- 25 May, 2022 1 commit
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Wanpeng Li authored
In commit ec0671d5 ("KVM: LAPIC: Delay trace_kvm_wait_lapic_expire tracepoint to after vmexit", 2019-06-04), trace_kvm_wait_lapic_expire was moved after guest_exit_irqoff() because invoking tracepoints within kvm_guest_enter/kvm_guest_exit caused a lockdep splat. These days this is not necessary, because commit 87fa7f3e ("x86/kvm: Move context tracking where it belongs", 2020-07-09) restricted the RCU extended quiescent state to be closer to vmentry/vmexit. Moving the tracepoint back to __kvm_wait_lapic_expire is more accurate, because it will be reported even if vcpu_enter_guest causes multiple vmentries via the IPI/Timer fast paths, and it allows the removal of advance_expire_delta. Signed-off-by:
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Message-Id: <1650961551-38390-1-git-send-email-wanpengli@tencent.com> Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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- 12 May, 2022 13 commits
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Vipin Sharma authored
Avoid calling handlers on empty rmap entries and skip to the next non empty rmap entry. Empty rmap entries are noop in handlers. Signed-off-by:
Vipin Sharma <vipinsh@google.com> Suggested-by:
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20220502220347.174664-1-vipinsh@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Kai Huang authored
Intel MKTME KeyID bits (including Intel TDX private KeyID bits) should never be set to SPTE. Set shadow_me_value to 0 and shadow_me_mask to include all MKTME KeyID bits to include them to shadow_zero_check. Signed-off-by:
Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Message-Id: <27bc10e97a3c0b58a4105ff9107448c190328239.1650363789.git.kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Kai Huang authored
Intel Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption (MKTME) repurposes couple of high bits of physical address bits as 'KeyID' bits. Intel Trust Domain Extentions (TDX) further steals part of MKTME KeyID bits as TDX private KeyID bits. TDX private KeyID bits cannot be set in any mapping in the host kernel since they can only be accessed by software running inside a new CPU isolated mode. And unlike to AMD's SME, host kernel doesn't set any legacy MKTME KeyID bits to any mapping either. Therefore, it's not legitimate for KVM to set any KeyID bits in SPTE which maps guest memory. KVM maintains shadow_zero_check bits to represent which bits must be zero for SPTE which maps guest memory. MKTME KeyID bits should be set to shadow_zero_check. Currently, shadow_me_mask is used by AMD to set the sme_me_mask to SPTE, and shadow_me_shadow is excluded from shadow_zero_check. So initializing shadow_me_mask to represent all MKTME keyID bits doesn't work for VMX (as oppositely, they must be set to shadow_zero_check). Introduce a new 'shadow_me_value' to replace existing shadow_me_mask, and repurpose shadow_me_mask as 'all possible memory encryption bits'. The new schematic of them will be: - shadow_me_value: the memory encryption bit(s) that will be set to the SPTE (the original shadow_me_mask). - shadow_me_mask: all possible memory encryption bits (which is a super set of shadow_me_value). - For now, shadow_me_value is supposed to be set by SVM and VMX respectively, and it is a constant during KVM's life time. This perhaps doesn't fit MKTME but for now host kernel doesn't support it (and perhaps will never do). - Bits in shadow_me_mask are set to shadow_zero_check, except the bits in shadow_me_value. Introduce a new helper kvm_mmu_set_me_spte_mask() to initialize them. Replace shadow_me_mask with shadow_me_value in almost all code paths, except the one in PT64_PERM_MASK, which is used by need_remote_flush() to determine whether remote TLB flush is needed. This should still use shadow_me_mask as any encryption bit change should need a TLB flush. And for AMD, move initializing shadow_me_value/shadow_me_mask from kvm_mmu_reset_all_pte_masks() to svm_hardware_setup(). Signed-off-by:
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Kai Huang authored
Rename reset_rsvds_bits_mask() to reset_guest_rsvds_bits_mask() to make it clearer that it resets the reserved bits check for guest's page table entries. Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
