[ Upstream commit 7d3083ee ]

When receiving a vlan-tagged frame that still contains
a vlan header, the length of the packet will be greater
then MTU+ETH_HLEN since it will account of the extra
vlan header.  TG3 checks this for the case for 802.1Q,
but not for 802.1ad.  As a result, full sized 802.1ad
frames get dropped by the card.

Add a check for 802.1ad protocol when receving full
sized frames.
Suggested-by: Prashant Sreedharan <prashant@broadcom.com>
CC: Prashant Sreedharan <prashant@broadcom.com>
CC: Michael Chan <mchan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 476c1885 ]

TG3 appears to have an issue performing TSO and checksum offloading
correclty when the frame has been vlan encapsulated (non-accelrated).
In these cases, tcp checksum is not correctly updated.

This patch attempts to work around this issue.  After the patch,
802.1ad vlans start working correctly over tg3 devices.

CC: Prashant Sreedharan <prashant@broadcom.com>
CC: Michael Chan <mchan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 0d0162e7 ]

I cannot move a macvlan interface created on top of a bonding interface
to a different namespace:

% ip netns add dummy0
% ip link add link bond0 mac0 type macvlan
% ip link set mac0 netns dummy0
RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument
%

The problem seems to be that commit f9399814 ("bonding: Don't allow
bond devices to change network namespaces.") sets NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL
on bonding interfaces, and commit 797f87f8 ("macvlan: fix netdev
feature propagation from lower device") causes macvlan interfaces
to inherit its features from the lower device.

NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL should not be inherited from the lower device
by a macvlan.
Patch tested on 3.16.
Signed-off-by: Francesco Ruggeri <fruggeri@arista.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit c095f248 ]

As Toshiaki Makita pointed out, the BRIDGE_INPUT_SKB_CB will
not be initialized in br_should_learn() as that function
is called only from br_handle_local_finish().  That is
an input handler for link-local ethernet traffic so it perfectly
correct to check br->vlan_enabled here.

Reported-by: Toshiaki Makita<toshiaki.makita1@gmail.com>
Fixes: 20adfa1a bridge: Check if vlan filtering is enabled only once.
Signed-off-by: Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 20adfa1a ]

The bridge code checks if vlan filtering is enabled on both
ingress and egress.   When the state flip happens, it
is possible for the bridge to currently be forwarding packets
and forwarding behavior becomes non-deterministic.  Bridge
may drop packets on some interfaces, but not others.

This patch solves this by caching the filtered state of the
packet into skb_cb on ingress.  The skb_cb is guaranteed to
not be over-written between the time packet entres bridge
forwarding path and the time it leaves it.  On egress, we
can then check the cached state to see if we need to
apply filtering information.
Signed-off-by: Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 9a72c2da ]

The problem is that the slave is first linked and slave_cnt is
incremented afterwards leading to a div by zero in the modes that use it
as a modulus. What happens is that in bond_start_xmit()
bond_has_slaves() is used to evaluate further transmission and it becomes
true after the slave is linked in, but when slave_cnt is used in the xmit
path it is still 0, so fetch it once and transmit based on that. Since
it is used only in round-robin and XOR modes, the fix is only for them.
Thanks to Eric Dumazet for pointing out the fault in my first try to fix
this.

