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  1. 01 Aug, 2012 1 commit
    • Al Viro's avatar
      delousing target_core_file a bit · dbc6e022
      Al Viro authored 
      * set_fs(KERNEL_DS) + getname() is probably the weirdest implementation
of strdup() I've seen.  Especially since they don't to copy it at all...
* filp_open() never returns NULL; it's ERR_PTR(-E...) on failure.
* file->f_dentry is never going to be NULL, TYVM.
* match_strdup() + snprintf() + kfree() is a bloody weird way to spell
match_strlcpy().

Pox on cargo-cult programmers...
Signed-off-by: default avatarAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      dbc6e022
  3. 31 Jul, 2012 16 commits
  5. 30 Jul, 2012 14 commits
  7. 29 Jul, 2012 9 commits
    • Al Viro's avatar
      lockd: handle lockowner allocation failure in nlmclnt_proc() · bf884891
      Al Viro authored 
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      bf884891
    • Al Viro's avatar
      lockd: shift grabbing a reference to nlm_host into nlm_alloc_call() · 446945ab
      Al Viro authored 
      It's used both for client and server hosts; we can't do nlmclnt_release_host()
on failure exits, since the host might need nlmsvc_release_host(), with BUG_ON()
for calling the wrong one.  Makes life simpler for callers, actually...
Signed-off-by: default avatarAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      446945ab
    • Kees Cook's avatar
      fs: add link restriction audit reporting · a51d9eaa
      Kees Cook authored 
      Adds audit messages for unexpected link restriction violations so that
system owners will have some sort of potentially actionable information
about misbehaving processes.
Signed-off-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      a51d9eaa
    • Kees Cook's avatar
      fs: add link restrictions · 800179c9
      Kees Cook authored 
      This adds symlink and hardlink restrictions to the Linux VFS.

Symlinks:

A long-standing class of security issues is the symlink-based
time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable
directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation of this flaw
is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given symlink (i.e. a
root process follows a symlink belonging to another user). For a likely
incomplete list of hundreds of examples across the years, please see:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=/tmp

The solution is to permit symlinks to only be followed when outside
a sticky world-writable directory, or when the uid of the symlink and
follower match, or when the directory owner matches the symlink's owner.

Some pointers to the history of earlier discussion that I could find:

 1996 Aug, Zygo Blaxell
  http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=87602167419830&w=2
 1996 Oct, Andrew Tridgell
  http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/9610.2/0086.html
 1997 Dec, Albert D Cahalan
  http://lkml.org/lkml/1997/12/16/4
 2005 Feb, Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro
  http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/0502.0/1896.html
 2010 May, Kees Cook
  https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/5/30/144

Past objections and rebuttals could be summarized as:

 - Violates POSIX.
   - POSIX didn't consider this situation and it's not useful to follow
     a broken specification at the cost of security.
 - Might break unknown applications that use this feature.
   - Applications that break because of the change are easy to spot and
     fix. Applications that are vulnerable to symlink ToCToU by not having
     the change aren't. Additionally, no applications have yet been found
     that rely on this behavior.
 - Applications should just use mkstemp() or O_CREATE|O_EXCL.
   - True, but applications are not perfect, and new software is written
     all the time that makes these mistakes; blocking this flaw at the
     kernel is a single solution to the entire class of vulnerability.
 - This should live in the core VFS.
   - This should live in an LSM. (https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/5/31/135)
 - This should live in an LSM.
   - This should live in the core VFS. (https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/8/2/188)

Hardlinks:

On systems that have user-writable directories on the same partition
as system files, a long-standing class of security issues is the
hardlink-based time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in
world-writable directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation
of this flaw is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given
hardlink (i.e. a root process follows a hardlink created by another
user). Additionally, an issue exists where users can "pin" a potentially
vulnerable setuid/setgid file so that an administrator will not actually
upgrade a system fully.

The solution is to permit hardlinks to only be created when the user is
already the existing file's owner, or if they already have read/write
access to the existing file.

Many Linux users are surprised when they learn they can link to files
they have no access to, so this change appears to follow the doctrine
of "least surprise". Additionally, this change does not violate POSIX,
which states "the implementation may require that the calling process
has permission to access the existing file"[1].

This change is known to break some implementations of the "at" daemon,
though the version used by Fedora and Ubuntu has been fixed[2] for
a while. Otherwise, the change has been undisruptive while in use in
Ubuntu for the last 1.5 years.