Reviewed-by:
Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Expand and clean up the page fault stats. The current stats are at best incomplete, and at worst misleading. Differentiate between faults that are actually fixed vs those that result in an MMIO SPTE being created, track faults that are spurious, faults that trigger emulation, faults that that are fixed in the fast path, and last but not least, track the number of faults that are taken. Note, the number of faults that require emulation for write-protected shadow pages can roughly be calculated by subtracting the number of MMIO SPTEs created from the overall number of faults that trigger emulation. Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Use IS_ENABLED() instead of an #ifdef to activate the anti-RETPOLINE fast path for TDP page faults. The generated code is identical, and the #ifdef makes it dangerously difficult to extend the logic (guess who forgot to add an "else" inside the #ifdef and ran through the page fault handler twice). No functional or binary change intented. Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Move kvm_arch_async_page_ready() to mmu.c where it belongs, and move all of the page fault handling collateral that was in mmu.h purely for the async #PF handler into mmu_internal.h, where it belongs. This will allow kvm_mmu_do_page_fault() to act on the RET_PF_* return without having to expose those enums outside of the MMU. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Add RET_PF_CONTINUE and use it in handle_abnormal_pfn() and kvm_faultin_pfn() to signal that the page fault handler should continue doing its thing. Aside from being gross and inefficient, using a boolean return to signal continue vs. stop makes it extremely difficult to add more helpers and/or move existing code to a helper. E.g. hypothetically, if nested MMUs were to gain a separate page fault handler in the future, everything up to the "is self-modifying PTE" check can be shared by all shadow MMUs, but communicating up the stack whether to continue on or stop becomes a nightmare. More concretely, proposed support for private guest memory ran into a similar issue, where it'll be forced to forego a helper in order to yield sane code: https://lore.kernel.org/all/YkJbxiL%2FAz7olWlq@google.com. No functional change intended. Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Cc: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Tweak the "page fault can be fast" logic to explicitly check for !PRESENT faults in the access tracking case, and drop the exec/NX check that becomes redundant as a result. No sane hardware will generate an access that is both an instruct fetch and a write, i.e. it's a waste of cycles. If hardware goes off the rails, or KVM runs under a misguided hypervisor, spuriously running throught fast path is benign (KVM has been uknowingly being doing exactly that for years). Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Check for A/D bits being disabled instead of the access tracking mask being non-zero when deciding whether or not to attempt to fix a page fault vian the fast path. Originally, the access tracking mask was non-zero if and only if A/D bits were disabled by _KVM_ (including not being supported by hardware), but that hasn't been true since nVMX was fixed to honor EPTP12's A/D enabling, i.e. since KVM allowed L1 to cause KVM to not use A/D bits while running L2 despite KVM using them while running L1. In other words, don't attempt the fast path just because EPT is enabled. Note, attempting the fast path for all !PRESENT faults can "fix" a very, _VERY_ tiny percentage of faults out of mmu_lock by detecting that the fault is spurious, i.e. has been fixed by a different vCPU, but again the odds of that happening are vanishingly small. E.g. booting an 8-vCPU VM gets less than 10 successes out of 30k+ faults, and that's likely one of the more favorable scenarios. Disabling dirty logging can likely lead to a rash of collisions between vCPUs for some workloads that operate on a common set of pages, but penalizing _all_ !PRESENT faults for that one case is unlikely to be a net positive, not to mention that that problem is best solved by not zapping in the first place. The number of spurious faults does scale