1. 27 Nov, 2018 35 commits
  2. 23 Nov, 2018 5 commits
    • Greg Kroah-Hartman's avatar
      Linux 4.9.140 · e1864131
      Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
      e1864131
    • Greg Kroah-Hartman's avatar
      Revert "ipv6: set rt6i_protocol properly in the route when it is installed" · 961323dd
      Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
      This reverts commit 23e983e2 which is
      commit b91d5329 upstream.
      
      It breaks the Android networking test suite, which works fine with the
      backported patch in 4.14.  So something must be off for 4.9 for this
      patch, so just revert it.
      
      Cc: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com>
      Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
      Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
      Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      961323dd
    • Greg Kroah-Hartman's avatar
      Revert "x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2 STIBP mitigation" · 0afb423b
      Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
      This reverts commit 66fe51cb which is
      commit 53c613fe upstream.
      
      It's not ready for the stable trees as there are major slowdowns
      involved with this patch.
      Reported-by: default avatarJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Cc:  "WoodhouseDavid" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc:  "SchauflerCasey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
      Cc: Rainer Fiebig <jrf@mailbox.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      0afb423b
    • Greg Kroah-Hartman's avatar
      Linux 4.9.139 · 44caf8b3
      Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
      44caf8b3
    • Russell King's avatar
      ARM: spectre-v1: mitigate user accesses · 861f5387
      Russell King authored
      Commit a3c0f847 upstream.
      
      Spectre variant 1 attacks are about this sequence of pseudo-code:
      
      	index = load(user-manipulated pointer);
      	access(base + index * stride);
      
      In order for the cache side-channel to work, the access() must me made
      to memory which userspace can detect whether cache lines have been
      loaded.  On 32-bit ARM, this must be either user accessible memory, or
      a kernel mapping of that same user accessible memory.
      
      The problem occurs when the load() speculatively loads privileged data,
      and the subsequent access() is made to user accessible memory.
      
      Any load() which makes use of a user-maniplated pointer is a potential
      problem if the data it has loaded is used in a subsequent access.  This
      also applies for the access() if the data loaded by that access is used
      by a subsequent access.
      
      Harden the get_user() accessors against Spectre attacks by forcing out
      of bounds addresses to a NULL pointer.  This prevents get_user() being
      used as the load() step above.  As a side effect, put_user() will also
      be affected even though it isn't implicated.
      
      Also harden copy_from_user() by redoing the bounds check within the
      arm_copy_from_user() code, and NULLing the pointer if out of bounds.
      Acked-by: default avatarMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarRussell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      861f5387