Call trace (took it out of net-next kernel, but it's the same with net):
[46934.330038] divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP
[46934.330041] Modules linked in: bonding(O) 9p fscache
snd_hda_codec_generic crct10dif_pclmul
[46934.330041] bond0: Enslaving eth1 as an active interface with an up
link
[46934.330051]  ppdev joydev crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel 9pnet_virtio
ghash_clmulni_intel snd_hda_intel 9pnet snd_hda_controller parport_pc
serio_raw pcspkr snd_hda_codec parport virtio_balloon virtio_console
snd_hwdep snd_pcm pvpanic i2c_piix4 snd_timer i2ccore snd soundcore
virtio_blk virtio_net virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio ata_generic
pata_acpi floppy [last unloaded: bonding]
[46934.330053] CPU: 1 PID: 3382 Comm: ping Tainted: G           O
3.17.0-rc4+ #27
[46934.330053] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[46934.330054] task: ffff88005aebf2c0 ti: ffff88005b728000 task.ti:
ffff88005b728000
[46934.330059] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0198c33>]  [<ffffffffa0198c33>]
bond_start_xmit+0x1c3/0x450 [bonding]
[46934.330060] RSP: 0018:ffff88005b72b7f8  EFLAGS: 00010246
[46934.330060] RAX: 0000000000000679 RBX: ffff88004b077000 RCX:
000000000000002a
[46934.330061] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88004b3f0500 RDI:
ffff88004b077940
[46934.330061] RBP: ffff88005b72b830 R08: 00000000000000c0 R09:
ffff88004a83e000
[46934.330062] R10: 000000000000ffff R11: ffff88004b1f12c0 R12:
ffff88004b3f0500
[46934.330062] R13: ffff88004b3f0500 R14: 000000000000002a R15:
ffff88004b077940
[46934.330063] FS:  00007fbd91a4c740(0000) GS:ffff88005f080000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[46934.330064] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[46934.330064] CR2: 00007f803a8bb000 CR3: 000000004b2c9000 CR4:
00000000000406e0
[46934.330069] Stack:
[46934.330071]  ffffffff811e6169 00000000e772fa05 ffff88004b077000
ffff88004b3f0500
[46934.330072]  ffffffff81d17d18 000000000000002a 0000000000000000
ffff88005b72b8a0
[46934.330073]  ffffffff81620108 ffffffff8161fe0e ffff88005b72b8c4
ffff88005b302000
[46934.330073] Call Trace:
[46934.330077]  [<ffffffff811e6169>] ?
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x119/0x300
[46934.330084]  [<ffffffff81620108>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x188/0x410
[46934.330086]  [<ffffffff8161fe0e>] ? harmonize_features+0x2e/0x90
[46934.330088]  [<ffffffff81620b06>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x456/0x590
[46934.330089]  [<ffffffff81620c50>] dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x20
[46934.330090]  [<ffffffff8168f022>] arp_xmit+0x22/0x60
[46934.330091]  [<ffffffff8168f090>] arp_send.part.16+0x30/0x40
[46934.330092]  [<ffffffff8168f1e5>] arp_solicit+0x115/0x2b0
[46934.330094]  [<ffffffff8160b5d7>] ? copy_skb_header+0x17/0xa0
[46934.330096]  [<ffffffff8162875a>] neigh_probe+0x4a/0x70
[46934.330097]  [<ffffffff8162979c>] __neigh_event_send+0xac/0x230
[46934.330098]  [<ffffffff8162a00b>] neigh_resolve_output+0x13b/0x220
[46934.330100]  [<ffffffff8165f120>] ? ip_forward_options+0x1c0/0x1c0
[46934.330101]  [<ffffffff81660478>] ip_finish_output+0x1f8/0x860
[46934.330102]  [<ffffffff81661f08>] ip_output+0x58/0x90
[46934.330103]  [<ffffffff81661602>] ? __ip_local_out+0xa2/0xb0
[46934.330104]  [<ffffffff81661640>] ip_local_out_sk+0x30/0x40
[46934.330105]  [<ffffffff81662a66>] ip_send_skb+0x16/0x50
[46934.330106]  [<ffffffff81662ad3>] ip_push_pending_frames+0x33/0x40
[46934.330107]  [<ffffffff8168854c>] raw_sendmsg+0x88c/0xa30
[46934.330110]  [<ffffffff81612b31>] ? skb_recv_datagram+0x41/0x60
[46934.330111]  [<ffffffff816875a9>] ? raw_recvmsg+0xa9/0x1f0
[46934.330113]  [<ffffffff816978d4>] inet_sendmsg+0x74/0xc0
[46934.330114]  [<ffffffff81697a9b>] ? inet_recvmsg+0x8b/0xb0
[46934.330115] bond0: Adding slave eth2
[46934.330116]  [<ffffffff8160357c>] sock_sendmsg+0x9c/0xe0
[46934.330118]  [<ffffffff81603248>] ?
move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x28/0x80
[46934.330121]  [<ffffffff811b4477>] ? might_fault+0x47/0x50
[46934.330122]  [<ffffffff816039b9>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3a9/0x3c0
[46934.330125]  [<ffffffff8144a14a>] ? n_tty_write+0x3aa/0x530
[46934.330127]  [<ffffffff810d1ae4>] ? __wake_up+0x44/0x50
[46934.330129]  [<ffffffff81242b38>] ? fsnotify+0x238/0x310
[46934.330130]  [<ffffffff816048a1>] __sys_sendmsg+0x51/0x90
[46934.330131]  [<ffffffff816048f2>] SyS_sendmsg+0x12/0x20
[46934.330134]  [<ffffffff81738b29>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[46934.330144] Code: 48 8b 10 4c 89 ee 4c 89 ff e8 aa bc ff ff 31 c0 e9
1a ff ff ff 0f 1f 00 4c 89 ee 4c 89 ff e8 65 fb ff ff 31 d2 4c 89 ee 4c
89 ff <f7> b3 64 09 00 00 e8 02 bd ff ff 31 c0 e9 f2 fe ff ff 0f 1f 00
[46934.330146] RIP  [<ffffffffa0198c33>] bond_start_xmit+0x1c3/0x450
[bonding]
[46934.330146]  RSP <ffff88005b72b7f8>

CC: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <j.vosburgh@gmail.com>
CC: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@gmail.com>
Fixes: 278b2083 ("bonding: initial RCU conversion")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit eed4d839 ]

Use dst_entry held by sk_dst_get() to retrieve tunnel's PMTU.

The dst_mtu(__sk_dst_get(tunnel->sock)) call was racy. __sk_dst_get()
could return NULL if tunnel->sock->sk_dst_cache was reset just before the
call, thus making dst_mtu() dereference a NULL pointer:

[ 1937.661598] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
[ 1937.664005] IP: [<ffffffffa049db88>] pppol2tp_connect+0x33d/0x41e [l2tp_ppp]
[ 1937.664005] PGD daf0c067 PUD d9f93067 PMD 0
[ 1937.664005] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 1937.664005] Modules linked in: l2tp_ppp l2tp_netlink l2tp_core ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter ip_tables ebtable_nat ebtables x_tables udp_tunnel pppoe pppox ppp_generic slhc deflate ctr twofish_generic twofish_x86_64_3way xts lrw gf128mul glue_helper twofish_x86_64 twofish_common blowfish_generic blowfish_x86_64 blowfish_common des_generic cbc xcbc rmd160 sha512_generic hmac crypto_null af_key xfrm_algo 8021q garp bridge stp llc tun atmtcp clip atm ext3 mbcache jbd iTCO_wdt coretemp kvm_intel iTCO_vendor_support kvm pcspkr evdev ehci_pci lpc_ich mfd_core i5400_edac edac_core i5k_amb shpchp button processor thermal_sys xfs crc32c_generic libcrc32c dm_mod usbhid sg hid sr_mod sd_mod cdrom crc_t10dif crct10dif_common ata_generic ahci ata_piix tg3 libahci libata uhci_hcd ptp ehci_hcd pps_core usbcore scsi_mod libphy usb_common [last unloaded: l2tp_core]
[ 1937.664005] CPU: 0 PID: 10022 Comm: l2tpstress Tainted: G           O   3.17.0-rc1 #1
[ 1937.664005] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL160 G5, BIOS O12 08/22/2008
[ 1937.664005] task: ffff8800d8fda790 ti: ffff8800c43c4000 task.ti: ffff8800c43c4000
[ 1937.664005] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa049db88>]  [<ffffffffa049db88>] pppol2tp_connect+0x33d/0x41e [l2tp_ppp]
[ 1937.664005] RSP: 0018:ffff8800c43c7de8  EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 1937.664005] RAX: ffff8800da8a7240 RBX: ffff8800d8c64600 RCX: 000001c325a137b5
[ 1937.664005] RDX: 8c6318c6318c6320 RSI: 000000000000010c RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 1937.664005] RBP: ffff8800c43c7ea8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 1937.664005] R10: ffffffffa048e2c0 R11: ffff8800d8c64600 R12: ffff8800ca7a5000
[ 1937.664005] R13: ffff8800c439bf40 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000009
[ 1937.664005] FS:  00007fd7f610f700(0000) GS:ffff88011a600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1937.664005] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 1937.664005] CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 00000000d9d75000 CR4: 00000000000027e0
[ 1937.664005] Stack:
[ 1937.664005]  ffffffffa049da80 ffff8800d8fda790 000000000000005b ffff880000000009
[ 1937.664005]  ffff8800daf3f200 0000000000000003 ffff8800c43c7e48 ffffffff81109b57
[ 1937.664005]  ffffffff81109b0e ffffffff8114c566 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
[ 1937.664005] Call Trace:
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffffa049da80>] ? pppol2tp_connect+0x235/0x41e [l2tp_ppp]
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff81109b57>] ? might_fault+0x9e/0xa5
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff81109b0e>] ? might_fault+0x55/0xa5
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff8114c566>] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x1c/0x26
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff81309196>] SYSC_connect+0x87/0xb1
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff813e56f7>] ? sysret_check+0x1b/0x56
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff8107590d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x145/0x1a1
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff81213dee>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff8114c262>] ? spin_lock+0x9/0xb
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff813092b4>] SyS_connect+0x9/0xb
[ 1937.664005]  [<ffffffff813e56d2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 1937.664005] Code: 10 2a 84 81 e8 65 76 bd e0 65 ff 0c 25 10 bb 00 00 4d 85 ed 74 37 48 8b 85 60 ff ff ff 48 8b 80 88 01 00 00 48 8b b8 10 02 00 00 <48> 8b 47 20 ff 50 20 85 c0 74 0f 83 e8 28 89 83 10 01 00 00 89
[ 1937.664005] RIP  [<ffffffffa049db88>] pppol2tp_connect+0x33d/0x41e [l2tp_ppp]
[ 1937.664005]  RSP <ffff8800c43c7de8>
[ 1937.664005] CR2: 0000000000000020
[ 1939.559375] ---[ end trace 82d44500f28f8708 ]---

Fixes: f34c4a35 ("l2tp: take PMTU from tunnel UDP socket")
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit a45e92a5 ]

The first initializer in the following

        union vxlan_addr ipa = {
            .sin.sin_addr.s_addr = tip,
            .sa.sa_family = AF_INET,
        };

is optimised away by the compiler, due to the second initializer,
therefore initialising .sin.sin_addr.s_addr always to 0.
This results in netlink messages indicating a L3 miss never contain the
missed IP address. This was observed with GCC 4.8 and 4.9. I do not know about previous versions.
The problem affects user space programs relying on an IP address being
sent as part of a netlink message indicating a L3 miss.

Changing
            .sa.sa_family = AF_INET,
to
            .sin.sin_family = AF_INET,
fixes the problem.
Signed-off-by: Gerhard Stenzel <gerhard.stenzel@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 2ba5af42 ]

When there are multiple vlan headers present in a received frame, the first
one is put into vlan_tci and protocol is set to ETH_P_8021Q. Anything in the
skb beyond the VLAN TPID may be still non-linear, including the inner TCI
and ethertype. While ovs_flow_extract takes care of IP and IPv6 headers, it
does nothing with ETH_P_8021Q. Later, if OVS_ACTION_ATTR_POP_VLAN is
executed, __pop_vlan_tci pulls the next vlan header into vlan_tci.

This leads to two things:

1. Part of the resulting ethernet header is in the non-linear part of the
   skb. When eth_type_trans is called later as the result of
   OVS_ACTION_ATTR_OUTPUT, kernel BUGs in __skb_pull. Also, __pop_vlan_tci
   is in fact accessing random data when it reads past the TPID.

2. network_header points into the ethernet header instead of behind it.
   mac_len is set to a wrong value (10), too.
Reported-by: Yulong Pei <ypei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit dc808110 ]

af_packet can currently overwrite kernel memory by out of bound
accesses, because it assumed a [new] block can always hold one frame.

This is not generally the case, even if most existing tools do it right.

This patch clamps too long frames as API permits, and issue a one time
error on syslog.

[  394.357639] tpacket_rcv: packet too big, clamped from 5042 to 3966. macoff=82

In this example, packet header tp_snaplen was set to 3966,
and tp_len was set to 5042 (skb->len)
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Fixes: f6fb8f10 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 0c9ab092 ]

Fix TCP FRTO logic so that it always notices when snd_una advances,
indicating that any RTO after that point will be a new and distinct
loss episode.

Previously there was a very specific sequence that could cause FRTO to
fail to notice a new loss episode had started:

(1) RTO timer fires, enter FRTO and retransmit packet 1 in write queue
(2) receiver ACKs packet 1
(3) FRTO sends 2 more packets
(4) RTO timer fires again (should start a new loss episode)

The problem was in step (3) above, where tcp_process_loss() returned
early (in the spot marked "Step 2.b"), so that it never got to the
logic to clear icsk_retransmits. Thus icsk_retransmits stayed
non-zero. Thus in step (4) tcp_enter_loss() would see the non-zero
icsk_retransmits, decide that this RTO is not a new episode, and
decide not to cut ssthresh and remember the current cwnd and ssthresh
for undo.

