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  1. 26 Oct, 2015 10 commits
    • John Stultz's avatar
      time: Fix timekeeping_freqadjust()'s incorrect use of abs() instead of abs64() · cfd504fe
      John Stultz authored 
      commit 2619d7e9 upstream.

The internal clocksteering done for fine-grained error
correction uses a logarithmic approximation, so any time
adjtimex() adjusts the clock steering, timekeeping_freqadjust()
quickly approximates the correct clock frequency over a series
of ticks.

Unfortunately, the logic in timekeeping_freqadjust(), introduced
in commit:

  dc491596 ("timekeeping: Rework frequency adjustments to work better w/ nohz")

used the abs() function with a s64 error value to calculate the
size of the approximated adjustment to be made.

Per include/linux/kernel.h:

  "abs() should not be used for 64-bit types (s64, u64, long long) - use abs64()".

Thus on 32-bit platforms, this resulted in the clocksteering to
take a quite dampended random walk trying to converge on the
proper frequency, which caused the adjustments to be made much
slower then intended (most easily observed when large
adjustments are made).

This patch fixes the issue by using abs64() instead.
Reported-by: default avatarNuno Gonçalves <nunojpg@gmail.com>
Tested-by: default avatarNuno Goncalves <nunojpg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJohn Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Miroslav Lichvar <mlichvar@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1441840051-20244-1-git-send-email-john.stultz@linaro.orgSigned-off-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      cfd504fe
    • Guenter Roeck's avatar
      hwmon: (nct6775) Swap STEP_UP_TIME and STEP_DOWN_TIME registers for most chips · 6f789ac4
      Guenter Roeck authored 
      commit 728d2940 upstream.

The STEP_UP_TIME and STEP_DOWN_TIME registers are swapped for all chips but
NCT6775.
Reported-by: default avatarGrazvydas Ignotas <notasas@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGuenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      6f789ac4
    • Jann Horn's avatar
      CIFS: fix type confusion in copy offload ioctl · d575294a
      Jann Horn authored 
      commit 4c17a6d5 upstream.

This might lead to local privilege escalation (code execution as
kernel) for systems where the following conditions are met:

 - CONFIG_CIFS_SMB2 and CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX are enabled
 - a cifs filesystem is mounted where:
  - the mount option "vers" was used and set to a value >=2.0
  - the attacker has write access to at least one file on the filesystem

To attack this, an attacker would have to guess the target_tcon
pointer (but guessing wrong doesn't cause a crash, it just returns an
error code) and win a narrow race.
Signed-off-by: default avatarJann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarSteve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      d575294a
    • Paul Mackerras's avatar
      powerpc/MSI: Fix race condition in tearing down MSI interrupts · 2ce99cd2
      Paul Mackerras authored 
      commit e297c939 upstream.

This fixes a race which can result in the same virtual IRQ number
being assigned to two different MSI interrupts.  The most visible
consequence of that is usually a warning and stack trace from the
sysfs code about an attempt to create a duplicate entry in sysfs.

The race happens when one CPU (say CPU 0) is disposing of an MSI
while another CPU (say CPU 1) is setting up an MSI.  CPU 0 calls
(for example) pnv_teardown_msi_irqs(), which calls
msi_bitmap_free_hwirqs() to indicate that the MSI (i.e. its
hardware IRQ number) is no longer in use.  Then, before CPU 0 gets
to calling irq_dispose_mapping() to free up the virtal IRQ number,
CPU 1 comes in and calls msi_bitmap_alloc_hwirqs() to allocate an
MSI, and gets the same hardware IRQ number that CPU 0 just freed.
CPU 1 then calls irq_create_mapping() to get a virtual IRQ number,
which sees that there is currently a mapping for that hardware IRQ
number and returns the corresponding virtual IRQ number (which is
the same virtual IRQ number that CPU 0 was using).  CPU 0 then
calls irq_dispose_mapping() and frees that virtual IRQ number.
Now, if another CPU comes along and calls irq_create_mapping(), it
is likely to get the virtual IRQ number that was just freed,
resulting in the same virtual IRQ number apparently being used for
two different hardware interrupts.

To fix this race, we just move the call to msi_bitmap_free_hwirqs()
to after the call to irq_dispose_mapping().  Since virq_to_hw()
doesn't work for the virtual IRQ number after irq_dispose_mapping()
has been called, we need to call it before irq_dispose_mapping() and
remember the result for the msi_bitmap_free_hwirqs() call.

The pattern of calling msi_bitmap_free_hwirqs() before
irq_dispose_mapping() appears in 5 places under arch/powerpc, and
appears to have originated in commit 05af7bd2 ("[POWERPC] MPIC
U3/U4 MSI backend") from 2007.

Fixes: 05af7bd2 ("[POWERPC] MPIC U3/U4 MSI backend")
Reported-by: default avatarAlexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
[ kamal: backport to 3.19-stable: pasemi/msi.c -->
  arch/powerpc/sysdev/mpic_pasemi_msi.c ]
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      2ce99cd2
    • Ard Biesheuvel's avatar
      ARM: 8429/1: disable GCC SRA optimization · 6d81ea7f
      Ard Biesheuvel authored 
      commit a077224f upstream.

