On failure to return a pathname from ima_d_path(), a pointer to
dname is returned, which is subsequently used in the IMA measurement
list, the IMA audit records, and other audit logging.  Saving the
pointer to dname for later use has the potential to race with rename.

Intead of returning a pointer to dname on failure, this patch returns
a pointer to a copy of the filename.
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

Make sure that we have not received less bytes than what is indicated
in the header of the TPM response. Also, check the number of bytes in
the response before accessing its data.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkine@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkine@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkine@linux.intel.com>

Since commit 1107d065 ("tpm_tis: Introduce intermediate layer for
TPM access") Atmel 3203 TPM on ThinkPad X61S (TPM firmware version 13.9)
no longer works.  The initialization proceeds fine until we get and
start using chip-reported timeouts - and the chip reports C and D
timeouts of zero.

It turns out that until commit 8e54caf4 ("tpm: Provide a generic
means to override the chip returned timeouts") we had actually let
default timeout values remain in this case, so let's bring back this
behavior to make chips like Atmel 3203 work again.

Use a common code that was introduced by that commit so a warning is
printed in this case and /sys/class/tpm/tpm*/timeouts correctly says the
timeouts aren't chip-original.

Fixes: 1107d065 ("tpm_tis: Introduce intermediate layer for TPM access")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <mail@maciej.szmigiero.name>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>

This is a regression when this code was reworked and made the error
print unconditional. The original code deliberately suppressed printing
of the first error message so it could quietly sense
TPM_ERR_INVALID_POSTINIT.

Fixes: a502feb67b47 ("tpm: Clean up reading of timeout and duration capabilities")
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>

crb_check_resource() in TPM CRB driver calls
acpi_dev_resource_memory() which only handles 32-bit resources.
Adding a call to acpi_dev_resource_address_space() in TPM CRB
driver which handles 64-bit resources.
Signed-off-by: Jiandi An <anjiandi@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>

Drop duplicate header module.h from tpm_tis_spi.c.
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>

tpm/st33zp24/st33zp24.c does not use any miscdevice so this patch remove
this unnecessary inclusion.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>

Use corret kdoc format for function description and eliminate warning
of type:

tpm_ibmvtpm.c:66: warning: No description found for parameter 'count'
Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>

The tpm stack uses pdev name convention for the parent device.
Fix that also in tpm_chip_alloc().

Fixes: 3897cd9c ("tpm: Split out the devm stuff from tpmm_chip_alloc")'
Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>

Use correct kdoc format, describe correct parameters and return values.
Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>

Functions tpm_transmit and transmit_cmd are referenced
from other functions kdoc hence deserve documentation.
Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>

The SECCOMP_RET_KILL mode is documented as immediately killing the
process as if a SIGSYS had been sent and not caught (similar to a
SIGKILL).  However, a SIGSYS is documented as triggering a coredump
which does not happen today.

This has the advantage of being able to more easily debug a process
that fails a seccomp filter.  Today, most apps need to recompile and
change their filter in order to get detailed info out, or manually run
things through strace, or enable detailed kernel auditing.  Now we get
coredumps that fit into existing system-wide crash reporting setups.

From a security pov, this shouldn't be a problem.  Unhandled signals
can already be sent externally which trigger a coredump independent of
the status of the seccomp filter.  The act of dumping core itself does
not cause change in execution of the program.

URL: https://crbug.com/676357Signed-off-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine
what security modules are active on a system. I have added
/sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated
list of the active security modules. No more groping around
in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks.

Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated
to the latest security next branch.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

The kernel build bot turned up a bad config combination when
CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR is y and CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH is n,
resulting in the build error
   security/built-in.o: In function `aa_unpack':
   (.text+0x841e2): undefined reference to `aa_g_hash_policy'
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

AA_BUG() uses WARN and won't break the kernel like BUG_ON().
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

If this sysctl is set to non-zero and a process with CAP_MAC_ADMIN in
the root namespace has created an AppArmor policy namespace,
unprivileged processes will be able to change to a profile in the
newly created AppArmor policy namespace and, if the profile allows
CAP_MAC_ADMIN and appropriate file permissions, will be able to load
policy in the respective policy namespace.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Allow a profile to carry extra data that can be queried via userspace.
This provides a means to store extra data in a profile that a trusted
helper can extract and use from live policy.
Signed-off-by: William Hua <william.hua@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

apparmor should be checking the SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT constant. Also
in complain mode make it so apparmor can elect to log a message,
informing of the check.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Allow turning off the computation of the policy hashes via the
apparmor.hash_policy kernel parameter.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Moving the use of fqname to later allows learning profiles to be based
on the fqname request instead of just the hname. It also allows cleaning
up some of the name parsing and lookup by allowing the use of
the fqlookupn_profile() lib fn.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

The aad macro can replace aad strings when it is not intended to. Switch
to a fn macro so it is only applied when intended.

Also at the same time cleanup audit_data initialization by putting
common boiler plate behind a macro, and dropping the gfp_t parameter
which will become useless.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Having ops be an integer that is an index into an op name table is
awkward and brittle. Every op change requires an edit for both the
op constant and a string in the table. Instead switch to using const
strings directly, eliminating the need for the table that needs to
be kept in sync.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Trying to update the task cred while the task current cred is not the
real cred will result in an error at the cred layer. Avoid this by
failing early and delaying the update.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Having per policy ns interface files helps with containers restoring
policy.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

This is just setup for new ns specific .load, .replace, .remove interface
files.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Verify that profiles in a load set specify the same policy ns and
audit the name of the policy ns that policy is being loaded for.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Store loaded policy and allow introspecting it through apparmorfs. This
has several uses from debugging, policy validation, and policy checkpoint
and restore for containers.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Policy management will be expanded beyond traditional unconfined root.
This will require knowning the profile of the task doing the management
and the ns view.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Prepare for a tighter pairing of user namespaces and apparmor policy
namespaces, by making the ns to be viewed available.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Prepare for a tighter pairing of user namespaces and apparmor policy
namespaces, by making the ns to be viewed available and checking
that the user namespace level is the same as the policy ns level.

This strict pairing will be relaxed once true support of user namespaces
lands.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>