1, 2 , 3, 4, 5, 6, n} size = {0, 96, 192, 8, 16, 32, 64, 2^n} The mapping table before 3.10 is like this: index = {0 , 1 , 2, 3, 4 , 5 , 6, n} size = {32, 64, 96, 128, 192, 256, 512, 2^(n+3)} The problem on my mips64 machine is as follows: (1) When configured DEBUG_SLAB && DEBUG_PAGEALLOC && DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC && DEBUG_SPINLOCK, the sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node) will be "150", and the macro INDEX_NODE turns out to be "2": #define INDEX_NODE kmalloc_index(sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node)) (2) Then the result of kmalloc_size(INDEX_NODE + 1) is 8. (3) Then "if(size >= kmalloc_size(INDEX_NODE + 1)" will lead to "size = PAGE_SIZE". (4) Then "if ((size >= (PAGE_SIZE >> 3))" test will be satisfied and "flags |= CFLGS_OFF_SLAB" will be covered. (5) if (flags & CFLGS_OFF_SLAB)" test will be satisfied and will go to "cachep->slabp_cache = kmalloc_slab(slab_size, 0u)", and the result here may be NULL while kernel bootup. (6) Finally,"BUG_ON(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(cachep->slabp_cache));" causes the BUG info as the following shows (may be only mips64 has this problem): This patch fixes the problem of kmalloc_size(INDEX_NODE + 1) and removes the BUG by adding 'size >= 256' check to guarantee that all necessary small sized slabs are initialized regardless sequence of slab size in mapping table. Fixes: e3366016 ("slab: Use common kmalloc_index/kmalloc_size...") Signed-off-by:
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Reported-by:
Liuhailong <liu.hailong6@zte.com.cn> Acked-by:
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Andy Shevchenko authored
commit 6bea0f6d upstream. In case we have less than maximum allowed channels (8) and autoconfiguration is enabled the DWC_PARAMS read is wrong because it uses different arithmetic to what is needed for channel priority setup. Re-do the caclulations properly. This now works on AVR32 board well. Fixes: fed2574b (dw_dmac: introduce software emulation of LLP transfers) Cc: yitian.bu@tangramtek.com Signed-off-by:
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Vinod Koul <vinod.koul@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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John Stultz authored
commit 67dfae0c upstream. This patch fixes one cases where abs() was being used with 64-bit nanosecond values, where the result may be capped at 32-bits. This potentially could cause watchdog false negatives on 32-bit systems, so this patch addresses the issue by using abs64(). Signed-off-by:
John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1442279124-7309-2-git-send-email-john.stultz@linaro.orgSigned-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
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Li Bin authored
commit ee556d00 upstream. When function graph tracer is enabled, the following operation will trigger panic: mount -t debugfs nodev /sys/kernel echo next_tgid > /sys/kernel/tracing/set_ftrace_filter echo function_graph > /sys/kernel/tracing/current_tracer ls /proc/ ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 198.501417] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address cb88537fdc8ba316 [ 198.506126] pgd = ffffffc008f79000 [ 198.509363] [cb88537fdc8ba316] *pgd=00000000488c6003, *pud=00000000488c6003, *pmd=0000000000000000 [ 198.517726] Internal error: Oops: 94000005 [#1] SMP [ 198.518798] Modules linked in: [ 198.520582] CPU: 1 PID: 1388 Comm: ls Tainted: G [ 198.521800] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 198.522852] task: ffffffc0fa9e8000 ti: ffffffc0f9ab0000 task.ti: ffffffc0f9ab0000 [ 198.524306] PC is at next_tgid+0x30/0x100 [ 198.525205] LR is at return_to_handler+0x0/0x20 [ 198.526090] pc : [<ffffffc0002a1070>] lr : [<ffffffc0000907c0>] pstate: 60000145 [ 198.527392] sp : ffffffc0f9ab3d40 [ 198.528084] x29: ffffffc0f9ab3d40 x28: ffffffc0f9ab0000 [ 198.529406] x27: ffffffc000d6a000 x26: ffffffc000b786e8 [ 198.530659] x25: ffffffc0002a1900 x24: ffffffc0faf16c00 [ 198.531942] x23: ffffffc0f9ab3ea0 x22: 0000000000000002 [ 198.533202] x21: ffffffc000d85050 x20: 0000000000000002 [ 198.534446] x19: 0000000000000002 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 198.535719] x17: 000000000049fa08 x16: ffffffc000242efc [ 198.537030] x15: 0000007fa472b54c x14: ffffffffff000000 [ 198.538347] x13: ffffffc0fada84a0 x12: 0000000000000001 [ 198.539634] x11: ffffffc0f9ab3d70 x10: ffffffc0f9ab3d70 [ 198.540915] x9 : ffffffc0000907c0 x8 : ffffffc0f9ab3d40 [ 198.542215] x7 : 0000002e330f08f0 x6 : 0000000000000015 [ 198.543508] x5 : 0000000000000f08 x4 : ffffffc0f9835ec0 [ 198.544792] x3 : cb88537fdc8ba316 x2 : cb88537fdc8ba306 [ 198.546108] x1 : 0000000000000002 x0 : ffffffc000d85050 [ 198.547432] [ 198.547920] Process ls (pid: 1388, stack limit = 0xffffffc0f9ab0020) [ 198.549170] Stack: (0xffffffc0f9ab3d40 to 0xffffffc0f9ab4000) [ 198.582568] Call trace: [ 198.583313] [<ffffffc0002a1070>] next_tgid+0x30/0x100 [ 198.584359] [<ffffffc0000907bc>] ftrace_graph_caller+0x6c/0x70 [ 198.585503] [<ffffffc0000907bc>] ftrace_graph_caller+0x6c/0x70 [ 198.586574] [<ffffffc0000907bc>] ftrace_graph_caller+0x6c/0x70 [ 198.587660] [<ffffffc0000907bc>] ftrace_graph_caller+0x6c/0x70 [ 198.588896] Code: aa0003f5 2a0103f4 b4000102 91004043 (885f7c60) [ 198.591092] ---[ end trace 6a346f8f20949ac8 ]--- This is because when using function graph tracer, if the traced function return value is in multi regs ([x0-x7]), return_to_handler may corrupt them. So in return_to_handler, the parameter regs should be protected properly. Signed-off-by:
Li Bin <huawei.libin@huawei.com> Acked-by:
AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
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NeilBrown authored
commit 66eefe5d upstream. Calling e.g. blk_queue_max_hw_sectors() after calls to disk_stack_limits() discards the settings determined by disk_stack_limits(). So we need to make those calls first. Fixes: 199dc6ed ("md/raid0: update queue parameter in a safer location.") Reported-by:
Jes Sorensen <Jes.Sorensen@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
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NeilBrown authored
commit 199dc6ed upstream. When a (e.g.) RAID5 array is reshaped to RAID0, the updating of queue parameters (e.g. max number of sectors per bio) is done in the wrong place. It should be part of ->run, but it is actually part of ->takeover. This means it happens before level_store() calls: blk_set_stacking_limits(&mddev->queue->limits); and so it ineffective. This can lead to errors from underlying devices. So move all the relevant settings out of create_stripe_zones() and into raid0_run(). As this can lead to a bug-on it is suitable for any -stable kernel which supports reshape to RAID0. So 2.6.35 or later. As the bug has been present for five years there is no urgency, so no need to rush into -stable. Fixes: 9af204cf ("md: Add support for Raid5->Raid0 and Raid10->Raid0 takeover") Reported-by:
Yi Zhang <yizhan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Stephen Smalley authored
commit ab76f7b4 upstream. Unused space between the end of __ex_table and the start of rodata can be left W+x in the kernel page tables. Extend the setting of the NX bit to cover this gap by starting from text_end rather than rodata_start. Before: ---[ High Kernel Mapping ]--- 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000 16M pmd 0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81600000 6M ro PSE GLB x pmd 0xffffffff81600000-0xffffffff81754000 1360K ro GLB x pte 0xffffffff81754000-0xffffffff81800000 688K RW GLB x pte 0xffffffff81800000-0xffffffff81a00000 2M ro PSE GLB NX pmd 0xffffffff81a00000-0xffffffff81b3b000 1260K ro GLB NX pte 0xffffffff81b3b000-0xffffffff82000000 4884K RW GLB NX pte 0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff82200000 2M RW PSE GLB NX pmd 0xffffffff82200000-0xffffffffa0000000 478M pmd After: ---[ High Kernel Mapping ]--- 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000 16M pmd 0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81600000 6M ro PSE GLB x pmd 0xffffffff81600000-0xffffffff81754000 1360K ro GLB x pte 0xffffffff81754000-0xffffffff81800000 688K RW GLB NX pte 0xffffffff81800000-0xffffffff81a00000 2M ro PSE GLB NX pmd 0xffffffff81a00000-0xffffffff81b3b000 1260K ro GLB NX pte 0xffffffff81b3b000-0xffffffff82000000 4884K RW GLB NX pte 0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff82200000 2M RW PSE GLB NX pmd 0xffffffff82200000-0xffffffffa0000000 478M pmd Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443704662-3138-1-git-send-email-sds@tycho.nsa.govSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Lee, Chun-Yi authored