[1] http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/linkat.html
[2] http://anonscm.debian.org/gitweb/?p=collab-maint/at.git;a=commitdiff;h=f4114656c3a6c6f6070e315ffdf940a49eda3279

This patch is based on the patches in Openwall and grsecurity, along with
suggestions from Al Viro. I have added a sysctl to enable the protected
behavior, and documentation.
Signed-off-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      800179c9
    • Jeff Layton's avatar
      vfs: don't let do_last pass negative dentry to audit_inode · 3134f37e
      Jeff Layton authored 
      I can reliably reproduce the following panic by simply setting an audit
rule on a recent 3.5.0+ kernel:

 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000040
 IP: [<ffffffff810d1250>] audit_copy_inode+0x10/0x90
 PGD 7acd9067 PUD 7b8fb067 PMD 0
 Oops: 0000 [#86] SMP
 Modules linked in: nfs nfs_acl auth_rpcgss fscache lockd sunrpc tpm_bios btrfs zlib_deflate libcrc32c kvm_amd kvm joydev virtio_net pcspkr i2c_piix4 floppy virtio_balloon microcode virtio_blk cirrus drm_kms_helper ttm drm i2c_core [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan]
 CPU 0
 Pid: 1286, comm: abrt-dump-oops Tainted: G      D      3.5.0+ #1 Bochs Bochs
 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810d1250>]  [<ffffffff810d1250>] audit_copy_inode+0x10/0x90
 RSP: 0018:ffff88007aebfc38  EFLAGS: 00010282
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88003692d860 RCX: 00000000000038c4
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88006baf5d80 RDI: ffff88003692d860
 RBP: ffff88007aebfc68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: ffff880036d30f00 R14: ffff88006baf5d80 R15: ffff88003692d800
 FS:  00007f7562634740(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000040 CR3: 000000003643d000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
 Process abrt-dump-oops (pid: 1286, threadinfo ffff88007aebe000, task ffff880079614530)
 Stack:
  ffff88007aebfdf8 ffff88007aebff28 ffff88007aebfc98 ffffffff81211358
  ffff88003692d860 0000000000000000 ffff88007aebfcc8 ffffffff810d4968
  ffff88007aebfcc8 ffff8800000038c4 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
 Call Trace:
  [<ffffffff81211358>] ? ext4_lookup+0xe8/0x160
  [<ffffffff810d4968>] __audit_inode+0x118/0x2d0
  [<ffffffff811955a9>] do_last+0x999/0xe80
  [<ffffffff81191fe8>] ? inode_permission+0x18/0x50
  [<ffffffff81171efa>] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11a/0x130
  [<ffffffff81195b4a>] path_openat+0xba/0x420
  [<ffffffff81196111>] do_filp_open+0x41/0xa0
  [<ffffffff811a24bd>] ? alloc_fd+0x4d/0x120
  [<ffffffff811855cd>] do_sys_open+0xed/0x1c0
  [<ffffffff810d40cc>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xcc/0x300
  [<ffffffff811856c1>] sys_open+0x21/0x30
  [<ffffffff81611ca9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
  RSP <ffff88007aebfc38>
 CR2: 0000000000000040

The problem is that do_last is passing a negative dentry to audit_inode.
The comments on lookup_open note that it can pass back a negative dentry
if O_CREAT is not set.

This patch fixes the oops, but I'm not clear on whether there's a better
approach.

Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      3134f37e
    • Al Viro's avatar
      brcm80211: pointless current->files passed to filp_close() · 0b5306b3
      Al Viro authored 
      ... only needed if it's been in descriptor table
Signed-off-by: default avatarAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      0b5306b3
    • Al Viro's avatar
      sound_firmware: don't pass crap to filp_close() · 58609306
      Al Viro authored 
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      58609306
    • Al Viro's avatar
      gadgetfs: clean up · 20818a0c
      Al Viro authored 
      sigh...
* opened files have non-NULL dentries and non-NULL inodes
* close_filp() needs current->files only if the file had been
in descriptor table.
Signed-off-by: default avatarAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      20818a0c
    • Al Viro's avatar
      slightly reduce lossage in gdm72xx · 09fada5b
      Al Viro authored 
      * filp_close() needs non-NULL second argument only if it'd been in descriptor
table
* opened files have non-NULL dentries, TYVM
* ... and those dentries are positive - it's kinda hard to open a file that
doesn't exist.
Signed-off-by: default avatarAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      09fada5b
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