- 20 May, 2022 1 commit
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Peter Zijlstra authored
Commit 47f33de4 ("x86/sev: Mark the code returning to user space as syscall gap") added a bunch of text references without annotating them, resulting in a spree of objtool complaints: vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: vc_switch_off_ist+0x77: relocation to !ENDBR: entry_SYSCALL_64+0x15c vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: vc_switch_off_ist+0x8f: relocation to !ENDBR: entry_SYSCALL_compat+0xa5 vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: vc_switch_off_ist+0x97: relocation to !ENDBR: .entry.text+0x21ea vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: vc_switch_off_ist+0xef: relocation to !ENDBR: .entry.text+0x162 vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: __sev_es_ist_enter+0x60: relocation to !ENDBR: entry_SYSCALL_64+0x15c vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: __sev_es_ist_enter+0x6c: relocation to !ENDBR: .entry.text+0x162 vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: __sev_es_ist_enter+0x8a: relocation to !ENDBR: entry_SYSCALL_compat+0xa5 vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: __sev_es_ist_enter+0xc1: relocation to !ENDBR: .entry.text+0x21ea Since these text references are used to compare against IP, and are not an indirect call target, they don't need ENDBR so annotate them away. Fixes: 47f33de4 ("x86/sev: Mark the code returning to user space as syscall gap") Reported-by:
Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by:
Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220520082604.GQ2578@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net
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- 19 May, 2022 1 commit
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Lai Jiangshan authored
When returning to user space, %rsp is user-controlled value. If it is a SNP-guest and the hypervisor decides to mess with the code-page for this path while a CPU is executing it, a potential #VC could hit in the syscall return path and mislead the #VC handler. So make ip_within_syscall_gap() return true in this case. Signed-off-by:
Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com> Signed-off-by:
Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220412124909.10467-1-jiangshanlai@gmail.com
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- 18 May, 2022 1 commit
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Lai Jiangshan authored
In idtentry_vc(), vc_switch_off_ist() determines a safe stack to switch to, off of the IST stack. Annotate the new stack switch with ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER in case UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER is used. A stack walk before looks like this: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.18.0-rc7+ #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl dump_stack kernel_exc_vmm_communication asm_exc_vmm_communication ? native_read_msr ? __x2apic_disable.part.0 ? x2apic_setup ? cpu_init ? trap_init ? start_kernel ? x86_64_start_reservations ? x86_64_start_kernel ? secondary_startup_64_no_verify </TASK> and with the fix, the stack dump is exact: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.18.0-rc7+ #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl dump_stack kernel_exc_vmm_communication asm_exc_vmm_communication RIP: 0010:native_read_msr Code: ... < snipped regs > ? __x2apic_disable.part.0 x2apic_setup cpu_init trap_init start_kernel x86_64_start_reservations x86_64_start_kernel secondary_startup_64_no_verify </TASK> [ bp: Test in a SEV-ES guest and rewrite the commit message to explain what exactly this does. ] Fixes: a13644f3 ("x86/entry/64: Add entry code for #VC handler") Signed-off-by:Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220316041612.71357-1-jiangshanlai@gmail.com
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- 17 May, 2022 1 commit
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Colin Ian King authored
Variable info is being assigned the same value twice, remove the redundant assignment. Also assign variable v in the declaration. Cleans up clang scan warning: warning: Value stored to 'info' during its initialization is never read [deadcode.DeadStores] No code changed: # arch/x86/kernel/sev.o: text data bss dec hex filename 19878 4487 4112 28477 6f3d sev.o.before 19878 4487 4112 28477 6f3d sev.o.after md5: bfbaa515af818615fd01fea91e7eba1b sev.o.before.asm bfbaa515af818615fd01fea91e7eba1b sev.o.after.asm [ bp: Running the before/after check on sev.c because sev-shared.c gets included into it. ] Fixes: 597cfe48 ("x86/boot/compressed/64: Setup a GHCB-based VC Exception handler") Signed-off-by:Colin Ian King <colin.i.king@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 02 May, 2022 1 commit
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Borislav Petkov authored
Fix: arch/x86/kernel/sev.c:605:16: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) arch/x86/kernel/sev.c:605:16: expected struct snp_secrets_page_layout *layout arch/x86/kernel/sev.c:605:16: got void [noderef] __iomem *[assigned] mem Reported-by:
kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 27 Apr, 2022 3 commits
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Brijesh Singh authored