There were two main consequences to the bug that we have
observed. First, ssthresh was not decreased in step (4). Second, when
there was a series of such FRTO (1-4) sequences that happened to be
followed by an FRTO undo, we would restore the cwnd and ssthresh from
before the entire series started (instead of the cwnd and ssthresh
from before the most recent RTO). This could result in cwnd and
ssthresh being restored to values much bigger than the proper values.
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Fixes: e33099f9 ("tcp: implement RFC5682 F-RTO")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 4fab9071 ]

Make sure we use the correct address-family-specific function for
handling MTU reductions from within tcp_release_cb().

Previously AF_INET6 sockets were incorrectly always using the IPv6
code path when sometimes they were handling IPv4 traffic and thus had
an IPv4 dst.
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Diagnosed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Fixes: 563d34d0 ("tcp: dont drop MTU reduction indications")
Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit bc8fc7b8 ]

As of 4fddbf5d ("sit: strictly restrict incoming traffic to tunnel link device"),
when looking up a tunnel, tunnel's underlying interface (t->parms.link)
is verified to match incoming traffic's ingress device.

However the comparison was incorrectly based on skb->dev->iflink.

Instead, dev->ifindex should be used, which correctly represents the
interface from which the IP stack hands the ipip6 packets.

This allows setting up sit tunnels bound to vlan interfaces (otherwise
incoming ipip6 traffic on the vlan interface was dropped due to
ipip6_tunnel_lookup match failure).
Signed-off-by: Shmulik Ladkani <shmulik.ladkani@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 9d186cac ]

We don't know right timestamp for repaired skb-s. Wrong RTT estimations
isn't good, because some congestion modules heavily depends on it.

This patch adds the TCPCB_REPAIRED flag, which is included in
TCPCB_RETRANS.

Thanks to Eric for the advice how to fix this issue.

This patch fixes the warning:
[  879.562947] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2825 at net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3078 tcp_ack+0x11f5/0x1380()
[  879.567253] CPU: 0 PID: 2825 Comm: socket-tcpbuf-l Not tainted 3.16.0-next-20140811 #1
[  879.567829] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[  879.568177]  0000000000000000 00000000c532680c ffff880039643d00 ffffffff817aa2d2
[  879.568776]  0000000000000000 ffff880039643d38 ffffffff8109afbd ffff880039d6ba80
[  879.569386]  ffff88003a449800 000000002983d6bd 0000000000000000 000000002983d6bc
[  879.569982] Call Trace:
[  879.570264]  [<ffffffff817aa2d2>] dump_stack+0x4d/0x66
[  879.570599]  [<ffffffff8109afbd>] warn_slowpath_common+0x7d/0xa0
[  879.570935]  [<ffffffff8109b0ea>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20
[  879.571292]  [<ffffffff816d0a05>] tcp_ack+0x11f5/0x1380
[  879.571614]  [<ffffffff816d10bd>] tcp_rcv_established+0x1ed/0x710
[  879.571958]  [<ffffffff816dc9da>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x10a/0x370
[  879.572315]  [<ffffffff81657459>] release_sock+0x89/0x1d0
[  879.572642]  [<ffffffff816c81a0>] do_tcp_setsockopt.isra.36+0x120/0x860
[  879.573000]  [<ffffffff8110a52e>] ? rcu_read_lock_held+0x6e/0x80
[  879.573352]  [<ffffffff816c8912>] tcp_setsockopt+0x32/0x40
[  879.573678]  [<ffffffff81654ac4>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
[  879.574031]  [<ffffffff816537b0>] SyS_setsockopt+0x80/0xf0
[  879.574393]  [<ffffffff817b40a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[  879.574730] ---[ end trace a17cbc38eb8c5c00 ]---

v2: moving setting of skb->when for repaired skb-s in tcp_write_xmit,
    where it's set for other skb-s.

Fixes: 431a9124 ("tcp: timestamp SYN+DATA messages")
Fixes: 740b0f18 ("tcp: switch rtt estimations to usec resolution")
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 10545937 ]

On IOMMU systems DMA mapping can fail, we need to check for
that possibility.
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 945a3676 ]

Commit 1d8faf48 ("net/core: Add VF link state control") added new
attribute to IFLA_VF_INFO group in rtnl_fill_ifinfo but did not adjust size
of the allocated memory in if_nlmsg_size/rtnl_vfinfo_size. As the result, we
may trigger warnings in rtnl_getlink and similar functions when many VF
links are enabled, as the information does not fit into the allocated skb.

Fixes: 1d8faf48 ("net/core: Add VF link state control")
Reported-by: Yulong Pei <ypei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

[ Upstream commit 4e48ed88 ]

netlink doesn't set any network header offset thus when the skb is
being passed to tap devices via dev_queue_xmit_nit(), it emits klog
false positives due to it being unset like:

  ...
  [  124.990397] protocol 0000 is buggy, dev nlmon0
  [  124.990411] protocol 0000 is buggy, dev nlmon0
  ...

So just reset the network header before passing to the device; for
packet sockets that just means nothing will change - mac and net
offset hold the same value just as before.
Reported-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit 307fd543 upstream.

Replace equivalent (and partially incorrect) scatter-gather functions
with ones from crypto-API.

