- 12 Jan, 2020 26 commits
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Stefan Wahren authored
[ Upstream commit 30e647a7 ] During definition of the CPU thermal zone of BCM283x SoC family there was a misunderstanding of the meaning "criticial trip point" and the thermal throttling range of the VideoCore firmware. The latter one takes effect when the core temperature is at least 85 degree celsius or higher So the current critical trip point doesn't make sense, because the thermal shutdown appears before the firmware has a chance to throttle the ARM core(s). Fix these unwanted shutdowns by increasing the critical trip point to a value which shouldn't be reached with working thermal throttling. Fixes: 0fe4d218 ("ARM: dts: bcm283x: Add CPU thermal zone with 1 trip point") Signed-off-by:
Stefan Wahren <wahrenst@gmx.net> Signed-off-by:
Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Dragos Tarcatu authored
[ Upstream commit a3039aef ] The return value of soc_tplg_pcm_create() is currently not checked in soc_tplg_pcm_elems_load(). If an error is to occur there, the topology ignores it and continues loading. Fix that by checking the status and rejecting the topology on error. Reviewed-by:
Ranjani Sridharan <ranjani.sridharan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Dragos Tarcatu <dragos_tarcatu@mentor.com> Signed-off-by:
Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191210003939.15752-3-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by:
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Chuhong Yuan authored
[ Upstream commit a841e285 ] The driver forgets to call pci_release_regions() in probe failure and remove. Add the missed calls to fix it. Signed-off-by:
Chuhong Yuan <hslester96@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191206075500.18525-1-hslester96@gmail.comSigned-off-by:
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Florian Fainelli authored
[ Upstream commit fac2c2da ] The MDIO node on Cygnus had an reversed #address-cells and #size-cells properties, correct those. Fixes: 40c26d3a ("ARM: dts: Cygnus: Add the ethernet switch and ethernet PHY") Reported-by:
Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Reviewed-by:
Ray Jui <ray.jui@broadcom.com> Reviewed-by:
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Masami Hiramatsu authored
[ Upstream commit 5cc6c8d4 ] Fix multiple kprobe event testcase to work it correctly. There are 2 bugfixes. - Since `wc -l FILE` returns not only line number but also FILE filename, following "if" statement always failed. Fix this bug by replacing it with 'cat FILE | wc -l' - Since "while do-done loop" block with pipeline becomes a subshell, $N local variable is not update outside of the loop. Fix this bug by using actual target number (256) instead of $N. Signed-off-by:
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Reviewed-by:
Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by:
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Florian Fainelli authored
[ Upstream commit 093c3f94 ] The MDIO node on BCM5301X had an reversed #address-cells and #size-cells properties, correct those, silencing checker warnings: .../linux/arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm4708-asus-rt-ac56u.dt.yaml: mdio@18003000: #address-cells:0:0: 1 was expected Reported-by:
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Pablo Neira Ayuso authored
[ Upstream commit 0d2c96af ] Userspace might bogusly sent NFT_DATA_VERDICT in several netlink attributes that assume NFT_DATA_VALUE. Moreover, make sure that error path invokes nft_data_release() to decrement the reference count on the chain object. Fixes: 96518518 ("netfilter: add nftables") Fixes: 0f3cd9b3 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add range expression") Signed-off-by:
Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by:
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Pablo Neira Ayuso authored
[ Upstream commit bffc124b ] Only NFTA_SET_ELEM_KEY and NFTA_SET_ELEM_FLAGS make sense for elements whose NFT_SET_ELEM_INTERVAL_END flag is set on. Fixes: 96518518 ("netfilter: add nftables") Signed-off-by:
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Pablo Neira Ayuso authored
[ Upstream commit db3b665d ] The existing rbtree implementation might store consecutive elements where the closing element and the opening element might overlap, eg. [ a, a+1) [ a+1, a+2) This patch removes the optimization for non-anonymous sets in the exact matching case, where it is assumed to stop searching in case that the closing element is found. Instead, invalidate candidate interval and keep looking further in the tree. The lookup/get operation might return false, while there is an element in the rbtree. Moreover, the get operation returns true as if a+2 would be in the tree. This happens with named sets after several set updates. The existing lookup optimization (that only works for the anonymous sets) might not reach the opening [ a+1,... element if the closing ...,a+1) is found in first place when walking over the rbtree. Hence, walking the full tree in that case is needed. This patch fixes the lookup and get operations. Fixes: e701001e ("netfilter: nft_rbtree: allow adjacent intervals with dynamic updates") Fixes: ba0e4d99 ("netfilter: nf_tables: get set elements via netlink") Signed-off-by:
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Phil Sutter authored
[ Upstream commit 16416655 ] With 'bytes(__u32)' being 32, a left-shift of 31 may happen which is undefined for the signed 32-bit value 1. Avoid this by declaring 1 as unsigned. Signed-off-by:
Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc> Signed-off-by:
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Sudeep Holla authored
[ Upstream commit 2a76352a ] Currently we add individual copy of same OPP table for each CPU within the cluster. This is redundant and doesn't reflect the reality. We can't use core cpumask to set policy->cpus in ve_spc_cpufreq_init() anymore as it gets called via cpuhp_cpufreq_online()->cpufreq_online() ->cpufreq_driver->init() and the cpumask gets updated upon CPU hotplug operations. It also may cause issues when the vexpress_spc_cpufreq driver is built as a module. Since ve_spc_clk_init is built-in device initcall, we should be able to use the same topology_core_cpumask to set the opp sharing cpumask via dev_pm_opp_set_sharing_cpus and use the same later in the driver via dev_pm_opp_get_sharing_cpus. Cc: Liviu Dudau <liviu.dudau@arm.com> Cc: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com> Acked-by:
Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> Tested-by:
Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Stefan Roese authored
[ Upstream commit 0aeb1f2b ] Without this "jedec,spi-nor" compatible property, probing of the SPI NOR does not work on the NXP i.MX6ULL EVK. Fix this by adding this compatible property to the DT. Fixes: 7d77b850 ("ARM: dts: imx6ull: fix the imx6ull-14x14-evk configuration") Signed-off-by:
Stefan Roese <sr@denx.de> Reviewed-by:
Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Frieder Schrempf <frieder.schrempf@kontron.de> Signed-off-by:
Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Arvind Sankar authored