The GHCB specification section 2.7 states that when SEV-SNP is enabled, a guest should not rely on the hypervisor to provide the address of the AP jump table. Instead, if a guest BIOS wants to provide an AP jump table, it should record the address in the SNP secrets page so the guest operating system can obtain it directly from there. Fix this on the guest kernel side by having SNP guests use the AP jump table address published in the secrets page rather than issuing a GHCB request to get it. [ mroth: - Improve error handling when ioremap()/memremap() return NULL - Don't mix function calls with declarations - Add missing __init - Tweak commit message ] Fixes: 0afb6b66 ("x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs") Signed-off-by:Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
Currently, get_secrets_page() is only reachable from the following call chain: __init snp_init_platform_device(): get_secrets_page() so mark it as __init as well. This is also needed since it calls early_memremap(), which is also an __init routine. Similarly, get_jump_table_addr() is only reachable from the following call chain: __init setup_real_mode(): sme_sev_setup_real_mode(): sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(): get_jump_table_addr() so mark get_jump_table_addr() and everything up that call chain as __init as well. This is also needed since future patches will add a call to get_secrets_page(), which needs to be __init due to the reasons stated above. Suggested-by: -
Tom Lendacky authored
Rename the drivers/virt/coco/sevguest directory and files to sev-guest so as to match the driver name. [ bp: Rename Documentation/virt/coco/sevguest.rst too, as reported by sfr: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427101059.3bf55262@canb.auug.org.au ] Signed-off-by:Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 21 Apr, 2022 1 commit
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Tom Lendacky authored
During patch review, it was decided the SNP guest driver name should not be SEV-SNP specific, but should be generic for use with anything SEV. However, this feedback was missed and the driver name, and many of the driver functions and structures, are SEV-SNP name specific. Rename the driver to "sev-guest" (to match the misc device that is created) and update some of the function and structure names, too. While in the file, adjust the one pr_err() message to be a dev_err() message so that the message, if issued, uses the driver name. Signed-off-by:
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- 20 Apr, 2022 1 commit
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Michael Roth authored
The helpers in arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi.c might be used during early boot to access the EFI system/config tables, and in some cases these EFI helpers might attempt to print debug/error messages, before console_init() has been called. __putstr() checks some variables to avoid printing anything before the console has been initialized, but this isn't enough since those variables live in .bss, which may not have been cleared yet. This can lead to a triple-fault occurring, primarily when booting in legacy/CSM mode (where EFI helpers will attempt to print some debug messages). Fix this by declaring these globals in .data section instead so there is no dependency on .bss being cleared before accessing them. Fixes: c01fce9c ("x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup") Reported-by:
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- 17 Apr, 2022 1 commit
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Borislav Petkov authored
Copy the needed symbols only and remove the kernel proper includes. No functional changes. Signed-off-by:
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- 14 Apr, 2022 1 commit
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Haowen Bai authored
The function enc_payload() is wrongly declared bool but returns an integer value. Correct it. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Fixes: fce96cf0 ("virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver") Signed-off-by:
Haowen Bai <baihaowen@meizu.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 11 Apr, 2022 1 commit
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Yang Yingliang authored
If alloc_pages() fails, it returns a NULL pointer. Replace the wrong IS_ERR() check with the proper NULL pointer check. Fixes: fce96cf0 ("virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver") Reported-by:
Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 08 Apr, 2022 1 commit
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Peter Gonda authored
Replace the halt loop in handle_vc_boot_ghcb() with an sev_es_terminate(). The HLT gives the system no indication the guest is unhappy. The termination request will signal there was an error during VC handling during boot. [ bp: Update it to pass the reason set too. ] Signed-off-by:
Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 07 Apr, 2022 18 commits
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Michael Roth authored
Update the documentation with information regarding SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement details and what sort of assurances it provides to guests. Signed-off-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