The replacement is motivated by page-faults in sg_copy_part triggered
by successive calls to crypto_hash_update. The following fault appears
after calling crypto_ahash_update twice, first with 13 and then
with 285 bytes:

Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000008
Faulting instruction address: 0xf9bf9a8c
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
SMP NR_CPUS=8 CoreNet Generic
Modules linked in: tcrypt(+) caamhash caam_jr caam tls
CPU: 6 PID: 1497 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted
3.12.19-rt30-QorIQ-SDK-V1.6+g9fda9f2 #75
task: e9308530 ti: e700e000 task.ti: e700e000
NIP: f9bf9a8c LR: f9bfcf28 CTR: c0019ea0
REGS: e700fb80 TRAP: 0300   Not tainted
(3.12.19-rt30-QorIQ-SDK-V1.6+g9fda9f2)
MSR: 00029002 <CE,EE,ME>  CR: 44f92024  XER: 20000000
DEAR: 00000008, ESR: 00000000

GPR00: f9bfcf28 e700fc30 e9308530 e70b1e55 00000000 ffffffdd e70b1e54 0bebf888
GPR08: 902c7ef5 c0e771e2 00000002 00000888 c0019ea0 00000000 00000000 c07a4154
GPR16: c08d0000 e91a8f9c 00000001 e98fb400 00000100 e9c83028 e70b1e08 e70b1d48
GPR24: e992ce10 e70b1dc8 f9bfe4f4 e70b1e55 ffffffdd e70b1ce0 00000000 00000000
NIP [f9bf9a8c] sg_copy+0x1c/0x100 [caamhash]
LR [f9bfcf28] ahash_update_no_ctx+0x628/0x660 [caamhash]
Call Trace:
[e700fc30] [f9bf9c50] sg_copy_part+0xe0/0x160 [caamhash] (unreliable)
[e700fc50] [f9bfcf28] ahash_update_no_ctx+0x628/0x660 [caamhash]
[e700fcb0] [f954e19c] crypto_tls_genicv+0x13c/0x300 [tls]
[e700fd10] [f954e65c] crypto_tls_encrypt+0x5c/0x260 [tls]
[e700fd40] [c02250ec] __test_aead.constprop.9+0x2bc/0xb70
[e700fe40] [c02259f0] alg_test_aead+0x50/0xc0
[e700fe60] [c02241e4] alg_test+0x114/0x2e0
[e700fee0] [c022276c] cryptomgr_test+0x4c/0x60
[e700fef0] [c004f658] kthread+0x98/0xa0
[e700ff40] [c000fd04] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit d974baa3 upstream.

CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.

TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.

This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry.  Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact.  A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit 76835b0e upstream.

Commit b0c29f79 (futexes: Avoid taking the hb->lock if there's
nothing to wake up) changes the futex code to avoid taking a lock when
there are no waiters. This code has been subsequently fixed in commit
11d4616b (futex: revert back to the explicit waiter counting code).
Both the original commit and the fix-up rely on get_futex_key_refs() to
always imply a barrier.

However, for private futexes, none of the cases in the switch statement
of get_futex_key_refs() would be hit and the function completes without
a memory barrier as required before checking the "waiters" in
futex_wake() -> hb_waiters_pending(). The consequence is a race with a
thread waiting on a futex on another CPU, allowing the waker thread to
read "waiters == 0" while the waiter thread to have read "futex_val ==
locked" (in kernel).

Without this fix, the problem (user space deadlocks) can be seen with
Android bionic's mutex implementation on an arm64 multi-cluster system.
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reported-by: Matteo Franchin <Matteo.Franchin@arm.com>
Fixes: b0c29f79 (futexes: Avoid taking the hb->lock if there's nothing to wake up)
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Tested-by: Mike Galbraith <umgwanakikbuti@gmail.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit d4bf205d upstream.

The pstore filesystem still creates duplicate filename/inode pairs for
some pstore types.  Add the id to the filename to prevent that.

Before patch:

[/sys/fs/pstore] ls -li
total 0
1250 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 67 Sep 29 17:09 console-efi
1250 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 67 Sep 29 17:09 console-efi
1250 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 67 Sep 29 17:09 console-efi
1250 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 67 Sep 29 17:09 console-efi
1250 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 67 Sep 29 17:09 console-efi
1250 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 67 Sep 29 17:09 console-efi
1250 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 67 Sep 29 17:09 console-efi
1250 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 67 Sep 29 17:09 console-efi
1250 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 67 Sep 29 17:09 console-efi

After:

[/sys/fs/pstore] ls -li
total 0
1232 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 148 Sep 29 17:09 console-efi-141202499100000
1231 -r--r--r--. 1 root root  67 Sep 29 17:09 console-efi-141202499200000
1230 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 148 Sep 29 17:44 console-efi-141202705400000
1229 -r--r--r--. 1 root root  67 Sep 29 17:44 console-efi-141202705500000
1228 -r--r--r--. 1 root root  67 Sep 29 20:42 console-efi-141203772600000
1227 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 148 Sep 29 23:42 console-efi-141204854900000
1226 -r--r--r--. 1 root root  67 Sep 29 23:42 console-efi-141204855000000
1225 -r--r--r--. 1 root root 148 Sep 29 23:59 console-efi-141204954200000
1224 -r--r--r--. 1 root root  67 Sep 29 23:59 console-efi-141204954400000
Signed-off-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit 923190d3 upstream.

sb_finish_set_opts() can race with inode_free_security()
when initializing inode security structures for inodes
created prior to initial policy load or by the filesystem
during ->mount().   This appears to have always been
a possible race, but commit 3dc91d43 ("SELinux:  Fix possible
NULL pointer dereference in selinux_inode_permission()")
made it more evident by immediately reusing the unioned
list/rcu element  of the inode security structure for call_rcu()
upon an inode_free_security().  But the underlying issue
was already present before that commit as a possible use-after-free
of isec.

Shivnandan Kumar reported the list corruption and proposed
a patch to split the list and rcu elements out of the union
as separate fields of the inode_security_struct so that setting
the rcu element would not affect the list element.  However,
this would merely hide the issue and not truly fix the code.

This patch instead moves up the deletion of the list entry
prior to dropping the sbsec->isec_lock initially.  Then,
if the inode is dropped subsequently, there will be no further
references to the isec.
Reported-by: Shivnandan Kumar <shivnandan.k@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit 6fbc198c upstream.

