1. 19 Jan, 2018 4 commits
  2. 17 Jan, 2018 2 commits
  3. 16 Jan, 2018 2 commits
  4. 14 Jan, 2018 7 commits
    • Tom Lendacky's avatar
      x86/retpoline: Add LFENCE to the retpoline/RSB filling RSB macros · 28d437d5
      Tom Lendacky authored
      The PAUSE instruction is currently used in the retpoline and RSB filling
      macros as a speculation trap.  The use of PAUSE was originally suggested
      because it showed a very, very small difference in the amount of
      cycles/time used to execute the retpoline as compared to LFENCE.  On AMD,
      the PAUSE instruction is not a serializing instruction, so the pause/jmp
      loop will use excess power as it is speculated over waiting for return
      to mispredict to the correct target.
      
      The RSB filling macro is applicable to AMD, and, if software is unable to
      verify that LFENCE is serializing on AMD (possible when running under a
      hypervisor), the generic retpoline support will be used and, so, is also
      applicable to AMD.  Keep the current usage of PAUSE for Intel, but add an
      LFENCE instruction to the speculation trap for AMD.
      
      The same sequence has been adopted by GCC for the GCC generated retpolines.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Acked-by: default avatarDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Acked-by: default avatarArjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180113232730.31060.36287.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
      28d437d5
    • David Woodhouse's avatar
      x86/retpoline: Fill RSB on context switch for affected CPUs · c995efd5
      David Woodhouse authored
      On context switch from a shallow call stack to a deeper one, as the CPU
      does 'ret' up the deeper side it may encounter RSB entries (predictions for
      where the 'ret' goes to) which were populated in userspace.
      
      This is problematic if neither SMEP nor KPTI (the latter of which marks
      userspace pages as NX for the kernel) are active, as malicious code in
      userspace may then be executed speculatively.
      
      Overwrite the CPU's return prediction stack with calls which are predicted
      to return to an infinite loop, to "capture" speculation if this
      happens. This is required both for retpoline, and also in conjunction with
      IBRS for !SMEP && !KPTI.
      
      On Skylake+ the problem is slightly different, and an *underflow* of the
      RSB may cause errant branch predictions to occur. So there it's not so much
      overwrite, as *filling* the RSB to attempt to prevent it getting
      empty. This is only a partial solution for Skylake+ since there are many
      other conditions which may result in the RSB becoming empty. The full
      solution on Skylake+ is to use IBRS, which will prevent the problem even
      when the RSB becomes empty. With IBRS, the RSB-stuffing will not be
      required on context switch.
      
      [ tglx: Added missing vendor check and slighty massaged comments and
        	changelog ]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Acked-by: default avatarArjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
      Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515779365-9032-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
      c995efd5
    • Andrey Ryabinin's avatar
      x86/kasan: Panic if there is not enough memory to boot · 0d39e266
      Andrey Ryabinin authored
      Currently KASAN doesn't panic in case it don't have enough memory
      to boot. Instead, it crashes in some random place:
      
       kernel BUG at arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c:27!
      
       RIP: 0010:__phys_addr+0x268/0x276
       Call Trace:
        kasan_populate_shadow+0x3f2/0x497
        kasan_init+0x12e/0x2b2
        setup_arch+0x2825/0x2a2c
        start_kernel+0xc8/0x15f4
        x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c
        x86_64_start_kernel+0x72/0x75
        secondary_startup_64+0xa5/0xb0
      
      Use memblock_virt_alloc_try_nid() for allocations without failure
      fallback. It will panic with an out of memory message.
      Reported-by: default avatarkernel test robot <xiaolong.ye@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Acked-by: default avatarDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: lkp@01.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180110153602.18919-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
      0d39e266
    • Thomas Gleixner's avatar
      x86/retpoline: Remove compile time warning · b8b9ce4b
      Thomas Gleixner authored
      Remove the compile time warning when CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y and the compiler
      does not have retpoline support. Linus rationale for this is:
      
        It's wrong because it will just make people turn off RETPOLINE, and the
        asm updates - and return stack clearing - that are independent of the
        compiler are likely the most important parts because they are likely the
        ones easiest to target.
      