with the number of vCPUs, e.g. a 255-vCPU VM using TDP "jumps" to ~60 spurious faults detected in the fast path (again out of 30k), but that's all of 0.2% of faults. Using legacy shadow paging does get more spurious faults, and a few more detected out of mmu_lock, but the percentage goes _down_ to 0.08% (and that's ignoring faults that are reflected into the guest), i.e. the extra detections are purely due to the sheer number of faults observed. On the other hand, getting a "negative" in the fast path takes in the neighborhood of 150-250 cycles. So while it is tempting to keep/extend the current behavior, such a change needs to come with hard numbers showing that it's actually a win in the grand scheme, or any scheme for that matter. Fixes: 995f00a6 ("x86: kvm: mmu: use ept a/d in vmcs02 iff used in vmcs12") Signed-off-by:
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Li RongQing authored
Passing per_cpu() to list_for_each_entry() causes the macro to be evaluated N+1 times for N sleeping vCPUs. This is a very small inefficiency, and the code is cleaner if the address of the per-CPU variable is loaded earlier. Do this for both the list and the spinlock. Signed-off-by:
Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com> Message-Id: <1649244302-6777-1-git-send-email-lirongqing@baidu.com> Reviewed-by:
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Maxim Levitsky authored
This shows up as a TDP MMU leak when running nested. Non-working cmpxchg on L0 relies makes L1 install two different shadow pages under same spte, and one of them is leaked. Fixes: 1c2361f6 ("KVM: x86: Use __try_cmpxchg_user() to emulate atomic accesses") Signed-off-by:
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 03 May, 2022 7 commits
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Paolo Bonzini authored
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Sandipan Das authored
On some x86 processors, CPUID leaf 0xA provides information on Architectural Performance Monitoring features. It advertises a PMU version which Qemu uses to determine the availability of additional MSRs to manage the PMCs. Upon receiving a KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID ioctl request for the same, the kernel constructs return values based on the x86_pmu_capability irrespective of the vendor. This leaf and the additional MSRs are not supported on AMD and Hygon processors. If AMD PerfMonV2 is detected, the PMU version is set to 2 and guest startup breaks because of an attempt to access a non-existent MSR. Return zeros to avoid this. Fixes: a6c06ed1 ("KVM: Expose the architectural performance monitoring CPUID leaf") Reported-by:
Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com> Message-Id: <3fef83d9c2b2f7516e8ff50d60851f29a4bcb716.1651058600.git.sandipan.das@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
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Kyle Huey authored
Zen renumbered some of the performance counters that correspond to the well known events in perf_hw_id. This code in KVM was never updated for that, so guest that attempt to use counters on Zen that correspond to the pre-Zen perf_hw_id values will silently receive the wrong values. This has been observed in the wild with rr[0] when running in Zen 3 guests. rr uses the retired conditional branch counter 00d1 which is incorrectly recognized by KVM as PERF_COUNT_HW_STALLED_CYCLES_BACKEND. [0] https://rr-project.org/Signed-off-by:
Kyle Huey <me@kylehuey.com> Message-Id: <20220503050136.86298-1-khuey@kylehuey.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [Check guest family, not host. - Paolo] Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
We are dropping A/D bits (and W bits) in the TDP MMU. Even if mmu_lock is held for write, as volatile SPTEs can be written by other tasks/vCPUs outside of mmu_lock. Attempting to prove that bug exposed another notable goof, which has been lurking for a decade, give or take: KVM treats _all_ MMU-writable SPTEs as volatile, even though KVM never clears WRITABLE outside of MMU lock. As a result, the legacy MMU (and the TDP MMU if not fixed) uses XCHG to update writable SPTEs. The fix does not seem to have an easily-measurable affect on performance; page faults are so slow that wasting even a few hundred cycles is dwarfed by the base cost.
