- 12 Jul, 2017 40 commits
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Joe Perches authored
Make the code like the rest of the kernel. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/bc5927726abc70d7c066df7ab4cb7cfce4a7b577.1499284835.git.joe@perches.comSigned-off-by:
Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Tomi Valkeinen <tomi.valkeinen@ti.com> Cc: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Joe Perches authored
Make the code like the rest of the kernel. But there is an oddity here because the inline should probably be removed. It's an extern function in intelfb.h and it is used in intelfbdrv.c and intelfbhw.c. The inline is kept here as I suppose it's possible for some compiler to make the uses inline in intelfbdrv and and also create an external function for intelfbhw. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8ba151a1fdc84e42cbf4aafc798513c0158edee1.1499284835.git.joe@perches.comSigned-off-by:
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Joe Perches authored
Make the code like the rest of the kernel. Also use inline instead of __inline__. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a5072b74b6c293e6ec93c4900482e9d3267f15b2.1499284835.git.joe@perches.comSigned-off-by:
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Joe Perches authored
Make the code like the rest of the kernel. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/55d3e89d50bb03d603bfb28019fab07f48bdc714.1499284835.git.joe@perches.comSigned-off-by:
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Joe Perches authored
Make the code like the rest of the kernel. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3f980cd89084ae09716353aba3171e4b3815e690.1499284835.git.joe@perches.comSigned-off-by:
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Joe Perches authored
Make the code like the rest of the kernel. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1cd3d401626e51ea0e2333a860e76e80bc560a4c.1499284835.git.joe@perches.comSigned-off-by:
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Joe Perches authored
Make the code like the rest of the kernel. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f81bb2a67a97b1fd8b6ea99bd350d8a0f6864fb1.1499284835.git.joe@perches.comSigned-off-by:
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Joe Perches authored
Make the code like the rest of the kernel. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/756d3fb543e981b9284e756fa27616725a354b28.1499284835.git.joe@perches.comSigned-off-by:
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Joe Perches authored
Make the code like the rest of the kernel. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/14db9c166d5b68efa77e337cfe49bb9b29bca3f7.1499284835.git.joe@perches.comSigned-off-by:
Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by:
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Joe Perches authored
Make the use of inline like the rest of the kernel. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f42b2202bd0d4e7ccf79ce5348bb255a035e67bb.1499284835.git.joe@perches.comSigned-off-by:
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Joe Perches authored
Make the use of inline like the rest of the kernel. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/d47074493af80ce12590340294bc49618165c30d.1499284835.git.joe@perches.comSigned-off-by:
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Joe Perches authored
Make the use of asmlinkage like the rest of the kernel. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/efb2dfed4d9315bf68ec0334c81b65af176a0174.1499284835.git.joe@perches.comSigned-off-by:
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Joe Perches authored
Move inline to be like the rest of the kernel. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/6bf1bec049897c4158f698b866810f47c728f233.1499284835.git.joe@perches.comSigned-off-by:
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Joe Perches authored
Convert 'u8 inline' to 'inline u8' to be the same style used by the rest of the kernel. Miscellanea: jornada_ssp_reverse is an odd function. It is declared inline but is also EXPORT_SYMBOL. It is also apparently only used by jornada720_ssp.c Likely the EXPORT_SYMBOL could be removed and the function converted to static. The addition of static and removal of EXPORT_SYMBOL was not done. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5bd3b2bf39c6c9caf773949f18158f8f5ec08582.1499284835.git.joe@perches.comSigned-off-by:
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Joe Perches authored
asmlinkage is either 'extern "C"' or blank. Move the uses of asmlinkage before the return types to be similar to the rest of the kernel. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/005b8e120650c6a13b541e420f4e3605603fe9e6.1499284835.git.joe@perches.comSigned-off-by:
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Joe Perches authored
Make sure static, extern, and asmlinkage appear before a specific type. e.g.: int asmlinkage foo(void) is better written asmlinkage int foo(void) Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/31704c96df2d5fd9df0b41165940a7a4feb16a63.1499284835.git.joe@perches.comSigned-off-by: -
Michal Hocko authored
Page migration (for memory hotplug, soft_offline_page or mbind) needs to allocate a new memory. This can trigger an oom killer if the target memory is depleated. Although quite unlikely, still possible, especially for the memory hotplug (offlining of memoery). Up to now we didn't really have reasonable means to back off. __GFP_NORETRY can fail just too easily and __GFP_THISNODE sticks to a single node and that is not suitable for all callers. But now that we have __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL we should use it. It is preferable to fail the migration than disrupt the system by killing some processes. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170623085345.11304-7-mhocko@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by:
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Alex Belits <alex.belits@cavium.com> Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Signed-off-by:
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Michal Hocko authored
