- 19 Sep, 2019 26 commits
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Suraj Jitindar Singh authored
commit 6fbcdd59 upstream. Commit ddf35cf3 ("powerpc: Use barrier_nospec in copy_from_user()") Added barrier_nospec before loading from user-controlled pointers. The intention was to order the load from the potentially user-controlled pointer vs a previous branch based on an access_ok() check or similar. In order to achieve the same result, add a barrier_nospec to the raw_copy_in_user() function before loading from such a user-controlled pointer. Fixes: ddf35cf3 ("powerpc: Use barrier_nospec in copy_from_user()") Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <sjitindarsingh@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Steve Wahl authored
x86/purgatory: Change compiler flags from -mcmodel=kernel to -mcmodel=large to fix kexec relocation errors commit e16c2983 upstream. The last change to this Makefile caused relocation errors when loading a kdump kernel. Restore -mcmodel=large (not -mcmodel=kernel), -ffreestanding, and -fno-zero-initialized-bsss, without reverting to the former practice of resetting KBUILD_CFLAGS. Purgatory.ro is a standalone binary that is not linked against the rest of the kernel. Its image is copied into an array that is linked to the kernel, and from there kexec relocates it wherever it desires. With the previous change to compiler flags, the error "kexec: Overflow in relocation type 11 value 0x11fffd000" was encountered when trying to load the crash kernel. This is from kexec code trying to relocate the purgatory.ro object. From the error message, relocation type 11 is R_X86_64_32S. The x86_64 ABI says: "The R_X86_64_32 and R_X86_64_32S relocations truncate the computed value to 32-bits. The linker must verify that the generated value for the R_X86_64_32 (R_X86_64_32S) relocation zero-extends (sign-extends) to the original 64-bit value." This type of relocation doesn't work when kexec chooses to place the purgatory binary in memory that is not reachable with 32 bit addresses. The compiler flag -mcmodel=kernel allows those type of relocations to be emitted, so revert to using -mcmodel=large as was done before. Also restore the -ffreestanding and -fno-zero-initialized-bss flags because they are appropriate for a stand alone piece of object code which doesn't explicitly zero the bss, and one other report has said undefined symbols are encountered without -ffreestanding. These identical compiler flag changes need to happen for every object that becomes part of the purgatory.ro object, so gather them together first into PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE and PURGATORY_CFLAGS, and then apply them to each of the objects that have C source. Do not apply any of these flags to kexec-purgatory.o, which is not part of the standalone object but part of the kernel proper. Tested-by: Vaibhav Rustagi <vaibhavrustagi@google.com> Tested-by: Andreas Smas <andreas@lonelycoder.com> Signed-off-by: Steve Wahl <steve.wahl@hpe.com> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: None Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com Cc: dimitri.sivanich@hpe.com Cc: mike.travis@hpe.com Cc: russ.anderson@hpe.com Fixes: b059f801 ("x86/purgatory: Use CFLAGS_REMOVE rather than reset KBUILD_CFLAGS") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190905202346.GA26595@swahl-linuxSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Andreas Smas <andreas@lonelycoder.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Paolo Bonzini authored
commit f7eea636 upstream. The implementation of vmread to memory is still incomplete, as it lacks the ability to do vmread to I/O memory just like vmptrst. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Fuqian Huang authored
commit 541ab2ae upstream. Emulation of VMPTRST can incorrectly inject a page fault when passed an operand that points to an MMIO address. The page fault will use uninitialized kernel stack memory as the CR2 and error code. The right behavior would be to abort the VM with a KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR exit to userspace; however, it is not an easy fix, so for now just ensure that the error code and CR2 are zero. Signed-off-by: Fuqian Huang <huangfq.daxian@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [add comment] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Thomas Huth authored
commit 53936b5b upstream. When the userspace program runs the KVM_S390_INTERRUPT ioctl to inject an interrupt, we convert them from the legacy struct kvm_s390_interrupt to the new struct kvm_s390_irq via the s390int_to_s390irq() function. However, this function does not take care of all types of interrupts that we can inject into the guest later (see do_inject_vcpu()). Since we do not clear out the s390irq values before calling s390int_to_s390irq(), there is a chance that we copy random data from the kernel stack which could be leaked to the userspace later. Specifically, the problem exists with the KVM_S390_INT_PFAULT_INIT interrupt: s390int_to_s390irq() does not handle it, and the function __inject_pfault_init() later copies irq->u.ext which contains the random kernel stack data. This data can then be leaked either to the guest memory in __deliver_pfault_init(), or the userspace might retrieve it directly with the KVM_S390_GET_IRQ_STATE ioctl. Fix it by handling that interrupt type in s390int_to_s390irq(), too, and by making sure that the s390irq struct is properly pre-initialized. And while we're at it, make sure that s390int_to_s390irq() now directly returns -EINVAL for unknown interrupt types, so that we immediately get a proper error code in case we add more interrupt types to do_inject_vcpu() without updating s390int_to_s390irq() sometime in the future. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20190912115438.25761-1-thuth@redhat.comSigned-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Igor Mammedov authored
commit 13a17cc0 upstream. If userspace doesn't set KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES on memslot before calling kvm_s390_vm_start_migration(), kernel will oops with: Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference in virtual kernel address space Failing address: 0000000000000000 TEID: 0000000000000483 Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE. AS:0000000002a2000b R2:00000001bff8c00b R3:00000001bff88007 S:00000001bff91000 P:000000000000003d Oops: 0004 ilc:2 [#1] SMP ... Call Trace: ([<001fffff804ec552>] kvm_s390_vm_set_attr+0x347a/0x3828 [kvm]) [<001fffff804ecfc0>] kvm_arch_vm_ioctl+0x6c0/0x1998 [kvm] [<001fffff804b67e4>] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x51c/0x11a8 [kvm] [<00000000008ba572>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1d2/0xe58 [<00000000008bb284>] ksys_ioctl+0x8c/0xb8 [<00000000008bb2e2>] sys_ioctl+0x32/0x40 [<000000000175552c>] system_call+0x2b8/0x2d8 INFO: lockdep is turned off. Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<0000000000dbaf60>] __memset+0xc/0xa0 due to ms->dirty_bitmap being NULL, which might crash the host. Make sure that ms->dirty_bitmap is set before using it or return -EINVAL otherwise. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: afdad616 ("KVM: s390: Fix storage attributes migration with memory slots") Signed-off-by: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20190911075218.29153-1-imammedo@redhat.com/Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Yunfeng Ye authored