Version 2 of GHCB specification defines Non-Automatic-Exit (NAE) to get extended guest report which is similar to the SNP_GET_REPORT ioctl. The main difference is related to the additional data that will be returned. That additional data returned is a certificate blob that can be used by the SNP guest user. The certificate blob layout is defined in the GHCB specification. The driver simply treats the blob as a opaque data and copies it to userspace. [ bp: Massage commit message, cast 1st arg of access_ok() ] Signed-off-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
The SNP_GET_DERIVED_KEY ioctl interface can be used by the SNP guest to ask the firmware to provide a key derived from a root key. The derived key may be used by the guest for any purposes it chooses, such as a sealing key or communicating with the external entities. See SEV-SNP firmware spec for more information. [ bp: No need to memset "req" - it will get overwritten. ] Signed-off-by:
Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-45-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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Brijesh Singh authored
The SEV-SNP specification provides the guest a mechanism to communicate with the PSP without risk from a malicious hypervisor who wishes to read, alter, drop or replay the messages sent. The driver uses snp_issue_guest_request() to issue GHCB SNP_GUEST_REQUEST or SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST NAE events to submit the request to PSP. The PSP requires that all communication should be encrypted using key specified through a struct snp_guest_platform_data descriptor. Userspace can use SNP_GET_REPORT ioctl() to query the guest attestation report. See SEV-SNP spec section Guest Messages for more details. [ bp: Remove the "what" from the commit message, massage. ] Signed-off-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
Version 2 of the GHCB specification provides a Non Automatic Exit (NAE) event type that can be used by the SEV-SNP guest to communicate with the PSP without risk from a malicious hypervisor who wishes to read, alter, drop or replay the messages sent. SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE can insert two special pages into the guest’s memory: the secrets page and the CPUID page. The PSP firmware populates the contents of the secrets page. The secrets page contains encryption keys used by the guest to interact with the firmware. Because the secrets page is encrypted with the guest’s memory encryption key, the hypervisor cannot read the keys. See SEV-SNP firmware spec for further details on the secrets page format. Create a platform device that the SEV-SNP guest driver can bind to get the platform resources such as encryption key and message id to use to communicate with the PSP. The SEV-SNP guest driver provides a userspace interface to get the attestation report, key derivation, extended attestation report etc. Signed-off-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
Version 2 of GHCB specification provides SNP_GUEST_REQUEST and SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST NAE that can be used by the SNP guest to communicate with the PSP. While at it, add a snp_issue_guest_request() helper that will be used by driver or other subsystem to issue the request to PSP. See SEV-SNP firmware and GHCB spec for more details. Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
For debugging purposes it is very useful to have a way to see the full contents of the SNP CPUID table provided to a guest. Add an sev=debug kernel command-line option to do so. Also introduce some infrastructure so that additional options can be specified via sev=option1[,option2] over time in a consistent manner. [ bp: Massage, simplify string parsing. ] Suggested-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
SEV-SNP guests will be provided the location of special 'secrets' and 'CPUID' pages via the Confidential Computing blob. This blob is provided to the run-time kernel either through a boot_params field that was initialized by the boot/compressed kernel, or via a setup_data structure as defined by the Linux Boot Protocol. Locate the Confidential Computing blob from these sources and, if found, use the provided CPUID page/table address to create a copy that the run-time kernel will use when servicing CPUID instructions via a #VC handler. Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
Initial/preliminary detection of SEV-SNP is done via the Confidential Computing blob. Check for it prior to the normal SEV/SME feature initialization, and add some sanity checks to confirm it agrees with SEV-SNP CPUID/MSR bits. Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
The run-time kernel will need to access the Confidential Computing blob very early during boot to access the CPUID table it points to. At that stage, it will be relying on the identity-mapped page table set up by the boot/compressed kernel, so make sure the blob and the CPUID table it points to are mapped in advance. [ bp: Massage. ] Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
SEV-specific code will need to add some additional mappings, but doing this within ident_map_64.c requires some SEV-specific helpers to be exported and some SEV-specific struct definitions to be pulled into ident_map_64.c. Instead, export add_identity_map() so SEV-specific (and other subsystem-specific) code can be better contained outside of ident_map_64.c. While at it, rename the function to kernel_add_identity_map(), similar to the kernel_ident_mapping_init() function it relies upon. No functional changes. Suggested-by:
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Michael Roth authored
SEV-SNP guests will be provided the location of special 'secrets' 'CPUID' pages via the Confidential Computing blob. This blob is provided to the boot kernel either through an EFI config table entry, or via a setup_data structure as defined by the Linux Boot Protocol. Locate the Confidential Computing from these sources and, if found, use the provided CPUID page/table address to create a copy that the boot kernel will use when servicing CPUID instructions via a #VC CPUID handler. [ bp: s/cpuid/CPUID/ ] Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
Initial/preliminary detection of SEV-SNP is done via the Confidential Computing blob. Check for it prior to the normal SEV/SME feature initialization, and add some sanity checks to confirm it agrees with SEV-SNP CPUID/MSR bits. Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
The previously defined Confidential Computing blob is provided to the kernel via a setup_data structure or EFI config table entry. Currently, these are both checked for by boot/compressed kernel to access the CPUID table address within it for use with SEV-SNP CPUID enforcement. To also enable that enforcement for the run-time kernel, similar access to the CPUID table is needed early on while it's still using the identity-mapped page table set up by boot/compressed, where global pointers need to be accessed via fixup_pointer(). This isn't much of an issue for accessing setup_data, and the EFI config table helper code currently used in boot/compressed *could* be used in this case as well since they both rely on identity-mapping. However, it has some reliance on EFI helpers/string constants that would need to be accessed via fixup_pointer(), and fixing it up while making it shareable between boot/compressed and run-time kernel is fragile and introduces a good bit of ugliness. Instead, add a boot_params->cc_blob_address pointer that the boot/compressed kernel can initialize so that the run-time kernel can access the CC blob from there instead of re-scanning the EFI config table. Also document these in Documentation/x86/zero-page.rst. While there, add missing documentation for the acpi_rsdp_addr field, which serves a similar purpose in providing the run-time kernel a pointer to the ACPI RSDP table so that it does not need to [re-]scan the EFI configuration table. [ bp: Fix typos, massage commit message. ] Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
CPUID instructions generate a #VC exception for SEV-ES/SEV-SNP guests, for which early handlers are currently set up to handle. In the case of SEV-SNP, guests can use a configurable location in guest memory that has been pre-populated with a firmware-validated CPUID table to look up the relevant CPUID values rather than requesting them from hypervisor via a VMGEXIT. Add the various hooks in the #VC handlers to allow CPUID instructions to be handled via the table. The code to actually configure/enable the table will be added in a subsequent commit. Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
This code will also be used later for SEV-SNP-validated CPUID code in some cases, so move it to a common helper. While here, also add a check to terminate in cases where the CPUID function/subfunction is indexed and the subfunction is non-zero, since the GHCB MSR protocol does not support non-zero subfunctions. Suggested-by:
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
Determining which CPUID leafs have significant ECX/index values is also needed by guest kernel code when doing SEV-SNP-validated CPUID lookups. Move this to common code to keep future updates in sync. Signed-off-by:
Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-31-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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Brijesh Singh authored
While launching encrypted guests, the hypervisor may need to provide some additional information during the guest boot. When booting under an EFI-based BIOS, the EFI configuration table contains an entry for the confidential computing blob that contains the required information. To support booting encrypted guests on non-EFI VMs, the hypervisor needs to pass this additional information to the guest kernel using a different method. For this purpose, introduce SETUP_CC_BLOB type in setup_data to hold the physical address of the confidential computing blob location. The boot loader or hypervisor may choose to use this method instead of an EFI configuration table. The CC blob location scanning should give preference to a setup_data blob over an EFI configuration table. In AMD SEV-SNP, the CC blob contains the address of the secrets and CPUID pages. The secrets page includes information such as a VM to PSP communication key and the CPUID page contains PSP-filtered CPUID values. Define the AMD SEV confidential computing blob structure. While at it, define the EFI GUID for the confidential computing blob. [ bp: Massage commit message, mark struct __packed. ] Signed-off-by:
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-30-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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- 06 Apr, 2022 8 commits
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Michael Roth authored