Commit 24f8e00a ("drm/i915: Prefer to report ENOMEM rather than incur the oom for gfx allocations") has tried to remove disruptive OOM killer because the userspace should be able to cope with allocation failures. At the time only __GFP_NORETRY could achieve that and it turned out that this would fail the allocations just too easily. So "drm/i915: Remove __GFP_NORETRY from our buffer allocator" removed it and hoped for a better solution. __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL is that solution. It will keep retrying the allocation until there is no more progress and we would go OOM. Instead we fail the allocation and let the caller to deal with it. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170623085345.11304-6-mhocko@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
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Michal Hocko authored
Now that __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL has a reasonable semantic regardless of the request size we can drop the hackish implementation for !costly orders. __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL retries as long as the reclaim makes a forward progress and backs of when we are out of memory for the requested size. Therefore we do not need to enforce__GFP_NORETRY for !costly orders just to silent the oom killer anymore. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170623085345.11304-5-mhocko@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
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Michal Hocko authored
KM_MAYFAIL didn't have any suitable GFP_FOO counterpart until recently so it relied on the default page allocator behavior for the given set of flags. This means that small allocations actually never failed. Now that we have __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL flag which works independently on the allocation request size we can map KM_MAYFAIL to it. The allocator will try as hard as it can to fulfill the request but fails eventually if the progress cannot be made. It does so without triggering the OOM killer which can be seen as an improvement because KM_MAYFAIL users should be able to deal with allocation failures. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170623085345.11304-4-mhocko@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
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Michal Hocko authored
__GFP_REPEAT was designed to allow retry-but-eventually-fail semantic to the page allocator. This has been true but only for allocations requests larger than PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER. It has been always ignored for smaller sizes. This is a bit unfortunate because there is no way to express the same semantic for those requests and they are considered too important to fail so they might end up looping in the page allocator for ever, similarly to GFP_NOFAIL requests. Now that the whole tree has been cleaned up and accidental or misled usage of __GFP_REPEAT flag has been removed for !costly requests we can give the original flag a better name and more importantly a more useful semantic. Let's rename it to __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL which tells the user that the allocator would try really hard but there is no promise of a success. This will work independent of the order and overrides the default allocator behavior. Page allocator users have several levels of guarantee vs. cost options (take GFP_KERNEL as an example) - GFP_KERNEL & ~__GFP_RECLAIM - optimistic allocation without _any_ attempt to free memory at all. The most light weight mode which even doesn't kick the background reclaim. Should be used carefully because it might deplete the memory and the next user might hit the more aggressive reclaim - GFP_KERNEL & ~__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM (or GFP_NOWAIT)- optimistic allocation without any attempt to free memory from the current context but can wake kswapd to reclaim memory if the zone is below the low watermark. Can be used from either atomic contexts or when the request is a performance optimization and there is another fallback for a slow path. - (GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_HIGH) & ~__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM (aka GFP_ATOMIC) - non sleeping allocation with an expensive fallback so it can access some portion of memory reserves. Usually used from interrupt/bh context with an expensive slow path fallback. - GFP_KERNEL - both background and direct reclaim are allowed and the _default_ page allocator behavior is used. That means that !costly allocation requests are basically nofail but there is no guarantee of that behavior so failures have to be checked properly by callers (e.g. OOM killer victim is allowed to fail currently). - GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NORETRY - overrides the default allocator behavior and all allocation requests fail early rather than cause disruptive reclaim (one round of reclaim in this implementation). The OOM killer is not invoked. - GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL - overrides the default allocator behavior and all allocation requests try really hard. The request will fail if the reclaim cannot make any progress. The OOM killer won't be triggered. - GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL - overrides the default allocator behavior and all allocation requests will loop endlessly until they succeed. This might be really dangerous especially for larger orders. Existing users of __GFP_REPEAT are changed to __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL because they already had their semantic. No new users are added. __alloc_pages_slowpath is changed to bail out for __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL if there is no progress and we have already passed the OOM point. This means that all the reclaim opportunities have been exhausted except the most disruptive one (the OOM killer) and a user defined fallback behavior is more sensible than keep retrying in the page allocator. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix arch/sparc/kernel/mdesc.c] [mhocko@suse.com: semantic fix] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170626123847.GM11534@dhcp22.suse.cz [mhocko@kernel.org: address other thing spotted by Vlastimil] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170626124233.GN11534@dhcp22.suse.cz Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170623085345.11304-3-mhocko@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
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Michal Hocko authored