commit eddf3e9c upstream. The following crash was observed: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158 Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP pc : resend_irqs+0x68/0xb0 lr : resend_irqs+0x64/0xb0 ... Call trace: resend_irqs+0x68/0xb0 tasklet_action_common.isra.6+0x84/0x138 tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38 __do_softirq+0x120/0x324 run_ksoftirqd+0x44/0x60 smpboot_thread_fn+0x1ac/0x1e8 kthread+0x134/0x138 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 The reason for this is that the interrupt resend mechanism happens in soft interrupt context, which is a asynchronous mechanism versus other operations on interrupts. free_irq() does not take resend handling into account. Thus, the irq descriptor might be already freed before the resend tasklet is executed. resend_irqs() does not check the return value of the interrupt descriptor lookup and derefences the return value unconditionally. 1): __setup_irq irq_startup check_irq_resend // activate softirq to handle resend irq 2): irq_domain_free_irqs irq_free_descs free_desc call_rcu(&desc->rcu, delayed_free_desc) 3): __do_softirq tasklet_action resend_irqs desc = irq_to_desc(irq) desc->handle_irq(desc) // desc is NULL --> Ooops Fix this by adding a NULL pointer check in resend_irqs() before derefencing the irq descriptor. Fixes: a4633adc ("[PATCH] genirq: add genirq sw IRQ-retrigger") Signed-off-by: Yunfeng Ye <yeyunfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Zhiqiang Liu <liuzhiqiang26@huawei.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1630ae13-5c8e-901e-de09-e740b6a426a7@huawei.comSigned-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Alexander Duyck authored
commit 377228ac upstream. There were a couple cases where the ITR value generated via the adaptive ITR scheme could exceed 126. This resulted in the value becoming either 0 or something less than 10. Switching back and forth between a value less than 10 and a value greater than 10 can cause issues as certain hardware features such as RSC to not function well when the ITR value has dropped that low. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: b4ded832 ("ixgbe: Update adaptive ITR algorithm") Reported-by: Gregg Leventhal <gleventhal@janestreet.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <andrewx.bowers@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Filipe Manana authored
commit 410f954c upstream. Sometimes when fsync'ing a file we need to log that other inodes exist and when we need to do that we acquire a reference on the inodes and then drop that reference using iput() after logging them. That generally is not a problem except if we end up doing the final iput() (dropping the last reference) on the inode and that inode has a link count of 0, which can happen in a very short time window if the logging path gets a reference on the inode while it's being unlinked. In that case we end up getting the eviction callback, btrfs_evict_inode(), invoked through the iput() call chain which needs to drop all of the inode's items from its subvolume btree, and in order to do that, it needs to join a transaction at the helper function evict_refill_and_join(). However because the task previously started a transaction at the fsync handler, btrfs_sync_file(), it has current->journal_info already pointing to a transaction handle and therefore evict_refill_and_join() will get that transaction handle from btrfs_join_transaction(). From this point on, two different problems can happen: 1) evict_refill_and_join() will often change the transaction handle's block reserve (->block_rsv) and set its ->bytes_reserved field to a value greater than 0. If evict_refill_and_join() never commits the transaction, the eviction handler ends up decreasing the reference count (->use_count) of the transaction handle through the call to btrfs_end_transaction(), and after that point we have a transaction handle with a NULL ->block_rsv (which is the value prior to the transaction join from evict_refill_and_join()) and a ->bytes_reserved value greater than 0. If after the eviction/iput completes the inode logging path hits an error or it decides that it must fallback to a transaction commit, the btrfs fsync handle, btrfs_sync_file(), gets a non-zero value from btrfs_log_dentry_safe(), and because of that non-zero value it tries to commit the transaction using a handle with a NULL ->block_rsv and a non-zero ->bytes_reserved value. This makes the transaction commit hit an assertion failure at btrfs_trans_release_metadata() because ->bytes_reserved is not zero but the ->block_rsv is NULL. The produced stack trace for that is like the following: [192922.917158] assertion failed: !trans->bytes_reserved, file: fs/btrfs/transaction.c, line: 816 [192922.917553] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [192922.917922] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3532! [192922.918310] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI [192922.918666] CPU: 2 PID: 883 Comm: fsstress Tainted: G W 5.1.4-btrfs-next-47 #1 [192922.919035] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.2-0-gf9626ccb91-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [192922.919801] RIP: 0010:assfail.constprop.25+0x18/0x1a [btrfs] (...) [192922.920925] RSP: 0018:ffffaebdc8a27da8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [192922.921315] RAX: 0000000000000051 RBX: ffff95c9c16a41c0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [192922.921692] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff95cab6b16838 RDI: ffff95cab6b16838 [192922.922066] RBP: ffff95c9c16a41c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [192922.922442] R10: ffffaebdc8a27e70 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff95ca731a0980 [192922.922820] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff95ca84c73338 R15: ffff95ca731a0ea8 [192922.923200] FS: 00007f337eda4e80(0000) GS:ffff95cab6b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [192922.923579] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [192922.923948] CR2: 00007f337edad000 CR3: 00000001e00f6002 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [192922.924329] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [192922.924711] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [192922.925105] Call Trace: [192922.925505] btrfs_trans_release_metadata+0x10c/0x170 [btrfs] [192922.925911] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x3e/0xaf0 [btrfs] [192922.926324] btrfs_sync_file+0x44c/0x490 [btrfs] [192922.926731] do_fsync+0x38/0x60 [192922.927138] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x13/0x20 [192922.927543] do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1c0 [192922.927939] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe (...) [192922.934077] ---[ end trace f00808b12068168f ]--- 2) If evict_refill_and_join() decides to commit the transaction, it will be able to do it, since the nested transaction join only increments the transaction handle's ->use_count reference counter and it does not prevent the transaction from getting committed. This means that after eviction completes, the fsync logging path will be using a transaction handle that refers to an already committed transaction. What happens when using such a stale transaction can be unpredictable, we are at least having a use-after-free on the transaction handle itself, since the transaction commit will call kmem_cache_free() against the handle regardless of its ->use_count value, or we can end up silently losing all the updates to the log tree after that iput() in the logging path, or using a transaction handle that in the meanwhile was allocated to another task for a new transaction, etc, pretty much unpredictable what can happen. In order to fix both of them, instead of using iput() during logging, use btrfs_add_delayed_iput(), so that the logging path of fsync never drops the last reference on an inode, that step is offloaded to a safe context (usually the cleaner kthread). The assertion failure issue was sporadically triggered by the test case generic/475 from fstests, which loads the dm error target while fsstress is running, which lead to fsync failing while logging inodes with -EIO errors and then trying later to commit the transaction, triggering the assertion failure. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Kent Gibson authored
commit e95fbc13 upstream. linehandle_create should not allow both GPIOHANDLE_REQUEST_INPUT and GPIOHANDLE_REQUEST_OUTPUT to be set. Fixes: d7c51b47 ("gpio: userspace ABI for reading/writing GPIO lines") Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kent Gibson <warthog618@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bgolaszewski@baylibre.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Hans de Goede authored
commit 61f7f7c8 upstream. Another day; another DSDT bug we need to workaround... Since commit ca876c74 ("gpiolib-acpi: make sure we trigger edge events at least once on boot") we call _AEI edge handlers at boot. In some rare cases this causes problems. One example of this is the Minix Neo Z83-4 mini PC, this device has a clear DSDT bug where it has some copy and pasted code for dealing with Micro USB-B connector host/device role switching, while the mini PC does not even have a micro-USB connector. This code, which should not be there, messes with the DDC data pin from the HDMI connector (switching it to GPIO mode) breaking HDMI support. To avoid problems like this, this commit adds a new gpiolib_acpi.run_edge_events_on_boot kernel commandline option, which allows disabling the running of _AEI edge event handlers at boot. The default value is -1/auto which uses a DMI based blacklist, the initial version of this blacklist contains the Neo Z83-4 fixing the HDMI breakage. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Daniel Drake <drake@endlessm.com> Cc: Ian W MORRISON <ianwmorrison@gmail.com> Reported-by: Ian W MORRISON <ianwmorrison@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Ian W MORRISON <ianwmorrison@gmail.com> Fixes: ca876c74 ("gpiolib-acpi: make sure we trigger edge events at least once on boot") Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190827202835.213456-1-hdegoede@redhat.comAcked-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Ian W MORRISON <ianwmorrison@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Yang Yingliang authored
[ Upstream commit 77f22f92 ] I got a UAF repport in tun driver when doing fuzzy test: [ 466.269490] ================================================================== [ 466.271792] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tun_chr_read_iter+0x2ca/0x2d0 [ 466.271806] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888372139250 by task tun-test/2699 [ 466.271810] [ 466.271824] CPU: 1 PID: 2699 Comm: tun-test Not tainted 5.3.0-rc1-00001-g5a9433db2614-dirty #427 [ 466.271833] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 466.271838] Call Trace: [ 466.271858] dump_stack+0xca/0x13e [ 466.271871] ? tun_chr_read_iter+0x2ca/0x2d0 [ 466.271890] print_address_description+0x79/0x440 [ 466.271906] ? vprintk_func+0x5e/0xf0 [ 466.271920] ? tun_chr_read_iter+0x2ca/0x2d0 [ 466.271935] __kasan_report+0x15c/0x1df [ 466.271958] ? tun_chr_read_iter+0x2ca/0x2d0 [ 466.271976] kasan_report+0xe/0x20 [ 466.271987] tun_chr_read_iter+0x2ca/0x2d0 [ 466.272013] do_iter_readv_writev+0x4b7/0x740 [ 466.272032] ? default_llseek+0x2d0/0x2d0 [ 466.272072] do_iter_read+0x1c5/0x5e0 [ 466.272110] vfs_readv+0x108/0x180 [ 466.299007] ? compat_rw_copy_check_uvector+0x440/0x440 [ 466.299020] ? fsnotify+0x888/0xd50 [ 466.299040] ? __fsnotify_parent+0xd0/0x350 [ 466.299064] ? fsnotify_first_mark+0x1e0/0x1e0 [ 466.304548] ? vfs_write+0x264/0x510 [ 466.304569] ? ksys_write+0x101/0x210 [ 466.304591] ? do_preadv+0x116/0x1a0 [ 466.304609] do_preadv+0x116/0x1a0 [ 466.309829] do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x600 [ 466.309849] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 466.309861] RIP: 0033:0x4560f9 [ 466.309875] Code: 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 466.309889] RSP: 002b:00007ffffa5166e8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000127 [ 466.322992] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000400460 RCX: 00000000004560f9 [ 466.322999] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 00000000200008c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 466.323007] RBP: 00007ffffa516700 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 466.323014] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 000000000040cb10 [ 466.323021] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000006d7018 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 466.323057] [ 466.323064] Allocated by task 2605: [ 466.335165] save_stack+0x19/0x80 [ 466.336240] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.8+0xa0/0xd0 [ 466.337755] kmem_cache_alloc+0xe8/0x320 [ 466.339050] getname_flags+0xca/0x560 [ 466.340229] user_path_at_empty+0x2c/0x50 [ 466.341508] vfs_statx+0xe6/0x190 [ 466.342619] __do_sys_newstat+0x81/0x100 [ 466.343908] do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x600 [ 466.345303] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 466.347034] [ 466.347517] Freed by task 2605: [ 466.348471] save_stack+0x19/0x80 [ 466.349476] __kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x180 [ 466.350726] kmem_cache_free+0xc8/0x430 [ 466.351874] putname+0xe2/0x120 [ 466.352921] filename_lookup+0x257/0x3e0 [ 466.354319] vfs_statx+0xe6/0x190 [ 466.355498] __do_sys_newstat+0x81/0x100 [ 466.356889] do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x600 [ 466.358037] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 466.359567] [ 466.360050] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888372139100 [ 466.360050] which belongs to the cache names_cache of size 4096 [ 466.363735] The buggy address is located 336 bytes inside of [ 466.363735] 4096-byte region [ffff888372139100, ffff88837213a100) [ 466.367179] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 466.368604] page:ffffea000dc84e00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8883df1b4f00 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 466.371582] flags: 0x2fffff80010200(slab|head) [ 466.372910] raw: 002fffff80010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff8883df1b4f00 [ 466.375209] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000070007 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 466.377778] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 466.379730] [ 466.380288] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 