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Sean Christopherson authored
Use an atomic XCHG to write TDP MMU SPTEs that have volatile bits, even if mmu_lock is held for write, as volatile SPTEs can be written by other tasks/vCPUs outside of mmu_lock. If a vCPU uses the to-be-modified SPTE to write a page, the CPU can cache the translation as WRITABLE in the TLB despite it being seen by KVM as !WRITABLE, and/or KVM can clobber the Accessed/Dirty bits and not properly tag the backing page. Exempt non-leaf SPTEs from atomic updates as KVM itself doesn't modify non-leaf SPTEs without holding mmu_lock, they do not have Dirty bits, and KVM doesn't consume the Accessed bit of non-leaf SPTEs. Dropping the Dirty and/or Writable bits is most problematic for dirty logging, as doing so can result in a missed TLB flush and eventually a missed dirty page. In the unlikely event that the only dirty page(s) is a clobbered SPTE, clear_dirty_gfn_range() will see the SPTE as not dirty (based on the Dirty or Writable bit depending on the method) and so not update the SPTE and ultimately not flush. If the SPTE is cached in the TLB as writable before it is clobbered, the guest can continue writing the associated page without ever taking a write-protect fault. For most (all?) file back memory, dropping the Dirty bit is a non-issue. The primary MMU write-protects its PTEs on writeback, i.e. KVM's dirty bit is effectively ignored because the primary MMU will mark that page dirty when the write-protection is lifted, e.g. when KVM faults the page back in for write. The Accessed bit is a complete non-issue. Aside from being unused for non-leaf SPTEs, KVM doesn't do a TLB flush when aging SPTEs, i.e. the Accessed bit may be dropped anyways. Lastly, the Writable bit is also problematic as an extension of the Dirty bit, as KVM (correctly) treats the Dirty bit as volatile iff the SPTE is !DIRTY && WRITABLE. If KVM fixes an MMU-writable, but !WRITABLE, SPTE out of mmu_lock, then it can allow the CPU to set the Dirty bit despite the SPTE being !WRITABLE when it is checked by KVM. But that all depends on the Dirty bit being problematic in the first place. Fixes: 2f2fad08 ("kvm: x86/mmu: Add functions to handle changed TDP SPTEs") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com> Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Cc: Venkatesh Srinivas <venkateshs@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Move the is_shadow_present_pte() check out of spte_has_volatile_bits() and into its callers. Well, caller, since only one of its two callers doesn't already do the shadow-present check. Opportunistically move the helper to spte.c/h so that it can be used by the TDP MMU, which is also the primary motivation for the shadow-present change. Unlike the legacy MMU, the TDP MMU uses a single path for clear leaf and non-leaf SPTEs, and to avoid unnecessary atomic updates, the TDP MMU will need to check is_last_spte() prior to calling spte_has_volatile_bits(), and calling is_last_spte() without first calling is_shadow_present_spte() is at best odd, and at worst a violation of KVM's loosely defines SPTE rules. Note, mmu_spte_clear_track_bits() could likely skip the write entirely for SPTEs that are not shadow-present. Leave that cleanup for a future patch to avoid introducing a functional change, and because the shadow-present check can likely be moved further up the stack, e.g. drop_large_spte() appears to be the only path that doesn't already explicitly check for a shadow-present SPTE. No functional change intended. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Don't treat SPTEs that are truly writable, i.e. writable in hardware, as being volatile (unless they're volatile for other reasons, e.g. A/D bits). KVM _sets_ the WRITABLE bit out of mmu_lock, but never _clears_ the bit out of mmu_lock, so if the WRITABLE bit is set, it cannot magically get cleared just because the SPTE is MMU-writable. Rename the wrapper of MMU-writable to be more literal, the previous name of spte_can_locklessly_be_made_writable() is wrong and misleading. Fixes: c7ba5b48 ("KVM: MMU: fast path of handling guest page fault") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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- 02 May, 2022 3 commits
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Yuan Yao authored
The helper function, vcpu_to_pi_desc(), is defined to get the posted interrupt descriptor from vcpu. There is one place that doesn't use it, and instead references vmx_vcpu->pi_desc directly. Remove the inconsistency. Signed-off-by:
Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com> Message-Id: <ee7be7832bc424546fd4f05015a844a0205b5ba2.1646422845.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