        And it's annoying because most people won't be able to do anything about
        it. The number of people building their own compiler? Very small. So if
        their distro hasn't got a compiler yet (and pretty much nobody does), the
        warning is just annoying crap.
      
        It is already properly reported as part of the sysfs interface. The
        compile-time warning only encourages bad things.
      
      Fixes: 76b04384 ("x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support")
      Requested-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
      Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzWgquv4i6Mab6bASqYXg3ErV3XDFEYf=GEcCDQg5uAtw@mail.gmail.com
      b8b9ce4b
    • Peter Zijlstra's avatar
      x86,perf: Disable intel_bts when PTI · 99a9dc98
      Peter Zijlstra authored
      The intel_bts driver does not use the 'normal' BTS buffer which is exposed
      through the cpu_entry_area but instead uses the memory allocated for the
      perf AUX buffer.
      
      This obviously comes apart when using PTI because then the kernel mapping;
      which includes that AUX buffer memory; disappears. Fixing this requires to
      expose a mapping which is visible in all context and that's not trivial.
      
      As a quick fix disable this driver when PTI is enabled to prevent
      malfunction.
      
      Fixes: 385ce0ea ("x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig")
      Reported-by: default avatarVince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
      Reported-by: default avatarRobert Święcki <robert@swiecki.net>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: greg@kroah.com
      Cc: hughd@google.com
      Cc: luto@amacapital.net
      Cc: Vince Weaver <vince@deater.net>
      Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180114102713.GB6166@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net
      99a9dc98
    • W. Trevor King's avatar
      security/Kconfig: Correct the Documentation reference for PTI · a237f762
      W. Trevor King authored
      When the config option for PTI was added a reference to documentation was
      added as well. But the documentation did not exist at that point. The final
      documentation has a different file name.
      
      Fix it up to point to the proper file.
      
      Fixes: 385ce0ea ("x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarW. Trevor King <wking@tremily.us>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
      Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
      Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3009cc8ccbddcd897ec1e0cb6dda524929de0d14.1515799398.git.wking@tremily.us
      a237f762
    • Thomas Gleixner's avatar
      x86/pti: Fix !PCID and sanitize defines · f10ee3dc
      Thomas Gleixner authored
      The switch to the user space page tables in the low level ASM code sets
      unconditionally bit 12 and bit 11 of CR3. Bit 12 is switching the base
      address of the page directory to the user part, bit 11 is switching the
      PCID to the PCID associated with the user page tables.
      
      This fails on a machine which lacks PCID support because bit 11 is set in
      CR3. Bit 11 is reserved when PCID is inactive.
      
      While the Intel SDM claims that the reserved bits are ignored when PCID is
      disabled, the AMD APM states that they should be cleared.
      
      This went unnoticed as the AMD APM was not checked when the code was
      developed and reviewed and test systems with Intel CPUs never failed to
      boot. The report is against a Centos 6 host where the guest fails to boot,
      so it's not yet clear whether this is a virt issue or can happen on real
      hardware too, but thats irrelevant as the AMD APM clearly ask for clearing
      the reserved bits.
      
      Make sure that on non PCID machines bit 11 is not set by the page table
      switching code.
      
      Andy suggested to rename the related bits and masks so they are clearly
      describing what they should be used for, which is done as well for clarity.
      
      That split could have been done with alternatives but the macro hell is
      horrible and ugly. This can be done on top if someone cares to remove the
      extra orq. For now it's a straight forward fix.
      
      Fixes: 6fd166aa ("x86/mm: Use/Fix PCID to optimize user/kernel switches")
      Reported-by: default avatarLaura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801140009150.2371@nanos
      f10ee3dc
  5. 13 Jan, 2018 1 commit
    • Andy Lutomirski's avatar
      selftests/x86: Add test_vsyscall · 352909b4
      Andy Lutomirski authored
      This tests that the vsyscall entries do what they're expected to do.
      It also confirms that attempts to read the vsyscall page behave as
      expected.
      