466.381844] ffff888372139100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 466.384009] ffff888372139180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 466.386131] >ffff888372139200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 466.388257] ^ [ 466.390234] ffff888372139280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 466.392512] ffff888372139300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 466.394667] ================================================================== tun_chr_read_iter() accessed the memory which freed by free_netdev() called by tun_set_iff(): CPUA CPUB tun_set_iff() alloc_netdev_mqs() tun_attach() tun_chr_read_iter() tun_get() tun_do_read() tun_ring_recv() register_netdevice() <-- inject error goto err_detach tun_detach_all() <-- set RCV_SHUTDOWN free_netdev() <-- called from err_free_dev path netdev_freemem() <-- free the memory without check refcount (In this path, the refcount cannot prevent freeing the memory of dev, and the memory will be used by dev_put() called by tun_chr_read_iter() on CPUB.) (Break from tun_ring_recv(), because RCV_SHUTDOWN is set) tun_put() dev_put() <-- use the memory freed by netdev_freemem() Put the publishing of tfile->tun after register_netdevice(), so tun_get() won't get the tun pointer that freed by err_detach path if register_netdevice() failed. Fixes: eb0fb363 ("tuntap: attach queue 0 before registering netdevice") Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Suggested-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Xin Long authored
[ Upstream commit 42dec1db ] Unlike kfree(p), kfree_rcu(p, rcu) won't do NULL pointer check. When tipc_nametbl_remove_publ returns NULL, the panic below happens: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000068 RIP: 0010:__call_rcu+0x1d/0x290 Call Trace: <IRQ> tipc_publ_notify+0xa9/0x170 [tipc] tipc_node_write_unlock+0x8d/0x100 [tipc] tipc_node_link_down+0xae/0x1d0 [tipc] tipc_node_check_dest+0x3ea/0x8f0 [tipc] ? tipc_disc_rcv+0x2c7/0x430 [tipc] tipc_disc_rcv+0x2c7/0x430 [tipc] ? tipc_rcv+0x6bb/0xf20 [tipc] tipc_rcv+0x6bb/0xf20 [tipc] ? ip_route_input_slow+0x9cf/0xb10 tipc_udp_recv+0x195/0x1e0 [tipc] ? tipc_udp_is_known_peer+0x80/0x80 [tipc] udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x180/0x460 udp_unicast_rcv_skb.isra.56+0x75/0x90 __udp4_lib_rcv+0x4ce/0xb90 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x11c/0x210 ip_local_deliver+0x6b/0xe0 ? ip_rcv_finish+0xa9/0x410 ip_rcv+0x273/0x362 Fixes: 97ede29e ("tipc: convert name table read-write lock to RCU") Reported-by: Li Shuang <shuali@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Neal Cardwell authored
[ Upstream commit af38d07e ] Fix tcp_ecn_withdraw_cwr() to clear the correct bit: TCP_ECN_QUEUE_CWR. Rationale: basically, TCP_ECN_DEMAND_CWR is a bit that is purely about the behavior of data receivers, and deciding whether to reflect incoming IP ECN CE marks as outgoing TCP th->ece marks. The TCP_ECN_QUEUE_CWR bit is purely about the behavior of data senders, and deciding whether to send CWR. The tcp_ecn_withdraw_cwr() function is only called from tcp_undo_cwnd_reduction() by data senders during an undo, so it should zero the sender-side state, TCP_ECN_QUEUE_CWR. It does not make sense to stop the reflection of incoming CE bits on incoming data packets just because outgoing packets were spuriously retransmitted. The bug has been reproduced with packetdrill to manifest in a scenario with RFC3168 ECN, with an incoming data packet with CE bit set and carrying a TCP timestamp value that causes cwnd undo. Before this fix, the IP CE bit was ignored and not reflected in the TCP ECE header bit, and sender sent a TCP CWR ('W') bit on the next outgoing data packet, even though the cwnd reduction had been undone. After this fix, the sender properly reflects the CE bit and does not set the W bit. Note: the bug actually predates 2005 git history; this Fixes footer is chosen to be the oldest SHA1 I have tested (from Sep 2007) for which the patch applies cleanly (since before this commit the code was in a .h file). Fixes: bdf1ee5d ("[TCP]: Move code from tcp_ecn.h to tcp*.c and tcp.h & remove it") Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Xin Long authored
[ Upstream commit 10eb56c5 ] Transport should use its own pf_retrans to do the error_count check, instead of asoc's. Otherwise, it's meaningless to make pf_retrans per transport. Fixes: 5aa93bcf ("sctp: Implement quick failover draft from tsvwg") Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Christophe JAILLET authored
[ Upstream commit b456d724 ] The '.exit' functions from 'pernet_operations' structure should be marked as __net_exit, not __net_init. Fixes: 8e2d61e0 ("sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization") Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr> Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Cong Wang authored
[ Upstream commit d4d6ec6d ] In case of TCA_HHF_NON_HH_WEIGHT or TCA_HHF_QUANTUM is zero, it would make no progress inside the loop in hhf_dequeue() thus kernel would get stuck. Fix this by checking this corner case in hhf_change(). Fixes: 10239edf ("net-qdisc-hhf: Heavy-Hitter Filter (HHF) qdisc") Reported-by: syzbot+bc6297c11f19ee807dc2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+041483004a7f45f1f20a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+55be5f513bed37fc4367@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us> Cc: Terry Lam <vtlam@google.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit b88dd52c ] Whenever MQ is not used on a multiqueue device, we experience serious reordering problems. Bisection found the cited commit. The issue can be described this way : - A single qdisc hierarchy is shared by all transmit queues. (eg : tc qdisc replace dev eth0 root fq_codel) - When/if try_bulk_dequeue_skb_slow() dequeues a packet targetting a different transmit queue than the one used to build a packet train, we stop building the current list and save the 'bad' skb (P1) in a special queue. (bad_txq) - When dequeue_skb() calls qdisc_dequeue_skb_bad_txq() and finds this skb (P1), it checks if the associated transmit queues is still in frozen state. If the queue is still blocked (by BQL or NIC tx ring full), we leave the skb in bad_txq and return NULL. - dequeue_skb() calls q->dequeue() to get another packet (P2) The other packet can target the problematic queue (that we found in frozen state for the bad_txq packet), but another cpu just ran TX completion and made room in the txq that is now ready to accept new packets. - Packet P2 is sent while P1 is still held in bad_txq, P1 might be sent at next round. In practice P2 is the lead of a big packet train (P2,P3,P4 ...) filling the BQL budget and delaying P1 by many packets :/ To solve this problem, we have to block the dequeue process as long as the first packet in bad_txq can not be sent. Reordering issues disappear and no side effects have been seen. Fixes: a53851e2 ("net: sched: explicit locking in gso_cpu fallback") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Stefan Chulski authored
