- 12 Jan, 2017 1 commit
-
-
Paulo Zanoni authored
[ Upstream commit 0727e40a ] Bspec says: "The mailbox response data may not account for memory read latency. If the mailbox response data for level 0 is 0us, add 2 microseconds to the result for each valid level." This means we should only do the +2 in case wm[0] == 0, not always. So split the sanitizing implementation from the WA implementation and fix the WA implementation. v2: Add Fixes tag (Maarten). Fixes: 367294be ("drm/i915/gen9: Add 2us read latency to WM level") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Vandana Kannan <vandana.kannan@intel.com> Reviewed-by:
Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Paulo Zanoni <paulo.r.zanoni@intel.com> Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/1474578035-424-5-git-send-email-paulo.r.zanoni@intel.comSigned-off-by:
Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
-
- 24 Dec, 2016 1 commit
-
-
Sasha Levin authored
Signed-off-by:
-
- 23 Dec, 2016 19 commits
-
-
Sumit Saxena authored
[ Upstream commit 5e5ec175 ] This patch will fix regression caused by commit 1e793f6f ("scsi: megaraid_sas: Fix data integrity failure for JBOD (passthrough) devices"). The problem was that the MEGASAS_IS_LOGICAL macro did not have braces and as a result the driver ended up exposing a lot of non-existing SCSI devices (all SCSI commands to channels 1,2,3 were returned as SUCCESS-DID_OK by driver). [mkp: clarified patch description] Fixes: 1e793f6fReported-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Kashyap Desai <kashyap.desai@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by:
Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com> Tested-by:
Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com> Tested-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Michal Kubeček authored
[ Upstream commit 3de81b75 ] Qian Zhang (张谦) reported a potential socket buffer overflow in tipc_msg_build() which is also known as CVE-2016-8632: due to insufficient checks, a buffer overflow can occur if MTU is too short for even tipc headers. As anyone can set device MTU in a user/net namespace, this issue can be abused by a regular user. As agreed in the discussion on Ben Hutchings' original patch, we should check the MTU at the moment a bearer is attached rather than for each processed packet. We also need to repeat the check when bearer MTU is adjusted to new device MTU. UDP case also needs a check to avoid overflow when calculating bearer MTU. References: CVE-2016-8632 Fixes: b97bf3fd ("[TIPC] Initial merge") Signed-off-by:
Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Reported-by:
Qian Zhang (张谦) <zhangqian-c@360.cn> Acked-by:
Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Conflicts: net/tipc/bearer.c net/tipc/bearer.h due to 1a90632d: tipc: eliminate remnants of hungarian notation and b1c29f6b tipc: simplify resetting and disabling of bearers Signed-off-by:
Philipp Hahn <hahn@univention.de> Signed-off-by:
-
Kees Cook authored
[ Upstream commit 0eab121e ] Prior to commit c0371da6 ("put iov_iter into msghdr") in v3.19, there was no check that the iovec contained enough bytes for an ICMP header, and the read loop would walk across neighboring stack contents. Since the iov_iter conversion, bad arguments are noticed, but the returned error is EFAULT. Returning EINVAL is a clearer error and also solves the problem prior to v3.19. This was found using trinity with KASAN on v3.18: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy_fromiovec+0x60/0x114 at addr ffffffc071077da0 Read of size 8 by task trinity-c2/9623 page:ffffffbe034b9a08 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 flags: 0x0() page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected CPU: 0 PID: 9623 Comm: trinity-c2 Tainted: G BU 3.18.0-dirty #15 Hardware name: Google Tegra210 Smaug Rev 1,3+ (DT) Call trace: [<ffffffc000209c98>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1ac arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:90 [<ffffffc000209e54>] show_stack+0x10/0x1c arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:171 [< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [<ffffffc000f18dc4>] dump_stack+0x7c/0xd0 lib/dump_stack.c:50 [< inline >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:147 [< inline >] kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:236 [<ffffffc000373dcc>] kasan_report+0x380/0x4b8 mm/kasan/report.c:259 [< inline >] check_memory_region mm/kasan/kasan.c:264 [<ffffffc00037352c>] __asan_load8+0x20/0x70 mm/kasan/kasan.c:507 [<ffffffc0005b9624>] memcpy_fromiovec+0x5c/0x114 lib/iovec.c:15 [< inline >] memcpy_from_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:2667 [<ffffffc000ddeba0>] ping_common_sendmsg+0x50/0x108 net/ipv4/ping.c:674 [<ffffffc000dded30>] ping_v4_sendmsg+0xd8/0x698 net/ipv4/ping.c:714 [<ffffffc000dc91dc>] inet_sendmsg+0xe0/0x12c net/ipv4/af_inet.c:749 [< inline >] __sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:624 [< inline >] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:632 [<ffffffc000cab61c>] sock_sendmsg+0x124/0x164 net/socket.c:643 [< inline >] SYSC_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [<ffffffc000cad270>] SyS_sendto+0x178/0x1d8 net/socket.c:1761 CVE-2016-8399 Reported-by:
Qidan He <i@flanker017.me> Fixes: c319b4d7 ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by:
-
Philip Pettersson authored
[ Upstream commit 84ac7260 ] When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished. This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously initialized timer will not be deleted. The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start of packet_set_ring. References: CVE-2016-8655 Fixes: f6fb8f10 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.") Signed-off-by:
Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Sabrina Dubroca authored
[ Debian: net-add-recursion-limit-to-gro.patch ] Currently, GRO can do unlimited recursion through the gro_receive handlers. This was fixed for tunneling protocols by limiting tunnel GRO to one level with encap_mark, but both VLAN and TEB still have this problem. Thus, the kernel is vulnerable to a stack overflow, if we receive a packet composed entirely of VLAN headers. This patch adds a recursion counter to the GRO layer to prevent stack overflow. When a gro_receive function hits the recursion limit, GRO is aborted for this skb and it is processed normally. Thanks to Vladimír Beneš <vbenes@redhat.com> for the initial bug report. Fixes: CVE-2016-7039 Fixes: 9b174d88 ("net: Add Transparent Ethernet Bridging GRO support.") Fixes: 66e5133f ("vlan: Add GRO support for non hardware accelerated vlan") Signed-off-by:
Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Reviewed-by:
Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by:
-
Jaganath Kanakkassery authored
[ Upstream commit 951b6a07 ] addr can be NULL and it should not be dereferenced before NULL checking. References: CVE-2015-8956 Signed-off-by:
Jaganath Kanakkassery <jaganath.k@samsung.com> Signed-off-by:
Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by:
-
Jann Horn authored
[ bugfix/all/ptrace-being-capable-wrt-a-process-requires-mapped-uids-gids.patch ] ptrace_has_cap() checks whether the current process should be treated as having a certain capability for ptrace checks against another process. Until now, this was equivalent to has_ns_capability(current, target_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE). However, if a root-owned process wants to enter a user namespace for some reason without knowing who owns it and therefore can't change to the namespace owner's uid and gid before entering, as soon as it has entered the namespace, the namespace owner can attach to it via ptrace and thereby gain access to its uid and gid. While it is possible for the entering process to switch to the uid of a claimed namespace owner before entering, causing the attempt to enter to fail if the claimed uid is wrong, this doesn't solve the problem of determining an appropriate gid. With this change, the entering process can first enter the namespace and then safely inspect the namespace's properties, e.g. through /proc/self/{uid_map,gid_map}, assuming that the namespace owner doesn't have access to uid 0. Changed in v2: The caller needs to be capable in the namespace into which tcred's uids/gids can be mapped. Rederences: CVE-2015-8709 References: https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/12/25/71Signed-off-by:Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Signed-off-by:
-
Dan Carpenter authored
[ Upstream commit 7bc2b55a ] We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't overflow. References: CVE-2016-7425 Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by:
Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
-
Eric W. Biederman authored
[ Upstream commit d2921684 ] CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace. mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2 mount --make-rshared / for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem as some people have managed to hit this by accident. As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned. Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users as follows: > The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of > the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance > problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less > than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired. > > Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that > have been triggered and not yet expired. > > The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common > case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've > not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries. > > The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large > number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat > more active mounts. So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and malfunctioning programs. For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl. Tested-by:
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Conflicts: fs/namespace.c kernel/sysctl.c Signed-off-by:
-
Jan Kara authored
[ Upstream commit 07393101 ] When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that. References: CVE-2016-7097 Reviewed-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by:
Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Jan Kara authored
[ Upstream commit 030b533c ] Currently, notify_change() clears capabilities or IMA attributes by calling security_inode_killpriv() before calling into ->setattr. Thus it happens before any other permission checks in inode_change_ok() and user is thus allowed to trigger clearing of capabilities or IMA attributes for any file he can look up e.g. by calling chown for that file. This is unexpected and can lead to user DoSing a system. Fix the problem by calling security_inode_killpriv() at the end of inode_change_ok() instead of from notify_change(). At that moment we are sure user has permissions to do the requested change. References: CVE-2015-1350 Reviewed-by:
-
Jan Kara authored
[ Upstream commit 31051c85 ] inode_change_ok() will be resposible for clearing capabilities and IMA extended attributes and as such will need dentry. Give it as an argument to inode_change_ok() instead of an inode. Also rename inode_change_ok() to setattr_prepare() to better relect that it does also some modifications in addition to checks. References: CVE-2015-1350 Reviewed-by:
-
Andreas Gruenbacher authored
NFSv2 can set the atime and/or mtime of a file to specific timestamps but not to the server's current time. To implement the equivalent of utimes("file", NULL), it uses a heuristic. NFSv3 and later do support setting the atime and/or mtime to the server's current time directly. The NFSv2 heuristic is still enabled, and causes timestamps to be set wrong sometimes. Fix this by moving the heuristic into the NFSv2 specific code. We can leave it out of the create code path: the owner can always set timestamps arbitrarily, and the workaround would never trigger. References: CVE-2015-1350 Signed-off-by:J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Jan Kara authored
[ Upstream commit 62490330 ] To avoid clearing of capabilities or security related extended attributes too early, inode_change_ok() will need to take dentry instead of inode. Propagate it down to fuse_do_setattr(). References: CVE-2015-1350 Acked-by:
Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
-
Jan Kara authored
[ upstream commit 69bca807 ] To avoid clearing of capabilities or security related extended attributes too early, inode_change_ok() will need to take dentry instead of inode. Propagate dentry down to functions calling inode_change_ok(). This is rather straightforward except for xfs_set_mode() function which does not have dentry easily available. Luckily that function does not call inode_change_ok() anyway so we just have to do a little dance with function prototypes. References: CVE-2015-1350 Acked-by:
Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
-
Andreas Dilger authored
mbcache provides absolutely no value for Lustre xattrs (because they are unique and cannot be shared between files) and as we can see it has a noticable overhead in some cases. In the past there was a CONFIG_MBCACHE option that would allow it to be disabled, but this was removed in newer kernels, so we will need to patch ldiskfs to fix this. References: <https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=107301> References: <https://git.hpdd.intel.com/fs/lustre-release.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/ldiskfs/kernel_patches/patches/rhel7/ext4-disable-mb-cache.patch> References: CVE-2015-8952 On 13.12.2016 at 15:58 Ben Hutchings wrote: > I decided not to apply this as it's a userland ABI extension that we > would then need to carry indefinitely. Signed-off-by:
-
Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit bb1fceca ] When tcp_sendmsg() allocates a fresh and empty skb, it puts it at the tail of the write queue using tcp_add_write_queue_tail() Then it attempts to copy user data into this fresh skb. If the copy fails, we undo the work and remove the fresh skb. Unfortunately, this undo lacks the change done to tp->highest_sack and we can leave a dangling pointer (to a freed skb) Later, tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue() can dereference this pointer and access freed memory. For regular kernels where memory is not unmapped, this might cause SACK bugs because tcp_highest_sack_seq() is buggy, returning garbage instead of tp->snd_nxt, but with various debug features like CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, this can crash the kernel. This bug was found by Marco Grassi thanks to syzkaller. Fixes: 6859d494 ("[TCP]: Abstract tp->highest_sack accessing & point to next skb") Reported-by:
Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Reviewed-by:
Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior authored
[ Upstream commit 90944e40 ] If the gcc is configured to do -fPIE by default then the build aborts later with: | Unsupported relocation type: unknown type rel type name (29) Tagging it stable so it is possible to compile recent stable kernels as well. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior authored
[ Upstream commit 82031ea2 ] Adding -no-PIE to the fstack protector check. -no-PIE was introduced before -fstack-protector so there is no need for a runtime check. Without it the build stops: |Cannot use CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG: -fstack-protector-strong available but compiler is broken due to -mcmodel=kernel + -fPIE if -fPIE is enabled by default. Tagging it stable so it is possible to compile recent stable kernels as well. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
-
- 22 Dec, 2016 9 commits
-
-
Andy Lutomirski authored
[ Upstream commit e1bfc11c ] cr4_init_shadow() will panic on 486-like machines without CR4. Fix it using __read_cr4_safe(). Reported-by: david@saggiorato.net Signed-off-by:
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1e02ce4c ("x86: Store a per-cpu shadow copy of CR4") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/43a20f81fb504013bf613913dc25574b45336a61.1475091074.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
-
Roger Quadros authored
[ Upstream commit d248220f ] Since commit 6ce0d200 ("ARM: dma: Use dma_pfn_offset for dma address translation"), dma_to_pfn() already returns the PFN with the physical memory start offset so we don't need to add it again. This fixes USB mass storage lock-up problem on systems that can't do DMA over the entire physical memory range (e.g.) Keystone 2 systems with 4GB RAM can only do DMA over the first 2GB. [K2E-EVM]. What happens there is that without this patch SCSI layer sets a wrong bounce buffer limit in scsi_calculate_bounce_limit() for the USB mass storage device. dma_max_pfn() evaluates to 0x8fffff and bounce_limit is set to 0x8fffff000 whereas maximum DMA'ble physical memory on Keystone 2 is 0x87fffffff. This results in non DMA'ble pages being given to the USB controller and hence the lock-up. NOTE: in the above case, USB-SCSI-device's dma_pfn_offset was showing as 0. This should have really been 0x780000 as on K2e, LOWMEM_START is 0x80000000 and HIGHMEM_START is 0x800000000. DMA zone is 2GB so dma_max_pfn should be 0x87ffff. The incorrect dma_pfn_offset for the USB storage device is because USB devices are not correctly inheriting the dma_pfn_offset from the USB host controller. This will be fixed by a separate patch. Fixes: 6ce0d200 ("ARM: dma: Use dma_pfn_offset for dma address translation") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Reported-by:
Grygorii Strashko <grygorii.strashko@ti.com> Signed-off-by:
Roger Quadros <rogerq@ti.com> Signed-off-by:
Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
-
zhong jiang authored
[ Upstream commit 5b398e41 ] I hit the following hung task when runing a OOM LTP test case with 4.1 kernel. Call trace: [<ffffffc000086a88>] __switch_to+0x74/0x8c [<ffffffc000a1bae0>] __schedule+0x23c/0x7bc [<ffffffc000a1c09c>] schedule+0x3c/0x94 [<ffffffc000a1eb84>] rwsem_down_write_failed+0x214/0x350 [<ffffffc000a1e32c>] down_write+0x64/0x80 [<ffffffc00021f794>] __ksm_exit+0x90/0x19c [<ffffffc0000be650>] mmput+0x118/0x11c [<ffffffc0000c3ec4>] do_exit+0x2dc/0xa74 [<ffffffc0000c46f8>] do_group_exit+0x4c/0xe4 [<ffffffc0000d0f34>] get_signal+0x444/0x5e0 [<ffffffc000089fcc>] do_signal+0x1d8/0x450 [<ffffffc00008a35c>] do_notify_resume+0x70/0x78 The oom victim cannot terminate because it needs to take mmap_sem for write while the lock is held by ksmd for read which loops in the page allocator ksm_do_scan scan_get_next_rmap_item down_read get_next_rmap_item alloc_rmap_item #ksmd will loop permanently. There is no way forward because the oom victim cannot release any memory in 4.1 based kernel. Since 4.6 we have the oom reaper which would solve this problem because it would release the memory asynchronously. Nevertheless we can relax alloc_rmap_item requirements and use __GFP_NORETRY because the allocation failure is acceptable as ksm_do_scan would just retry later after the lock got dropped. Such a patch would be also easy to backport to older stable kernels which do not have oom_reaper. While we are at it add GFP_NOWARN so the admin doesn't have to be alarmed by the allocation failure. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1474165570-44398-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com> Suggested-by:
Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Suggested-by:
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by:
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
-
Sergei Miroshnichenko authored
[ Upstream commit 9abefcb1 ] A timer was used to restart after the bus-off state, leading to a relatively large can_restart() executed in an interrupt context, which in turn sets up pinctrl. When this happens during system boot, there is a high probability of grabbing the pinctrl_list_mutex, which is locked already by the probe() of other device, making the kernel suspect a deadlock condition [1]. To resolve this issue, the restart_timer is replaced by a delayed work. [1] https://github.com/victronenergy/venus/issues/24Signed-off-by:
Sergei Miroshnichenko <sergeimir@emcraft.com> Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
-
Joonwoo Park authored
[ Upstream commit 28b89b9e ] A discrepancy between cpu_online_mask and cpuset's effective_cpus mask is inevitable during hotplug since cpuset defers updating of effective_cpus mask using a workqueue, during which time nothing prevents the system from more hotplug operations. For that reason guarantee_online_cpus() walks up the cpuset hierarchy until it finds an intersection under the assumption that top cpuset's effective_cpus mask intersects with cpu_online_mask even with such a race occurring. However a sequence of CPU hotplugs can open a time window, during which none of the effective CPUs in the top cpuset intersect with cpu_online_mask. For example when there are 4 possible CPUs 0-3 and only CPU0 is online: ======================== =========================== cpu_online_mask top_cpuset.effective_cpus ======================== =========================== echo 1 > cpu2/online. CPU hotplug notifier woke up hotplug work but not yet scheduled. [0,2] [0] echo 0 > cpu0/online. The workqueue is still runnable. [2] [0] ======================== =========================== Now there is no intersection between cpu_online_mask and top_cpuset.effective_cpus. Thus invoking sys_sched_setaffinity() at this moment can cause following: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000d0 ------------[ cut here ]------------ Kernel BUG at ffffffc0001389b0 [verbose debug info unavailable] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 96000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 2 PID: 1420 Comm: taskset Tainted: G W 4.4.8+ #98 task: ffffffc06a5c4880 ti: ffffffc06e124000 task.ti: ffffffc06e124000 PC is at guarantee_online_cpus+0x2c/0x58 LR is at cpuset_cpus_allowed+0x4c/0x6c <snip> Process taskset (pid: 1420, stack limit = 0xffffffc06e124020) Call trace: [<ffffffc0001389b0>] guarantee_online_cpus+0x2c/0x58 [<ffffffc00013b208>] cpuset_cpus_allowed+0x4c/0x6c [<ffffffc0000d61f0>] sched_setaffinity+0xc0/0x1ac [<ffffffc0000d6374>] SyS_sched_setaffinity+0x98/0xac [<ffffffc000085cb0>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28 The top cpuset's effective_cpus are guaranteed to be identical to cpu_online_mask eventually. Hence fall back to cpu_online_mask when there is no intersection between top cpuset's effective_cpus and cpu_online_mask. Signed-off-by:
Joonwoo Park <joonwoop@codeaurora.org> Acked-by:
Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: cgroups@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.17+ Signed-off-by:
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
-
Karl Beldan authored
[ Upstream commit f6d7c1b5 ] This fixes subpage writes when using 4-bit HW ECC. There has been numerous reports about ECC errors with devices using this driver for a while. Also the 4-bit ECC has been reported as broken with subpages in [1] and with 16 bits NANDs in the driver and in mach* board files both in mainline and in the vendor BSPs. What I saw with 4-bit ECC on a 16bits NAND (on an LCDK) which got me to try reinitializing the ECC engine: - R/W on whole pages properly generates/checks RS code - try writing the 1st subpage only of a blank page, the subpage is well written and the RS code properly generated, re-reading the same page the HW detects some ECC error, reading the same page again no ECC error is detected Note that the ECC engine is already reinitialized in the 1-bit case. Tested on my LCDK with UBI+UBIFS using subpages. This could potentially get rid of the issue workarounded in [1]. [1] 28c015a9 ("mtd: davinci-nand: disable subpage write for keystone-nand") Fixes: 6a4123e5 ("mtd: nand: davinci_nand, 4-bit ECC for smallpage") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Karl Beldan <kbeldan@baylibre.com> Acked-by:
Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@free-electrons.com> Signed-off-by:
Brian Norris <computersforpeace@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Rob Clark authored
