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  1. 11 Sep, 2020 1 commit
  3. 10 Sep, 2020 8 commits
  5. 09 Sep, 2020 4 commits
    • Andrii Nakryiko's avatar
      perf: Stop using deprecated bpf_program__title() · 8081ede1
      Andrii Nakryiko authored 
      Switch from deprecated bpf_program__title() API to
bpf_program__section_name(). Also drop unnecessary error checks because
neither bpf_program__title() nor bpf_program__section_name() can fail or
return NULL.

Fixes: 52109584 ("libbpf: Deprecate notion of BPF program "title" in favor of "section name"")
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarTobias Klauser <tklauser@distanz.ch>
Acked-by: default avatarJiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200908180127.1249-1-andriin@fb.com
      8081ede1
    • Yonghong Song's avatar
      selftests/bpf: Fix test_sysctl_loop{1, 2} failure due to clang change · 7fb5eefd
      Yonghong Song authored 
      Andrii reported that with latest clang, when building selftests, we have
error likes:
  error: progs/test_sysctl_loop1.c:23:16: in function sysctl_tcp_mem i32 (%struct.bpf_sysctl*):
  Looks like the BPF stack limit of 512 bytes is exceeded.
  Please move large on stack variables into BPF per-cpu array map.

The error is triggered by the following LLVM patch:
  https://reviews.llvm.org/D87134

For example, the following code is from test_sysctl_loop1.c:
  static __always_inline int is_tcp_mem(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx)
  {
    volatile char tcp_mem_name[] = "net/ipv4/tcp_mem/very_very_very_very_long_pointless_string";
    ...
  }
Without the above LLVM patch, the compiler did optimization to load the string
(59 bytes long) with 7 64bit loads, 1 8bit load and 1 16bit load,
occupying 64 byte stack size.

With the above LLVM patch, the compiler only uses 8bit loads, but subregister is 32bit.
So stack requirements become 4 * 59 = 236 bytes. Together with other stuff on
the stack, total stack size exceeds 512 bytes, hence compiler complains and quits.

To fix the issue, removing "volatile" key word or changing "volatile" to
"const"/"static const" does not work, the string is put in .rodata.str1.1 section,
which libbpf did not process it and errors out with
  libbpf: elf: skipping unrecognized data section(6) .rodata.str1.1
  libbpf: prog 'sysctl_tcp_mem': bad map relo against '.L__const.is_tcp_mem.tcp_mem_name'
          in section '.rodata.str1.1'

Defining the string const as global variable can fix the issue as it puts the string constant
in '.rodata' section which is recognized by libbpf. In the future, when libbpf can process
'.rodata.str*.*' properly, the global definition can be changed back to local definition.

Defining tcp_mem_name as a global, however, triggered a verifier failure.
   ./test_progs -n 7/21
  libbpf: load bpf program failed: Permission denied
  libbpf: -- BEGIN DUMP LOG ---
  libbpf:
  invalid stack off=0 size=1
  verification time 6975 usec
  stack depth 160+64
  processed 889 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 4 total_states
  14 peak_states 14 mark_read 10

  libbpf: -- END LOG --
  libbpf: failed to load program 'sysctl_tcp_mem'
  libbpf: failed to load object 'test_sysctl_loop2.o'
  test_bpf_verif_scale:FAIL:114
  #7/21 test_sysctl_loop2.o:FAIL
This actually exposed a bpf program bug. In test_sysctl_loop{1,2}, we have code
like
  const char tcp_mem_name[] = "<...long string...>";
  ...
  char name[64];
  ...
  for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tcp_mem_name); ++i)
      if (name[i] != tcp_mem_name[i])
          return 0;
In the above code, if sizeof(tcp_mem_name) > 64, name[i] access may be
out of bound. The sizeof(tcp_mem_name) is 59 for test_sysctl_loop1.c and
79 for test_sysctl_loop2.c.