[ Upstream commit 63b2ed4e ] Regarding to IEEE 802.3-2015 standard section 2 28B.3 Priority resolution - Table 28-3 - Pause resolution In case of Local device Pause=1 AsymDir=0, Link partner Pause=1 AsymDir=1, Local device resolution should be enable PAUSE transmit, disable PAUSE receive. And in case of Local device Pause=1 AsymDir=1, Link partner Pause=1 AsymDir=0, Local device resolution should be enable PAUSE receive, disable PAUSE transmit. Fixes: 9525ae83 ("phylink: add phylink infrastructure") Signed-off-by: Stefan Chulski <stefanc@marvell.com> Reported-by: Shaul Ben-Mayor <shaulb@marvell.com> Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Shmulik Ladkani authored
[ Upstream commit 3dcbdb13 ] Historically, support for frag_list packets entering skb_segment() was limited to frag_list members terminating on exact same gso_size boundaries. This is verified with a BUG_ON since commit 89319d38 ("net: Add frag_list support to skb_segment"), quote: As such we require all frag_list members terminate on exact MSS boundaries. This is checked using BUG_ON. As there should only be one producer in the kernel of such packets, namely GRO, this requirement should not be difficult to maintain. However, since commit 6578171a ("bpf: add bpf_skb_change_proto helper"), the "exact MSS boundaries" assumption no longer holds: An eBPF program using bpf_skb_change_proto() DOES modify 'gso_size', but leaves the frag_list members as originally merged by GRO with the original 'gso_size'. Example of such programs are bpf-based NAT46 or NAT64. This lead to a kernel BUG_ON for flows involving: - GRO generating a frag_list skb - bpf program performing bpf_skb_change_proto() or bpf_skb_adjust_room() - skb_segment() of the skb See example BUG_ON reports in [0]. In commit 13acc94e ("net: permit skb_segment on head_frag frag_list skb"), skb_segment() was modified to support the "gso_size mangling" case of a frag_list GRO'ed skb, but *only* for frag_list members having head_frag==true (having a page-fragment head). Alas, GRO packets having frag_list members with a linear kmalloced head (head_frag==false) still hit the BUG_ON. This commit adds support to skb_segment() for a 'head_skb' packet having a frag_list whose members are *non* head_frag, with gso_size mangled, by disabling SG and thus falling-back to copying the data from the given 'head_skb' into the generated segmented skbs - as suggested by Willem de Bruijn [1]. Since this approach involves the penalty of skb_copy_and_csum_bits() when building the segments, care was taken in order to enable this solution only when required: - untrusted gso_size, by testing SKB_GSO_DODGY is set (SKB_GSO_DODGY is set by any gso_size mangling functions in net/core/filter.c) - the frag_list is non empty, its item is a non head_frag, *and* the headlen of the given 'head_skb' does not match the gso_size. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20190826170724.25ff616f@pixies/ https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/9265b93f-253d-6b8c-f2b8-4b54eff1835c@fb.com/ [1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CA+FuTSfVsgNDi7c=GUU8nMg2hWxF2SjCNLXetHeVPdnxAW5K-w@mail.gmail.com/ Fixes: 6578171a ("bpf: add bpf_skb_change_proto helper") Suggested-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.duyck@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Shmulik Ladkani <shmulik.ladkani@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan authored
[ Upstream commit 10cc514f ] In event of failure during register_netdevice, free_netdev is invoked immediately. free_netdev assumes that all the netdevice refcounts have been dropped prior to it being called and as a result frees and clears out the refcount pointer. However, this is not necessarily true as some of the operations in the NETDEV_UNREGISTER notifier handlers queue RCU callbacks for invocation after a grace period. The IPv4 callback in_dev_rcu_put tries to access the refcount after free_netdev is called which leads to a null de-reference- 44837.761523: <6> Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000004a88287000 44837.761651: <2> pc : in_dev_finish_destroy+0x4c/0xc8 44837.761654: <2> lr : in_dev_finish_destroy+0x2c/0xc8 44837.762393: <2> Call trace: 44837.762398: <2> in_dev_finish_destroy+0x4c/0xc8 44837.762404: <2> in_dev_rcu_put+0x24/0x30 44837.762412: <2> rcu_nocb_kthread+0x43c/0x468 44837.762418: <2> kthread+0x118/0x128 44837.762424: <2> ret_from_fork+0x10/0x1c Fix this by waiting for the completion of the call_rcu() in case of register_netdevice errors. Fixes: 93ee31f1 ("[NET]: Fix free_netdev on register_netdev failure.") Cc: Sean Tranchetti <stranche@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <subashab@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Steffen Klassert authored
[ Upstream commit f39b683d ] The ixgbe driver currently does IPsec TX offloading based on an existing secpath. However, the secpath can also come from the RX side, in this case it is misinterpreted for TX offload and the packets are dropped with a "bad sa_idx" error. Fix this by using the xfrm_offload() function to test for TX offload. Fixes: 59259470 ("ixgbe: process the Tx ipsec offload") Reported-by: Michael Marley <michael@michaelmarley.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Eric Biggers authored
[ Upstream commit fe163e53 ] syzbot reported: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in capi_write+0x791/0xa90 drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:700 CPU: 0 PID: 10025 Comm: syz-executor379 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #2 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613 __msan_warning+0x82/0xf0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:313 capi_write+0x791/0xa90 drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:700 do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:703 [inline] do_iter_write+0x83e/0xd80 fs/read_write.c:961 vfs_writev fs/read_write.c:1004 [inline] do_writev+0x397/0x840 fs/read_write.c:1039 __do_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1112 [inline] __se_sys_writev+0x9b/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1109 __x64_sys_writev+0x4a/0x70 fs/read_write.c:1109 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 [...] The problem is that capi_write() is reading past the end of the message. Fix it by checking the message's length in the needed places. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+0849c524d9c634f5ae66@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Christophe JAILLET authored
[ Upstream commit d23dbc47 ] The '.exit' functions from 'pernet_operations' structure should be marked as __net_exit, not __net_init. Fixes: d862e546 ("net: ipv6: Implement /proc/net/icmp6.") Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Bjørn Mork authored