[ Upstream commit ff397be6 ] efi_graphics_output_protocol::query_mode() returns info in callee-allocated memory which must be freed by the caller, which we aren't doing. We don't actually need to call query_mode() in order to obtain the info for the current graphics mode, which is already there in gop->mode->info, so just access it directly in the setup_gop32/64() functions. Also nothing uses the size of the info structure, so don't update the passed-in size (which is the size of the gop_handle table in bytes) unnecessarily. Signed-off-by:
Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu> Signed-off-by:
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com> Cc: Masayoshi Mizuma <m.mizuma@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191206165542.31469-5-ardb@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Arvind Sankar authored
[ Upstream commit dbd89c30 ] If we've found a usable instance of the Graphics Output Protocol (GOP) with a framebuffer, it is possible that one of the later EFI calls fails while checking if any support console output. In this case status may be an EFI error code even though we found a usable GOP. Fix this by explicitly return EFI_SUCCESS if a usable GOP has been located. Signed-off-by:
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Arvind Sankar authored
[ Upstream commit 6fc3cec3 ] If we don't find a usable instance of the Graphics Output Protocol (GOP) because none of them have a framebuffer (i.e. they were all PIXEL_BLT_ONLY), but all the EFI calls succeeded, we will return EFI_SUCCESS even though we didn't find a usable GOP. Fix this by explicitly returning EFI_NOT_FOUND if no usable GOPs are found, allowing the caller to probe for UGA instead. Signed-off-by:
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Hans de Goede authored
[ Upstream commit 7eccc05c ] When the Teclast X89 quirk was added we did not have jack-detection support yet. Note the over-current detection limit is set to 2mA instead of the usual 1.5mA because this tablet tends to give false-positive button-presses when it is set to 1.5mA. Signed-off-by:
Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Acked-by:
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Dave Young authored
[ Upstream commit af164898 ] Michael Weiser reported that he got this error during a kexec rebooting: esrt: Unsupported ESRT version 2904149718861218184. The ESRT memory stays in EFI boot services data, and it was reserved in kernel via efi_mem_reserve(). The initial purpose of the reservation is to reuse the EFI boot services data across kexec reboot. For example the BGRT image data and some ESRT memory like Michael reported. But although the memory is reserved it is not updated in the X86 E820 table, and kexec_file_load() iterates system RAM in the IO resource list to find places for kernel, initramfs and other stuff. In Michael's case the kexec loaded initramfs overwrote the ESRT memory and then the failure happened. Since kexec_file_load() depends on the E820 table being updated, just fix this by updating the reserved EFI boot services memory as reserved type in E820. Originally any memory descriptors with EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME attribute are bypassed in the reservation code path because they are assumed as reserved. But the reservation is still needed for multiple kexec reboots, and it is the only possible case we come here thus just drop the code chunk, then everything works without side effects. On my machine the ESRT memory sits in an EFI runtime data range, it does not trigger the problem, but I successfully tested with BGRT instead. both kexec_load() and kexec_file_load() work and kdump works as well. [ mingo: Edited the changelog. ] Reported-by:
Michael Weiser <michael@weiser.dinsnail.net> Tested-by:
Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191204075233.GA10520@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.comSigned-off-by:
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Sudip Mukherjee authored
[ Upstream commit 587db8eb ] When we use 'O=' with make to build libtraceevent in a separate folder it fails to install libtraceevent.a and libtraceevent.so.1.1.0 with the error: INSTALL /home/sudip/linux/obj-trace/libtraceevent.a INSTALL /home/sudip/linux/obj-trace/libtraceevent.so.1.1.0 cp: cannot stat 'libtraceevent.a': No such file or directory Makefile:225: recipe for target 'install_lib' failed make: *** [install_lib] Error 1 I used the command: make O=../../../obj-trace DESTDIR=~/test prefix==/usr install It turns out libtraceevent Makefile, even though it builds in a separate folder, searches for libtraceevent.a and libtraceevent.so.1.1.0 in its source folder. So, add the 'OUTPUT' prefix to the source path so that 'make' looks for the files in the correct place. Signed-off-by:
Sudipm Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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qize wang authored
[ Upstream commit 1e58252e ] mwifiex_process_tdls_action_frame() without checking the incoming tdls infomation element's vality before use it, this may cause multi heap buffer overflows. Fix them by putting vality check before use it. IE is TLV struct, but ht_cap and ht_oper aren’t TLV struct. the origin marvell driver code is wrong: memcpy(&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.ht_oper, pos,.... memcpy((u8 *)&sta_ptr->tdls_cap.ht_capb, pos,... Fix the bug by changing pos(the address of IE) to pos+2 ( the address of IE value ). Signed-off-by:
qize wang <wangqize888888888@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
[ Upstream commit 18a110b0 ] Curtis Taylor and Jon Maxwell reported and debugged a crash on 3.10 based kernel. Crash occurs in ctnetlink_conntrack_events because net->nfnl socket is NULL. The nfnl socket was set to NULL by netns destruction running on another cpu. The exiting network namespace calls the relevant destructors in the following order: 1. ctnetlink_net_exit_batch This nulls out the event callback pointer in struct netns. 2. nfnetlink_net_exit_batch This nulls net->nfnl socket and frees it. 3. nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list This removes all remaining conntrack entries. This is order is correct. The only explanation for the crash so ar is: cpu1: conntrack is dying, eviction occurs: -> nf_ct_delete() -> nf_conntrack_event_report \ -> nf_conntrack_eventmask_report -> notify->fcn() (== ctnetlink_conntrack_events). cpu1: a. fetches rcu protected pointer to obtain ctnetlink event callback. b. gets interrupted. cpu2: runs netns exit handlers: a runs ctnetlink destructor, event cb pointer set to NULL. b runs nfnetlink destructor, nfnl socket is closed and set to NULL. cpu1: c. resumes and trips over NULL net->nfnl. Problem appears to be that ctnetlink_net_exit_batch only prevents future callers of nf_conntrack_eventmask_report() from obtaining the callback. It doesn't wait of other cpus that might have already obtained the callbacks address. I don't see anything in upstream kernels that would prevent similar crash: We need to wait for all cpus to have exited the event callback. Fixes: 9592a5c0 ("netfilter: ctnetlink: netns support") Signed-off-by:
Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by:
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Marco Elver authored