Without promotion-to-global change, old compiler generates code where
the overflowed stack access is actually filled with valid value, so hiding
the bpf program bug. With promotion-to-global change, the code is different,
more specifically, the previous loading constants to stack is gone, and
"name" occupies stack[-64:0] and overflow access triggers a verifier error.
To fix the issue, adjust "name" buffer size properly.
Reported-by: default avatarAndrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarYonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: default avatarAndrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200909171542.3673449-1-yhs@fb.com
      7fb5eefd
    • Yonghong Song's avatar
      selftests/bpf: Add test for map_ptr arithmetic · e6054fc1
      Yonghong Song authored 
      Change selftest map_ptr_kern.c with disabling inlining for
one of subtests, which will fail the test without previous
verifier change. Also added to verifier test for both
"map_ptr += scalar" and "scalar += map_ptr" arithmetic.
Signed-off-by: default avatarYonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: default avatarAndrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200908175703.2463721-1-yhs@fb.com
      e6054fc1
    • Yonghong Song's avatar
      bpf: Permit map_ptr arithmetic with opcode add and offset 0 · 7c696732
      Yonghong Song authored 
      Commit 41c48f3a ("bpf: Support access
to bpf map fields") added support to access map fields
with CORE support. For example,

            struct bpf_map {
                    __u32 max_entries;
            } __attribute__((preserve_access_index));

            struct bpf_array {
                    struct bpf_map map;
                    __u32 elem_size;
            } __attribute__((preserve_access_index));

            struct {
                    __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY);
                    __uint(max_entries, 4);
                    __type(key, __u32);
                    __type(value, __u32);
            } m_array SEC(".maps");

            SEC("cgroup_skb/egress")
            int cg_skb(void *ctx)
            {
                    struct bpf_array *array = (struct bpf_array *)&m_array;

                    /* .. array->map.max_entries .. */
            }

In kernel, bpf_htab has similar structure,

	    struct bpf_htab {
		    struct bpf_map map;
                    ...
            }

In the above cg_skb(), to access array->map.max_entries, with CORE, the clang will
generate two builtin's.
            base = &m_array;
            /* access array.map */
            map_addr = __builtin_preserve_struct_access_info(base, 0, 0);
            /* access array.map.max_entries */
            max_entries_addr = __builtin_preserve_struct_access_info(map_addr, 0, 0);
	    max_entries = *max_entries_addr;

In the current llvm, if two builtin's are in the same function or
in the same function after inlining, the compiler is smart enough to chain
them together and generates like below:
            base = &m_array;
            max_entries = *(base + reloc_offset); /* reloc_offset = 0 in this case */
and we are fine.

But if we force no inlining for one of functions in test_map_ptr() selftest, e.g.,
check_default(), the above two __builtin_preserve_* will be in two different
functions. In this case, we will have code like:
   func check_hash():
            reloc_offset_map = 0;
            base = &m_array;
            map_base = base + reloc_offset_map;
            check_default(map_base, ...)
   func check_default(map_base, ...):
            max_entries = *(map_base + reloc_offset_max_entries);

In kernel, map_ptr (CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) does not allow any arithmetic.
The above "map_base = base + reloc_offset_map" will trigger a verifier failure.
  ; VERIFY(check_default(&hash->map, map));
  0: (18) r7 = 0xffffb4fe8018a004
  2: (b4) w1 = 110
  3: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +0) = r1
   R1_w=invP110 R7_w=map_value(id=0,off=4,ks=4,vs=8,imm=0) R10=fp0
  ; VERIFY_TYPE(BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH, check_hash);
  4: (18) r1 = 0xffffb4fe8018a000
  6: (b4) w2 = 1
  7: (63) *(u32 *)(r1 +0) = r2
   R1_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=8,imm=0) R2_w=invP1 R7_w=map_value(id=0,off=4,ks=4,vs=8,imm=0) R10=fp0
  8: (b7) r2 = 0
  9: (18) r8 = 0xffff90bcb500c000
  11: (18) r1 = 0xffff90bcb500c000
  13: (0f) r1 += r2
  R1 pointer arithmetic on map_ptr prohibited

To fix the issue, let us permit map_ptr + 0 arithmetic which will
result in exactly the same map_ptr.
Signed-off-by: default avatarYonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: default avatarAndrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200908175702.2463625-1-yhs@fb.com
      7c696732
  7. 07 Sep, 2020 3 commits
  9. 04 Sep, 2020 20 commits
  11. 02 Sep, 2020 4 commits
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