Patch series "mm: give __GFP_REPEAT a better semantic". The main motivation for the change is that the current implementation of __GFP_REPEAT is not very much useful. The documentation says: * __GFP_REPEAT: Try hard to allocate the memory, but the allocation attempt * _might_ fail. This depends upon the particular VM implementation. It just fails to mention that this is true only for large (costly) high order which has been the case since the flag was introduced. A similar semantic would be really helpful for smal orders as well, though, because we have places where a failure with a specific fallback error handling is preferred to a potential endless loop inside the page allocator. The earlier cleanup dropped __GFP_REPEAT usage for low (!costly) order users so only those which might use larger orders have stayed. One new user added in the meantime is addressed in patch 1. Let's rename the flag to something more verbose and use it for existing users. Semantic for those will not change. Then implement low (!costly) orders failure path which is hit after the page allocator is about to invoke the oom killer. With that we have a good counterpart for __GFP_NORETRY and finally can tell try as hard as possible without the OOM killer. Xfs code already has an existing annotation for allocations which are allowed to fail and we can trivially map them to the new gfp flag because it will provide the semantic KM_MAYFAIL wants. Christoph didn't consider the new flag really necessary but didn't respond to the OOM killer aspect of the change so I have kept the patch. If this is still seen as not really needed I can drop the patch. kvmalloc will allow also !costly high order allocations to retry hard before falling back to the vmalloc. drm/i915 asked for the new semantic explicitly. Memory migration code, especially for the memory hotplug, should back off rather than invoking the OOM killer as well. This patch (of 6): Commit 3377e227 ("MIPS: Add 48-bit VA space (and 4-level page tables) for 4K pages.") has added a new __GFP_REPEAT user but using this flag doesn't really make any sense for order-0 request which is the case here because PUD_ORDER is 0. __GFP_REPEAT has historically effect only on allocation requests with order > PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER. This doesn't introduce any functional change. This is a preparatory patch for later work which renames the flag and redefines its semantic. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170623085345.11304-2-mhocko@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
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Rik van Riel authored
When RLIMIT_STACK is, for example, 256MB, the current code results in a gap between the top of the task and mmap_base of 256MB, failing to take into account the amount by which the stack address was randomized. In other words, the stack gets less than RLIMIT_STACK space. Ensure that the gap between the stack and mmap_base always takes stack randomization and the stack guard gap into account. Inspired by Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170622200033.25714-4-riel@redhat.comSigned-off-by:
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reported-by:
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Rik van Riel authored
When RLIMIT_STACK is, for example, 256MB, the current code results in a gap between the top of the task and mmap_base of 256MB, failing to take into account the amount by which the stack address was randomized. In other words, the stack gets less than RLIMIT_STACK space. Ensure that the gap between the stack and mmap_base always takes stack randomization and the stack guard gap into account. Obtained from Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170622200033.25714-3-riel@redhat.comSigned-off-by:
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Rik van Riel authored
When RLIMIT_STACK is, for example, 256MB, the current code results in a gap between the top of the task and mmap_base of 256MB, failing to take into account the amount by which the stack address was randomized. In other words, the stack gets less than RLIMIT_STACK space. Ensure that the gap between the stack and mmap_base always takes stack randomization and the stack guard gap into account. Obtained from Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170622200033.25714-2-riel@redhat.comSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Rik van Riel authored
Use the ascii-armor canary to prevent unterminated C string overflows from being able to successfully overwrite the canary, even if they somehow obtain the canary value. Inspired by execshield ascii-armor and Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170524123446.78510066@annuminas.surriel.comSigned-off-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by:
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Rik van Riel authored
Use the ascii-armor canary to prevent unterminated C string overflows from being able to successfully overwrite the canary, even if they somehow obtain the canary value. Inspired by execshield ascii-armor and Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170524155751.424-5-riel@redhat.comSigned-off-by:
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Rik van Riel authored
Use the ascii-armor canary to prevent unterminated C string overflows from being able to successfully overwrite the canary, even if they somehow obtain the canary value. Inspired by execshield ascii-armor and Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170524155751.424-4-riel@redhat.comSigned-off-by:
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Rik van Riel authored