While working on the 32-bit ARM port of UEFI, I noticed a strange
corruption in the kernel log. The following snprintf() statement
(in drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c:efi_md_typeattr_format())

	snprintf(pos, size, "|%3s|%2s|%2s|%2s|%3s|%2s|%2s|%2s|%2s]",

was producing the following output in the log:

	|    |   |   |   |    |WB|WT|WC|UC]
	|    |   |   |   |    |WB|WT|WC|UC]
	|    |   |   |   |    |WB|WT|WC|UC]
	|RUN|   |   |   |    |WB|WT|WC|UC]*
	|RUN|   |   |   |    |WB|WT|WC|UC]*
	|    |   |   |   |    |WB|WT|WC|UC]
	|RUN|   |   |   |    |WB|WT|WC|UC]*
	|    |   |   |   |    |WB|WT|WC|UC]
	|RUN|   |   |   |    |   |   |   |UC]
	|RUN|   |   |   |    |   |   |   |UC]

As it turns out, this is caused by incorrect code being emitted for
the string() function in lib/vsprintf.c. The following code

	if (!(spec.flags & LEFT)) {
		while (len < spec.field_width--) {
			if (buf < end)
				*buf = ' ';
			++buf;
		}
	}
	for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
		if (buf < end)
			*buf = *s;
		++buf; ++s;
	}
	while (len < spec.field_width--) {
		if (buf < end)
			*buf = ' ';
		++buf;
	}

when called with len == 0, triggers an issue in the GCC SRA optimization
pass (Scalar Replacement of Aggregates), which handles promotion of signed
struct members incorrectly. This is a known but as yet unresolved issue.
(https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=65932). In this particular
case, it is causing the second while loop to be executed erroneously a
single time, causing the additional space characters to be printed.

So disable the optimization by passing -fno-ipa-sra.
Acked-by: default avatarNicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarRussell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      6d81ea7f
    • Guenter Roeck's avatar
      spi: Fix documentation of spi_alloc_master() · 70761657
      Guenter Roeck authored 
      commit a394d635 upstream.

Actually, spi_master_put() after spi_alloc_master() must _not_ be followed
by kfree(). The memory is already freed with the call to spi_master_put()
through spi_master_class, which registers a release function. Calling both
spi_master_put() and kfree() results in often nasty (and delayed) crashes
elsewhere in the kernel, often in the networking stack.

This reverts commit eb4af0f5.

Link to patch and concerns: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/3/269
or
http://lkml.iu.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1209.0/00790.html

Alexey Klimov: This revert becomes valid after
94c69f76 when spi-imx.c
has been fixed and there is no need to call kfree() so comment
for spi_alloc_master() should be fixed.
Signed-off-by: default avatarGuenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexey Klimov <alexey.klimov@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      70761657
    • Tan, Jui Nee's avatar
      spi: spi-pxa2xx: Check status register to determine if SSSR_TINT is disabled · 88f143b3
      Tan, Jui Nee authored 
      commit 02bc933e upstream.

On Intel Baytrail, there is case when interrupt handler get called, no SPI
message is captured. The RX FIFO is indeed empty when RX timeout pending
interrupt (SSSR_TINT) happens.

Use the BIOS version where both HSUART and SPI are on the same IRQ. Both
drivers are using IRQF_SHARED when calling the request_irq function. When
running two separate and independent SPI and HSUART application that
generate data traffic on both components, user will see messages like
below on the console:

  pxa2xx-spi pxa2xx-spi.0: bad message state in interrupt handler

This commit will fix this by first checking Receiver Time-out Interrupt,
if it is disabled, ignore the request and return without servicing.
Signed-off-by: default avatarTan, Jui Nee <jui.nee.tan@intel.com>
Acked-by: default avatarJarkko Nikula <jarkko.nikula@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      88f143b3
    • David Howells's avatar
      KEYS: Don't permit request_key() to construct a new keyring · cf9f252f
      David Howells authored 
      commit 911b79cd upstream.

If request_key() is used to find a keyring, only do the search part - don't
do the construction part if the keyring was not found by the search.  We
don't really want keyrings in the negative instantiated state since the
rejected/negative instantiation error value in the payload is unioned with
keyring metadata.

Now the kernel gives an error:

	request_key("keyring", "#selinux,bdekeyring", "keyring", KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      cf9f252f
    • David Howells's avatar
      KEYS: Fix crash when attempt to garbage collect an uninstantiated keyring · b67c9e4a
      David Howells authored 
      commit f05819df upstream.