[ Upstream commit 89f82cbb ] Use instead __copy_from_user_inatomic() and fallback to slow-path where we drop and re-aquire the lock in case of fault. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by:
Vaishali Thakkar <vaishali.thakkar@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Pawel Moll authored
[ Upstream commit 4e486cba ] The "Miscellaneous Node" fell through cracks of node initialisation, as its ID is shared with HN-I. This patch treats MN as a special case (which it is), adding separate validation check for it and pre-defining the node ID in relevant events descriptions. That way one can simply run: # perf stat -a -e ccn/mn_ecbarrier/ <workload> Additionally, direction in the MN pseudo-events XP watchpoint definitions is corrected to be "TX" (1) as they are defined from the crosspoint point of view (thus barriers are transmitted from XP to MN). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.17+ Signed-off-by:
Pawel Moll <pawel.moll@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
-
Pawel Moll authored
[ Upstream commit 8f06c51f ] Since 688d4dfc "perf tools: Support parsing parameterized events" the perf userspace tools understands "argument=?" syntax in the events file, making sure that required arguments are provided by the user and not defaulting to 0, causing confusion. This patch adds the required arguments lists for CCN events. Signed-off-by:
-
- 29 Nov, 2016 1 commit
-
-
Sasha Levin authored
Signed-off-by:
-
- 26 Nov, 2016 9 commits
-
-
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior authored
[ Upstream commit 8ae94224 ] Debian started to build the gcc with -fPIE by default so the kernel build ends before it starts properly with: |kernel/bounds.c:1:0: error: code model kernel does not support PIC mode Also add to KBUILD_AFLAGS due to: |gcc -Wp,-MD,arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/.note.o.d … -mfentry -DCC_USING_FENTRY … vdso/vdso32/note.S |arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/note.S:1:0: sorry, unimplemented: -mfentry isn’t supported for 32-bit in combination with -fpic Tagging it stable so it is possible to compile recent stable kernels as well. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
-
Stefan Richter authored
[ Upstream commit e9300a4b ] RFC 2734 defines the datagram_size field in fragment encapsulation headers thus: datagram_size: The encoded size of the entire IP datagram. The value of datagram_size [...] SHALL be one less than the value of Total Length in the datagram's IP header (see STD 5, RFC 791). Accordingly, the eth1394 driver of Linux 2.6.36 and older set and got this field with a -/+1 offset: ether1394_tx() /* transmit */ ether1394_encapsulate_prep() hdr->ff.dg_size = dg_size - 1; ether1394_data_handler() /* receive */ if (hdr->common.lf == ETH1394_HDR_LF_FF) dg_size = hdr->ff.dg_size + 1; else dg_size = hdr->sf.dg_size + 1; Likewise, I observe OS X 10.4 and Windows XP Pro SP3 to transmit 1500 byte sized datagrams in fragments with datagram_size=1499 if link fragmentation is required. Only firewire-net sets and gets datagram_size without this offset. The result is lacking interoperability of firewire-net with OS X, Windows XP, and presumably Linux' eth1394. (I did not test with the latter.) For example, FTP data transfers to a Linux firewire-net box with max_rec smaller than the 1500 bytes MTU - from OS X fail entirely, - from Win XP start out with a bunch of fragmented datagrams which time out, then continue with unfragmented datagrams because Win XP temporarily reduces the MTU to 576 bytes. So let's fix firewire-net's datagram_size accessors. Note that firewire-net thereby loses interoperability with unpatched firewire-net, but only if link fragmentation is employed. (This happens with large broadcast datagrams, and with large datagrams on several FireWire CardBus cards with smaller max_rec than equivalent PCI cards, and it can be worked around by setting a small enough MTU.) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de> Signed-off-by:
-
Stefan Richter authored
[ Upstream commit 667121ac ] The IP-over-1394 driver firewire-net lacked input validation when handling incoming fragmented datagrams. A maliciously formed fragment with a respectively large datagram_offset would cause a memcpy past the datagram buffer. So, drop any packets carrying a fragment with offset + length larger than datagram_size. In addition, ensure that - GASP header, unfragmented encapsulation header, or fragment encapsulation header actually exists before we access it, - the encapsulated datagram or fragment is of nonzero size. Reported-by:
Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
-
John David Anglin authored