[ Upstream commit 1a365e82 ] This fixes various data races in spinlock_debug. By testing with KCSAN, it is observable that the console gets spammed with data races reports, suggesting these are extremely frequent. Example data race report: read to 0xffff8ab24f403c48 of 4 bytes by task 221 on cpu 2: debug_spin_lock_before kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:85 [inline] do_raw_spin_lock+0x9b/0x210 kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:112 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:143 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x39/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] get_partial_node.isra.0.part.0+0x32/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:1873 get_partial_node mm/slub.c:1870 [inline] <snip> write to 0xffff8ab24f403c48 of 4 bytes by task 167 on cpu 3: debug_spin_unlock kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:103 [inline] do_raw_spin_unlock+0xc9/0x1a0 kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:138 __raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:159 [inline] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2d/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:191 spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock.h:393 [inline] free_debug_processing+0x1b3/0x210 mm/slub.c:1214 __slab_free+0x292/0x400 mm/slub.c:2864 <snip> As a side-effect, with KCSAN, this eventually locks up the console, most likely due to deadlock, e.g. .. -> printk lock -> spinlock_debug -> KCSAN detects data race -> kcsan_print_report() -> printk lock -> deadlock. This fix will 1) avoid the data races, and 2) allow using lock debugging together with KCSAN. Reported-by:
Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Signed-off-by:
Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191120155715.28089-1-elver@google.comSigned-off-by:
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Tzung-Bi Shih authored
[ Upstream commit 45dfbf56 ] max98090_interrupt() and max98090_pll_work() run in 2 different threads. There are 2 possible races: Note: M98090_REG_DEVICE_STATUS = 0x01. Note: ULK == 0, PLL is locked; ULK == 1, PLL is unlocked. max98090_interrupt max98090_pll_work ---------------------------------------------- schedule max98090_pll_work restart max98090 codec receive ULK INT assert ULK == 0 schedule max98090_pll_work (1). In the case (1), the PLL is locked but max98090_interrupt unnecessarily schedules another max98090_pll_work. max98090_interrupt max98090_pll_work max98090 codec ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ULK = 1 receive ULK INT read 0x01 ULK = 0 (clear on read) schedule max98090_pll_work restart max98090 codec ULK = 1 receive ULK INT read 0x01 ULK = 0 (clear on read) read 0x01 assert ULK == 0 (2). In the case (2), both max98090_interrupt and max98090_pll_work read the same clear-on-read register. max98090_pll_work would falsely thought PLL is locked. Note: the case (2) race is introduced by the previous commit ("ASoC: max98090: exit workaround earlier if PLL is locked") to check the status and exit the loop earlier in max98090_pll_work. There are 2 possible solution options: A. turn off ULK interrupt before scheduling max98090_pll_work; and turn on again before exiting max98090_pll_work. B. remove the second thread of execution. Option A cannot fix the case (2) race because it still has 2 threads access the same clear-on-read register simultaneously. Although we could suppose the register is volatile and read the status via I2C could be much slower than the hardware raises the bits. Option B introduces a maximum 10~12 msec penalty delay in the interrupt handler. However, it could only punish the jack detection by extra 10~12 msec. Adopts option B which is the better solution overall. Signed-off-by:
Tzung-Bi Shih <tzungbi@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191122073114.219945-4-tzungbi@google.comReviewed-by:
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Wen Yang authored
[ Upstream commit 4affd79a ] This is caused by dereferencing 'rdev' after put_device() in the _regulator_get()/_regulator_put() functions. This patch just moves the put_device() down a bit to avoid the issue. Signed-off-by:
Wen Yang <wenyang@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Liam Girdwood <lgirdwood@gmail.com> Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191124145835.25999-1-wenyang@linux.alibaba.comSigned-off-by:
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Daniel Borkmann authored
commit 6d4f151a upstream. Anatoly has been fuzzing with kBdysch harness and reported a KASAN slab oob in one of the outcomes: [...] [ 77.359642] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x71/0x130 [ 77.360463] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880679bac68 by task bpf/406 [ 77.361119] [ 77.361289] CPU: 2 PID: 406 Comm: bpf Not tainted 5.5.0-rc2-xfstests-00157-g2187f215 #1 [ 77.362134] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 77.362984] Call Trace: [ 77.363249] dump_stack+0x97/0xe0 [ 77.363603] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1d/0x220 [ 77.364251] ? bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x71/0x130 [ 77.365030] ? bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x71/0x130 [ 77.365860] __kasan_report.cold+0x37/0x7b [ 77.366365] ? bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x71/0x130 [ 77.366940] kasan_report+0xe/0x20 [ 77.367295] bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache+0x71/0x130 [ 77.367821] ? bpf_skb_load_helper_8+0xf0/0xf0 [ 77.368278] ? mark_lock+0xa3/0x9b0 [ 77.368641] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 77.369096] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 [ 77.369460] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x110 [ 77.369876] ? bpf_skb_load_helper_8+0xf0/0xf0 [ 77.370330] ___bpf_prog_run+0x16c0/0x28f0 [ 77.370755] __bpf_prog_run32+0x83/0xc0 [ 77.371153] ? __bpf_prog_run64+0xc0/0xc0 [ 77.371568] ? match_held_lock+0x1b/0x230 [ 77.371984] ? rcu_read_lock_held+0xa1/0xb0 [ 77.372416] ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x50 [ 77.372826] sk_filter_trim_cap+0x17c/0x4d0 [ 77.373259] ? sock_kzfree_s+0x40/0x40 [ 77.373648] ? __get_filter+0x150/0x150 [ 77.374059] ? skb_copy_datagram_from_iter+0x80/0x280 [ 77.374581] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa5/0x140 [ 77.375025] unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x33a/0xa70 [ 77.375459] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 77.375893] ? unix_peer_get+0xa0/0xa0 [ 77.376287] ? __fget_light+0xa4/0xf0 [ 77.376670] __sys_sendto+0x265/0x280 [ 77.377056] ? __ia32_sys_getpeername+0x50/0x50 [ 77.377523] ? lock_downgrade+0x350/0x350 [ 77.377940] ? __sys_setsockopt+0x2a6/0x2c0 [ 77.378374] ? sock_read_iter+0x240/0x240 [ 77.378789] ? __sys_socketpair+0x22a/0x300 [ 77.379221] ? __ia32_sys_socket+0x50/0x50 [ 77.379649] ? mark_held_locks+0x1d/0x90 [ 77.380059] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c [ 77.380536] __x64_sys_sendto+0x74/0x90 [ 77.380938] do_syscall_64+0x68/0x2a0 [ 77.381324] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 77.381878] RIP: 0033:0x44c070 [...] After further debugging, turns out while in case of other helper functions we disallow passing modified ctx, the special case of ld/abs/ind instruction which has similar semantics (except r6 being the ctx argument) is missing such check. Modified ctx is impossible here as bpf_skb_load_helper_8_no_cache() and others are expecting skb fields in original position, hence, add check_ctx_reg() to reject any modified ctx. Issue was first introduced back in f1174f77 ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking"). Fixes: f1174f77 ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking") Reported-by:
Anatoly Trosinenko <anatoly.trosinenko@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by:
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200106215157.3553-1-daniel@iogearbox.netSigned-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Andrey Konovalov authored
commit 8442b02b upstream. When fuzzing the USB subsystem with syzkaller, we currently use 8 testing processes within one VM. To isolate testing processes from one another it is desirable to assign a dedicated USB bus to each of those, which means we need at least 8 Dummy UDC/HCD devices. This patch increases the maximum number of Dummy UDC/HCD devices to 32 (more than 8 in case we need more of them in the future). Signed-off-by:
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/665578f904484069bb6100fb20283b22a046ad9b.1571667489.git.andreyknvl@google.comSigned-off-by:
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Andrey Konovalov authored
commit 6dabeb89 upstream. Commit fea34091 ("USB: add direction bit to urb->transfer_flags") has added a usb_urb_dir_in() helper function that can be used to determine the direction of the URB. With that patch USB_DIR_IN control requests with wLength == 0 are considered out requests by real USB HCDs. This patch changes dummy-hcd to use the usb_urb_dir_in() helper to match that behavior. Signed-off-by:
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- 09 Jan, 2020 14 commits
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
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Alexander Shishkin authored
[ Upstream commit ff61541c ] Commit 8062382c ("perf/x86/intel/bts: Add BTS PMU driver") brought in a warning with the BTS buffer initialization that is easily tripped with (assuming KPTI is disabled): instantly throwing: > ------------[ cut here ]------------ > WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 326 at arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c:86 bts_buffer_setup_aux+0x117/0x3d0 > Modules linked in: > CPU: 2 PID: 326 Comm: perf Not tainted 5.4.0-rc8-00291-gceb9e773 #904 > RIP: 0010:bts_buffer_setup_aux+0x117/0x3d0 > Call Trace: > rb_alloc_aux+0x339/0x550 > perf_mmap+0x607/0xc70 > mmap_region+0x76b/0xbd0 ... It appears to assume (for lost raisins) that PagePrivate() is set, while later it actually tests for PagePrivate() before using page_private(). Make it consistent and always check PagePrivate() before using page_private(). Fixes: 8062382c ("perf/x86/intel/bts: Add BTS PMU driver") Signed-off-by:
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191205142853.28894-2-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.comSigned-off-by:
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SeongJae Park authored
[ Upstream commit f9bd84a8 ] For each I/O request, blkback first maps the foreign pages for the request to its local pages. If an allocation of a local page for the mapping fails, it should unmap every mapping already made for the request. However, blkback's handling mechanism for the allocation failure does not mark the remaining foreign pages as unmapped. Therefore, the unmap function merely tries to unmap every valid grant page for the request, including the pages not mapped due to the allocation failure. On a system that fails the allocation frequently, this problem leads to following kernel crash. [ 372.012538] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001 [ 372.012546] IP: [<ffffffff814071ac>] gnttab_unmap_refs.part.7+0x1c/0x40 [ 372.012557] PGD 16f3e9067 PUD 16426e067 PMD 0 [ 372.012562] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP [ 372.012566] Modules linked in: act_police sch_ingress cls_u32 ... [ 372.012746] Call Trace: [ 372.012752] [<ffffffff81407204>] gnttab_unmap_refs+0x34/0x40 [ 372.012759] [<ffffffffa0335ae3>] xen_blkbk_unmap+0x83/0x150 [xen_blkback] ... [ 372.012802] [<ffffffffa0336c50>] dispatch_rw_block_io+0x970/0x980 [xen_blkback] ... Decompressing Linux... Parsing ELF... done. Booting the kernel. [ 0.000000] Initializing cgroup subsys cpuset This commit fixes this problem by marking the grant pages of the given request that didn't mapped due to the allocation failure as invalid. Fixes: c6cc142d ("xen-blkback: use balloon pages for all mappings") Reviewed-by:
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.de> Reviewed-by:
Maximilian Heyne <mheyne@amazon.de> Reviewed-by:
Paul Durrant <pdurrant@amazon.co.uk> Reviewed-by:
Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> Signed-off-by:
SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de> Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by:
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Heiko Carstens authored
[ Upstream commit 72a81ad9 ] If an SMT capable system is not IPL'ed from the first CPU the setup of the physical to logical CPU mapping is broken: the IPL core gets CPU number 0, but then the next core gets CPU number 1. Correct would be that all SMT threads of CPU 0 get the subsequent logical CPU numbers. This is important since a lot of code (like e.g. the CPU topology code) assumes that CPU maps are setup like this. If the mapping is broken the system will not IPL due to broken topology masks: [ 1.716341] BUG: arch topology broken [ 1.716342] the SMT domain not a subset of the MC domain [ 1.716343] BUG: arch topology broken [ 1.716344] the MC domain not a subset of the BOOK domain This scenario can usually not happen since LPARs are always IPL'ed from CPU 0 and also re-IPL is intiated from CPU 0. However older kernels did initiate re-IPL on an arbitrary CPU. If therefore a re-IPL from an old kernel into a new kernel is initiated this may lead to crash. Fix this by setting up the physical to logical CPU mapping correctly. Signed-off-by:
Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Zhihao Cheng authored
[ Upstream commit 6abf5726 ] Running stress-test test_2 in mtd-utils on ubi device, sometimes we can get following oops message: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffff00000140 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 280a067 P4D 280a067 PUD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 0 PID: 60 Comm: kworker/u16:1 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.2.0 #13 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0 -0-ga698c8995f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-ubifs_0_0) RIP: 0010:rb_next_postorder+0x2e/0xb0 Code: 80 db 03 01 48 85 ff 0f 84 97 00 00 00 48 8b 17 48 83 05 bc 80 db 03 01 48 83 e2 fc 0f 84 82 00 00 00 48 83 05 b2 80 db 03 01 <48> 3b 7a 10 48 89 d0 74 02 f3 c3 48 8b 52 08 48 83 05 a3 80 db 03 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000887758 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: ffff888129ae4700 RBX: ffff888138b08400 RCX: 0000000080800001 RDX: ffffffff00000130 RSI: 0000000080800024 RDI: ffff888138b08400 RBP: ffff888138b08400 R08: ffffea0004a6b920 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffc90000887740 