On restore, virtio pci does the following:
+ set features
+ init vqs etc - device can be used at this point!
+ set ACKNOWLEDGE,DRIVER and DRIVER_OK status bits

This is in violation of the virtio spec, which
requires the following order:
- ACKNOWLEDGE
- DRIVER
- init vqs
- DRIVER_OK

This behaviour will break with hypervisors that assume spec compliant
behaviour.  It seems like a good idea to have this patch applied to
stable branches to reduce the support butden for the hypervisors.

Cc: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit d3051b48 upstream.

A panic was seen in the following sitation.

There are two threads running on the system. The first thread is a system
monitoring thread that is reading /proc/modules. The second thread is
loading and unloading a module (in this example I'm using my simple
dummy-module.ko).  Note, in the "real world" this occurred with the qlogic
driver module.

When doing this, the following panic occurred:

 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 kernel BUG at kernel/module.c:3739!
 invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
 Modules linked in: binfmt_misc sg nfsv3 rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs fscache intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel lrw igb gf128mul glue_helper iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support ablk_helper ptp sb_edac cryptd pps_core edac_core shpchp i2c_i801 pcspkr wmi lpc_ich ioatdma mfd_core dca ipmi_si nfsd ipmi_msghandler auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd sunrpc xfs libcrc32c sr_mod cdrom sd_mod crc_t10dif crct10dif_common mgag200 syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper ttm isci drm libsas ahci libahci scsi_transport_sas libata i2c_core dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: dummy_module]
 CPU: 37 PID: 186343 Comm: cat Tainted: GF          O--------------   3.10.0+ #7
 Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600CP/S2600CP, BIOS RMLSDP.86I.00.29.D696.1311111329 11/11/2013
 task: ffff8807fd2d8000 ti: ffff88080fa7c000 task.ti: ffff88080fa7c000
 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810d64c5>]  [<ffffffff810d64c5>] module_flags+0xb5/0xc0
 RSP: 0018:ffff88080fa7fe18  EFLAGS: 00010246
 RAX: 0000000000000003 RBX: ffffffffa03b5200 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: ffff88080fa7fe38 RDI: ffffffffa03b5000
 RBP: ffff88080fa7fe28 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffffffffa03b5000
 R13: ffffffffa03b5008 R14: ffffffffa03b5200 R15: ffffffffa03b5000
 FS:  00007f6ae57ef740(0000) GS:ffff88101e7a0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000404f70 CR3: 0000000ffed48000 CR4: 00000000001407e0
 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
 Stack:
  ffffffffa03b5200 ffff8810101e4800 ffff88080fa7fe70 ffffffff810d666c
  ffff88081e807300 000000002e0f2fbf 0000000000000000 ffff88100f257b00
  ffffffffa03b5008 ffff88080fa7ff48 ffff8810101e4800 ffff88080fa7fee0
 Call Trace:
  [<ffffffff810d666c>] m_show+0x19c/0x1e0
  [<ffffffff811e4d7e>] seq_read+0x16e/0x3b0
  [<ffffffff812281ed>] proc_reg_read+0x3d/0x80
  [<ffffffff811c0f2c>] vfs_read+0x9c/0x170
  [<ffffffff811c1a58>] SyS_read+0x58/0xb0
  [<ffffffff81605829>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
 Code: 48 63 c2 83 c2 01 c6 04 03 29 48 63 d2 eb d9 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 63 d2 c6 04 13 2d 41 8b 0c 24 8d 50 02 83 f9 01 75 b2 eb cb <0f> 0b 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41
 RIP  [<ffffffff810d64c5>] module_flags+0xb5/0xc0
  RSP <ffff88080fa7fe18>

    Consider the two processes running on the system.

    CPU 0 (/proc/modules reader)
    CPU 1 (loading/unloading module)

    CPU 0 opens /proc/modules, and starts displaying data for each module by
    traversing the modules list via fs/seq_file.c:seq_open() and
    fs/seq_file.c:seq_read().  For each module in the modules list, seq_read
    does

            op->start()  <-- this is a pointer to m_start()
            op->show()   <- this is a pointer to m_show()
            op->stop()   <-- this is a pointer to m_stop()

    The m_start(), m_show(), and m_stop() module functions are defined in
    kernel/module.c. The m_start() and m_stop() functions acquire and release
    the module_mutex respectively.

    ie) When reading /proc/modules, the module_mutex is acquired and released
    for each module.

    m_show() is called with the module_mutex held.  It accesses the module
    struct data and attempts to write out module data.  It is in this code
    path that the above BUG_ON() warning is encountered, specifically m_show()
    calls

    static char *module_flags(struct module *mod, char *buf)
    {
            int bx = 0;

            BUG_ON(mod->state == MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED);
    ...

    The other thread, CPU 1, in unloading the module calls the syscall
    delete_module() defined in kernel/module.c.  The module_mutex is acquired
    for a short time, and then released.  free_module() is called without the
    module_mutex.  free_module() then sets mod->state = MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED,
    also without the module_mutex.  Some additional code is called and then the
    module_mutex is reacquired to remove the module from the modules list:

        /* Now we can delete it from the lists */
        mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
        stop_machine(__unlink_module, mod, NULL);
        mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);

This is the sequence of events that leads to the panic.

CPU 1 is removing dummy_module via delete_module().  It acquires the
module_mutex, and then releases it.  CPU 1 has NOT set dummy_module->state to
MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED yet.

CPU 0, which is reading the /proc/modules, acquires the module_mutex and
acquires a pointer to the dummy_module which is still in the modules list.
CPU 0 calls m_show for dummy_module.  The check in m_show() for
MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED passed for dummy_module even though it is being
torn down.