[ Upstream commit 4d7ffcf3 ] A Mediatek based smartphone owner reports problems with USB tethering in Linux. The verbose USB listing shows a rndis_host interface pair (e0/01/03 + 10/00/00), but the driver fails to bind with [ 355.960428] usb 1-4: bad CDC descriptors The problem is a failsafe test intended to filter out ACM serial functions using the same 02/02/ff class/subclass/protocol as RNDIS. The serial functions are recognized by their non-zero bmCapabilities. No RNDIS function with non-zero bmCapabilities were known at the time this failsafe was added. But it turns out that some Wireless class RNDIS functions are using the bmCapabilities field. These functions are uniquely identified as RNDIS by their class/subclass/protocol, so the failing test can safely be disabled. The same applies to the two types of Misc class RNDIS functions. Applying the failsafe to Communication class functions only retains the original functionality, and fixes the problem for the Mediatek based smartphone. Tow examples of CDC functional descriptors with non-zero bmCapabilities from Wireless class RNDIS functions are: 0e8d:000a Mediatek Crosscall Spider X5 3G Phone CDC Header: bcdCDC 1.10 CDC ACM: bmCapabilities 0x0f connection notifications sends break line coding and serial state get/set/clear comm features CDC Union: bMasterInterface 0 bSlaveInterface 1 CDC Call Management: bmCapabilities 0x03 call management use DataInterface bDataInterface 1 and 19d2:1023 ZTE K4201-z CDC Header: bcdCDC 1.10 CDC ACM: bmCapabilities 0x02 line coding and serial state CDC Call Management: bmCapabilities 0x03 call management use DataInterface bDataInterface 1 CDC Union: bMasterInterface 0 bSlaveInterface 1 The Mediatek example is believed to apply to most smartphones with Mediatek firmware. The ZTE example is most likely also part of a larger family of devices/firmwares. Suggested-by: Lars Melin <larsm17@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Nicolas Dichtel authored
[ Upstream commit 94a72b3f ] NLM_F_MULTI must be used only when a NLMSG_DONE message is sent at the end. In fact, NLMSG_DONE is sent only at the end of a dump. Libraries like libnl will wait forever for NLMSG_DONE. Fixes: 949f1e39 ("bridge: mdb: notify on router port add and del") CC: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 16 Sep, 2019 14 commits
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
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yongduan authored
commit 060423bf upstream. The code assumes log_num < in_num everywhere, and that is true as long as in_num is incremented by descriptor iov count, and log_num by 1. However this breaks if there's a zero sized descriptor. As a result, if a malicious guest creates a vring desc with desc.len = 0, it may cause the host kernel to crash by overflowing the log array. This bug can be triggered during the VM migration. There's no need to log when desc.len = 0, so just don't increment log_num in this case. Fixes: 3a4d5c94 ("vhost_net: a kernel-level virtio server") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Lidong Chen <lidongchen@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: ruippan <ruippan@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: yongduan <yongduan@tencent.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Gustavo Romero authored
[ Upstream commit a8318c13 ] When in userspace and MSR FP=0 the hardware FP state is unrelated to the current process. This is extended for transactions where if tbegin is run with FP=0, the hardware checkpoint FP state will also be unrelated to the current process. Due to this, we need to ensure this hardware checkpoint is updated with the correct state before we enable FP for this process. Unfortunately we get this wrong when returning to a process from a hardware interrupt. A process that starts a transaction with FP=0 can take an interrupt. When the kernel returns back to that process, we change to FP=1 but with hardware checkpoint FP state not updated. If this transaction is then rolled back, the FP registers now contain the wrong state. The process looks like this: Userspace: Kernel Start userspace with MSR FP=0 TM=1 < ----- ... tbegin bne Hardware interrupt ---- > <do_IRQ...> .... ret_from_except restore_math() /* sees FP=0 */ restore_fp() tm_active_with_fp() /* sees FP=1 (Incorrect) */ load_fp_state() FP = 0 -> 1 < ----- Return to userspace with MSR TM=1 FP=1 with junk in the FP TM checkpoint TM rollback reads FP junk When returning from the hardware exception, tm_active_with_fp() is incorrectly making restore_fp() call load_fp_state() which is setting FP=1. The fix is to remove tm_active_with_fp(). tm_active_with_fp() is attempting to handle the case where FP state has been changed inside a transaction. In this case the checkpointed and transactional FP state is different and hence we must restore the FP state (ie. we can't do lazy FP restore inside a transaction that's used FP). It's safe to remove tm_active_with_fp() as this case is handled by restore_tm_state(). restore_tm_state() detects if FP has been using inside a transaction and will set load_fp and call restore_math() to ensure the FP state (checkpoint and transaction) is restored. This is a data integrity problem for the current process as the FP registers are corrupted. It's also a security problem as the FP registers from one process may be leaked to another. Similarly for VMX. A simple testcase to replicate this will be posted to tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c This fixes CVE-2019-15031. Fixes: a7771176 ("powerpc: Don't enable FP/Altivec if not checkpointed") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.15+ Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190904045529.23002-2-gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.comSigned-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Breno Leitao authored
[ Upstream commit 5c784c84 ] Currently msr_tm_active() is a wrapper around MSR_TM_ACTIVE() if CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM is set, or it is just a function that returns false if CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM is not set. This function is not necessary, since MSR_TM_ACTIVE() just do the same and could be used, removing the dualism and simplifying the code. This patchset remove every instance of msr_tm_active() and replaced it by MSR_TM_ACTIVE(). Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Lyude Paul authored
[ Upstream commit ad54567a ] quirk_reset_lenovo_thinkpad_50_nvgpu() resets NVIDIA GPUs to work around an apparent BIOS defect. It previously used pci_reset_function(), and the available method was a bus reset, which was fine because there was only one function on the bus. After b516ea58 ("PCI: Enable NVIDIA HDA controllers"), there are now two functions (the HDA controller and the GPU itself) on the bus, so the reset fails. Use pci_reset_bus() explicitly instead of pci_reset_function() since it's OK to reset both devices. [bhelgaas: commit log, add e0547c81] Fixes: b516ea58 ("PCI: Enable NVIDIA HDA controllers") Fixes: e0547c81 ("PCI: Reset Lenovo ThinkPad P50 nvgpu at boot if necessary") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190801220117.14952-1-lyude@redhat.comSigned-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Acked-by: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com> Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Cc: Daniel Drake <drake@endlessm.com> Cc: Aaron Plattner <aplattner@nvidia.com> Cc: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl> Cc: Ilia Mirkin <imirkin@alum.mit.edu> Cc: Karol Herbst <kherbst@redhat.com> Cc: Maik Freudenberg <hhfeuer@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Colin Ian King authored
[ Upstream commit fbbbbd2f ] There are two cases where u32 variables n and err are being checked for less than zero error values, the checks is always false because the variables are not signed. Fix this by making the variables ints. Addresses-Coverity: ("Unsigned compared against 0") Fixes: 345c0dbf ("ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Theodore Ts'o authored