      If changes are made to the vsyscall code or its memory map handling,
      running this test in all three of vsyscall=none, vsyscall=emulate,
      and vsyscall=native are helpful.
      
      (Because it's easy, this also compares the vsyscall results to their
       vDSO equivalents.)
      
      Note to KAISER backporters: please test this under all three
      vsyscall modes.  Also, in the emulate and native modes, make sure
      that test_vsyscall_64 agrees with the command line or config
      option as to which mode you're in.  It's quite easy to mess up
      the kernel such that native mode accidentally emulates
      or vice versa.
      
      Greg, etc: please backport this to all your Meltdown-patched
      kernels.  It'll help make sure the patches didn't regress
      vsyscalls.
      CSigned-off-by: default avatarAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2b9c5a174c1d60fd7774461d518aa75598b1d8fd.1515719552.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      352909b4
  6. 12 Jan, 2018 1 commit
  7. 11 Jan, 2018 12 commits
  8. 10 Jan, 2018 1 commit
  9. 09 Jan, 2018 3 commits
  10. 08 Jan, 2018 4 commits
    • Jike Song's avatar
      x86/mm/pti: Remove dead logic in pti_user_pagetable_walk*() · 8d56eff2
      Jike Song authored
      The following code contains dead logic:
      
       162 if (pgd_none(*pgd)) {
       163         unsigned long new_p4d_page = __get_free_page(gfp);
       164         if (!new_p4d_page)
       165                 return NULL;
       166
       167         if (pgd_none(*pgd)) {
       168                 set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_p4d_page)));
       169                 new_p4d_page = 0;
       170         }
       171         if (new_p4d_page)
       172                 free_page(new_p4d_page);
       173 }
      
      There can't be any difference between two pgd_none(*pgd) at L162 and L167,
      so it's always false at L171.
      
      Dave Hansen explained:
      
       Yes, the double-test was part of an optimization where we attempted to
       avoid using a global spinlock in the fork() path.  We would check for
       unallocated mid-level page tables without the lock.  The lock was only
       taken when we needed to *make* an entry to avoid collisions.
       
       Now that it is all single-threaded, there is no chance of a collision,
       no need for a lock, and no need for the re-check.
      
      As all these functions are only called during init, mark them __init as
      well.
      
      Fixes: 03f4424f ("x86/mm/pti: Add functions to clone kernel PMDs")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJike Song <albcamus@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Jiri Koshina <jikos@kernel.org>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
      Cc: Andi Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180108160341.3461-1-albcamus@gmail.com
      8d56eff2
    • Dave Hansen's avatar
      x86/tboot: Unbreak tboot with PTI enabled · 262b6b30
      Dave Hansen authored
      This is another case similar to what EFI does: create a new set of
      page tables, map some code at a low address, and jump to it.  PTI
      mistakes this low address for userspace and mistakenly marks it
      non-executable in an effort to make it unusable for userspace.
      
      Undo the poison to allow execution.
      
      Fixes: 385ce0ea ("x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig")
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
      Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
      Cc: Jeff Law <law@redhat.com>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: David" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Cc: Nick Clifton <nickc@redhat.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180108102805.GK25546@redhat.com
      262b6b30
    • Thomas Gleixner's avatar
      x86/cpu: Implement CPU vulnerabilites sysfs functions · 61dc0f55
      Thomas Gleixner authored
      Implement the CPU vulnerabilty show functions for meltdown, spectre_v1 and
      spectre_v2.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180107214913.177414879@linutronix.de
      61dc0f55
    • Thomas Gleixner's avatar
      sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder · 87590ce6
      Thomas Gleixner authored
      As the meltdown/spectre problem affects several CPU architectures, it makes
      sense to have common way to express whether a system is affected by a
      particular vulnerability or not. If affected the way to express the
      mitigation should be common as well.
      
      Create /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities folder and files for
      meltdown, spectre_v1 and spectre_v2.
      
      Allow architectures to override the show function.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
      Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180107214913.096657732@linutronix.de
      87590ce6
  11. 06 Jan, 2018 3 commits