Meanwhile CPU 1, which has been continuing to remove dummy_module without
holding the module_mutex, now calls free_module() and sets
dummy_module->state to MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED.

CPU 0 now calls module_flags() with dummy_module and ...

static char *module_flags(struct module *mod, char *buf)
{
        int bx = 0;

        BUG_ON(mod->state == MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED);

and BOOM.

Acquire and release the module_mutex lock around the setting of
MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED in the teardown path, which should resolve the
problem.

Testing: In the unpatched kernel I can panic the system within 1 minute by
doing

while (true) do insmod dummy_module.ko; rmmod dummy_module.ko; done

and

while (true) do cat /proc/modules; done

in separate terminals.

In the patched kernel I was able to run just over one hour without seeing
any issues.  I also verified the output of panic via sysrq-c and the output
of /proc/modules looks correct for all three states for the dummy_module.

        dummy_module 12661 0 - Unloading 0xffffffffa03a5000 (OE-)
        dummy_module 12661 0 - Live 0xffffffffa03bb000 (OE)
        dummy_module 14015 1 - Loading 0xffffffffa03a5000 (OE+)
Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit 0d082601 upstream.

Andy Lutomirski recently demonstrated that when chroot is used to set
the root path below the path for the new ``root'' passed to pivot_root
the pivot_root system call succeeds and leaks mounts.

In examining the code I see that starting with a new root that is
below the current root in the mount tree will result in a loop in the
mount tree after the mounts are detached and then reattached to one
another.  Resulting in all kinds of ugliness including a leak of that
mounts involved in the leak of the mount loop.

Prevent this problem by ensuring that the new mount is reachable from
the current root of the mount tree.

[Added stable cc.  Fixes CVE-2014-7970.  --Andy]
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87bnpmihks.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.orgSigned-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit f9865f06 upstream.

Commit f363e45f ("net/ceph: make ceph_msgr_wq non-reentrant")
effectively removed WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag from ceph_msgr_wq.  This is
wrong - libceph is very much a memory reclaim path, so restore it.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Micha Krause <micha@krausam.de>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit 95926035 upstream.

The emu10k1 voice allocator takes voice_lock spinlock.  When there is
no empty stream available, it tries to release a voice used by synth,
and calls get_synth_voice.  The callback function,
snd_emu10k1_synth_get_voice(), however, also takes the voice_lock,
thus it deadlocks.

The fix is simply removing the voice_lock holds in
snd_emu10k1_synth_get_voice(), as this is always called in the
spinlock context.
Reported-and-tested-by: Arthur Marsh <arthur.marsh@internode.on.net>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit 71458cfc upstream.

We're missing include/linux/compiler-gcc5.h which is required now
because gcc branched off to v5 in trunk.

Just copy the relevant bits out of include/linux/compiler-gcc4.h,
no new code is added as of now.

This fixes a build error when using gcc 5.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit 2a236122 upstream.

Starting with Linux 3.12 processes get stuck in D state forever in
UserModeLinux under sync heavy workloads. This bug was introduced by
commit 805f11a0 (um: ubd: Add REQ_FLUSH suppport).
Fix bug by adding a check if FLUSH request was successfully submitted to
the I/O thread and keeping the FLUSH request on the request queue on
submission failures.

Fixes: 805f11a0 (um: ubd: Add REQ_FLUSH suppport)
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Knabe <linux@thorsten-knabe.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit 9ff84a17 upstream.

Without this the aux port does not get detected, and consequently the
touchpad will not work.

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1110011Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit aa972409 upstream.

Unfortunately, ForcePad capability is not actually exported over PS/2, so
we have to resort to DMI checks.
Reported-by: Nicole Faerber <nicole.faerber@kernelconcepts.de>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit 934f3072 upstream.

commit 21caf2fc ("mm: teach mm by current context info to not do I/O
during memory allocation") introduces PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO flag to avoid doing
I/O inside memory allocation, __GFP_IO is cleared when this flag is set,
but __GFP_FS implies __GFP_IO, it should also be cleared.  Or it may still
run into I/O, like in superblock shrinker.  And this will make the kernel
run into the deadlock case described in that commit.

See Dave Chinner's comment about io in superblock shrinker:

Filesystem shrinkers do indeed perform IO from the superblock shrinker and
have for years.  Even clean inodes can require IO before they can be freed
- e.g.  on an orphan list, need truncation of post-eof blocks, need to
wait for ordered operations to complete before it can be freed, etc.

IOWs, Ext4, btrfs and XFS all can issue and/or block on arbitrary amounts
of IO in the superblock shrinker context.  XFS, in particular, has been
doing transactions and IO from the VFS inode cache shrinker since it was
first introduced....

Fix this by clearing __GFP_FS in memalloc_noio_flags(), this function has
masked all the gfp_mask that will be passed into fs for the processes
setting PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO in the direct reclaim path.

v1 thread at: https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/9/3/32Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: joyce.xue <xuejiufei@huawei.com>
Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit 0b37e097 upstream.

According to commit 80af2588 ("fanotify: groups can specify their
f_flags for new fd"), file descriptors created as part of file access
notification events inherit flags from the event_f_flags argument passed
to syscall fanotify_init(2)[1].

Unfortunately O_CLOEXEC is currently silently ignored.

Indeed, event_f_flags are only given to dentry_open(), which only seems to
care about O_ACCMODE and O_PATH in do_dentry_open(), O_DIRECT in
open_check_o_direct() and O_LARGEFILE in generic_file_open().