[ Upstream commit 170417c8 ] Commit 345c0dbf ("ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity") failed to add an exception for the journal inode in ext4_check_blockref(), which is the function used by ext4_get_branch() for indirect blocks. This caused attempts to read from the ext3-style journals to fail with: [ 848.968550] EXT4-fs error (device sdb7): ext4_get_branch:171: inode #8: block 30343695: comm jbd2/sdb7-8: invalid block Fix this by adding the missing exception check. Fixes: 345c0dbf ("ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity") Reported-by: Arthur Marsh <arthur.marsh@internode.on.net> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Theodore Ts'o authored
[ Upstream commit 0a944e8a ] Since the journal inode is already checked when we added it to the block validity's system zone, if we check it again, we'll just trigger a failure. This was causing failures like this: [ 53.897001] EXT4-fs error (device sda): ext4_find_extent:909: inode #8: comm jbd2/sda-8: pblk 121667583 bad header/extent: invalid extent entries - magic f30a, entries 8, max 340(340), depth 0(0) [ 53.931430] jbd2_journal_bmap: journal block not found at offset 49 on sda-8 [ 53.938480] Aborting journal on device sda-8. ... but only if the system was under enough memory pressure that logical->physical mapping for the journal inode gets pushed out of the extent cache. (This is why it wasn't noticed earlier.) Fixes: 345c0dbf ("ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity") Reported-by: Dan Rue <dan.rue@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Tested-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Lyude Paul authored
[ Upstream commit 34ca26a9 ] It appears when testing my previous fix for some of the legacy modesetting issues with MST, I misattributed some kernel splats that started appearing on my machine after a rebase as being from upstream. But it appears they actually came from my patch series: [ 2.980512] [drm:drm_atomic_helper_check_modeset [drm_kms_helper]] Updating routing for [CONNECTOR:65:eDP-1] [ 2.980516] [drm:drm_atomic_helper_check_modeset [drm_kms_helper]] [CONNECTOR:65:eDP-1] is not registered [ 2.980516] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 2.980519] Could not determine valid watermarks for inherited state [ 2.980553] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 551 at drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c:14983 intel_modeset_init+0x14d7/0x19f0 [i915] [ 2.980556] Modules linked in: i915(O+) i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper(O) syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm(O) intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal iTCO_wdt wmi_bmof coretemp crc32_pclmul psmouse i2c_i801 mei_me mei i2c_core lpc_ich mfd_core tpm_tis tpm_tis_core wmi tpm thinkpad_acpi pcc_cpufreq video ehci_pci crc32c_intel serio_raw ehci_hcd xhci_pci xhci_hcd [ 2.980577] CPU: 3 PID: 551 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G O 4.19.0-rc7Lyude-Test+ #1 [ 2.980579] Hardware name: LENOVO 20BWS1KY00/20BWS1KY00, BIOS JBET63WW (1.27 ) 11/10/2016 [ 2.980605] RIP: 0010:intel_modeset_init+0x14d7/0x19f0 [i915] [ 2.980607] Code: 89 df e8 ec 27 02 00 e9 24 f2 ff ff be 03 00 00 00 48 89 df e8 da 27 02 00 e9 26 f2 ff ff 48 c7 c7 c8 d1 34 a0 e8 23 cf dc e0 <0f> 0b e9 7c fd ff ff f6 c4 04 0f 85 37 f7 ff ff 48 8b 83 60 08 00 [ 2.980611] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000287988 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 2.980614] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88031b488000 RCX: 0000000000000006 [ 2.980617] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000086 RDI: ffff880321ad54d0 [ 2.980620] RBP: ffffc90000287a10 R08: 000000000000040a R09: 0000000000000065 [ 2.980623] R10: ffff88030ebb8f00 R11: ffffffff81416590 R12: ffff88031b488000 [ 2.980626] R13: ffff88031b4883a0 R14: ffffc900002879a8 R15: ffff880319099800 [ 2.980630] FS: 00007f475620d180(0000) GS:ffff880321ac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 2.980633] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 2.980636] CR2: 00007f9ef28018a0 CR3: 000000031b72c001 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [ 2.980639] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 2.980642] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 2.980645] Call Trace: [ 2.980675] i915_driver_load+0xb0e/0xdc0 [i915] [ 2.980681] ? kernfs_add_one+0xe7/0x130 [ 2.980709] i915_pci_probe+0x46/0x60 [i915] [ 2.980715] pci_device_probe+0xd4/0x150 [ 2.980719] really_probe+0x243/0x3b0 [ 2.980722] driver_probe_device+0xba/0x100 [ 2.980726] __driver_attach+0xe4/0x110 [ 2.980729] ? driver_probe_device+0x100/0x100 [ 2.980733] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xb0 [ 2.980736] driver_attach+0x1e/0x20 [ 2.980739] bus_add_driver+0x159/0x230 [ 2.980743] ? 0xffffffffa0393000 [ 2.980746] driver_register+0x70/0xc0 [ 2.980749] ? 0xffffffffa0393000 [ 2.980753] __pci_register_driver+0x57/0x60 [ 2.980780] i915_init+0x55/0x58 [i915] [ 2.980785] do_one_initcall+0x4a/0x1c4 [ 2.980789] ? do_init_module+0x27/0x210 [ 2.980793] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x131/0x190 [ 2.980797] do_init_module+0x60/0x210 [ 2.980800] load_module+0x2063/0x22e0 [ 2.980804] ? vfs_read+0x116/0x140 [ 2.980807] ? vfs_read+0x116/0x140 [ 2.980811] __do_sys_finit_module+0xbd/0x120 [ 2.980814] ? __do_sys_finit_module+0xbd/0x120 [ 2.980818] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x1a/0x20 [ 2.980821] do_syscall_64+0x5a/0x110 [ 2.980824] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 2.980826] RIP: 0033:0x7f4754e32879 [ 2.980828] Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f7 45 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 2.980831] RSP: 002b:00007fff43fd97d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [ 2.980834] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000559a44ca64f0 RCX: 00007f4754e32879 [ 2.980836] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f475599f4cd RDI: 0000000000000018 [ 2.980838] RBP: 00007f475599f4cd R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 2.980839] R10: 0000000000000018 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 2.980841] R13: 0000559a44c92fd0 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 2.980881] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 551 at drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_display.c:14983 intel_modeset_init+0x14d7/0x19f0 [i915] [ 2.980884] ---[ end trace 5eb47a76277d4731 ]--- The cause of this appears to be due to the fact that if there's pre-existing display state that was set by the BIOS when i915 loads, it will attempt to perform a modeset before the driver is registered with userspace. Since this happens before the driver's registered with userspace, it's connectors are also unregistered and thus-states which would turn on DPMS on a connector end up getting rejected since the connector isn't registered. These bugs managed to get past Intel's CI partially due to the fact it never ran a full test on my patches for some reason, but also because all of the tests unload the GPU once before running. Since this bug is only really triggered when the drivers tries to perform a modeset before it's been fully registered with userspace when coming from whatever display configuration the firmware left us with, it likely would never have been picked up by CI in the first place. After some discussion with vsyrjala, we decided the best course of action would be to just move the unregistered connector checks out of update_connector_routing() and into drm_atomic_set_crtc_for_connector(). The reason for this being that legacy modesetting isn't going to be expecting failures anywhere (at least this is the case with X), so ideally we want to ensure that any DPMS changes will still work even on unregistered connectors. Instead, we now only reject new modesets which would change the current CRTC assigned to an unregistered connector unless no new CRTC is being assigned to replace the connector's previous one. Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com> Reported-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Fixes: 4d802739 ("drm/atomic_helper: Disallow new modesets on unregistered connectors") Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20181009204424.21462-1-lyude@redhat.com (cherry picked from commit b5d29843) Fixes: e9655095 ("drm/atomic_helper: Disallow new modesets on unregistered connectors") Signed-off-by: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Halil Pasic authored