Future patches for SEV-SNP-validated CPUID will also require early parsing of the EFI configuration. Incrementally move the related code into a set of helpers that can be re-used for that purpose. In this instance, the current acpi.c kexec handling is mainly used to get the alternative EFI config table address provided by kexec via a setup_data entry of type SETUP_EFI. If not present, the code then falls back to normal EFI config table address provided by EFI system table. This would need to be done by all call-sites attempting to access the EFI config table, so just have efi_get_conf_table() handle that automatically. Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
Future patches for SEV-SNP-validated CPUID will also require early parsing of the EFI configuration. Incrementally move the related code into a set of helpers that can be re-used for that purpose. [ bp: Unbreak unnecessarily broken lines. ] Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
Future patches for SEV-SNP-validated CPUID will also require early parsing of the EFI configuration. Incrementally move the related code into a set of helpers that can be re-used for that purpose. [ bp: Remove superfluous zeroing of a stack variable. ] Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
Future patches for SEV-SNP-validated CPUID will also require early parsing of the EFI configuration. Incrementally move the related code into a set of helpers that can be re-used for that purpose. Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
Future patches for SEV-SNP-validated CPUID will also require early parsing of the EFI configuration. Incrementally move the related code into a set of helpers that can be re-used for that purpose. First, carve out the functionality which determines the EFI environment type the machine is booting on. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
Due to 103a4908 ("x86/head/64: Disable stack protection for head$(BITS).o") kernel/head{32,64}.c are compiled with -fno-stack-protector to allow a call to set_bringup_idt_handler(), which would otherwise have stack protection enabled with CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG. While sufficient for that case, there may still be issues with calls to any external functions that were compiled with stack protection enabled that in-turn make stack-protected calls, or if the exception handlers set up by set_bringup_idt_handler() make calls to stack-protected functions. Subsequent patches for SEV-SNP CPUID validation support will introduce both such cases. Attempting to disable stack protection for everything in scope to address that is prohibitive since much of the code, like the SEV-ES #VC handler, is shared code that remains in use after boot and could benefit from having stack protection enabled. Attempting to inline calls is brittle and can quickly balloon out to library/helper code where that's not really an option. Instead, re-enable stack protection for head32.c/head64.c, and make the appropriate changes to ensure the segment used for the stack canary is initialized in advance of any stack-protected C calls. For head64.c: - The BSP will enter from startup_64() and call into C code (startup_64_setup_env()) shortly after setting up the stack, which may result in calls to stack-protected code. Set up %gs early to allow for this safely. - APs will enter from secondary_startup_64*(), and %gs will be set up soon after. There is one call to C code prior to %gs being setup (__startup_secondary_64()), but it is only to fetch 'sme_me_mask' global, so just load 'sme_me_mask' directly instead, and remove the now-unused __startup_secondary_64() function. For head32.c: - BSPs/APs will set %fs to __BOOT_DS prior to any C calls. In recent kernels, the compiler is configured to access the stack canary at %fs:__stack_chk_guard [1], which overlaps with the initial per-cpu '__stack_chk_guard' variable in the initial/"master" .data..percpu area. This is sufficient to allow access to the canary for use during initial startup, so no changes are needed there. [1] 3fb0fdb3 ("x86/stackprotector/32: Make the canary into a regular percpu variable") [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Suggested-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> #for 64-bit %gs set up Signed-off-by:
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Tom Lendacky authored
To provide a more secure way to start APs under SEV-SNP, use the SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event. This allows for guest control over the AP register state rather than trusting the hypervisor with the SEV-ES Jump Table address. During native_smp_prepare_cpus(), invoke an SEV-SNP function that, if SEV-SNP is active, will set/override apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu. This will allow the SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event method to be used to boot the APs. As a result of installing the override when SEV-SNP is active, this method of starting the APs becomes the required method. The override function will fail to start the AP if the hypervisor does not have support for AP creation. [ bp: Work in forgotten review comments. ] Signed-off-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
Add the needed functionality to change pages state from shared to private and vice-versa using the Page State Change VMGEXIT as documented in the GHCB spec. Signed-off-by:
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