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888128d48000 R13: 0000000000000800 R14: 000000000000011e R15: 00000000000007c8 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88813ba00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffff00000140 CR3: 000000013789d000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: destroy_old_idx+0x5d/0xa0 [ubifs] ubifs_tnc_start_commit+0x4fe/0x1380 [ubifs] do_commit+0x3eb/0x830 [ubifs] ubifs_run_commit+0xdc/0x1c0 [ubifs] Above Oops are due to the slab-out-of-bounds happened in do-while of function layout_in_gaps indirectly called by ubifs_tnc_start_commit. In function layout_in_gaps, there is a do-while loop placing index nodes into the gaps created by obsolete index nodes in non-empty index LEBs until rest index nodes can totally be placed into pre-allocated empty LEBs. @c->gap_lebs points to a memory area(integer array) which records LEB numbers used by 'in-the-gaps' method. Whenever a fitable index LEB is found, corresponding lnum will be incrementally written into the memory area pointed by @c->gap_lebs. The size ((@c->lst.idx_lebs + 1) * sizeof(int)) of memory area is allocated before do-while loop and can not be changed in the loop. But @c->lst.idx_lebs could be increased by function ubifs_change_lp (called by layout_leb_in_gaps->ubifs_find_dirty_idx_leb->get_idx_gc_leb) during the loop. So, sometimes oob happens when number of cycles in do-while loop exceeds the original value of @c->lst.idx_lebs. See detail in https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=204229. This patch fixes oob in layout_in_gaps. Signed-off-by:
Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit c305c6ae ] KCSAN reported a data-race [1] While we can use READ_ONCE() on the read sides, we need to make sure hh->hh_len is written last. [1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in eth_header_cache / neigh_resolve_output write to 0xffff8880b9dedcb8 of 4 bytes by task 29760 on cpu 0: eth_header_cache+0xa9/0xd0 net/ethernet/eth.c:247 neigh_hh_init net/core/neighbour.c:1463 [inline] neigh_resolve_output net/core/neighbour.c:1480 [inline] neigh_resolve_output+0x415/0x470 net/core/neighbour.c:1470 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:511 [inline] ip6_finish_output2+0x7a2/0xec0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:116 __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:142 [inline] __ip6_finish_output+0x2d7/0x330 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:127 ip6_finish_output+0x41/0x160 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:152 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:294 [inline] ip6_output+0xf2/0x280 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:175 dst_output include/net/dst.h:436 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:305 [inline] ndisc_send_skb+0x459/0x5f0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:505 ndisc_send_ns+0x207/0x430 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:647 rt6_probe_deferred+0x98/0xf0 net/ipv6/route.c:615 process_one_work+0x3d4/0x890 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0xa0/0x800 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 read to 0xffff8880b9dedcb8 of 4 bytes by task 29572 on cpu 1: neigh_resolve_output net/core/neighbour.c:1479 [inline] neigh_resolve_output+0x113/0x470 net/core/neighbour.c:1470 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:511 [inline] ip6_finish_output2+0x7a2/0xec0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:116 __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:142 [inline] __ip6_finish_output+0x2d7/0x330 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:127 ip6_finish_output+0x41/0x160 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:152 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:294 [inline] ip6_output+0xf2/0x280 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:175 dst_output include/net/dst.h:436 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:305 [inline] ndisc_send_skb+0x459/0x5f0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:505 ndisc_send_ns+0x207/0x430 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:647 rt6_probe_deferred+0x98/0xf0 net/ipv6/route.c:615 process_one_work+0x3d4/0x890 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0xa0/0x800 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 29572 Comm: kworker/1:4 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc6+ #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: events rt6_probe_deferred Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by:
syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
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Darrick J. Wong authored
[ Upstream commit 5d1116d4 ] Christoph Hellwig complained about the following soft lockup warning when running scrub after generic/175 when preemption is disabled and slub debugging is enabled: watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#3 stuck for 22s! [xfs_scrub:161] Modules linked in: irq event stamp: 41692326 hardirqs last enabled at (41692325): [<ffffffff8232c3b7>] _raw_0 hardirqs last disabled at (41692326): [<ffffffff81001c5a>] trace0 softirqs last enabled at (41684994): [<ffffffff8260031f>] __do_e softirqs last disabled at (41684987): [<ffffffff81127d8c>] irq_e0 CPU: 3 PID: 16189 Comm: xfs_scrub Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #30 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.124 RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x39/0x40 Code: 89 f3 be 01 00 00 00 e8 d5 3a e5 fe 48 89 ef e8 ed 87 e5 f2 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000233f970 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffff3 RAX: ffff88813b398040 RBX: 0000000000000286 RCX: 0000000000000006 RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff88813b3988c0 RDI: ffff88813b398040 RBP: ffff888137958640 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffea00042b0c00 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff88810ac32308 R15: ffff8881376fc040 FS: 00007f6113dea700(0000) GS:ffff88813bb80000(0000) knlGS:00000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f6113de8ff8 CR3: 000000012f290000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Call Trace: free_debug_processing+0x1dd/0x240 __slab_free+0x231/0x410 kmem_cache_free+0x30e/0x360 xchk_ag_btcur_free+0x76/0xb0 xchk_ag_free+0x10/0x80 xchk_bmap_iextent_xref.isra.14+0xd9/0x120 xchk_bmap_iextent+0x187/0x210 xchk_bmap+0x2e0/0x3b0 xfs_scrub_metadata+0x2e7/0x500 xfs_ioc_scrub_metadata+0x4a/0xa0 xfs_file_ioctl+0x58a/0xcd0 do_vfs_ioctl+0xa0/0x6f0 ksys_ioctl+0x5b/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x11/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe If preemption is disabled, all metadata buffers needed to perform the scrub are already in memory, and there are a lot of records to check, it's possible that the scrub thread will run for an extended period of time without sleeping for IO or any other reason. Then the watchdog timer or the RCU stall timeout can trigger, producing the backtrace above. To fix this problem, call cond_resched() from the scrub thread so that we back out to the scheduler whenever necessary. Reported-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Signed-off-by:
Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by:
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Masashi Honma authored
[ Upstream commit cd486e62 ] Sometimes the hardware will push small packets that trigger a WARN_ON in mac80211. Discard them early to avoid this issue. This patch ports 2 patches from ath9k to ath9k_htc. commit 3c0efb74 "ath9k: discard undersized packets". commit df5c4150 "ath9k: correctly handle short radar pulses". [ 112.835889] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 112.835971] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 0 at net/mac80211/rx.c:804 ieee80211_rx_napi+0xaac/0xb40 [mac80211] [ 112.835973] Modules linked in: ath9k_htc ath9k_common ath9k_hw ath mac80211 cfg80211 libarc4 nouveau snd_hda_codec_hdmi intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic ledtrig_audio snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec video snd_hda_core ttm snd_hwdep drm_kms_helper snd_pcm crct10dif_pclmul snd_seq_midi drm snd_seq_midi_event crc32_pclmul snd_rawmidi ghash_clmulni_intel snd_seq aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd cryptd snd_seq_device glue_helper snd_timer sch_fq_codel i2c_algo_bit fb_sys_fops snd input_leds syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt intel_cstate mei_me intel_rapl_perf soundcore mxm_wmi lpc_ich mei kvm_intel kvm mac_hid irqbypass parport_pc ppdev lp parport ip_tables x_tables autofs4 hid_generic usbhid hid raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear e1000e ahci libahci wmi [ 112.836022] CPU: 5 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/5 Not tainted 5.3.0-wt #1 [ 112.836023] Hardware name: MouseComputer Co.,Ltd. X99-S01/X99-S01, BIOS 1.0C-W7 04/01/2015 [ 112.836056] RIP: 0010:ieee80211_rx_napi+0xaac/0xb40 [mac80211] [ 112.836059] Code: 00 00 66 41 89 86 b0 00 00 00 e9 c8 fa ff ff 4c 89 b5 40 ff ff ff 49 89 c6 e9 c9 fa ff ff 48 c7 c7 e0 a2 a5 c0 e8 47 41 b0 e9 <0f> 0b 48 89 df e8 5a 94 2d ea e9 02 f9 ff ff 41 39 c1 44 89 85 60 [ 112.836060] RSP: 0018:ffffaa6180220da8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 112.836062] RAX: 0000000000000024 RBX: ffff909a20eeda00 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 112.836064] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff909a2f957448 RDI: ffff909a2f957448 [ 112.836065] RBP: ffffaa6180220e78 R08: 00000000000006e9 R09: 0000000000000004 [ 112.836066] R10: 000000000000000a R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 112.836068] R13: ffff909a261a47a0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000004 [ 112.836070] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff909a2f940000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 112.836071] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 112.836073] CR2: 00007f4e3ffffa08 CR3: 00000001afc0a006 CR4: 00000000001606e0 [ 112.836074] Call Trace: [ 112.836076] <IRQ> [ 112.836083] ? finish_td+0xb3/0xf0 [ 112.836092] ? ath9k_rx_prepare.isra.11+0x22f/0x2a0 [ath9k_htc] [ 112.836099] ath9k_rx_tasklet+0x10b/0x1d0 [ath9k_htc] [ 112.836105] tasklet_action_common.isra.22+0x63/0x110 [ 112.836108] tasklet_action+0x22/0x30 [ 112.836115] __do_softirq+0xe4/0x2da [ 112.836118] irq_exit+0xae/0xb0 [ 112.836121] do_IRQ+0x86/0xe0 [ 112.836125] common_interrupt+0xf/0xf [ 112.836126] </IRQ> [ 112.836130] RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xa9/0x440 [ 112.836133] Code: 3d bc 20 38 55 e8 f7 1d 84 ff 49 89 c7 0f 1f 44 00 00 31 ff e8 28 29 84 ff 80 7d d3 00 0f 85 e6 01 00 00 fb 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 <45> 85 ed 0f 89 ff 01 00 00 41 c7 44 24 10 00 00 00 00 48 83 c4 18 [ 112.836134] RSP: 0018:ffffaa61800e3e48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffde [ 112.836136] RAX: ffff909a2f96b340 RBX: ffffffffabb58200 RCX: 000000000000001f [ 112.836137] RDX: 0000001a458adc5d RSI: 0000000026c9b581 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 112.836139] RBP: ffffaa61800e3e88 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 000000000002abc0 [ 112.836140] R10: ffffaa61800e3e18 R11: 000000000000002d R12: ffffca617fb40b00 [ 112.836141] R13: 0000000000000002 R14: ffffffffabb582d8 R15: 0000001a458adc5d [ 112.836145] ? cpuidle_enter_state+0x98/0x440 [ 112.836149] ? menu_select+0x370/0x600 [ 112.836151] cpuidle_enter+0x2e/0x40 [ 112.836154] call_cpuidle+0x23/0x40 [ 112.836156] do_idle+0x204/0x280 [ 112.836159] cpu_startup_entry+0x1d/0x20 [ 112.836164] start_secondary+0x167/0x1c0 [ 112.836169] secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 [ 112.836173] ---[ end trace 9f4cd18479cc5ae5 ]--- Signed-off-by:
Masashi Honma <masashi.honma@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Masashi Honma authored
[ Upstream commit e01fddc1 ] rs_datalen is be16 so we need to convert it before printing. Signed-off-by:
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Taehee Yoo authored
[ Upstream commit 5343da4c ] Current code doesn't limit the number of nested devices. Nested devices would be handled recursively and this needs huge stack memory. So, unlimited nested devices could make stack overflow. This patch adds upper_level and lower_level, they are common variables and represent maximum lower/upper depth. When upper/lower device is attached or dettached, {lower/upper}_level are updated. and if maximum depth is bigger than 8, attach routine fails and returns -EMLINK. In addition, this patch converts recursive routine of netdev_walk_all_{lower/upper} to iterator routine. Test commands: ip link add dummy0 type dummy ip link add link dummy0 name vlan1 type vlan id 1 ip link set vlan1 up for i in {2..55} do let A=$i-1 ip link add vlan$i link vlan$A type vlan id $i done ip link del dummy0 Splat looks like: [ 155.513226][ T908] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __unwind_start+0x71/0x850 [ 155.514162][ T908] Write of size 88 at addr ffff8880608a6cc0 by task ip/908 [ 155.515048][ T908] [ 155.515333][ T908] CPU: 0 PID: 908 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #96 [ 155.516147][ T908] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 155.517233][ T908] Call Trace: [ 155.517627][ T908] [ 155.517918][ T908] Allocated by task 0: [ 155.518412][ T908] (stack is not available) [ 155.518955][ T908] [ 155.519228][ T908] Freed by task 0: [ 155.519885][ T908] (stack is not available) [ 155.520452][ T908] [ 155.520729][ T908] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880608a6ac0 [ 155.520729][ T908] which belongs to the cache names_cache of size 4096 [ 155.522387][ T908] The buggy address is located 512 bytes inside of [ 155.522387][ T908] 4096-byte region [ffff8880608a6ac0, ffff8880608a7ac0) [ 155.523920][ T908] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 155.524552][ T908] page:ffffea0001822800 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88806c657cc0 index:0x0 compound_mapcount:0 [ 155.525836][ T908] flags: 0x100000000010200(slab|head) [ 155.526445][ T908] raw: 0100000000010200 ffffea0001813808 ffffea0001a26c08 ffff88806c657cc0 [ 155.527424][ T908] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000070007 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 155.528429][ T908] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 155.529158][ T908] [ 155.529410][ T908] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 155.530060][ T908] ffff8880608a6b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 155.530971][ T908] ffff8880608a6c00: fb fb fb fb fb f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f2 f2 f2 f3 f3 f3 [ 155.531889][ T908] >ffff8880608a6c80: f3 fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 155.532806][ T908] ^ [ 155.533509][ T908] ffff8880608a6d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 [ 155.534436][ T908] ffff8880608a6d80: f2 f3 f3 f3 f3 fb fb fb 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ ... ] Signed-off-by:
Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit dba7d9b8 ] There are few places where we fetch tp->rcv_nxt while this field can change from IRQ or other cpu. We need to add READ_ONCE() annotations, and also make sure write sides use corresponding WRITE_ONCE() to avoid store-tearing. Note that tcp_inq_hint() was already using READ_ONCE(tp->rcv_nxt) syzbot reported : BUG: KCSAN: data-race in tcp_poll / tcp_queue_rcv write to 0xffff888120425770 of 4 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0: tcp_rcv_nxt_update net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3365 [inline] tcp_queue_rcv+0x180/0x380 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:4638 tcp_rcv_established+0xbf1/0xf50 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5616 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x381/0x4e0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1542 tcp_v4_rcv+0x1a03/0x1bf0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1923 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x51/0x470 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:204 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x110/0x140 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:231 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:305 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:299 [inline] ip_local_deliver+0x133/0x210 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:252 dst_input include/net/dst.h:442 [inline] ip_rcv_finish+0x121/0x160 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:413 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:305 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:299 [inline] ip_rcv+0x18f/0x1a0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:523 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xa7/0xe0 net/core/dev.c:5004 __netif_receive_skb+0x37/0xf0 net/core/dev.c:5118 netif_receive_skb_internal+0x59/0x190 net/core/dev.c:5208 napi_skb_finish net/core/dev.c:5671 [inline] napi_gro_receive+0x28f/0x330 net/core/dev.c:5704 receive_buf+0x284/0x30b0 drivers/net/virtio_net.c:1061 read to 0xffff888120425770 of 4 bytes by task 7254 on cpu 1: tcp_stream_is_readable net/ipv4/tcp.c:480 [inline] tcp_poll+0x204/0x6b0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:554 sock_poll+0xed/0x250 net/socket.c:1256 vfs_poll include/linux/poll.h:90 [inline] ep_item_poll.isra.0+0x90/0x190 fs/eventpoll.c:892 ep_send_events_proc+0x113/0x5c0 fs/eventpoll.c:1749 ep_scan_ready_list.constprop.0+0x189/0x500 fs/eventpoll.c:704 ep_send_events fs/eventpoll.c:1793 [inline] ep_poll+0xe3/0x900 fs/eventpoll.c:1930 do_epoll_wait+0x162/0x180 fs/eventpoll.c:2294 __do_sys_epoll_pwait fs/eventpoll.c:2325 [inline] __se_sys_epoll_pwait fs/eventpoll.c:2311 [inline] __x64_sys_epoll_pwait+0xcd/0x170 fs/eventpoll.c:2311 do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x2f0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 7254 Comm: syz-fuzzer Not tainted 5.3.0+ #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
[ Upstream commit f0308fb0 ] If an ICMP packet comes in on the UDP socket backing an AF_RXRPC socket as the UDP socket is being shut down, rxrpc_error_report() may get called to deal with it after sk_user_data on the UDP socket has been cleared, leading to a NULL pointer access when this local endpoint record gets accessed. Fix this by just returning immediately if sk_user_data was NULL. The oops looks like the following: #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page ... RIP: 0010:rxrpc_error_report+0x1bd/0x6a9 ... Call Trace: ? sock_queue_err_skb+0xbd/0xde ? __udp4_lib_err+0x313/0x34d __udp4_lib_err+0x313/0x34d icmp_unreach+0x1ee/0x207 icmp_rcv+0x25b/0x28f ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x95/0x10e ip_local_deliver+0xe9/0x148 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x52/0x6e process_backlog+0xdc/0x177 net_rx_action+0xf9/0x270 __do_softirq+0x1b6/0x39a ? smpboot_register_percpu_thread+0xce/0xce run_ksoftirqd+0x1d/0x42 smpboot_thread_fn+0x19e/0x1b3 kthread+0xf1/0xf6 ? kthread_delayed_work_timer_fn+0x83/0x83 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 Fixes: 17926a79 ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both") Reported-by: syzbot+611164843bd48cc2190c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
[ Upstream commit 3a83f677 ] On a 2-socket Power9 system with 32 cores/128 threads (SMT4) and 1TB of memory running the following guest configs: guest A: - 224GB of memory - 56 VCPUs (sockets=1,cores=28,threads=2), where: VCPUs 0-1 are pinned to CPUs 0-3, VCPUs 2-3 are pinned to CPUs 4-7, ... VCPUs 54-55 are pinned to CPUs 108-111 guest B: - 4GB of memory - 4 VCPUs (sockets=1,cores=4,threads=1) with the following workloads (with KSM and THP enabled in all): guest A: stress --cpu 40 --io 20 --vm 20 --vm-bytes 512M guest B: stress --cpu 4 --io 4 --vm 4 --vm-bytes 512M host: stress --cpu 4 --io 4 --vm 2 --vm-bytes 256M the below soft-lockup traces were observed after an hour or so and persisted until the host was reset (this was found to be reliably reproducible for this configuration, for kernels 4.15, 4.18, 5.0, and 5.3-rc5): [ 1253.183290] rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU [ 1253.183319] rcu: 124-....: (5250 ticks this GP) idle=10a/1/0x4000000000000002 softirq=5408/5408 fqs=1941 [ 1256.287426] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#105 stuck for 23s! [CPU 52/KVM:19709] [ 1264.075773] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#24 stuck for 23s! [worker:19913] [ 1264.079769] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#31 stuck for 23s! [worker:20331] [ 1264.095770] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#45 stuck for 23s! [worker:20338] [ 1264.131773] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#64 stuck for 23s! [avocado:19525] [ 1280.408480] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#124 stuck for 22s! [ksmd:791] [ 1316.198012] rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU [ 1316.198032] rcu: 124-....: (21003 ticks this GP) idle=10a/1/0x4000000000000002 softirq=5408/5408 fqs=8243 [ 1340.411024] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#124 stuck for 22s! [ksmd:791] [ 1379.212609] rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU [ 1379.212629] rcu: 124-....: (36756 ticks this GP) idle=10a/1/0x4000000000000002 softirq=5408/5408 fqs=14714 [ 1404.413615] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#124 stuck for 22s! [ksmd:791] [ 1442.227095] rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU [ 1442.227115] rcu: 124-....: (52509 ticks this GP) idle=10a/1/0x4000000000000002 softirq=5408/5408 fqs=21403 [ 1455.111787] INFO: task worker:19907 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 1455.111822] Tainted: G L 5.3.0-rc5-mdr-vanilla+ #1 [ 1455.111833] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 1455.111884] INFO: task worker:19908 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 1455.111905] Tainted: G L 5.3.0-rc5-mdr-vanilla+ #1 [ 1455.111925] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 1455.111966] INFO: task worker:20328 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 1455.111986] Tainted: G L 5.3.0-rc5-mdr-vanilla+ #1 [ 1455.111998] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 1455.112048] INFO: task worker:20330 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 1455.112068] Tainted: G L 5.3.0-rc5-mdr-vanilla+ #1 [ 1455.112097] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 1455.112138] INFO: task worker:20332 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 1455.112159] Tainted: G L 5.3.0-rc5-mdr-vanilla+ #1 [ 1455.112179] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 1455.112210] INFO: task worker:20333 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 1455.112231] Tainted: G L 5.3.0-rc5-mdr-vanilla+ #1 [ 1455.112242] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 1455.112282] INFO: task worker:20335 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 1455.112303] Tainted: G L 5.3.0-rc5-mdr-vanilla+ #1 [ 1455.112332] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 1455.112372] INFO: task worker:20336 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 1455.112392] Tainted: G L 5.3.0-rc5-mdr-vanilla+ #1 CPUs 45, 24, and 124 are stuck on spin locks, likely held by CPUs 105 and 31. CPUs 105 and 31 are stuck in smp_call_function_many(), waiting on target CPU 42. For instance: # CPU 105 registers (via xmon) R00 = c00000000020b20c R16 = 00007d1bcd800000 R01 = c00000363eaa7970 R17 = 0000000000000001 R02 = c0000000019b3a00 R18 = 000000000000006b R03 = 000000000000002a R19 = 00007d537d7aecf0 R04 = 000000000000002a R20 = 60000000000000e0 R05 = 000000000000002a R21 = 0801000000000080 R06 = c0002073fb0caa08 R22 = 0000000000000d60 R07 = c0000000019ddd78 R23 = 0000000000000001 R08 = 000000000000002a R24 = c00000000147a700 R09 = 0000000000000001 R25 = c0002073fb0ca908 R10 = c000008ffeb4e660 R26 = 0000000000000000 R11 = c0002073fb0ca900 R27 = c0000000019e2464 R12 = c000000000050790 R28 = c0000000000812b0 R13 = c000207fff623e00 R29 = c0002073fb0ca808 R14 = 00007d1bbee00000 R30 = c0002073fb0ca800 R15 = 00007d1bcd600000 R31 = 0000000000000800 pc = c00000000020b260 smp_call_function_many+0x3d0/0x460 cfar= c00000000020b270 smp_call_function_many+0x3e0/0x460 lr = c00000000020b20c smp_call_function_many+0x37c/0x460 msr = 900000010288b033 cr = 44024824 ctr = c000000000050790 xer = 0000000000000000 trap = 100 CPU 42 is running normally, doing VCPU work: # CPU 42 stack trace (via xmon) [link register ] c00800001be17188 kvmppc_book3s_radix_page_fault+0x90/0x2b0 [kvm_hv] [c000008ed3343820] c000008ed3343850 (unreliable) [c000008ed33438d0] c00800001be11b6c kvmppc_book3s_hv_page_fault+0x264/0xe30 [kvm_hv] [c000008ed33439d0] c00800001be0d7b4 kvmppc_vcpu_run_hv+0x8dc/0xb50 [kvm_hv] [c000008ed3343ae0] c00800001c10891c kvmppc_vcpu_run+0x34/0x48 [kvm] [c000008ed3343b00] c00800001c10475c kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x244/0x420 [kvm] [c000008ed3343b90] c00800001c0f5a78 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x470/0x7c8 [kvm] [c000008ed3343d00] c000000000475450 do_vfs_ioctl+0xe0/0xc70 [c000008ed3343db0] c0000000004760e4 ksys_ioctl+0x104/0x120 [c000008ed3343e00] c000000000476128 sys_ioctl+0x28/0x80 [c000008ed3343e20] c00000000000b388 system_call+0x5c/0x70 --- Exception: c00 (System Call) at 00007d545cfd7694 SP (7d53ff7edf50) is in userspace It was subsequently found that ipi_message[PPC_MSG_CALL_FUNCTION] was set for CPU 42 by at least 1 of the CPUs waiting in smp_call_function_many(), but somehow the corresponding call_single_queue entries were never processed by CPU 42, causing the callers to spin in csd_lock_wait() indefinitely. Nick Piggin suggested something similar to the following sequence as a possible explanation (interleaving of CALL_FUNCTION/RESCHEDULE IPI messages seems to be most common, but any mix of CALL_FUNCTION and !CALL_FUNCTION messages could trigger it): CPU X: smp_muxed_ipi_set_message(): X: smp_mb() X: message[RESCHEDULE] = 1 X: doorbell_global_ipi(42): X: kvmppc_set_host_ipi(42, 1) X: ppc_msgsnd_sync()/smp_mb() X: ppc_msgsnd() -> 42 42: doorbell_exception(): // from CPU X 42: ppc_msgsync() 105: smp_muxed_ipi_set_message(): 105: smb_mb() // STORE DEFERRED DUE TO RE-ORDERING --105: message[CALL_FUNCTION] = 1 | 105: doorbell_global_ipi(42): | 105: kvmppc_set_host_ipi(42, 1) | 42: kvmppc_set_host_ipi(42, 0) | 42: smp_ipi_demux_relaxed() | 42: // returns to executing guest | // RE-ORDERED STORE COMPLETES ->105: message[CALL_FUNCTION] = 1 105: ppc_msgsnd_sync()/smp_mb() 105: ppc_msgsnd() -> 42 42: local_paca->kvm_hstate.host_ipi == 0 // IPI ignored 105: // hangs waiting on 42 to process messages/call_single_queue This can be prevented with an smp_mb() at the beginning of kvmppc_set_host_ipi(), such that stores to message[<type>] (or other state indicated by the host_ipi flag) are ordered vs. the store to to host_ipi. However, doing so might still allow for the following scenario (not yet observed): CPU X: smp_muxed_ipi_set_message(): X: smp_mb() X: message[RESCHEDULE] = 1 X: doorbell_global_ipi(42): X: kvmppc_set_host_ipi(42, 1) X: ppc_msgsnd_sync()/smp_mb() X: ppc_msgsnd() -> 42 42: doorbell_exception(): // from CPU X 42: ppc_msgsync() // STORE DEFERRED DUE TO RE-ORDERING -- 42: kvmppc_set_host_ipi(42, 0) | 42: smp_ipi_demux_relaxed() | 105: smp_muxed_ipi_set_message(): | 105: smb_mb() | 105: message[CALL_FUNCTION] = 1 | 105: doorbell_global_ipi(42): | 105: kvmppc_set_host_ipi(42, 1) | // RE-ORDERED STORE COMPLETES -> 42: kvmppc_set_host_ipi(42, 0) 42: // returns to executing guest 105: ppc_msgsnd_sync()/smp_mb() 105: ppc_msgsnd() -> 42 42: local_paca->kvm_hstate.host_ipi == 0 // IPI ignored 105: // hangs waiting on 42 to process messages/call_single_queue Fixing this scenario would require an smp_mb() *after* clearing host_ipi flag in kvmppc_set_host_ipi() to order the store vs. subsequent processing of IPI messages. To handle both cases, this patch splits kvmppc_set_host_ipi() into separate set/clear functions, where we execute smp_mb() prior to setting host_ipi flag, and after clearing host_ipi flag. These functions pair with each other to synchronize the sender and receiver sides. With that change in place the above workload ran for 20 hours without triggering any lock-ups. Fixes: 755563bc ("powerpc/powernv: Fixes for hypervisor doorbell handling") # v4.0 Signed-off-by:
Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by:
Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190911223155.16045-1-mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.comSigned-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
[ Upstream commit 3cfa1488 ] This exercises kernel code path that deal with addresses that have a limited lifetime. Without previous fix, this triggers following crash on net-next: BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in check_lifetime+0x403/0x670 Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000010 by task kworker [..] Signed-off-by:
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