commit e3c41e37 upstream. The original bug is a page fault crash that sometimes happens on big machines when preparing ELF headers: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffc90613fc9000 IP: [<ffffffff8103d645>] prepare_elf64_ram_headers_callback+0x165/0x260 The bug is caused by us under-counting the number of memory ranges and subsequently not allocating enough ELF header space for them. The bug is typically masked on smaller systems, because the ELF header allocation is rounded up to the next page. This patch modifies the code in fill_up_crash_elf_data() by using walk_system_ram_res() instead of walk_system_ram_range() to correctly count the max number of crash memory ranges. That's because the walk_system_ram_range() filters out small memory regions that reside in the same page, but walk_system_ram_res() does not. Here's how I found the bug: After tracing prepare_elf64_headers() and prepare_elf64_ram_headers_callback(), the code uses walk_system_ram_res() to fill-in crash memory regions information to the program header, so it counts those small memory regions that reside in a page area. But, when the kernel was using walk_system_ram_range() in fill_up_crash_elf_data() to count the number of crash memory regions, it filters out small regions. I printed those small memory regions, for example: kexec: Get nr_ram ranges. vaddr=0xffff880077592258 paddr=0x77592258, sz=0xdc0 Based on the code in walk_system_ram_range(), this memory region will be filtered out: pfn = (0x77592258 + 0x1000 - 1) >> 12 = 0x77593 end_pfn = (0x77592258 + 0xfc0 -1 + 1) >> 12 = 0x77593 end_pfn - pfn = 0x77593 - 0x77593 = 0 <=== if (end_pfn > pfn) is FALSE So, the max_nr_ranges that's counted by the kernel doesn't include small memory regions - causing us to under-allocate the required space. That causes the page fault crash that happens in a later code path when preparing ELF headers. This bug is not easy to reproduce on small machines that have few CPUs, because the allocated page aligned ELF buffer has more free space to cover those small memory regions' PT_LOAD headers. Signed-off-by:
Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Jiang Liu <jiang.liu@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443531537-29436-1-git-send-email-jlee@suse.comSigned-off-by:
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Dave Airlie authored
commit 274d8352 upstream. Since 9eb1e57f drm/dp/mst: make sure mst_primary mstb is valid in work function we validate the mstb structs in the work function, and doing that takes a reference. So we should never get here with the work function running using the mstb device, only if the work function hasn't run yet or is running for another mstb. So we don't need to sync the work here, this was causing lockdep spew as below. [ +0.000160] ============================================= [ +0.000001] [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] [ +0.000002] 3.10.0-320.el7.rhel72.stable.backport.3.x86_64.debug #1 Tainted: G W ------------ [ +0.000001] --------------------------------------------- [ +0.000001] kworker/4:2/1262 is trying to acquire lock: [ +0.000001] ((&mgr->work)){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff810b29a5>] flush_work+0x5/0x2e0 [ +0.000007] but task is already holding lock: [ +0.000001] ((&mgr->work)){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff810b57e4>] process_one_work+0x1b4/0x710 [ +0.000004] other info that might help us debug this: [ +0.000001] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ +0.000002] CPU0 [ +0.000000] ---- [ +0.000001] lock((&mgr->work)); [ +0.000002] lock((&mgr->work)); [ +0.000001] *** DEADLOCK *** [ +0.000001] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ +0.000002] 2 locks held by kworker/4:2/1262: [ +0.000001] #0: (events_long){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff810b57e4>] process_one_work+0x1b4/0x710 [ +0.000004] #1: ((&mgr->work)){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff810b57e4>] process_one_work+0x1b4/0x710 [ +0.000003] stack backtrace: [ +0.000003] CPU: 4 PID: 1262 Comm: kworker/4:2 Tainted: G W ------------ 3.10.0-320.el7.rhel72.stable.backport.3.x86_64.debug #1 [ +0.000001] Hardware name: LENOVO 20EGS0R600/20EGS0R600, BIOS GNET71WW (2.19 ) 02/05/2015 [ +0.000008] Workqueue: events_long drm_dp_mst_link_probe_work [drm_kms_helper] [ +0.000001] ffffffff82c26c90 00000000a527b914 ffff88046399bae8 ffffffff816fe04d [ +0.000004] ffff88046399bb58 ffffffff8110f47f ffff880461438000 0001009b840fc003 [ +0.000002] ffff880461438a98 