The following sequence of commands:

    i=`keyctl add user a a @s`
    keyctl request2 keyring foo bar @t
    keyctl unlink $i @s

tries to invoke an upcall to instantiate a keyring if one doesn't already
exist by that name within the user's keyring set.  However, if the upcall
fails, the code sets keyring->type_data.reject_error to -ENOKEY or some
other error code.  When the key is garbage collected, the key destroy
function is called unconditionally and keyring_destroy() uses list_empty()
on keyring->type_data.link - which is in a union with reject_error.
Subsequently, the kernel tries to unlink the keyring from the keyring names
list - which oopses like this:

	BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
	IP: [<ffffffff8126e051>] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88
	...
	Workqueue: events key_garbage_collector
	...
	RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8126e051>] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88
	RSP: 0018:ffff88003e2f3d30  EFLAGS: 00010203
	RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: ffff88003bf1a900 RCX: 0000000000000000
	RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000003bfc6901 RDI: ffffffff81a73a40
	RBP: ffff88003e2f3d38 R08: 0000000000000152 R09: 0000000000000000
	R10: ffff88003e2f3c18 R11: 000000000000865b R12: ffff88003bf1a900
	R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88003bf1a908 R15: ffff88003e2f4000
	...
	CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000003e3ec000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
	...
	Call Trace:
	 [<ffffffff8126c756>] key_gc_unused_keys.constprop.1+0x5d/0x10f
	 [<ffffffff8126ca71>] key_garbage_collector+0x1fa/0x351
	 [<ffffffff8105ec9b>] process_one_work+0x28e/0x547
	 [<ffffffff8105fd17>] worker_thread+0x26e/0x361
	 [<ffffffff8105faa9>] ? rescuer_thread+0x2a8/0x2a8
	 [<ffffffff810648ad>] kthread+0xf3/0xfb
	 [<ffffffff810647ba>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2
	 [<ffffffff815f2ccf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
	 [<ffffffff810647ba>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2

Note the value in RAX.  This is a 32-bit representation of -ENOKEY.

The solution is to only call ->destroy() if the key was successfully
instantiated.
Reported-by: default avatarDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: default avatarDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      b67c9e4a
    • David Howells's avatar
      KEYS: Fix race between key destruction and finding a keyring by name · 423661a2
      David Howells authored 
      commit 94c4554b upstream.

There appears to be a race between:

 (1) key_gc_unused_keys() which frees key->security and then calls
     keyring_destroy() to unlink the name from the name list

 (2) find_keyring_by_name() which calls key_permission(), thus accessing
     key->security, on a key before checking to see whether the key usage is 0
     (ie. the key is dead and might be cleaned up).

Fix this by calling ->destroy() before cleaning up the core key data -
including key->security.
Reported-by: default avatarPetr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      423661a2
  3. 23 Oct, 2015 2 commits
  5. 21 Oct, 2015 1 commit
    • Jann Horn's avatar
      fs: if a coredump already exists, unlink and recreate with O_EXCL · abcd0a01
      Jann Horn authored 
      commit fbb18169 upstream.

It was possible for an attacking user to trick root (or another user) into
writing his coredumps into an attacker-readable, pre-existing file using
rename() or link(), causing the disclosure of secret data from the victim
process' virtual memory.  Depending on the configuration, it was also
possible to trick root into overwriting system files with coredumps.  Fix
that issue by never writing coredumps into existing files.

Requirements for the attack:
 - The attack only applies if the victim's process has a nonzero
   RLIMIT_CORE and is dumpable.
 - The attacker can trick the victim into coredumping into an
   attacker-writable directory D, either because the core_pattern is
   relative and the victim's cwd is attacker-writable or because an
   absolute core_pattern pointing to a world-writable directory is used.
 - The attacker has one of these:
  A: on a system with protected_hardlinks=0:
     execute access to a folder containing a victim-owned,
     attacker-readable file on the same partition as D, and the
     victim-owned file will be deleted before the main part of the attack
     takes place. (In practice, there are lots of files that fulfill
     this condition, e.g. entries in Debian's /var/lib/dpkg/info/.)
     This does not apply to most Linux systems because most distros set
     protected_hardlinks=1.
  B: on a system with protected_hardlinks=1:
     execute access to a folder containing a victim-owned,
     attacker-readable and attacker-writable file on the same partition
     as D, and the victim-owned file will be deleted before the main part
     of the attack takes place.
     (This seems to be uncommon.)
  C: on any system, independent of protected_hardlinks:
     write access to a non-sticky folder containing a victim-owned,
     attacker-readable file on the same partition as D
     (This seems to be uncommon.)

The basic idea is that the attacker moves the victim-owned file to where
he expects the victim process to dump its core.  The victim process dumps
its core into the existing file, and the attacker reads the coredump from
it.

If the attacker can't move the file because he does not have write access
to the containing directory, he can instead link the file to a directory
he controls, then wait for the original link to the file to be deleted
(because the kernel checks that the link count of the corefile is 1).

A less reliable variant that requires D to be non-sticky works with link()
and does not require deletion of the original link: link() the file into
D, but then unlink() it directly before the kernel performs the link count
check.

On systems with protected_hardlinks=0, this variant allows an attacker to
not only gain information from coredumps, but also clobber existing,
victim-writable files with coredumps.  (This could theoretically lead to a
privilege escalation.)
Signed-off-by: default avatarJann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
      abcd0a01
  7. 20 Oct, 2015 27 commits
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