[ Upstream commit 6ed51832 ] We have one critical section in the syscall entry path in which we switch from the userspace stack to kernel stack. In the event of an external interrupt, the interrupt code distinguishes between those two states by analyzing the value of sr7. If sr7 is zero, it uses the kernel stack. Therefore it's important, that the value of sr7 is in sync with the currently enabled stack. This patch now disables interrupts while executing the critical section. This prevents the interrupt handler to possibly see an inconsistent state which in the worst case can lead to crashes. Interestingly, in the syscall exit path interrupts were already disabled in the critical section which switches back to the userspace stack. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net> Signed-off-by:
Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Signed-off-by:
-
Miklos Szeredi authored
[ Upstream commit 641089c1 ] Make sure the copied up file hits the disk before renaming to the final destination. If this is not done then the copy-up may corrupt the data in the file in case of a crash. Signed-off-by:
-
Matt Redfearn authored
[ Upstream commit 34563769 ] Commit c6017e79 ("virtio: console: add locks around buffer removal in port unplug path") added locking around the freeing of buffers in the vq. However, when free_buf() is called with can_sleep = true and rproc is enabled, it calls dma_free_coherent() directly, requiring interrupts to be enabled. Currently a WARNING is triggered due to the spin locking around free_buf, with a call stack like this: WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 121 at ./include/linux/dma-mapping.h:433 free_buf+0x1a8/0x288 Call Trace: [<8040c538>] show_stack+0x74/0xc0 [<80757240>] dump_stack+0xd0/0x110 [<80430d98>] __warn+0xfc/0x130 [<80430ee0>] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x3c [<807e7c6c>] free_buf+0x1a8/0x288 [<807ea590>] remove_port_data+0x50/0xac [<807ea6a0>] unplug_port+0xb4/0x1bc [<807ea858>] virtcons_remove+0xb0/0xfc [<807b6734>] virtio_dev_remove+0x58/0xc0 [<807f918c>] __device_release_driver+0xac/0x134 [<807f924c>] device_release_driver+0x38/0x50 [<807f7edc>] bus_remove_device+0xfc/0x130 [<807f4b74>] device_del+0x17c/0x21c [<807f4c38>] device_unregister+0x24/0x38 [<807b6b50>] unregister_virtio_device+0x28/0x44 Fix this by restructuring the loops to allow the locks to only be taken where it is necessary to protect the vqs, and release it while the buffer is being freed. Fixes: c6017e79 ("virtio: console: add locks around buffer removal in port unplug path") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Matt Redfearn <matt.redfearn@imgtec.com> Signed-off-by:
Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
-
NeilBrown authored
[ Upstream commit 1217e1d1 ] mddev->curr_resync usually records where the current resync is up to, but during the starting phase it has some "magic" values. 1 - means that the array is trying to start a resync, but has yielded to another array which shares physical devices, and also needs to start a resync 2 - means the array is trying to start resync, but has found another array which shares physical devices and has already started resync. 3 - means that resync has commensed, but it is possible that nothing has actually been resynced yet. It is important that this value not be visible to user-space and particularly that it doesn't get written to the metadata, as the resync or recovery checkpoint. In part, this is because it may be slightly higher than the correct value, though this is very rare. In part, because it is not a multiple of 4K, and some devices only support 4K aligned accesses. There are two places where this value is propagates into either ->curr_resync_completed or ->recovery_cp or ->recovery_offset. These currently avoid the propagation of values 1 and 3, but will allow 3 to leak through. Change them to only propagate the value if it is > 3. As this can cause an array to fail, the patch is suitable for -stable. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (v3.7+) Reported-by:
Viswesh <viswesh.vichu@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
-
NeilBrown authored
[ Upstream commit 5ed1df2e ] There can be a small window between the moment that recovery actually writes the last block and the time when various sysfs and /proc/mdstat attributes report that it has finished. During this time, 'sync_completed' can have the wrong value. This can confuse monitoring software. So: - don't set curr_resync_completed beyond the end of the devices, - set it correctly when resync/recovery has completed. Signed-off-by:
-
Ching Huang authored
[ Upstream commit 2bf7dc84 ] The arcmsr driver failed to pass SYNCHRONIZE CACHE to controller firmware. Depending on how drive caches are handled internally by controller firmware this could potentially lead to data integrity problems. Ensure that cache flushes are passed to the controller. [mkp: applied by hand and removed unused vars] Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Ching Huang <ching2048@areca.com.tw> Reported-by:
-