0000000000000000 0000000804dc26e1 ffffffff824a2c00 [ +0.000003] Call Trace: [ +0.000004] [<ffffffff816fe04d>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b [ +0.000004] [<ffffffff8110f47f>] __lock_acquire+0x115f/0x1250 [ +0.000002] [<ffffffff8110fd49>] lock_acquire+0x99/0x1e0 [ +0.000002] [<ffffffff810b29a5>] ? flush_work+0x5/0x2e0 [ +0.000002] [<ffffffff810b29ee>] flush_work+0x4e/0x2e0 [ +0.000002] [<ffffffff810b29a5>] ? flush_work+0x5/0x2e0 [ +0.000004] [<ffffffff81025905>] ? native_sched_clock+0x35/0x80 [ +0.000002] [<ffffffff81025959>] ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10 [ +0.000002] [<ffffffff810da1f5>] ? local_clock+0x25/0x30 [ +0.000002] [<ffffffff8110dca9>] ? mark_held_locks+0xb9/0x140 [ +0.000003] [<ffffffff810b4ed5>] ? __cancel_work_timer+0x95/0x160 [ +0.000002] [<ffffffff810b4ee8>] __cancel_work_timer+0xa8/0x160 [ +0.000002] [<ffffffff810b4fb0>] cancel_work_sync+0x10/0x20 [ +0.000007] [<ffffffffa0160d17>] drm_dp_destroy_mst_branch_device+0x27/0x120 [drm_kms_helper] [ +0.000006] [<ffffffffa0163968>] drm_dp_mst_link_probe_work+0x78/0xa0 [drm_kms_helper] [ +0.000002] [<ffffffff810b5850>] process_one_work+0x220/0x710 [ +0.000002] [<ffffffff810b57e4>] ? process_one_work+0x1b4/0x710 [ +0.000005] [<ffffffff810b5e5b>] worker_thread+0x11b/0x3a0 [ +0.000003] [<ffffffff810b5d40>] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710 [ +0.000002] [<ffffffff810beced>] kthread+0xed/0x100 [ +0.000003] [<ffffffff810bec00>] ? insert_kthread_work+0x80/0x80 [ +0.000003] [<ffffffff817121d8>] ret_from_fork+0x58/0x90 v2: add flush_work. Reviewed-by:
Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Signed-off-by:
Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Dave Airlie authored
commit df4839fd upstream. output ports should always have a connector, unless in the rare case connector allocation fails in the driver. In this case we only need to teardown the pdt, and free the struct, and there is no need to send a hotplug msg. In the case were we add the port to the destroy list we need to send a hotplug if we destroy any connectors, so userspace knows to reprobe stuff. this patch also handles port->connector allocation failing which should be a rare event, but makes the code consistent. Reviewed-by:
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Mel Gorman authored
commit 2f84a899 upstream. SunDong reported the following on https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=103841 I think I find a linux bug, I have the test cases is constructed. I can stable recurring problems in fedora22(4.0.4) kernel version, arch for x86_64. I construct transparent huge page, when the parent and child process with MAP_SHARE, MAP_PRIVATE way to access the same huge page area, it has the opportunity to lead to huge page copy on write failure, and then it will munmap the child corresponding mmap area, but then the child mmap area with VM_MAYSHARE attributes, child process munmap this area can trigger VM_BUG_ON in set_vma_resv_flags functions (vma - > vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE). There were a number of problems with the report (e.g. it's hugetlbfs that triggers this, not transparent huge pages) but it was fundamentally correct in that a VM_BUG_ON in set_vma_resv_flags() can be triggered that looks like this vma ffff8804651fd0d0 start 00007fc474e00000 end 00007fc475e00000 next ffff8804651fd018 prev ffff8804651fd188 mm ffff88046b1b1800 prot 8000000000000027 anon_vma (null) vm_ops ffffffff8182a7a0 pgoff 0 file ffff88106bdb9800 private_data (null) flags: 0x84400fb(read|write|shared|mayread|maywrite|mayexec|mayshare|dontexpand|hugetlb) ------------ kernel BUG at mm/hugetlb.c:462! SMP Modules linked in: xt_pkttype xt_LOG xt_limit [..] CPU: 38 PID: 26839 Comm: map Not tainted 4.0.4-default #1 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R810/0TT6JF, BIOS 2.7.4 04/26/2012 set_vma_resv_flags+0x2d/0x30 The VM_BUG_ON is correct because private and shared mappings have different reservation accounting but the warning clearly shows that the VMA is shared. When a private COW fails to allocate a new page then only the process that created the VMA gets the page -- all the children unmap the page. If the children access that data in the future then they get killed. The problem is that the same file is mapped shared and private. During the COW, the allocation fails, the VMAs are traversed to unmap the other private pages but a shared VMA is found and the bug is triggered. This patch identifies such VMAs and skips them. Signed-off-by:
Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Reported-by:
SunDong <sund_sky@126.com> Reviewed-by:
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Reviewed-by:
Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Signed-off-by:
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Dirk Müller authored
commit d2922422 upstream. The cpu feature flags are not ever going to change, so warning everytime can cause a lot of kernel log spam (in our case more than 10GB/hour). The warning seems to only occur when nested virtualization is enabled, so it's probably triggered by a KVM bug. This is a sensible and safe change anyway, and the KVM bug fix might not be suitable for stable releases anyway. Signed-off-by:
Dirk Mueller <dmueller@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Bandan Das authored
commit f104765b upstream. If hardware doesn't support DecodeAssist - a feature that provides more information about the intercept in the VMCB, KVM decodes the instruction and then updates the next_rip vmcb control field. However, NRIP support itself depends on cpuid Fn8000_000A_EDX[NRIPS]. Since skip_emulated_instruction() doesn't verify nrip support before accepting control.next_rip as valid, avoid writing this field if support isn't present. Signed-off-by:
Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Matt Fleming authored
commit a5caa209 upstream. Beginning with UEFI v2.5 EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE was introduced that signals that the firmware PE/COFF loader supports splitting code and data sections of PE/COFF images into separate EFI memory map entries. This allows the kernel to map those regions with strict memory protections, e.g. EFI_MEMORY_RO for code, EFI_MEMORY_XP for data, etc. Unfortunately, an unwritten requirement of this new feature is that the regions need to be mapped with the same offsets relative to each other as observed in the EFI memory map. If this is not done crashes like this may occur, BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffffefe6086dd IP: [<fffffffefe6086dd>] 0xfffffffefe6086dd Call Trace: [<ffffffff8104c90e>] efi_call+0x7e/0x100 [<ffffffff81602091>] ? virt_efi_set_variable+0x61/0x90 [<ffffffff8104c583>] efi_delete_dummy_variable+0x63/0x70 [<ffffffff81f4e4aa>] efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x383/0x392 [<ffffffff81f37e1b>] start_kernel+0x38a/0x417 [<ffffffff81f37495>] x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c [<ffffffff81f37582>] x86_64_start_kernel+0xeb/0xef Here 0xfffffffefe6086dd refers to an address the firmware expects to be mapped but which the OS never claimed was mapped. The issue is that included in these regions are relative addresses to other regions which were emitted by the firmware toolchain before the "splitting" of sections occurred at runtime. Needless to say, we don't satisfy this unwritten requirement on x86_64 and instead map the EFI memory map entries in reverse order. The above crash is almost certainly triggerable with any kernel newer than v3.13 because that's when we rewrote the EFI runtime region mapping code, in commit d2f7cbe7 ("x86/efi: Runtime services virtual mapping"). For kernel versions before v3.13 things may work by pure luck depending on the fragmentation of the kernel virtual address space at the time we map the EFI regions. Instead of mapping the EFI memory map entries in reverse order, where entry N has a higher virtual address than entry N+1, map them in the same order as they appear in the EFI memory map to preserve this relative offset between regions. This patch has been kept as small as possible with the intention that it should be applied aggressively to stable and distribution kernels. It is very much a bugfix rather than support for a new feature, since when EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE is enabled we must map things as outlined above to even boot - we have no way of asking the firmware not to split the code/data regions. In fact, this patch doesn't even make use of the more strict memory protections available in UEFI v2.5. That will come later. Suggested-by:
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reported-by:
Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Odin.com> Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443218539-7610-2-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.ukSigned-off-by:
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Ben Hutchings authored
commit 95c2b175 upstream. Per-IRQ directories in procfs are created only when a handler is first added to the irqdesc, not when the irqdesc is created. In the case of a shared IRQ, multiple tasks can race to create a directory. This race condition seems to have been present forever, but is easier to hit with async probing. Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443266636.2004.2.camel@decadent.org.ukSigned-off-by:
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Fabiano Fidêncio authored
commit 8d0d9401 upstream. When disabling/enabling a crtc the primary area must be updated independently of which crtc has been disabled/enabled. Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1264735Signed-off-by:
Fabiano Fidêncio <fidencio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit eddd3826 upstream. Dmitry Vyukov reported the following using trinity and the memory error detector AddressSanitizer (https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel). [ 124.575597] ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address ffff88002e280000 [ 124.576801] ffff88002e280000 is located 131938492886538 bytes to the left of 28857600-byte region [ffffffff81282e0a, ffffffff82e0830a) [ 124.578633] Accessed by thread T10915: [ 124.579295] inlined in describe_heap_address ./arch/x86/mm/asan/report.c:164 [ 124.579295] #0 ffffffff810dd277 in asan_report_error ./arch/x86/mm/asan/report.c:278 [ 124.580137] #1 ffffffff810dc6a0 in asan_check_region ./arch/x86/mm/asan/asan.c:37 [ 124.581050] #2 ffffffff810dd423 in __tsan_read8 ??:0 [ 124.581893] #3 ffffffff8107c093 in get_wchan ./arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c:444 The address checks in the 64bit implementation of get_wchan() are wrong in several ways: - The lower bound of the stack is not the start of the stack page. It's the start of the stack page plus sizeof (struct thread_info) - The upper bound must be: top_of_stack - TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING - 2 * sizeof(unsigned long). The 2 * sizeof(unsigned long) is required because the stack pointer points at the frame pointer. The layout on the stack is: ... IP FP ... IP FP. So we need to make sure that both IP and FP are in the bounds. Fix the bound checks and get rid of the mix of numeric constants, u64 and unsigned long. Making all unsigned long allows us to use the same function for 32bit as well. Use READ_ONCE() when accessing the stack. This does not prevent a concurrent wakeup of the task and the stack changing, but at least it avoids TOCTOU. Also check task state at the end of the loop. Again that does not prevent concurrent changes, but it avoids walking for nothing. Add proper comments while at it. Reported-by:
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reported-by:
Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Based-on-patch-from: Wolfram Gloger <wmglo@dent.med.uni-muenchen.de> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by:
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Andy Lutomirski authored
commit 3ee4298f upstream. x86_32, unlike x86_64, pads the top of the kernel stack, because the hardware stack frame formats are variable in size. Document this padding and give it a name. This should make no change whatsoever to the compiled kernel image. It also doesn't fix any of the current bugs in this area. Signed-off-by:
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Acked-by:
Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/02bf2f54b8dcb76a62a142b6dfe07d4ef7fc582e.1426009661.git.luto@amacapital.net [ Fixed small details, such as a missed magic constant in entry_32.S pointed out by Denys Vlasenko. ] Signed-off-by:
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Linus Torvalds authored
commit b9a53227 upstream. As reported by Dmitry Vyukov, we really shouldn't do ipc_addid() before having initialized the IPC object state. Yes, we initialize the IPC object in a locked state, but with all the lockless RCU lookup work, that IPC object lock no longer means that the state cannot be seen. We already did this for the IPC semaphore code (see commit e8577d1f: "ipc/sem.c: fully initialize sem_array before making it visible") but we clearly forgot about msg and shm. Reported-by:
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