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  1. 23 Apr, 2016 1 commit
  3. 21 Apr, 2016 2 commits
  5. 20 Apr, 2016 1 commit
  7. 19 Apr, 2016 1 commit
    • Davidlohr Bueso's avatar
      locking/pvqspinlock: Fix division by zero in qstat_read() · 66876595
      Davidlohr Bueso authored 
      While playing with the qstat statistics (in <debugfs>/qlockstat/) I ran into
the following splat on a VM when opening pv_hash_hops:

  divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP
  ...
  RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810b61fe>]  [<ffffffff810b61fe>] qstat_read+0x12e/0x1e0
  ...
  Call Trace:
    [<ffffffff811cad7c>] ? mem_cgroup_commit_charge+0x6c/0xd0
    [<ffffffff8119750c>] ? page_add_new_anon_rmap+0x8c/0xd0
    [<ffffffff8118d3b9>] ? handle_mm_fault+0x1439/0x1b40
    [<ffffffff811937a9>] ? do_mmap+0x449/0x550
    [<ffffffff811d3de3>] ? __vfs_read+0x23/0xd0
    [<ffffffff811d4ab2>] ? rw_verify_area+0x52/0xd0
    [<ffffffff811d4bb1>] ? vfs_read+0x81/0x120
    [<ffffffff811d5f12>] ? SyS_read+0x42/0xa0
    [<ffffffff815720f6>] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xa8

Fix this by verifying that qstat_pv_kick_unlock is in fact non-zero,
similarly to what the qstat_pv_latency_wake case does, as if nothing
else, this can come from resetting the statistics, thus having 0 kicks
should be quite valid in this context.
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: default avatarWaiman Long <Waiman.Long@hpe.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: dave@stgolabs.net
Cc: waiman.long@hpe.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1460961103-24953-1-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.netSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      66876595
  9. 18 Apr, 2016 1 commit
  11. 17 Apr, 2016 5 commits
  13. 16 Apr, 2016 7 commits
  15. 15 Apr, 2016 17 commits
  17. 14 Apr, 2016 5 commits
    • Mike Snitzer's avatar
      dm cache metadata: fix READ_LOCK macros and cleanup WRITE_LOCK macros · 9567366f
      Mike Snitzer authored 
      The READ_LOCK macro was incorrectly returning -EINVAL if
dm_bm_is_read_only() was true -- it will always be true once the cache
metadata transitions to read-only by dm_cache_metadata_set_read_only().

Wrap READ_LOCK and WRITE_LOCK multi-statement macros in do {} while(0).
Also, all accesses of the 'cmd' argument passed to these related macros
are now encapsulated in parenthesis.

A follow-up patch can be developed to eliminate the use of macros in
favor of pure C code.  Avoiding that now given that this needs to apply
to stable@.
Reported-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Fixes: d14fcf3d ("dm cache: make sure every metadata function checks fail_io")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      9567366f
    • Keith Busch's avatar
      NVMe: Always use MSI/MSI-x interrupts · a5229050
      Keith Busch authored 
      Multiple users have reported device initialization failure due the driver
not receiving legacy PCI interrupts. This is not unique to any particular
controller, but has been observed on multiple platforms.

There have been no issues reported or observed when with message signaled
interrupts, so this patch attempts to use MSI-x during initialization,
falling back to MSI. If that fails, legacy would become the default.

The setup_io_queues error handling had to change as a result: the admin
queue's msix_entry used to be initialized to the legacy IRQ. The case
where nr_io_queues is 0 would fail request_irq when setting up the admin
queue's interrupt since re-enabling MSI-x fails with 0 vectors, leaving
the admin queue's msix_entry invalid. Instead, return success immediately.
Reported-by: default avatarTim Muhlemmer <muhlemmer@gmail.com>
Reported-by: default avatarJon Derrick <jonathan.derrick@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKeith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
      a5229050
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      /proc/iomem: only expose physical resource addresses to privileged users · 51d7b120
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      In commit c4004b02 ("x86: remove the kernel code/data/bss resources
from /proc/iomem") I was hoping to remove the phyiscal kernel address
data from /proc/iomem entirely, but that had to be reverted because some
system programs actually use it.

This limits all the detailed resource information to properly
credentialed users instead.
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      51d7b120
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      pci-sysfs: use proper file capability helper function · ab0fa82b
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      The PCI config access checked the file capabilities correctly, but used
the itnernal security capability check rather than the helper function
that is actually meant for that.

The security_capable() has unusual return values and is not meant to be
used elsewhere (the only other use is in the capability checking
functions that we actually intend people to use, and this odd PCI usage
really stood out when looking around the capability code.
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      ab0fa82b
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Make file credentials available to the seqfile interfaces · 34dbbcdb
      Linus Torvalds authored 
      A lot of seqfile users seem to be using things like %pK that uses the
credentials of the current process, but that is actually completely
wrong for filesystem interfaces.

The unix semantics for permission checking files is to check permissions
at _open_ time, not at read or write time, and that is not just a small
detail: passing off stdin/stdout/stderr to a suid application and making
the actual IO happen in privileged context is a classic exploit
technique.

So if we want to be able to look at permissions at read time, we need to
use the file open credentials, not the current ones.  Normal file
accesses can just use "f_cred" (or any of the helper functions that do
that, like file_ns_capable()), but the seqfile interfaces do not have
any such options.

It turns out that seq_file _does_ save away the user_ns information of
the file, though.  Since user_ns is just part of the full credential
information, replace that special case with saving off the cred pointer
instead, and suddenly seq_file has all the permission information it
needs.
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      34dbbcdb
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