It's a pity, since, according to some lookup on various search engines and
http://codesearch.debian.net/, there's already some userspace code which
use O_CLOEXEC:

- in systemd's readahead[2]:

    fanotify_fd = fanotify_init(FAN_CLOEXEC|FAN_NONBLOCK, O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOATIME);

- in clsync[3]:

    #define FANOTIFY_EVFLAGS (O_LARGEFILE|O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC)

    int fanotify_d = fanotify_init(FANOTIFY_FLAGS, FANOTIFY_EVFLAGS);

- in examples [4] from "Filesystem monitoring in the Linux
  kernel" article[5] by Aleksander Morgado:

    if ((fanotify_fd = fanotify_init (FAN_CLOEXEC,
                                      O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC | O_LARGEFILE)) < 0)

Additionally, since commit 48149e9d ("fanotify: check file flags
passed in fanotify_init").  having O_CLOEXEC as part of fanotify_init()
second argument is expressly allowed.

So it seems expected to set close-on-exec flag on the file descriptors if
userspace is allowed to request it with O_CLOEXEC.

But Andrew Morton raised[6] the concern that enabling now close-on-exec
might break existing applications which ask for O_CLOEXEC but expect the
file descriptor to be inherited across exec().

In the other hand, as reported by Mihai Dontu[7] close-on-exec on the file
descriptor returned as part of file access notify can break applications
due to deadlock.  So close-on-exec is needed for most applications.

More, applications asking for close-on-exec are likely expecting it to be
enabled, relying on O_CLOEXEC being effective.  If not, it might weaken
their security, as noted by Jan Kara[8].

So this patch replaces call to macro get_unused_fd() by a call to function
get_unused_fd_flags() with event_f_flags value as argument.  This way
O_CLOEXEC flag in the second argument of fanotify_init(2) syscall is
interpreted and close-on-exec get enabled when requested.

[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/fanotify_init.2.html
[2] http://cgit.freedesktop.org/systemd/systemd/tree/src/readahead/readahead-collect.c?id=v208#n294
[3] https://github.com/xaionaro/clsync/blob/v0.2.1/sync.c#L1631
    https://github.com/xaionaro/clsync/blob/v0.2.1/configuration.h#L38
[4] http://www.lanedo.com/~aleksander/fanotify/fanotify-example.c
[5] http://www.lanedo.com/2013/filesystem-monitoring-linux-kernel/
[6] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141001153621.65e9258e65a6167bf2e4cb50@linux-foundation.org
[7] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141002095046.3715eb69@mdontu-l
[8] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141002104410.GB19748@quack.suse.cz

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1411562410.git.ydroneaud@opteya.comSigned-off-by: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Tested-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Cc: Mihai Don\u021bu <mihai.dontu@gmail.com>
Cc: Pádraig Brady <P@draigBrady.com>
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk-manpages <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Lino Sanfilippo <LinoSanfilippo@gmx.de>
Cc: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit b8839b8c upstream.

The math in both blk_stack_limits() and queue_limit_alignment_offset()
assume that a block device's io_min (aka minimum_io_size) is always a
power-of-2.  Fix the math such that it works for non-power-of-2 io_min.

This issue (of alignment_offset != 0) became apparent when testing
dm-thinp with a thinp blocksize that matches a RAID6 stripesize of
1280K.  Commit fdfb4c8c ("dm thin: set minimum_io_size to pool's data
block size") unlocked the potential for alignment_offset != 0 due to
the dm-thin-pool's io_min possibly being a non-power-of-2.
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit 24dff96a upstream.

we used to check for "nobody else could start doing anything with
that opened file" by checking that refcount was 2 or less - one
for descriptor table and one we'd acquired in fget() on the way to
wherever we are.  That was race-prone (somebody else might have
had a reference to descriptor table and do fget() just as we'd
been checking) and it had become flat-out incorrect back when
we switched to fget_light() on those codepaths - unlike fget(),
it doesn't grab an extra reference unless the descriptor table
is shared.  The same change allowed a race-free check, though -
we are safe exactly when refcount is less than 2.

It was a long time ago; pre-2.6.12 for ioctl() (the codepath leading
to ppp one) and 2.6.17 for sendmsg() (netlink one).  OTOH,
netlink hadn't grown that check until 3.9 and ppp used to live
in drivers/net, not drivers/net/ppp until 3.1.  The bug existed
well before that, though, and the same fix used to apply in old
location of file.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit c2ca0fcd upstream.

This patch makes it possible to kill a process looping in
cont_expand_zero. A process may spend a lot of time in this function, so
it is desirable to be able to kill it.

It happened to me that I wanted to copy a piece data from the disk to a
file. By mistake, I used the "seek" parameter to dd instead of "skip". Due
to the "seek" parameter, dd attempted to extend the file and became stuck
doing so - the only possibility was to reset the machine or wait many
hours until the filesystem runs out of space and cont_expand_zero fails.
We need this patch to be able to terminate the process.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit 475d0db7 upstream.

total_objects could be 0 and is used as a denom.

While total_objects is a "long", total_objects == 0 unlikely happens for
3.12 and later kernels because 32-bit architectures would not be able to
hold (1 << 32) objects. However, total_objects == 0 may happen for kernels
between 3.1 and 3.11 because total_objects in prune_super() was an "int"
and (e.g.) x86_64 architecture might be able to hold (1 << 32) objects.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit 99358a1c upstream.

schedule_delayed_work() happening when the work is already pending is
a cheap no-op.  Don't bother with ->wbuf_queued logics - it's both
broken (cancelling ->wbuf_dwork leaves it set, as spotted by Jeff Harris)
and pointless.  It's cheaper to let schedule_delayed_work() handle that
case.
Reported-by: Jeff Harris <jefftharris@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Jeff Harris <jefftharris@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>

commit 0e6d3112 upstream.

It is currently possible to execve() an x32 executable on an x86_64
kernel that has only ia32 compat enabled.  However all its syscalls
will fail, even _exit().  This usually causes it to segfault.

Change the ELF compat architecture check so that x32 executables are
rejected if we don't support the x32 ABI.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1410120305.6822.9.camel@decadent.org.ukSigned-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>