Use the ascii-armor canary to prevent unterminated C string overflows from being able to successfully overwrite the canary, even if they somehow obtain the canary value. Inspired by execshield ascii-armor and Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170524155751.424-3-riel@redhat.comSigned-off-by:
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Rik van Riel authored
Patch series "stackprotector: ascii armor the stack canary", v2. Zero out the first byte of the stack canary value on 64 bit systems, in order to mitigate unterminated C string overflows. The null byte both prevents C string functions from reading the canary, and from writing it if the canary value were guessed or obtained through some other means. Reducing the entropy by 8 bits is acceptable on 64-bit systems, which will still have 56 bits of entropy left, but not on 32 bit systems, so the "ascii armor" canary is only implemented on 64-bit systems. Inspired by the "ascii armor" code in execshield and Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree. Also see https://github.com/thestinger/linux-hardened/ This patch (of 5): Introduce get_random_canary(), which provides a random unsigned long canary value with the first byte zeroed out on 64 bit architectures, in order to mitigate non-terminated C string overflows. The null byte both prevents C string functions from reading the canary, and from writing it if the canary value were guessed or obtained through some other means. Reducing the entropy by 8 bits is acceptable on 64-bit systems, which will still have 56 bits of entropy left, but not on 32 bit systems, so the "ascii armor" canary is only implemented on 64-bit systems. Inspired by the "ascii armor" code in the old execshield patches, and Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170524155751.424-2-riel@redhat.comSigned-off-by:
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Kees Cook authored
When building the sh architecture, the compiler doesn't realize that BUG() doesn't return, so it will complain about functions using BUG() that are marked with the noreturn attribute: lib/string.c: In function 'fortify_panic': >> lib/string.c:986:1: warning: 'noreturn' function does return } ^ Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170627192050.GA66784@beastSigned-off-by: -
Daniel Micay authored
This adds support for compiling with a rough equivalent to the glibc _FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 feature, providing compile-time and runtime buffer overflow checks for string.h functions when the compiler determines the size of the source or destination buffer at compile-time. Unlike glibc, it covers buffer reads in addition to writes. GNU C __builtin_*_chk intrinsics are avoided because they would force a much more complex implementation. They aren't designed to detect read overflows and offer no real benefit when using an implementation based on inline checks. Inline checks don't add up to much code size and allow full use of the regular string intrinsics while avoiding the need for a bunch of _chk functions and per-arch assembly to avoid wrapper overhead. This detects various overflows at compile-time in various drivers and some non-x86 core kernel code. There will likely be issues caught in regular use at runtime too. Future improvements left out of initial implementation for simplicity, as it's all quite optional and can be done incrementally: * Some of the fortified string functions (strncpy, strcat), don't yet place a limit on reads from the source based on __builtin_object_size of the source buffer. * Extending coverage to more string functions like strlcat. * It should be possible to optionally use __builtin_object_size(x, 1) for some functions (C strings) to detect intra-object overflows (like glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE=2), but for now this takes the conservative approach to avoid likely compatibility issues. * The compile-time checks should be made available via a separate config option which can be enabled by default (or always enabled) once enough time has passed to get the issues it catches fixed. Kees said: "This is great to have. While it was out-of-tree code, it would have blocked at least CVE-2016-3858 from being exploitable (improper size argument to strlcpy()). I've sent a number of fixes for out-of-bounds-reads that this detected upstream already" [arnd@arndb.de: x86: fix fortified memcpy] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170627150047.660360-1-arnd@arndb.de [keescook@chromium.org: avoid panic() in favor of BUG()] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170626235122.GA25261@beast [keescook@chromium.org: move from -mm, add ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE, tweak Kconfig help] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526095404.20439-1-danielmicay@gmail.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-8-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by:
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by:
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Daniel Axtens authored
Testing the fortified string functions[1] would cause a kernel panic on boot in test_feature_fixups() due to a buffer overflow in memcmp. This boils down to things like this: extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1; extern unsigned int ftr_fixup_test1_orig; check(memcmp(&ftr_fixup_test1, &ftr_fixup_test1_orig, size) == 0); We know that these are asm labels so it is safe to read up to 'size' bytes at those addresses. However, because we have passed the address of a single unsigned int to memcmp, the compiler believes the underlying object is in fact a single unsigned int. So if size > sizeof(unsigned int), there will be a panic at runtime. We can fix this by changing the types: instead of calling the asm labels unsigned ints, call them unsigned int[]s. Therefore the size isn't incorrectly determined at compile time and we get a regular unsafe memcmp and no panic. [1] http://openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/09/2 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by:
Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Tested-by:
Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:
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Daniel Axtens authored
prom_init is a bit special; in theory it should be able to be linked separately to the kernel. To keep this from getting too complex, the symbols that prom_init.c uses are checked. Fortification adds symbols, and it gets quite messy as it includes things like panic(). So just don't fortify prom_init.c for now. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by:
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Kees Cook authored
This fixes a over-read condition detected by FORTIFY_SOURCE for this line: memcpy(SKB_TO_PKT(skb), &ack_pkt, sizeof(skb->cb)); The error was: In file included from ./include/linux/bitmap.h:8:0, from ./include/linux/cpumask.h:11, from ./include/linux/mm_types_task.h:13, from ./include/linux/mm_types.h:4, from ./include/linux/kmemcheck.h:4, from ./include/linux/skbuff.h:18, from drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c:34: In function 'memcpy', inlined from 'send_atomic_ack.constprop' at drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c:998:2, inlined from 'acknowledge' at drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c:1026:3, inlined from 'rxe_responder' at drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c:1286:10: ./include/linux/string.h:309:4: error: call to '__read_overflow2' declared with attribute error: detected read beyond size of object passed as 2nd parameter __read_overflow2(); Daniel Micay noted that struct rxe_pkt_info is 32 bytes on 32-bit architectures, but skb->cb is still 64. The memcpy() over-reads 32 bytes. This fixes it by zeroing the unused bytes in skb->cb. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-5-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: -
Kees Cook authored
Defining kexec_purgatory as a zero-length char array upsets compile time size checking. Since this is built on a per-arch basis, define it as an unsized char array (like is done for other similar things, e.g. linker sections). This silences the warning generated by the future CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE, which did not like the memcmp() of a "0 byte" array. This drops the __weak and uses an extern instead, since both users define kexec_purgatory. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by:
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Kees Cook authored
This avoids CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE from being enabled during the EFI stub build, as adding a panic() implementation may not work well. This can be adjusted in the future. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by:
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Acked-by:
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Nicholas Piggin authored
Implement an arch-speicfic watchdog rather than use the perf-based hardlockup detector. The new watchdog takes the soft-NMI directly, rather than going through perf. Perf interrupts are to be made maskable in future, so that would prevent the perf detector from working in those regions. Additionally, implement a SMP based detector where all CPUs watch one another by pinging a shared cpumask. This is because powerpc Book3S does not have a true periodic local NMI, but some platforms do implement a true NMI IPI. If a CPU is stuck with interrupts hard disabled, the soft-NMI watchdog does not work, but the SMP watchdog will. Even on platforms without a true NMI IPI to get a good trace from the stuck CPU, other CPUs will notice the lockup sufficiently to report it and panic. [npiggin@gmail.com: honor watchdog disable at boot/hotplug] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170621001346.5bb337c9@roar.ozlabs.ibm.com [npiggin@gmail.com: fix false positive warning at CPU unplug] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170630080740.20766-1-npiggin@gmail.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170616065715.18390-6-npiggin@gmail.comSigned-off-by:
Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@oracle.com> [sparc] Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by:
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Nicholas Piggin authored
After reconfiguring watchdog sysctls etc., architecture specific watchdogs may not get all their parameters updated. watchdog_nmi_reconfigure() can be implemented to pull the new values in and set the arch NMI watchdog. [npiggin@gmail.com: add code comments] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170617125933.774d3858@roar.ozlabs.ibm.com [arnd@arndb.de: hide unused function] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170620204854.966601-1-arnd@arndb.de Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170616065715.18390-5-npiggin@gmail.comSigned-off-by:
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Nicholas Piggin authored
Split SOFTLOCKUP_DETECTOR from LOCKUP_DETECTOR, and split HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF from HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR. LOCKUP_DETECTOR implies the general boot, sysctl, and programming interfaces for the lockup detectors. An architecture that wants to use a hard lockup detector must define HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF or HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH. Alternatively an arch can define HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG, which provides the minimum arch_touch_nmi_watchdog, and it otherwise does its own thing and does not implement the LOCKUP_DETECTOR interfaces. sparc is unusual in that it has started to implement some of the interfaces, but not fully yet. It should probably be converted to a full HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH. [npiggin@gmail.com: fix] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170617223522.66c0ad88@roar.ozlabs.ibm.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170616065715.18390-4-npiggin@gmail.comSigned-off-by:
Babu Moger <babu.moger@oracle.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@oracle.com> [sparc] Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by:
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