- 18 Jul, 2017 8 commits
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Johan Hovold authored
commit 8c76d7cd upstream. Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an integer underflow that could be triggered by a malicious device. This avoids leaking up to 56 bytes from after the URB transfer buffer to user space. Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by:
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Johan Hovold authored
commit 0b1d250a upstream. Fix a NULL-pointer dereference in the interrupt callback should a malicious device send data containing a bad port number by adding the missing sanity check. Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by:
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Anton Blanchard authored
commit 85e8a239 upstream. We see lpfc devices regularly fail during kexec. Fix this by adding a shutdown method which mirrors the remove method. Signed-off-by:
Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Reviewed-by:
Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mauricfo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by:
Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by:
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Kai-Heng Feng authored
commit 45838660 upstream. The aux port does not get detected without noloop quirk, so external PS/2 mouse cannot work as result. The PS/2 mouse can work with this quirk. BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1591053Signed-off-by:
Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com> Reviewed-by:
Marcos Paulo de Souza <marcos.souza.org@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Raghava Aditya Renukunta authored
commit 934767c5 upstream. The return status of the adapter check on KERNEL_PANIC is supposed to be the upper 16 bits of the OMR status register. Fixes: c421530b (scsi: aacraid: Reorder Adpater status check) Reported-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Raghava Aditya Renukunta <RaghavaAditya.Renukunta@microsemi.com> Reviewed-by:
Dave Carroll <david.carroll@microsemi.com> Signed-off-by:
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Felipe Balbi authored
commit 7369090a upstream. Some gadget drivers are bad, bad boys. We notice that ADB was passing bad Burst Size which caused top bits of param0 to be overwritten which confused DWC3 when running this command. In order to avoid future issues, we're going to make sure values passed by macros are always safe for the controller. Note that ADB still needs a fix to *not* pass bad values. Reported-by:
Mohamed Abbas <mohamed.abbas@intel.com> Sugested-by:
Adam Andruszak <adam.andruszak@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Rik van Riel authored
commit bf7165cf upstream. There are several trace include files that define TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE. Include several of them in the same .c file (as I currently have in some code I am working on), and the compile will blow up with a "warning: "TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE" redefined #define TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE syscalls" Every other include file in include/trace/events/ avoids that issue by having a #undef TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE before the #define; syscalls.h should have one, too. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160928225554.13bd7ac6@annuminas.surriel.com Fixes: b8007ef7 ("tracing: Separate raw syscall from syscall tracer") Signed-off-by:
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Streetman authored
commit c74fd80f upstream. Revert the main part of commit: af42b8d1 ("xen: fix MSI setup and teardown for PV on HVM guests") That commit introduced reading the pci device's msi message data to see if a pirq was previously configured for the device's msi/msix, and re-use that pirq. At the time, that was the correct behavior. However, a later change to Qemu caused it to call into the Xen hypervisor to unmap all pirqs for a pci device, when the pci device disables its MSI/MSIX vectors; specifically the Qemu commit: c976437c7dba9c7444fb41df45468968aaa326ad ("qemu-xen: free all the pirqs for msi/msix when driver unload") Once Qemu added this pirq unmapping, it was no longer correct for the kernel to re-use the pirq number cached in the pci device msi message data. All Qemu releases since 2.1.0 contain the patch that unmaps the pirqs when the pci device disables its MSI/MSIX vectors. This bug is causing failures to initialize multiple NVMe controllers under Xen, because the NVMe driver sets up a single MSIX vector for each controller (concurrently), and then after using that to talk to the controller for some configuration data, it disables the single MSIX vector and re-configures all the MSIX vectors it needs. So the MSIX setup code tries to re-use the cached pirq from the first vector for each controller, but the hypervisor has already given away that pirq to another controller, and its initialization fails. This is discussed in more detail at: https://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2017-01/msg00447.html Fixes: af42b8d1 ("xen: fix MSI setup and teardown for PV on HVM guests") Signed-off-by:
Dan Streetman <dan.streetman@canonical.com> Reviewed-by:
Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> Acked-by:
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by:
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- 02 Jul, 2017 7 commits
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Ben Hutchings authored
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Mikulas Patocka authored
commit 83cd904d upstream. Commit 6bd4837d ("mm: simplify find_vma_prev()") broke memory management on PA-RISC. After application of the patch, programs that allocate big arrays on the stack crash with segfault, for example, this will crash if compiled without optimization: int main() { char array[200000]; array[199999] = 0; return 0; } The reason is that PA-RISC has up-growing stack and the stack is usually the last memory area. In the above example, a page fault happens above the stack. Previously, if we passed too high address to find_vma_prev, it returned NULL and stored the last VMA in *pprev. After "simplify find_vma_prev" change, it stores NULL in *pprev. Consequently, the stack area is not found and it is not expanded, as it used to be before the change. This patch restores the old behavior and makes it return the last VMA in *pprev if the requested address is higher than address of any other VMA. Signed-off-by:
Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Acked-by:
KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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KOSAKI Motohiro authored
commit 6bd4837d upstream. commit 297c5eee ("mm: make the vma list be doubly linked") added the vm_prev member to vm_area_struct. We can simplify find_vma_prev() by using it. Also, this change helps to improve page fault performance because it has stronger locality of reference. Signed-off-by:
KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Shaohua Li <shaohua.li@intel.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
commit 5f2f9765 upstream. This fixes CVE-2017-7482. When a kerberos 5 ticket is being decoded so that it can be loaded into an rxrpc-type key, there are several places in which the length of a variable-length field is checked to make sure that it's not going to overrun the available data - but the data is padded to the nearest four-byte boundary and the code doesn't check for this extra. This could lead to the size-remaining variable wrapping and the data pointer going over the end of the buffer. Fix this by making the various variable-length data checks use the padded length. Reported-by:
石磊 <shilei-c@360.cn> Signed-off-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@auristor.com> Reviewed-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename, context] Signed-off-by:
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Helge Deller authored
commit bd726c90 upstream. Fix expand_upwards() on architectures with an upward-growing stack (parisc, metag and partly IA-64) to allow the stack to reliably grow exactly up to the address space limit given by TASK_SIZE. Signed-off-by:
Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Acked-by:
Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Hugh Dickins authored
commit 1be7107f upstream. Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping. But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX] which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN. This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical, unfortunatelly. Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot. One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace, but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong for some special case applications. For now, add a kernel command line option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units). Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page: because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point, a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK and strict non-overcommit mode. Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start (or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(), and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that. Original-patch-by:
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Original-patch-by:
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
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Linus Torvalds authored
commit 09884964 upstream. The stack vma is designed to grow automatically (marked with VM_GROWSUP or VM_GROWSDOWN depending on architecture) when an access is made beyond the existing boundary. However, particularly if you have not limited your stack at all ("ulimit -s unlimited"), this can cause the stack to grow even if the access was really just one past *another* segment. And that's wrong, especially since we first grow the segment, but then immediately later enforce the stack guard page on the last page of the segment. So _despite_ first growing the stack segment as a result of the access, the kernel will then make the access cause a SIGSEGV anyway! So do the same logic as the guard page check does, and consider an access to within one page of the next segment to be a bad access, rather than growing the stack to abut the next segment. Reported-and-tested-by:
Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 05 Jun, 2017 25 commits
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Ben Hutchings authored
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Eric Dumazet authored
commit 232cd35d upstream. Andrey Konovalov and idaifish@gmail.com reported crashes caused by one skb shared_info being overwritten from __ip6_append_data() Andrey program lead to following state : copy -4200 datalen 2000 fraglen 2040 maxfraglen 2040 alloclen 2048 transhdrlen 0 offset 0 fraggap 6200 The skb_copy_and_csum_bits(skb_prev, maxfraglen, data + transhdrlen, fraggap, 0); is overwriting skb->head and skb_shared_info Since we apparently detect this rare condition too late, move the code earlier to even avoid allocating skb and risking crashes. Once again, many thanks to Andrey and syzkaller team. Signed-off-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by:
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Tested-by:
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WANG Cong authored
commit 83eaddab upstream. Like commit 657831ff ("dccp/tcp: do not inherit mc_list from parent") we should clear ipv6_mc_list etc. for IPv6 sockets too. Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Acked-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
commit fdcee2cb upstream. SCTP needs fixes similar to 83eaddab ("ipv6/dccp: do not inherit ipv6_mc_list from parent"), otherwise bad things can happen. Signed-off-by:
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David S. Miller authored
commit 7dd7eb95 upstream. Do not use unsigned variables to see if it returns a negative error or not. Fixes: 2423496a ("ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header options") Reported-by:
Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by:
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Craig Gallek authored
commit 2423496a upstream. The KASAN warning repoted below was discovered with a syzkaller program. The reproducer is basically: int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, NEXTHDR_HOP); send(s, &one_byte_of_data, 1, MSG_MORE); send(s, &more_than_mtu_bytes_data, 2000, 0); The socket() call sets the nexthdr field of the v6 header to NEXTHDR_HOP, the first send call primes the payload with a non zero byte of data, and the second send call triggers the fragmentation path. The fragmentation code tries to parse the header options in order to figure out where to insert the fragment option. Since nexthdr points to an invalid option, the calculation of the size of the network header can made to be much larger than the linear section of the skb and data is read outside of it. This fix makes ip6_find_1stfrag return an error if it detects running out-of-bounds. [ 42.361487] ================================================================== [ 42.364412] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.365471] Read of size 840 at addr ffff88000969e798 by task ip6_fragment-oo/3789 [ 42.366469] [ 42.366696] CPU: 1 PID: 3789 Comm: ip6_fragment-oo Not tainted 4.11.0+ #41 [ 42.367628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 42.368824] Call Trace: [ 42.369183] dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b [ 42.369664] print_address_description+0x73/0x290 [ 42.370325] kasan_report+0x252/0x370 [ 42.370839] ? ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.371396] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0 [ 42.371978] memcpy+0x23/0x50 [ 42.372395] ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730 [ 42.372920] ? nf_ct_expect_unregister_notifier+0x110/0x110 [ 42.373681] ? ip6_copy_metadata+0x7f0/0x7f0 [ 42.374263] ? ip6_forward+0x2e30/0x2e30 [ 42.374803] ip6_finish_output+0x584/0x990 [ 42.375350] ip6_output+0x1b7/0x690 [ 42.375836] ? ip6_finish_output+0x990/0x990 [ 42.376411] ? ip6_fragment+0x3730/0x3730 [ 42.376968] ip6_local_out+0x95/0x160 [ 42.377471] ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x330 [ 42.377969] ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0 [ 42.378589] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2051/0x2db0 [ 42.379129] ? rawv6_bind+0x8b0/0x8b0 [ 42.379633] ? _copy_from_user+0x84/0xe0 [ 42.380193] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 [ 42.380878] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x162/0x930 [ 42.381427] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120 [ 42.382074] ? sock_has_perm+0x1f6/0x290 [ 42.382614] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x167/0x930 [ 42.383173] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660 [ 42.383727] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.384226] ? inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.384748] ? inet_recvmsg+0x540/0x540 [ 42.385263] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 [ 42.385758] SYSC_sendto+0x217/0x380 [ 42.386249] ? SYSC_connect+0x310/0x310 [ 42.386783] ? __might_fault+0x110/0x1d0 [ 42.387324] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660 [ 42.387880] ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x1f0 [ 42.388403] ? __fdget+0x18/0x20 [ 42.388851] ? sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 [ 42.389472] ? SyS_setsockopt+0x17f/0x260 [ 42.390021] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe [ 42.390650] SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 [ 42.391103] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.391731] RIP: 0033:0x7fbbb711e383 [ 42.392217] RSP: 002b:00007ffff4d34f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 42.393235] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fbbb711e383 [ 42.394195] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffff4d34f60 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 42.395145] RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 00007ffff4d34f40 R09: 0000000000000018 [ 42.396056] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400aad [ 42.396598] R13: 0000000000000066 R14: 00007ffff4d34ee0 R15: 00007fbbb717af00 [ 42.397257] [ 42.397411] Allocated by task 3789: [ 42.397702] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 [ 42.398005] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 42.398267] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 [ 42.398548] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 [ 42.398848] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xcb/0x380 [ 42.399224] __kmalloc_reserve.isra.32+0x41/0xe0 [ 42.399654] __alloc_skb+0xf8/0x580 [ 42.400003] sock_wmalloc+0xab/0xf0 [ 42.400346] __ip6_append_data.isra.41+0x2472/0x33d0 [ 42.400813] ip6_append_data+0x1a8/0x2f0 [ 42.401122] rawv6_sendmsg+0x11ee/0x2db0 [ 42.401505] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500 [ 42.401860] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 [ 42.402209] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7cb/0x930 [ 42.402582] __sys_sendmsg+0xd9/0x190 [ 42.402941] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 [ 42.403273] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.403718] [ 42.403871] Freed by task 1794: [ 42.404146] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 [ 42.404515] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 42.404827] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 [ 42.405167] kfree+0xe8/0x2b0 [ 42.405462] skb_free_head+0x74/0xb0 [ 42.405806] skb_release_data+0x30e/0x3a0 [ 42.406198] skb_release_all+0x4a/0x60 [ 42.406563] consume_skb+0x113/0x2e0 [ 42.406910] skb_free_datagram+0x1a/0xe0 [ 42.407288] netlink_recvmsg+0x60d/0xe40 [ 42.407667] sock_recvmsg+0xd7/0x110 [ 42.408022] ___sys_recvmsg+0x25c/0x580 [ 42.408395] __sys_recvmsg+0xd6/0x190 [ 42.408753] SyS_recvmsg+0x2d/0x50 [ 42.409086] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe [ 42.409513] [ 42.409665] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88000969e780 [ 42.409665] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 [ 42.410846] The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of [ 42.410846] 512-byte region [ffff88000969e780, ffff88000969e980) [ 42.411941] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 42.412405] page:ffffea000025a780 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0 [ 42.413298] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head) [ 42.413729] raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800c000c [ 42.414387] raw: ffffea00002a9500 0000000900000007 ffff88000c401280 0000000000000000 [ 42.415074] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 42.415604] [ 42.415757] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 42.416222] ffff88000969e880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 42.416904] ffff88000969e900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 42.417591] >ffff88000969e980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 42.418273] ^ [ 42.418588] ffff88000969ea00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 42.419273] ffff88000969ea80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 42.419882] ================================================================== Reported-by:
Craig Gallek <kraig@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Johan Hovold authored
commit 30572418 upstream. This driver needlessly took another reference to the tty on open, a reference which was then never released on close. This lead to not just a leak of the tty, but also a driver reference leak that prevented the driver from being unloaded after a port had once been opened. Fixes: 4a90f09b ("tty: usb-serial krefs") Signed-off-by:
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Johan Hovold authored
commit 654b404f upstream. Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device. This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer buffer to user space. Fixes: 8c209e67 ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32") Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
commit 657831ff upstream. syzkaller found a way to trigger double frees from ip_mc_drop_socket() It turns out that leave a copy of parent mc_list at accept() time, which is very bad. Very similar to commit 8b485ce6 ("tcp: do not inherit fastopen_req from parent") Initial report from Pray3r, completed by Andrey one. Thanks a lot to them ! Signed-off-by:
Pray3r <pray3r.z@gmail.com> Reported-by:
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J. Bruce Fields authored
commit 13bf9fbf upstream. The NFSv2/v3 code does not systematically check whether we decode past the end of the buffer. This generally appears to be harmless, but there are a few places where we do arithmetic on the pointers involved and don't account for the possibility that a length could be negative. Add checks to catch these. Reported-by:
Tuomas Haanpää <thaan@synopsys.com> Reported-by:
Ari Kauppi <ari@synopsys.com> Reviewed-by:
NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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J. Bruce Fields authored
commit db44bac4 upstream. Use a couple shortcuts that will simplify a following bugfix. Signed-off-by:
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J. Bruce Fields authored
commit e6838a29 upstream. A client can append random data to the end of an NFSv2 or NFSv3 RPC call without our complaining; we'll just stop parsing at the end of the expected data and ignore the rest. Encoded arguments and replies are stored together in an array of pages, and if a call is too large it could leave inadequate space for the reply. This is normally OK because NFS RPC's typically have either short arguments and long replies (like READ) or long arguments and short replies (like WRITE). But a client that sends an incorrectly long reply can violate those assumptions. This was observed to cause crashes. Also, several operations increment rq_next_page in the decode routine before checking the argument size, which can leave rq_next_page pointing well past the end of the page array, causing trouble later in svc_free_pages. So, following a suggestion from Neil Brown, add a central check to enforce our expectation that no NFSv2/v3 call has both a large call and a large reply. As followup we may also want to rewrite the encoding routines to check more carefully that they aren't running off the end of the page array. We may also consider rejecting calls that have any extra garbage appended. That would be safer, and within our rights by spec, but given the age of our server and the NFS protocol, and the fact that we've never enforced this before, we may need to balance that against the possibility of breaking some oddball client. Reported-by:
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Dan Carpenter authored
commit ee0d8d84 upstream. We should call ipxitf_put() if the copy_to_user() fails. Reported-by:
李强 <liqiang6-s@360.cn> Signed-off-by:
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Amey Telawane authored
commit e09e2867 upstream. Strcpy is inherently not safe, and strlcpy() should be used instead. __trace_find_cmdline() uses strcpy() because the comms saved must have a terminating nul character, but it doesn't hurt to add the extra protection of using strlcpy() instead of strcpy(). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1493806274-13936-1-git-send-email-amit.pundir@linaro.orgSigned-off-by:
Amey Telawane <ameyt@codeaurora.org> [AmitP: Cherry-picked this commit from CodeAurora kernel/msm-3.10 https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-3.10/commit/?id=2161ae9a70b12cf18ac8e5952a20161ffbccb477] Signed-off-by:
Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org> [ Updated change log and removed the "- 1" from len parameter ] Signed-off-by:
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Herbert Xu authored
commit ef0579b6 upstream. The ahash API modifies the request's callback function in order to clean up after itself in some corner cases (unaligned final and missing finup). When the request is complete ahash will restore the original callback and everything is fine. However, when the request gets an EBUSY on a full queue, an EINPROGRESS callback is made while the request is still ongoing. In this case the ahash API will incorrectly call its own callback. This patch fixes the problem by creating a temporary request object on the stack which is used to relay EINPROGRESS back to the original completion function. This patch also adds code to preserve the original flags value. Fixes: ab6bf4e5 ("crypto: hash - Fix the pointer voodoo in...") Reported-by:
Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Tested-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by:
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Marek Vasut authored
commit d4a7a0fb upstream. The ahash_def_finup() can make use of the request save/restore functions, thus make it so. This simplifies the code a little and unifies the code paths. Note that the same remark about free()ing the req->priv applies here, the req->priv can only be free()'d after the original request was restored. Finally, squash a bug in the invocation of completion in the ASYNC path. In both ahash_def_finup_done{1,2}, the function areq->base.complete(X, err); was called with X=areq->base.data . This is incorrect , as X=&areq->base is the correct value. By analysis of the data structures, we see the areq is of type 'struct ahash_request' , areq->base is of type 'struct crypto_async_request' and areq->base.completion is of type crypto_completion_t, which is defined in include/linux/crypto.h as: typedef void (*crypto_completion_t)(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err); This is one lead that the X should be &areq->base . Next up, we can inspect other code which calls the completion callback to give us kind-of statistical idea of how this callback is used. We can try: $ git grep base\.complete\( drivers/crypto/ Finally, by inspecting ahash_request_set_callback() implementation defined in include/crypto/hash.h , we observe that the .data entry of 'struct crypto_async_request' is intended for arbitrary data, not for completion argument. Signed-off-by:
Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@freescale.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
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Marek Vasut authored
commit 1ffc9fbd upstream. The functions to save original request within a newly adjusted request and it's counterpart to restore the original request can be re-used by more code in the crypto/ahash.c file. Pull these functions out from the code so they're available. Signed-off-by:
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Marek Vasut authored
commit ab6bf4e5 upstream. Add documentation for the pointer voodoo that is happening in crypto/ahash.c in ahash_op_unaligned(). This code is quite confusing, so add a beefy chunk of documentation. Moreover, make sure the mangled request is completely restored after finishing this unaligned operation. This means restoring all of .result, .base.data and .base.complete . Also, remove the crypto_completion_t complete = ... line present in the ahash_op_unaligned_done() function. This type actually declares a function pointer, which is very confusing. Finally, yet very important nonetheless, make sure the req->priv is free()'d only after the original request is restored in ahash_op_unaligned_done(). The req->priv data must not be free()'d before that in ahash_op_unaligned_finish(), since we would be accessing previously free()'d data in ahash_op_unaligned_done() and cause corruption. Signed-off-by:
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Marek Vasut authored
commit 1d9a394b upstream. When finishing the ahash request, the ahash_op_unaligned_done() will call complete() on the request. Yet, this will not call the correct complete callback. The correct complete callback was previously stored in the requests' private data, as seen in ahash_op_unaligned(). This patch restores the correct complete callback and .data field of the request before calling complete() on it. Signed-off-by:
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Chris Salls authored
commit cf01fb99 upstream. In the case that compat_get_bitmap fails we do not want to copy the bitmap to the user as it will contain uninitialized stack data and leak sensitive data. Signed-off-by:
Chris Salls <salls@cs.ucsb.edu> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
commit c9f838d1 upstream. This fixes CVE-2017-7472. Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel memory by leaking thread keyrings: #include <keyutils.h> int main() { for (;;) keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING); } Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before. To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred() and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding keyring is already present. Fixes: d84f4f99 ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials") Signed-off-by:
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Andrey Konovalov authored
commit bcc5364b upstream. When calculating po->tp_hdrlen + po->tp_reserve the result can overflow. Fix by checking that tp_reserve <= INT_MAX on assign. Signed-off-by:
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Andrey Konovalov authored
commit 8f8d28e4 upstream. When calculating rb->frames_per_block * req->tp_block_nr the result can overflow. Add a check that tp_block_size * tp_block_nr <= UINT_MAX. Since frames_per_block <= tp_block_size, the expression would never overflow. Signed-off-by:
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Andrey Konovalov authored
commit 2b6867c2 upstream. Subtracting tp_sizeof_priv from tp_block_size and casting to int to check whether one is less then the other doesn't always work (both of them are unsigned ints). Compare them as is instead. Also cast tp_sizeof_priv to u64 before using BLK_PLUS_PRIV, as it can overflow inside BLK_PLUS_PRIV otherwise. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Dumazet authored
commit dc808110 upstream. af_packet can currently overwrite kernel memory by out of bound accesses, because it assumed a [new] block can always hold one frame. This is not generally the case, even if most existing tools do it right. This patch clamps too long frames as API permits, and issue a one time error on syslog. [ 394.357639] tpacket_rcv: packet too big, clamped from 5042 to 3966. macoff=82 In this example, packet header tp_snaplen was set to 3966, and tp_len was set to 5042 (skb->len) Signed-off-by:
Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by:
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