For TDX guests, the maximum number of vcpus needs to be specified when the TDX guest VM is initialized (creating the TDX data corresponding to TDX guest) before creating vcpu. It needs to record the maximum number of vcpus on VM creation (KVM_CREATE_VM) and return error if the number of vcpus exceeds it Because there is already max_vcpu member in arm64 struct kvm_arch, move it to common struct kvm and initialize it to KVM_MAX_VCPUS before kvm_arch_init_vm() instead of adding it to x86 struct kvm_arch. Signed-off-by:
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Maxim Levitsky authored
This can cause various unexpected issues, since VM is partially destroyed at that point. For example when AVIC is enabled, this causes avic_vcpu_load to access physical id page entry which is already freed by .vm_destroy. Fixes: 8221c137 ("svm: Manage vcpu load/unload when enable AVIC") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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- 29 Apr, 2022 16 commits
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Lai Jiangshan authored
When shadowing 5-level NPT for 4-level NPT L1 guest, the root_sp is allocated with role.level = 5 and the guest pagetable's root gfn. And root_sp->spt[0] is also allocated with the same gfn and the same role except role.level = 4. Luckily that they are different shadow pages, but only root_sp->spt[0] is the real translation of the guest pagetable. Here comes a problem: If the guest switches from gCR4_LA57=0 to gCR4_LA57=1 (or vice verse) and uses the same gfn as the root page for nested NPT before and after switching gCR4_LA57. The host (hCR4_LA57=1) might use the same root_sp for the guest even the guest switches gCR4_LA57. The guest will see unexpected page mapped and L2 may exploit the bug and hurt L1. It is lucky that the problem can't hurt L0. And three special cases need to be handled: The root_sp should be like role.direct=1 sometimes: its contents are not backed by gptes, root_sp->gfns is meaningless. (For a normal high level sp in shadow paging, sp->gfns is often unused and kept zero, but it could be relevant and meaningful if sp->gfns is used because they are backed by concrete gptes.) For such root_sp in the case, root_sp is just a portal to contribute root_sp->spt[0], and root_sp->gfns should not be used and root_sp->spt[0] should not be dropped if gpte[0] of the guest root pagetable is changed. Such root_sp should not be accounted too. So add role.passthrough to distinguish the shadow pages in the hash when gCR4_LA57 is toggled and fix above special cases by using it in kvm_mmu_page_{get|set}_gfn() and sp_has_gptes(). Signed-off-by:Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com> Message-Id: <20220420131204.2850-3-jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Lai Jiangshan authored
Add sp_has_gptes() which equals to !sp->role.direct currently. Shadow page having gptes needs to be write-protected, accounted and responded to kvm_mmu_pte_write(). Use it in these places to replace !sp->role.direct and rename for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp. Signed-off-by:
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Suravee Suthikulpanit authored
This can help identify potential performance issues when handles AVIC incomplete IPI due vCPU not running. Reviewed-by:
Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
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Suravee Suthikulpanit authored
Currently, an AVIC-enabled VM suffers from performance bottleneck when scaling to large number of vCPUs for I/O intensive workloads. In such case, a vCPU often executes halt instruction to get into idle state waiting for interrupts, in which KVM would de-schedule the vCPU from physical CPU. When AVIC HW tries to deliver interrupt to the halting vCPU, it would result in AVIC incomplete IPI #vmexit to notify KVM to reschedule the target vCPU into running state. Investigation has shown the main hotspot is in the kvm_apic_match_dest() in the following call stack where it tries to find target vCPUs corresponding to the information in the ICRH/ICRL registers. - handle_exit - svm_invoke_exit_handler - avic_incomplete_ipi_interception - kvm_apic_match_dest However, AVIC provides hints in the #vmexit info, which can be used to retrieve the destination guest physical APIC ID. In addition, since QEMU defines guest physical APIC ID to be the same as vCPU ID, it can be used to quickly identify the target vCPU to deliver IPI, and avoid the overhead from searching through all vCPUs to match the target vCPU. Reviewed-by: -