[ Upstream commit 4f419eb1 ] The access to airq_areas was racy ever since the adapter interrupts got introduced to virtio-ccw, but since commit 39c7dcb1 ("virtio/s390: make airq summary indicators DMA") this became an issue in practice as well. Namely before that commit the airq_info that got overwritten was still functional. After that commit however the two infos share a summary_indicator, which aggravates the situation. Which means auto-online mechanism occasionally hangs the boot with virtio_blk. Signed-off-by: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com> Reported-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 96b14536 ("virtio-ccw: virtio-ccw adapter interrupt support.") Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Ville Syrjälä authored
[ Upstream commit a8f196a0 ] On VLV/CHV there is some kind of linkage between the cdclk frequency and the DP link frequency. The spec says: "For DP audio configuration, cdclk frequency shall be set to meet the following requirements: DP Link Frequency(MHz) | Cdclk frequency(MHz) 270 | 320 or higher 162 | 200 or higher" I suspect that would more accurately be expressed as "cdclk >= DP link clock", and in any case we can express it like that in the code because of the limited set of cdclk (200, 266, 320, 400 MHz) and link frequencies (162 and 270 MHz) we support. Without this we can end up in a situation where the cdclk is too low and enabling DP audio will kill the pipe. Happens eg. with 2560x1440 modes where the 266MHz cdclk is sufficient to pump the pixels (241.5 MHz dotclock) but is too low for the DP audio due to the link frequency being 270 MHz. v2: Spell out the cdclk and link frequencies we actually support Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Stefan Gottwald <gottwald@igel.com> Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111149Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190717114536.22937-1-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.comAcked-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> (cherry picked from commit bffb31f7) Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Coly Li authored
[ Upstream commit 50a260e8 ] There is a race between mca_reap(), btree_node_free() and journal code btree_flush_write(), which results very rare and strange deadlock or panic and are very hard to reproduce. Let me explain how the race happens. In btree_flush_write() one btree node with oldest journal pin is selected, then it is flushed to cache device, the select-and-flush is a two steps operation. Between these two steps, there are something may happen inside the race window, - The selected btree node was reaped by mca_reap() and allocated to other requesters for other btree node. - The slected btree node was selected, flushed and released by mca shrink callback bch_mca_scan(). When btree_flush_write() tries to flush the selected btree node, firstly b->write_lock is held by mutex_lock(). If the race happens and the memory of selected btree node is allocated to other btree node, if that btree node's write_lock is held already, a deadlock very probably happens here. A worse case is the memory of the selected btree node is released, then all references to this btree node (e.g. b->write_lock) will trigger NULL pointer deference panic. This race was introduced in commit cafe5635 ("bcache: A block layer cache"), and enlarged by commit c4dc2497 ("bcache: fix high CPU occupancy during journal"), which selected 128 btree nodes and flushed them one-by-one in a quite long time period. Such race is not easy to reproduce before. On a Lenovo SR650 server with 48 Xeon cores, and configure 1 NVMe SSD as cache device, a MD raid0 device assembled by 3 NVMe SSDs as backing device, this race can be observed around every 10,000 times btree_flush_write() gets called. Both deadlock and kernel panic all happened as aftermath of the race. The idea of the fix is to add a btree flag BTREE_NODE_journal_flush. It is set when selecting btree nodes, and cleared after btree nodes flushed. Then when mca_reap() selects a btree node with this bit set, this btree node will be skipped. Since mca_reap() only reaps btree node without BTREE_NODE_journal_flush flag, such race is avoided. Once corner case should be noticed, that is btree_node_free(). It might be called in some error handling code path. For example the following code piece from btree_split(), 2149 err_free2: 2150 bkey_put(b->c, &n2->key); 2151 btree_node_free(n2); 2152 rw_unlock(true, n2); 2153 err_free1: 2154 bkey_put(b->c, &n1->key); 2155 btree_node_free(n1); 2156 rw_unlock(true, n1); At line 2151 and 2155, the btree node n2 and n1 are released without mac_reap(), so BTREE_NODE_journal_flush also needs to be checked here. If btree_node_free() is called directly in such error handling path, and the selected btree node has BTREE_NODE_journal_flush bit set, just delay for 1 us and retry again. In this case this btree node won't be skipped, just retry until the BTREE_NODE_journal_flush bit cleared, and free the btree node memory. Fixes: cafe5635 ("bcache: A block layer cache") Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> Reported-and-tested-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Coly Li authored
[ Upstream commit 41508bb7 ] When accessing or modifying BTREE_NODE_dirty bit, it is not always necessary to acquire b->write_lock. In bch_btree_cache_free() and mca_reap() acquiring b->write_lock is necessary, and this patch adds comments to explain why mutex_lock(&b->write_lock) is necessary for checking or clearing BTREE_NODE_dirty bit there. Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Coly Li authored
[ Upstream commit e5ec5f47 ] In bch_btree_cache_free() and btree_node_free(), BTREE_NODE_dirty is always set no matter btree node is dirty or not. The code looks like this, if (btree_node_dirty(b)) btree_complete_write(b, btree_current_write(b)); clear_bit(BTREE_NODE_dirty, &b->flags); Indeed if btree_node_dirty(b) returns false, it means BTREE_NODE_dirty bit is cleared, then it is unnecessary to clear the bit again. This patch only clears BTREE_NODE_dirty when btree_node_dirty(b) is true (the bit is set), to save a few CPU cycles. Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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