Paolo Bonzini authored
direct_map is always equal to the direct field of the root page's role: - for shadow paging, direct_map is true if CR0.PG=0 and root_role.direct is copied from cpu_role.base.direct - for TDP, it is always true and root_role.direct is also always true - for shadow TDP, it is always false and root_role.direct is also always false Signed-off-by: -
Paolo Bonzini authored
Remove another duplicate field of struct kvm_mmu. This time it's the root level for page table walking; the separate field is always initialized as cpu_role.base.level, so its users can look up the CPU mode directly instead. Signed-off-by: -
Paolo Bonzini authored
root_role.level is always the same value as shadow_level: - it's kvm_mmu_get_tdp_level(vcpu) when going through init_kvm_tdp_mmu - it's the level argument when going through kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu - it's assigned directly from new_role.base.level when going through shadow_mmu_init_context Remove the duplication and get the level directly from the role. Reviewed-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
Do not lead init_kvm_*mmu into the temptation of poking into struct kvm_mmu_role_regs, by passing to it directly the CPU mode. Signed-off-by: -
Paolo Bonzini authored
Shadow MMUs compute their role from cpu_role.base, simply by adjusting the root level. It's one line of code, so do not place it in a separate function. Signed-off-by: -
Paolo Bonzini authored
Before the separation of the CPU and the MMU role, CR0.PG was not available in the base MMU role, because two-dimensional paging always used direct=1 in the MMU role. However, now that the raw role is snapshotted in mmu->cpu_role, the value of CR0.PG always matches both !cpu_role.base.direct and cpu_role.base.level > 0. There is no need to store it again in union kvm_mmu_extended_role; instead, write an is_cr0_pg accessor by hand that takes care of the conversion. Use cpu_role.base.level since the future of the direct field is unclear. Likewise, CR4.PAE is now always present in the CPU role as !cpu_role.base.has_4_byte_gpte. The inversion makes certain tests on the MMU role easier, and is easily hidden by the is_cr4_pae accessor when operating on the CPU role. Signed-off-by: -
Paolo Bonzini authored
It is quite confusing that the "full" union is called kvm_mmu_role but is used for the "cpu_role" field of struct kvm_mmu. Rename it to kvm_cpu_role. Signed-off-by: -
Paolo Bonzini authored
mmu_role represents the role of the root of the page tables. It does not need any extended bits, as those govern only KVM's page table walking; the is_* functions used for page table walking always use the CPU role. ext.valid is not present anymore in the MMU role, but an all-zero MMU role is impossible because the level field is never zero in the MMU role. So just zap the whole mmu_role in order to force invalidation after CPUID is updated. While making this change, which requires touching almost every occurrence of "mmu_role", rename it to "root_role". Signed-off-by: -
Paolo Bonzini authored
Now that the MMU role is separate from the CPU role, it can be a truthful description of the format of the shadow pages. This includes whether the shadow pages use the NX bit; so force the efer_nx field of the MMU role when TDP is disabled, and remove the hardcoding it in the callers of reset_shadow_zero_bits_mask. In fact, the initialization of reserved SPTE bits can now be made common to shadow paging and shadow NPT; move it to shadow_mmu_init_context. Signed-off-by: -
Paolo Bonzini authored
Pass the already-computed CPU role, instead of redoing it. Signed-off-by: -
Paolo Bonzini authored
Inline kvm_calc_mmu_role_common into its sole caller, and simplify it by removing the computation of unnecessary bits. Extended bits are unnecessary because page walking uses the CPU role, and EFER.NX/CR0.WP can be set to one unconditionally---matching the format of shadow pages rather than the format of guest pages. The MMU role for two dimensional paging does still depend on the CPU role, even if only barely so, due to SMM and guest mode; for consistency, pass it down to kvm_calc_tdp_mmu_root_page_role instead of querying the vcpu with is_smm or is_guest_mode. Signed-off-by: -
Paolo Bonzini authored
kvm_calc_shadow_root_page_role_common is the same as kvm_calc_cpu_role except for the level, which is overwritten afterwards in kvm_calc_shadow_mmu_root_page_role and kvm_calc_shadow_npt_root_page_role. role.base.direct is already set correctly for the CPU role, and CR0.PG=1 is required for VMRUN so it will also be correct for nested NPT. Signed-off-by:
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